S. P. MEHROTRA, J. The present Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, interalia, praying for quashing the order dated 20. 10. 2005 (Annexure-17 to the Writ Petition) passed by the Board of Directors, Vidur Gramin Bank, Bijnor (respondent no. 3) and the order dated 18. 12. 2004 (Annexure-15 to the Writ Petition) passed by the Chairman/disciplinary Authority, Vidur Gramin Bank, Bijnor (respondent no. 2), and further praying for placing back the petitioner on his post with all benefits and salary. 2. It appears that the petitioner was posted as Branch Manager in Vidur Gramin Bank, Kotkadar, Bijnor in the month of December, 2000. On 24. 12. 2001, the petitioner was transferred from Vidur Gramin Bank, Kotkadar, Bijnor to the Head Office of the Bank at Bijnor. 3. The petitioner was placed under suspension by the order dated 15. 2. 2002 (Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition) on the ground of alleged irregularities. The petitioner thereupon filed a Writ Petition before this Court being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10577 of 2002, and this Court by an interim order dated 11. 3. 2002 stayed the operation of the said suspension order dated 15. 2. 2002, but permitted the enquiry to go on. Copy of the said interim order dated 11. 3. 2002 has been filed as Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition. 4. Thereafter, the petitioner was issued a show-cause notice dated 14. 5. 2002, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-3 to the Writ Petition. 5. In the month of May, 2002, the petitioner was transferred from the Head Office, Bijnor to Vidur Gramin Bank, Pavati. 6. A chargesheet dated 14. 6. 2002 was thereafter issued to the petitioner levelling three charges against the petitioner. Copy of the said chargesheet dated 14. 6. 2002 has been filed as Annexure-6 to the Writ Petition. 7. It further appears that the petitioner gave his reply dated 22. 6. 2002 to the said show-cause notice dated 14. 5. 2002. Copy of the said reply dated 22. 6. 2002 has been filed as Annexure-7 to the Writ Petition. 8. Further, the petitioner gave his reply dated 3. 7. 2002 to the said chargesheet dated 14. 6. 2002. Copy of the said reply dated 3. 7. 2002 has been filed as Annexure-8 to the Writ Petition. 9. It further appears that by the order dated 6. 7. 6. 2002 has been filed as Annexure-7 to the Writ Petition. 8. Further, the petitioner gave his reply dated 3. 7. 2002 to the said chargesheet dated 14. 6. 2002. Copy of the said reply dated 3. 7. 2002 has been filed as Annexure-8 to the Writ Petition. 9. It further appears that by the order dated 6. 7. 2002 the Chairman/disciplinary Authority (respondent no. 2) appointed an Inquiry Officer to hold enquiry in regard to the charges levelled against the petitioner, as contained in the said chargesheet dated 14. 6. 2002. Copy of the said order dated 6. 7. 2002 has been filed as Annexure-9 to the Writ Petition. 10. The Inquiry Officer submitted his Enquiry Report dated 29. 5. 2003, copy whereof was sent to the petitioner by the Chairman/disciplinary Authority by communication dated 1. 7. 2003 giving opportunity to the petitioner to represent against the said Enquiry Report. Copy of the said Communication dated 1. 7. 2003 alongwith copy of the said Enquiry Report dated 29. 5. 2003 has been filed as Annexure-10 to the Writ Petition. 11. It may be mentioned that the Inquiry Officer in his said Enquiry Report concluded that Charge No. 1 and Charge No. 2 were proved against the petitioner while Charge No. 3 was partially proved. 12. In response to the said Communication dated 1. 7. 2003, the petitioner submitted his representation dated 28. 7. 2003 raising various objections to the said Enquiry Report dated 29. 5. 2003. Copy of the said representation dated 28. 7. 2003 has been filed as Annexure-11 to the Writ Petition. 13. The Chairman/disciplinary Authority (respondent no. 2) thereupon passed an order dated 20. 11. 2004, interalia, concluding that Charge No. 1, Charge No. 2 and Charge No. 3 were proved against the petitioner. In consequence of the said conclusions, the Chairman/disciplinary Authority proposed the punishment of recovery from the petitioner and the compulsory retirement of the petitioner and further proposed that the petitioner would not be paid any salary for the suspension period excepting suspension allowance. The said order dated 20. 11. 2004 further gave opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the aforesaid proposed punishments. Copy of the said order dated 20. 11. 2004 alongwith copy of the communication dated 20. 11. 2004 sent to the petitioner has been filed as Annexure-12 to the Writ Petition. 14. The said order dated 20. 11. 2004 further gave opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the aforesaid proposed punishments. Copy of the said order dated 20. 11. 2004 alongwith copy of the communication dated 20. 11. 2004 sent to the petitioner has been filed as Annexure-12 to the Writ Petition. 14. In response to the said show-cause notice as contained in the said order dated 20. 11. 2004, it appears that the petitioner placed his version before the Chairman/disciplinary Authority on 14. 12. 2004. Thereafter by the order dated 18. 12. 2004, the Chairman/disciplinary Authority confirmed the aforesaid proposed punishments against the petitioner. Copy of the said order dated 18. 12. 2004 alongwith its accompanying communication has been filed as Annexure-15 to the Writ Petition. 