T. Vaiphei, J.:- In this review application, we are called upon to re-consider our judgment and order dated 7.4.2005 rendered in connection with WP(C) No. 51(SH) of 2003. The material facts giving rise to this application may be noticed at the very outset. The petitioner had filed an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act before the Cen­tral Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench being Original Application No. 152 of 2002 seeking for a direction for antedating the date of his promotion as Office Superintendent Higher Selection Grade-I ("OS HSG-I" for short) and consequential improvement in his seniority. His case is that he joined as Postal Clerk on 13.7.1965 in the Shillong Postal Division, was promoted to the post of Upper Division Clerk in the Office of the Post Master General, N.E. Circle, Shillong on 23.1.1973 and was further promoted to Lower Selection Grade Clerk with effect from 1.1.1988. Subsequently, he was given the benefit of Biennial Cadre Review promotion to Higher Selection Grade-H ("HSG-H") with effect from 26.6.1993. Following the retire­ment of the incumbent holding the post of Office Superintendent, Circle Office, Shillong on 31.8.1995, he was promoted as Office Superintendent, Shillong Circle in the scale of pay of Rs. 1,600-2,660-, which was the pay scale of-HSG-II and which was drawn by him in the earlier post, with effect from 1.9.1995. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of OS HSG-I in the pay scale of Rs. 6,500-10,500/- from the post of OS HSG-II vide Memo dated 22.5.2001: it was also conveyed therein that the post of OS HSG-II, Circle Office, Shillong was to be treated as upgraded to HSG-I from the date of his joining the post, which was in pursuance of the communications dated 30.3.2001 and dated 19.4.2001. It is also the case of the petitioner that he had already officiated in the higher post on three different occasions in 1994-95 prior to his regular promotion. 2. It is also the case of the petitioner that he had already officiated in the higher post on three different occasions in 1994-95 prior to his regular promotion. 2. According to the petitioner, as per the policy of the Government of India, the Presi­dent of India accorded sanction for creation of 208 posts of HSG-I by upgrading the posts of HSG-II, and as per the Staff Inspection Unit norms, there was justification for one post of Office Superintendent inN.E. Circle in the rank of HSG-I, but the respondent authori­ties in a most illegal fashion did not act as per the policy decision and delayed his up-gradation without any justifiable ground. The petitioner also assailed the provisional seniority list communicated vide Memo dated 25.9.2001 wherein his name was shown at the bottom of the list at serial No. 18 by show­ing him as Deputy Office Superintendent. By this communication addressed to the Chief Post Master General, NE Circle, Shillong, the Assistant Director General (SGP) intimated about the DPC meeting to be held for pro­motion to the grade of Assistant Director (Recct), GCS Group 'B" in the Department of Posts reserved for Office Superintendent working in the Circle Office. A list of officials who were likely to find place in the eligibility zone as enclosed in that communication is as per their seniority. The concerned officer was advised to forward the up-to-date CR dos­siers along with vigilance clearance of the of­ficials belonging to the Circle by a specified date. The application was filed by the peti­tioner seeking a direction to antedate his pro­motion to the post of HSG-I with effect from 1.9.1995 and to give consequential benefits including his seniority. The application was contested by the respondent authorities. 3. On the basis of the material on record, the Tribunal found that the petitioner was or­dered to be promoted to OS HSG-I cadre in terms of the order dated 22.5.2001; which itself showed that the post of OS HSG-II was to be treated as upgraded to HSG-I from the date of joining the post by the petitioner, that the Post Master General, NE Circle had ac­corded the creation of temporary post of Head Assistant (General) in the Circle Of­fice, Shillong in the pay scale of Rs. 550-7507 -, and following the creation of the post of Head Assistant (General), the Post Master General had also ordered the up-gradation of the post of Office Superintendent, Circle Office, Shillong to HSG-I in the pay scale of Rs. 700-900 with immediate effect where­upon the post of Office Superintendent with the pay scale of Rs. 500-750- stood abolished; that by the communication dated 29.3.1985, the Office of the Post Master General communicated the order of approval of the Post Master General for making the posts of Office Superintendent, Circle Office, Shillong and Head Assistant, Shi Hong perma­nent and that in the gradation list of the offi­cials of