15. It further appears that the petitioner thereafter filed an Appeal under Regulation 47 of the Vidur Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2001 (hereinafter also referred to as "the Service Regulations, 2001" ). Copy of the memorandum of Appeal has been filed as Annexure-16 to the Writ Petition. 16. By the Communication dated 20. 10. 2005, the petitioner was communicated the decision of the Board of Directors, Vidur Gramin Bank (respondent no. 3) by its order dated 18. 10. 2005 regarding the dismissal of the said Appeal filed by the petitioner. The extract of the order dated 18. 10. 2005 passed by the Board of Directors, Vidur Gramin Bank (respondent no. 3) was reproduced in the said Communication dated 20. 10. 2005. Copy of the said Communication dated 20. 10. 2005 has been filed as Annexure-17 to the Writ Petition. 17. Counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have been exchanged between the parties. 18. It may be mentioned that copy of the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005 passed by the Board of Directors, Vidur Gramin Bank (respondent no. 3) has been filed as Annexure-CA-1 to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. It may further be mentioned that pursuant to the orders passed by this Court, the relevant records including those pertaining to the proceedings of the Board of Directors, Vidur Gramin Bank (respondent no. 3) held on 18. 10. 2005 have been produced before the Court by the learned counsel for the respondents, and we have perused the same. 19. It may further be mentioned that pursuant to the orders passed by this Court, the relevant records including those pertaining to the proceedings of the Board of Directors, Vidur Gramin Bank (respondent no. 3) held on 18. 10. 2005 have been produced before the Court by the learned counsel for the respondents, and we have perused the same. 19. We have heard S/shri D. C. Mathur and Vikas Budhwar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Dharmendra Vaish, learned counsel for the respondents, and perused the record. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made the following two submissions: 1. The Chairman (respondent no. 2), who was the Disciplinary Authority and imposed punishment on the petitioner, sat in the meeting of the Board of Directors (respondent no. 3) when the Appeal of the petitioner was considered on 18. 10. 2005 and was dismissed by the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005. Thus, the decision of the Board of Directors ( respondent no. 3) was vitiated by bias. 2. The decision of the Board of Directors dated 18. 10. 2005 as contained in the Communication dated 20. 10. 2005 did not give reasons for dismissing the Appeal of the petitioner, and therefore, the order/resolution of the Board of Directors was vitiated. Referring in this regard to Regulations 47, 48 and 49 of the Service Regulations, 2001, it is submitted that on a correct construction of the provisions of the said Regulations, it was incumbent on the Appellate Authority (Board of Directors- respondent no. 3) to record its reasons for dismissing the Appeal of the petitioner. 21. It is further submitted that even on the general principles of natural justice, the Appellate Authority is required to record its reasons for its decision in regard to the Appeal. 22. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the following decisions: 1. Amar Nath Chaudhary Vs. Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. and others, (2002) 2 SCC 290 . 2. Ram Chander Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 1173 : (1986) 3 SCC 103 . 3. Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem and others Vs. Madhusudhan Rao, 2008 AIR SCW 1365. 4. Cyril Lasrado (dead) by Lrs. & others Vs. Juliana Maria Lasrado & another, (2004) 7 SCC 431 : AIR 2005 SC 1367 . 23. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondents has made the following submissions: 1. The Chairman/disciplinary Authority (respondent no. 3. Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem and others Vs. Madhusudhan Rao, 2008 AIR SCW 1365. 4. Cyril Lasrado (dead) by Lrs. & others Vs. Juliana Maria Lasrado & another, (2004) 7 SCC 431 : AIR 2005 SC 1367 . 23. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondents has made the following submissions: 1. The Chairman/disciplinary Authority (respondent no. 2)went out of the meeting of the Board of Directors when the Appeal of the petitioner was to be considered, and the remaining present members unanimously appointed S. K. Rai, Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, Meerut as the Chairman of the meeting. This is evident from a perusal of the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure CA-1 to the counter affidavit. In the circumstances, the decision of the Board of Directors cannot be said to be vitiated on the ground of bias. 2. The decision of the Board of Directors, as contained in the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005 was an order of affirmance of the decision of the Disciplinary Authority, and keeping in view the said aspect, sufficient reasons have been indicated in the said order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005 of the Board of Directors for dismissing the Appeal of the petitioner. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the following decisions: 1. Tara Chand Khatri Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others, AIR 1977 SC 567 . 2. Ram Chander Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 1173 (supra ). 3. S. N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 . 4. State Bank of India, Bhopal Vs. S. S. Koshal, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 468. 