the Office of the Post Master Gen­eral, NE Circle, which was corrected up to 1.7.1986, the post of Office Superintendent with the pay scale of Rs. 700-900 was shown vacant. On making comparative reading of the communication dated 6.11.1995 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Com­munication, Department of Posts, the com­munication dated 30.3.2001 issued by the same Ministry addressed to all Heads of the Postal Circles and the written instructions re­ceived by the learned counsel for the respon­dent authorities, the Tribunal recorded the findings that the written instructions went counter to the policy enunciated in Memo dated 19.5.1981 and Memo dated 29.3.1985 and that the petitioner was eligible for up-gradation to the post of HSG-I in terms of the communication dated 6.11.1995, which also indicated the existence of vacancies and that except for three places mentioned therein, the concerned officials were given up-grada­tion to the higher scales in all other Circles. According to the Tribunal, the respondent authorities did not assign any reason for not considering the petitioner for his up-grada­tion to the higher scale, which is violative of his constitutional right guaranteed under Ar­ticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, and when he was found fit for promotion on up-gradation by the competent authority in May, 2001, he ought to have been promoted with effect from 1995 in terms of the com­munication dated 6.11.1995, which exercise, as per the departmental communication, was to be completed by 1.12.1995. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the Tribunal allowed the application and directed the respondent authorities to antedate the promotion/up-gra-dation of the petitioner to the post of Office Supeintendent HSG-I, at least, with effect from 1.12.1995, which is the date on which the respondents were ordered to complete the exercise of such up-gradation. Aggrieved by this judgment and order, the respondent authorities filed a writ petition being WP(C) No. 51 (SH) of 2003 before this Court. This Court did not find merit in the writ petition and dismissed the same. However, while dis­missing the writ petition, this Court made the following observations at paragraphs 10,11 and 12, which prompted the petitioner to file this review petition: "10. The provisional seniority list of Office Superintendent HSG-I/Office Superintendent HSG-II for consideration of the post of Assis­tant Director (Recruitment) GCS Group 'B' as on 1.1.2001 annexed as Annexure-II to the writ petition would abundantly show that the re­spondent was placed at serial No. 18 being an incumbent from North East showing him as Deputy Office Superintendent where in fact he was appointed as Office Superintendent HSG-II with effect from 1.9.95 on regular basis. Bear­ing in mind this provisional seniority list, we can unhesitatingly say that on the issuance of Circular dated 6.11.95, the respondent's case ought to have been considered for up-grada­tion to the post of Office Superintendent HSG-I but the same was not done in the instant case for the reason best known to the authorities. At this stage, it is stated at the Bar by learned coun­sel for the parties, that by this time the respon­dent had already retired by 31.3.2005 as evident from the provisional seniority list mentioned above wherein his date of birth was shown as 6.3.1945 and, as such, the respondent may be given only up-gradation for getting the retiral benefit. 11. In view of what has been observed and indicated, this Court is of the view that on con­sideration of the attenting facts and circum­stances of the case, the impugned order does not suffer from any error on law, and accord­ingly, we are disinclined to upset the same. 12. In the result, this writ petition fails and stands dismissed." 4. 11. In view of what has been observed and indicated, this Court is of the view that on con­sideration of the attenting facts and circum­stances of the case, the impugned order does not suffer from any error on law, and accord­ingly, we are disinclined to upset the same. 12. In the result, this writ petition fails and stands dismissed." 4. The respondent authorities, purportedly in compliance with the aforesaid order of this Court, issued the following order: "Department of Posts: India Office of the Chief Postmaster General, North East Circle, Shillong Memo No.: Staff/158-8/2001(1) Dated at Shillong, the 7th December, 2005 In pursuance of Postal Directorate D.O. No. 4-14/2003-SPBII dated 25.11.2005 in compliance of Learned Gauhati High Court, Shillong Bench judgment order dated 07.04.2005 in case No. WP(C) No. 51 (SH) 2003 upholding the Hon'ble CAT/Guwahati Bench judgment order dated 02.12.2003 in OA No. 152 of 2002 filed by Shri Tapan Kumar Dutta Roy, Office Superintendent, Circle Officer, Shillong (retired on superannua­tion on 31.03.2005 A/N), the Chief Postmaster General, North East Circle, Shillong has been pleased to issue the order as follows:- Order The order of promotion of Shri Tapan Kumar Dutta Roy, Office Superintendent, Circle Office, Shillong (retired on superannuation on 31.03.2005 A/N) to the grade of HSG-I issued vide this office memo No. Staff/9-4/OS(CO)/2001 dated 22.05.2001 will be effective fromOl. 12.1995 as directed by the above mentioned Learned Court. Sd/- (Lalhluna) Chief Postmaster General, North East Circle, Shillong-793001." 5. We have minutely gone through the judgment and order passed by the Tribunal and the pleadings of the petitioner before the Tribunal injuxtaposition, and are of the view that the Tribunal undoubtedly allowed the application of the petitioner and held that he was entitled for antedating his promotion/up-gradation to the post of Office Superintendent HSG-I on and from at least 1.12.1995, the date on which the respondents were or­dered to complete the exercise of up-grada-tion in terms of the communication dated 6.11.1995. In the application filed before the Tribunal, the petitioner specifically prayed for payment of the pre-revised pay scale of Rs. 2,000-3,2007- with effect from 1.12.1995 to 31.12.1995 and in the revised pay scale of Rs. 6,500-10,500/- with effect from 1.1.1996 to 21.5.2001. In the application filed before the Tribunal, the petitioner specifically prayed for payment of the pre-revised pay scale of Rs. 2,000-3,2007- with effect from 1.12.1995 to 31.12.1995 and in the revised pay scale of Rs. 6,500-10,500/- with effect from 1.1.1996 to 21.5.2001. However, the order dated 7.4.2005 dismissing the writ petition of the respondent authorities passed by us with the observation that following his retirement on 31.3.2005, the petitioner (the respondent therein) might be given only up-gradation for getting the retiral benefit, apparently created confusion and afforded an opportunity to the respondent authorities to deny the salary ar­rears to the petitioner with effect from 1.12.1995. In our reconsideration of the en­tire facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that our observation that the peti­tioner might be given only up-gradation for the purpose of retiral benefits on the ground he had retired from service on 31.3.2005, is unwarranted and wholly erroneous. Having dismissed the writ petition, the retirement of the petitioner from service cannot deprive him of his salary arrears, which are legitimately due to him, and which logically flows from the dismissal of the writ petition filed by the respondent authorities. Once the writ petition was dismissed and the relief granted by the Tribunal was, therefore, not interferred with by us, there is no earthly reason to deny the petitioner the benefit of his salary arrears, which he was held entitled to, on his promotion/up-gradation to the post of Office Superintendent HSG-I with effect from 1.12.1995. It is, however, the contention of Mr. S.C. Shyam, the learned CGC, appear­ing for the respondent authorities, that once this Court has held that the petitioner might be given only up-gradation for getting the retiral benefit, which has now attained final­ity, the issue cannot be re-opened by the pe­titioner by filing this review application: if he is so aggieved, he ought to have preferred an appeal before the Apex Court in terms of the direction of this Court contained in the judg­ment and order dated 7.4.2005, the respon­dent authorities issued the compliance order which is at Annexure-Il, for which the peti­tioner cannot have any legitimate grievance. Furthermore, contends the learned CGC, this is not a case of discovery of new evidence, which could not be produced by the petitioner at the time of passing the order sought to be reviewed despite exercise of due diligence nor is it a case of error apparent on the face of the record and, therefore, the review appli­cation is not maintainable. 6. We have given our anxious consider­ation to the submissions of the learned CGC, but we are unable to agree with him. On re­consideration of our judgment sought to be reviewed, we think that we have made an erroneous assumption of fact that following the retirement of the petitioner from service, he became entitled to up-gadation to the post of HSG-I only for the purpose of getting retiral benefit, and have in the process denied him of the salary arrears legitimately due to him. This is the unfortunate result of the erroneous view taken by us. Actus curiae neminem gravabit ("an act of the Court shall prejudice no man"). That the petitioner had already re­tired from service on 31.5.2005 cannot be a ground for denying the salary arrears due to him in terms of the judgment and order of the Tribunal. It is the duty of this Court to rectify, revise and re-call its orders as and when it is brought to its notice that certain of its orders were passed on a wrong and mistaken as­sumption of facts and that implementation of those orders would cause grave prejudice to the petitioner, for which he cannot be faulted. It is thus a case of an error or mistake appar­ent on the face of record. The Apex Court in S. Nagaraj Vs. State of Karnataka: 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595, para 36 observed: "It is the duty of the Court to rectify, revise and recall its orders as and when it is brought to its notice that certain of its orders were passed on a wrong or mistaken assumption of facts and that implementation of those orders would have serious consequences. An act of Court should prejudice none. 'Of all these things respecting which learned men dispute', said Cicero, 'there is none more important than clearly to understand that we are born for jus­tice and that right is founded not in opinion but in nature'. This very idea was echoed by James Madison (The Federalist, No. 51, p. 352). An act of Court should prejudice none. 'Of all these things respecting which learned men dispute', said Cicero, 'there is none more important than clearly to understand that we are born for jus­tice and that right is founded not in opinion but in nature'. This very idea was echoed by James Madison (The Federalist, No. 51, p. 352). He said: 'Justice is the end of Government. It is the end of the civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued, until it obtained or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." 7. A case of an error apparent on the face of record is best illustrated by the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Lakhsmi Vs. Meenakshi Ammal reported in AIR 1984 Mad 10 . That was a case where the plaintiff instituted a suit for partition and possession and mesne profits. Court fee was paid under Section 37(2) Court-Fees Act on the basis of the plaintiff being in constructive joint possession and not actual possession. The trial Court found that the vendor of the plaintiff had title to one-third share in the property and that the respondent was entitled to the remaining two-third. It was also found that a dispute was going on be­tween the plaintiff and the respondent regarding possession of the property and that the respondent cannot claim to have totally ex­cluded the plaintiff from the joint possession of the property. In this view, the payment of Court-fee under Section 37(2) of the Court-Fees Act was held to be correct. While grant­ing a preliminary decree for partition in favour of the plaintiff directing the division of the suit property into three equal shares and the al­lotment of one such share to her, the learned subordinate Judge left open the question of mesne profits to be decided in a separate enquiry under Order 20 Rule 12 CPC. The matter was taken to appeal before the learned District Judge, which, while upholding the decree granted in favour of the plaintiff, held that the order of the trial Court that the deter­mination of future mesne profits was left open to be decided in a separate enquiry under Order 20, Rule 12, CPC, was not correct. The second appeal filed by the respondent was also dismissed. The plaintiff thereafter filed LA. The second appeal filed by the respondent was also dismissed. The plaintiff thereafter filed LA. 148 of 1980 in A.S. 154 of 1977, pur­porting to be one under Order 47, Rule 1 and 3, CPC, praying for a review of the judg­ment of the learned District Judge on the ground that the respondent had admitted hav­ing rented out portions of the suit house to strangers and the collection of rents there from and as such, the claims for those profits from the date of suit will fall under Order 20, Rule 18, CPC and that owing to erroneous as­sumption and error apparent on the face of record, the relief of mesne profits had been deleted and, therefore, that should again be provided for by reviewing the judgment im­pugned therein. The learned Single Judge held that the lower appellate Court when it pro­ceeded to delete the decree granting the re­lief of mesne profits in favour of the plaintiff had proceeded on the assumption that the plaintiff was in joint possession of the property by which it understood that such pos­session was also physical possession of the property and, therefore, no question of pay­ment of mesne profits would arise under Or­der 20, Rule 12 CPC, that the case would be governed by Order 20, Rule 18, CPC and that in the absence of any finding by the Court below to the effect that the plaintiff was in physical possession of the property or least her share thereof, the plaintiff could not have been deprived of the relief of mesne profits. The learned Single Judge observed towards the end paragraph 4 of the judgment: "........It is thus obvious that what the peti­tioner in effect claims is only the correction by way of review of an erroneous decree resulting from the wrong assumption on the part of the lower appellate Court which had absolutely no basis whatever either on evidence or even on the basis of the findings recorded in the course of the proceedings. In other words, plainly the present case is one where the lower appellate Court proceeded to delete the decree for mesne profits on a totally erroneous assumption of a fact which as stated earlier had absolutely no existence. In other words, plainly the present case is one where the lower appellate Court proceeded to delete the decree for mesne profits on a totally erroneous assumption of a fact which as stated earlier had absolutely no existence. Consequently, the decree deleting the mesne profits earlier granted as a result of an erroneous assumption on the part of the lower appellate Court is one vitiated by an error ap­parent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the review jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 and 3, CPC. In this view, the order of the Court below declining to review the judgment is set aside and the petitioner will be entitled to a decree for mesne profits from the date of suit till the date of delivery of pos­session under Order 20, Rule 18 CPC which is directed to be relegated to a separate enquiry. The civil revision is therefore allowed with costs." 8. That apart, there is no prohibition on a party applying for clarification, if the order is not clear and the party against whom it has been made is trying to take advantage be­cause the order is couched in ambiguous or equivocal words. No doubt, a party is not entitled to a review of a judgment merely for the purpose of re-hearing and a fresh deci­sion of the case. When the proceedings stand terminated by final disposal of the writ peti­tion, it is not open to the Court to re-open the proceedings by means of miscellaneous ap­plication in respect of a matter which pro­vides fresh cause of action. If this principle is not followed, there would be confusion and chaos and finality of proceedings would cease to have any meaning. However, in a miscella­neous application, if no fresh relief, on the basis of a new cause of action, had been sought, it is open to the Court to re-open the proceed­ings. This position was explained by the Apex Court in the latest decision reported in (2009) 2 SCC164, K.A. Ansari&Anr. Vs. Indian Airlines Ltd. That was a case where the ap­pellant was one of the petitioners before the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi. This position was explained by the Apex Court in the latest decision reported in (2009) 2 SCC164, K.A. Ansari&Anr. Vs. Indian Airlines Ltd. That was a case where the ap­pellant was one of the petitioners before the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi. The learned Single Judge disposed of appellant's writ petition, inter alia, holding that "he would be entitled to be posted to a post in equivalent scale held by (him) when the let­ter dated 23.4.2003 was issued". The learned Single Judge further held that if as a result of this direction, the appellant was to be put in a post of higher grade, arrears of pay and al­lowance would also be paid to him within a specified time. Pursuant to that direction, the appellant who was in the pay scale of Rs. 6,200-8025 was placed in the pay scale of Rs. 5675-8025 and his pay in his previous pay scale was protected in the new pay scale according to the directions of the learned Single Judge. The appellant objected to his placement in the pay scale of Rs. 5675-8025 on the ground that it was not a pay scale equivalent to his previous pay scale of Rs. 6200-8025 but was a lower pay scale. The appellant therefore moved a miscellaneous application seeking a direction that he should be placed in the equivalent pay scale of Deputy Manager. The respondent Airlines' stand was that maximum of both the pay scales were the same, i.e. Rs.8025/-, and appellant's pay in the previous pay scale was also protected while placing him in the new pay scale. The learned Single Judge disposed of the miscellaneous application by directing the respondent Airlines to place appellant in the pay scale of Rs. 6200-8025 as he could not be placed in a lower pay scale. The learned Single Judge further clarified that if the pay scale of Rs. 6200-8025 was not available, the petitioner would have to be placed in the next higher grade. However, on appeal, the Division Bench held that after disposal of the writ petition, miscellaneous application was not maintainable and therefore the order on the miscellaneous application was without ju­risdiction. Allowing the special leave petition, the top Court observed: "19. 6200-8025 was not available, the petitioner would have to be placed in the next higher grade. However, on appeal, the Division Bench held that after disposal of the writ petition, miscellaneous application was not maintainable and therefore the order on the miscellaneous application was without ju­risdiction. Allowing the special leave petition, the top Court observed: "19. Having bestowed our anxious consid­eration on the rival submissions, we are of the opinion that keeping in view the terms of the final order dated 11.10.2004, the miscellaneous application could not be said to be founded on a separate or fresh cause of action so as to fall foul of the aforesaid legal position viz. on termi­nation of proceeding by final disposal of writ petition, it is not open to the Court to re-open the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which pro­vided fresh cause of action. 20. It is manifest that in Direction (ii), the learned Single Judge had clearly indicated that the writ petitioners would be entitled "to be posted to a post in equivalent scale held by them when the letter dated 23.4.2003 was is­sued". The respondent Airlines was obliged to obey and implement the said direction. If they had any doubt or if the order was not clear, it was always open to them to approach the Court for clarification of the said order. Without chal­lenging the said direction or seeking clarifica­tion, Indian Airlines could not circumvent the same on any ground whatsoever. Difficulty in implementation of an order passed by the Court, howsoever grave its effect may be, is no an-swer for its non-implementation. 21. In our opinion, in the miscellaneous ap­plication, no relief, on the basis of a new cause of action, had been sought. It was an applica­tion filed for pursuing and getting implemented the relief granted in the writ petition, namely, placement in appropriate grade in which he was placed at the time when the letter dated 23.4.2003, was issued. This was precisely done by the learned Single Judge vide his order dated 4.3.2005. 22. It was an applica­tion filed for pursuing and getting implemented the relief granted in the writ petition, namely, placement in appropriate grade in which he was placed at the time when the letter dated 23.4.2003, was issued. This was precisely done by the learned Single Judge vide his order dated 4.3.2005. 22. Without examining those factual aspects of the matter, in our judgment, the Division Bench was in error in holding that after the dis­posal of the writ petitions, miscellaneous appli­cation was not maintainable and the only rem­edy available to the applicant was to approach the authorities and if his interpretation was not acceptable to them, then he could file a fresh writ petition." 9. In our opinion, the relief of back wages denied by us on the sole ground that the pe­titioner had retired from service when the order sought to be reviewed was passed by us, appears to be unjustified and unwarranted on the facts and circumstances of this case. Once the petitioner was found to be entitled to up-gradation to the post of Office Super­intendent HSG-1 with effect from 1.12.1995, which post minus the pay scale of HSG-I he was holding hitherto, it would be irrational to deny him the relief of back wages: it was not a case of retrospective up-gradation per se, but he was admittedly discharging the post of Office Superinten­dent HSG-II with the same responsibility as Office Superintendent HSG-I. When this Court, being under a misapprehension as to the actual relief claimed by the petitioner, proceeded to deny the relief legitimately due to him, it will be either a case of error/mis­take apparent on the face of record thereby warranting a review of the order sought to be reviewed or a case for issuing clarifica­tion without requiring him to file a fresh writ petition when no fresh relief, on the basis of a new cause of action, is sought for. There­fore, in any view of the matter, there is ab­solutely no reason to deny the petitioner the relief of back wages in respect of the post of HSG-I with effect from 1.12.1995 to 21.5.2001. 10. The upshot of the foregoing discus­sion is that this review petition is allowed. We accordingly recall the portion of our judgment and order dated 7.1.2005 holding that the petitioner might be even up-gradation only for getting the retiral benefit. 10. The upshot of the foregoing discus­sion is that this review petition is allowed. We accordingly recall the portion of our judgment and order dated 7.1.2005 holding that the petitioner might be even up-gradation only for getting the retiral benefit. The remaining judgment and order sought to be reviewed shall remain intact. The respondent authori­ties are directed to pay to the petitioner the back salary arrears in terms of the pay scale of HSG-I with effect from 1.12.1995 till 21.5.2001 without any loss of time and posi­tively within two months from the date of re­ceipt of this judgment and order. However, the parties are directed to bear their respec­tive costs.