5. National Fertilizers Ltd. and another Vs. P. K. Khanna, AIR 2005 SC 3742 : 2005 AIR SCW 4333. 6. Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, AIR 2006 SC 1748 : (2006) 4 SCC 713 . 24. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 25. Let us consider the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, namely, that the decision of the Board of Directors (respondent no. 3) was vitiated by bias. 26. As is evident from the facts narrated above, the Chairman, Vidur Gramin Bank (respondent no. 2) as the Disciplinary Authority passed the punishment order against the petitioner. 25. Let us consider the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, namely, that the decision of the Board of Directors (respondent no. 3) was vitiated by bias. 26. As is evident from the facts narrated above, the Chairman, Vidur Gramin Bank (respondent no. 2) as the Disciplinary Authority passed the punishment order against the petitioner. Against the order of the Chairman/disciplinary Authority, the petitioner filed an Appeal before the Board of Directors, Vidur Gramin Bank (respondent no. 3 ). 27. When the Appeal of the petitioner was to be taken-up for consideration in the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 18. 10. 2005, the Chairman/disciplinary Authority (respondent no. 2) went out of the meeting, and the remaining present members unanimously appointed Shri S. K. Rai, Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, Meerut as Chairman of the meeting. Thereafter, the Appeal of the petitioner was considered by the Board of Directors, and the same was dismissed. 28. The said facts are evident from a perusal of the order/resolution passed by the Board of Directors on 18. 10. 2005, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-CA-1 to the counter affidavit. Relevant portion of the said order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005 is as under: 29. As noted above, the relevant records including the proceedings of the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 18. 10. 2005 have been produced before us by the learned counsel for the respondents, and we have perused the same. It is evident from the said records that copy of the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005, filed as Annexure-CA-1 to the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the respondents, is a correct copy of the original order/resolution. 30. In view of the above, it is evident that the Chairman/disciplinary Authority (respondent no. 2) abstained from attending the meeting of the Board of Directors when the Appeal of the petitioner was considered, and the same was presided over by Shri S. K. Rai, Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, Meerut. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Board of Directors as contained in the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005 cannot be said to be vitiated on the ground of bias. 31. As regards the decision in Amar Nath Chowdhury Vs. Braithwaite & Co. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Board of Directors as contained in the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005 cannot be said to be vitiated on the ground of bias. 31. As regards the decision in Amar Nath Chowdhury Vs. Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. and others, AIR 2002 SC 678 : (2002) 2 SCC 290 , relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the facts of the case were as narrated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the said AIR, which are reproduced below: "2. The appellant herein was an employee of Braithwaite and Company Limited, Calcutta, a Government of India Undertaking (hereinafter referred to as the Company ). It appears that certain misconduct committed by the appellant came to the notice of the Company. With the result, the Company decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant, herein. Consequently, the appellant was served with a charge-sheet to which he gave an explanation. An Inquiry Committee constituted for that purpose after making an enquiry, found the charges levelled against the appellant proved. The Inquiry Committee accordingly submitted its report to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority, who was the then Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company accepted the report submitted by the Inquiry Committee and he, by order dated 13-2-1984, removed the appellant from service. 3. Under the regulations framed by the Company, an appeal against an order of the Disciplinary Authority lies before the Board of Directors of the Company (hereinafter referred to as the "board" ). The appellant preferred an appeal against the order of his removal from service before the Board. It is not disputed that Shri S. Krishnaswami, who was then the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company and who, in his capacity as the Disciplinary Authority, removed the appellant from service presided over and participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board. The Board by order dated 31-8-1984, dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant by a non-speaking order. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Calcutta High Court. A learned single Judge of the High Court after having found defect in the proceedings, set aside the order of removal passed against the appellant. The Company filed a Letters Patent Appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Calcutta High Court. A learned single Judge of the High Court after having found defect in the proceedings, set aside the order of removal passed against the appellant. The Company filed a Letters Patent Appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench found the order and judgment of the Learned Single Judge as erroneous and in that view of the matter, the order passed by the learned Single Judge was set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant stood dismissed. It is against the said judgment and order of the High Court, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 32. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal of the delinquent employee and opined as under (paragraphs 6 and 8 of the said AIR): "6. One of the principles of natural justice is that no person shall be a judge in his own cause or the adjudicating authority must be impartial and must act without any kind of bias. The said rule against bias has its origin from the maxim known as nemo Debet Esse Judex in Propria Causa, which is based on the principle that justice not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. This could be possible only when a Judge or an adjudicating authority decides the matter impartially and without carrying any kind of bias. Bias may be of different kinds and forms. It may be pecuniary, personal or there may be bias as to the subject-matter etc. In the present case, we are not concerned with any of the aforesaid forms of bias. What we are concerned with in the present case is whether an authority can sit in appeal against its own order passed in the capacity of Disciplinary Authority. In Financial Commissioner (Taxation), Punjab and others v. Harbhajan Singh, (1996) 9 SCC 281 , it was held that the Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to sit over the order passed by him as an Appellate Authority. In the present case, the subject-matter of appeal before the Board was whether the order of removal passed by the Disciplinary Authority was in conformity with law. In the present case, the subject-matter of appeal before the Board was whether the order of removal passed by the Disciplinary Authority was in conformity with law. It is not disputed that Shri S. Krishnaswami, the then Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company acted as a Disciplinary Authority as well as an Appellate Authority when he presided over and participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board while deciding the appeal of the appellant. Such a dual function is not permissible on account of established rule against bias. In a situation where such a dual function is discharged by one and the same authority, unless permitted by an act of legislation or statutory provision, the same would be contrary to rule against bias. Where an authority earlier had taken a decision, he is disqualified to sit in appeal against his own decision, as he already pre-judged the matter otherwise such an appeal would be termed an appeal from Caesar to Caesar and filing of an appeal would be an exercise in futility. In that view of the matter, in the present case, fair play demanded that Shri Krishnaswami, the then Chairman- cum-Managing Director of the Company ought not to have participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board when the Board heard and decided the appeal of the appellant. 8. In view of the aforesaid definition of the expression board, the Board could have constituted a Committee of the Board/management or any officers of the Company by excluding the Chairman-cum- Managing Director of the Company and delegated any of its powers, including the appellate power, to such a committee to eliminate any allegation of bias against such an appellate authority. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that the rule against bias is not available in the present case in view of the doctrine of necessity. We are, therefore, of the view that reliance of the doctrine of necessity in the present case is totally misplaced. " (Emphasis supplied) 33. The facts of the above case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the above case, the Chairman-cum-Managing Director acted as the Disciplinary Authority as well as the 0 Appellate Authority when he presided over and participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board (Appellate Authority) while deciding the Appeal of the appellant (delinquent employee ). In the above case, the Chairman-cum-Managing Director acted as the Disciplinary Authority as well as the 0 Appellate Authority when he presided over and participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board (Appellate Authority) while deciding the Appeal of the appellant (delinquent employee ). Such a dual function was held to be not permissible on account of the established Rule against bias. On the other hand, as noted above, in the present case, the Chairman, who acted as the Disciplinary Authority, abstained from the meeting of the Board of Directors (Appellate Authority) when the Appeal of the petitioner was taken-up for consideration, and the meeting of the Board of Directors was presided over by the Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, Meerut. Hence, in the present case the question of bias does not arise. 34. Reference in this regard may be made to certain judicial decisions: 1. Ashok Kumar Yadav and others Vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1987 SC 454 (paragraphs 16 & 18 ). 2. Union of India and another Vs. Ashutosh Kumar Srivastava and another, AIR 2001 SC 4004 (paragraph 8) : (2002) 1 SCC 188 . 35. In view of the above, we find ourselves unable to accept the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 36. Let us now consider the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, namely, that the decision of the Board of Directors (respondent no. 3) did not give reasons for dismissing the Appeal of the petitioner. 37. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is necessary to refer to the relevant Regulations as contained in the Service Regulations, 2001, and the legal principles as emerge from various judicial decisions including those cited by the learned counsel for the parties. 38. As regards the relevant regulations, it is pertinent to refer to Regulations 47, 48 and 49 of the Service Regulations, 2001, which are reproduced below: 1 "47. Right to Appeal (i) An officer or employee shall have right of appeal against any order passed under these Regulations which injuriously affects his interest. (ii) The appeal shall be preferred to the Appellate Authority mentioned in Regulation 48 within 45 days of the date of receipt of the order appealed against. Right to Appeal (i) An officer or employee shall have right of appeal against any order passed under these Regulations which injuriously affects his interest. (ii) The appeal shall be preferred to the Appellate Authority mentioned in Regulation 48 within 45 days of the date of receipt of the order appealed against. The Appellate Authority shall consider the appeal and pass suitable order preferably within a period of 6 months. " "48. Appellate authorities An appeal shall lie; (i) to the Board where the Chairman or Committee of Directors is the Competent Authority. (ii) to the Chairman where any other officer is the Competent Authority. " "49. Requirement of an appeal Every appeal shall comply with the following requirements: (a) it shall be in writing and couched in polite and respectful language and shall be free from unnecessary padding or superfluous verbiage. (b) it shall contain all material statements and arguments relief on and shall be complete in itself. (c) it shall specify the relief desired. 2 (d) it shall not be addressed to directors personally. " 39. It will, thus, be noticed that Regulation 47 gives right of Appeal to any officer or employee of the Bank against any order passed under the Service Regulations, 2001, which injuriously affects his interest. Such Appeal should be filed within 45 days of the date of receipt of the order appealed against. 40. The Appeal is to be filed before the Appellate Authority mentioned in Regulation 48 of the Service Regulations, 2001. 41. The Appeal is required to comply with the requirements as mentioned in Regulation 49 of the Service Regulations, 2001. 42. Regulation 49, interalia, requires that the Appeal shall contain all material statements and arguments relied on and shall be complete in itself [clause (b) of Regulation 49]. The said Regulation, interalia, further requires that the Appeal shall specify the relief desired [clause (c) of Regulation 49]. 43. When such an Appeal is filed by an officer or employee, clause (ii) of Regulation 47, interalia, requires that "the Appellate Authority shall consider the Appeal and pass suitable order preferably within a period of six months. " 44. The said Regulation, interalia, further requires that the Appeal shall specify the relief desired [clause (c) of Regulation 49]. 43. When such an Appeal is filed by an officer or employee, clause (ii) of Regulation 47, interalia, requires that "the Appellate Authority shall consider the Appeal and pass suitable order preferably within a period of six months. " 44. Reading Clause (ii) of Regulation 47 and Clauses (b) and (c) of Regulation 49 of the Service Regulations, 2001 together, it is evident that it is incumbent on the Appellate Authority to consider besides other relevant materials all statements and arguments relied on, as mentioned in the Appeal as also the relief sought in the Appeal, and then pass suitable order on such Appeal. The said provisions evidently imply that the Appellate Authority should pass a reasoned order. The said conclusion is further borne out from the use of the word "consider" in clause (ii) of Regulation 47 of the Service Regulations, 2001 when it provides that "the Appellate Authority shall consider the Appeal and pass suitable order preferably within a period of six months". 45. In our view, the use of the word "consider" shows that the Appeal should be decided by the Appellate Authority on an objective consideration after due application of mind which implies the giving 3 of reasons for its decision. This view is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Chander Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 1173 (supra) (paragraph 9), which has been discussed in the later part of this judgment. 46. Let us now notice the legal principles as emerge from the various judicial decisions including those relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties. 47. In Tara Chand Khatri Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others, AIR 1977 SC 567 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as under (paragraph 19, 21 and 23 of the said AIR): "19. The second limb of the third contention raised on behalf of the appellant which also overlooks the decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court does not commend itself to us. The second limb of the third contention raised on behalf of the appellant which also overlooks the decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court does not commend itself to us. In this connection, we would like to make it clear that while it may be necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the enquiring officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment or the rules made thereunder, it would be laying down the proposition a little too broadly to say that even an order of concurrence must be supported by reasons. It cannot also, in our opinion, be laid down as a general rule that an order is a non-speaking order simply because it is brief and not elaborate. Every case, we think, has to be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances. Reference in this connection may be made with advantage to a catena of decisions. In Bimal Kumar Pandits case ( AIR 1963 SC 1612 ) (supra) it was categorically laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court that it was not a requirement of Article 311 (2) that in every case, the punishing authority should in its order requiring the civil servant to show cause give not only the punishment proposed to be inflicted on him but also the reasons for coming to that conclusion. In that case, it was clarified that the view is not justified that the appropriate authority must state its own grounds or reasons for proposing to take any specific action against the delinquent Government servant. 21. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1966) 1 SCR 466 = ( AIR 1966 SC 671 ), this Court repelled the contention of counsel for the appellant that every order appealable under Article 136 of the Constitution must be a speaking order and the omission to give reasons for the decision is of itself a sufficient ground for quashing it and held that an order of an administrative tribunal rejecting a revision application cannot be pronounced to be invalid on the sole ground that it does not give reasons for rejection. While distinguishing the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala, (1962) 2 SCR 339 = (AIR 1961 SC 1669) where the Central Government reversed the decision of the State Government without giving reasons for reversal, this Court pointed out that there was a vital difference between the order of reversal by the appellate authority and the order of affirmance by the revising 4 authority and that if the revising authority rejects a revision application stating that there was no valid ground for interference with the order of the subordinate authority in such a case, it could not be held that the order was arbitrary or that there was no trial of the revision application. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) speaking for himself in that case observed:- "ordinarily, the appellate or revisional tribunal shall give its own reasons succinctly; but in a case of affirmance where the original tribunal gives adequate reasons, the appellate tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the revision, as the case may be, agreeing with those reasons. " 23. Before concluding the discussion in regard to the third contention, we may point out that none of the decisions viz. Sardar Govindrao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1965) 1 SCR 678 = ( AIR 1965 SC 1222 ); Bhagat Raja v. The Union of India, (1967) 3 SCR 302 = ( AIR 1967 SC 1606 ); Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCR 40 = ( AIR 1971 SC 862 ); Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U. P. , (1971) 1 SCR 201 = ( AIR 1970 SC 1302 ); Rangnath v. Daulatrao, (1975) 1 SCC 686 = ( AIR 1975 SC 2146 ) and The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. The Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981 = ( AIR 1976 SC 1785 ) on which Mr. Ramamurthi has heavily leaned has anything to do with disciplinary proceedings. As such, they have little bearing on the point with which we are at present concerned. " (Emphasis supplied) 48. of India Ltd. v. The Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981 = ( AIR 1976 SC 1785 ) on which Mr. Ramamurthi has heavily leaned has anything to do with disciplinary proceedings. As such, they have little bearing on the point with which we are at present concerned. " (Emphasis supplied) 48. This decision, thus, lays down that while it may be necessary for a Disciplinary or Administrative Authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the enquiring officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment or the rules made thereunder, it would be laying down the proposition a little too broadly to say that even an order of concurrence must be supported by reasons. However, an order cannot be said to be a non-speaking order simply because it is brief and not elaborate. Further, every case has to be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances. 49. Further, their Lordships of the Supreme Court expressed their agreement with the decision of the Supreme Court in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 671 , wherein it has been laid down that there is a vital difference between the order of reversal by the Appellate Authority and the order of affirmance by the Revising Authority and that if the Revising Authority rejects a Revision Application stating that there is no valid ground for interference with the order of the subordinate authority in such a case, it cannot be held that the order is arbitrary or that there is no trial of the revision application. 5 50. In Ram Chander Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 1173 = (1986) 3 SCC 103 , the question involved was as to whether the order passed by the Railway Board dated March 11, 1972 dismissing the Appeal preferred by the appellant (Ram Chander) under Rule 18 (ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 was not in conformity with the requirements of the said Rules. 51. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to the provisions of Rule 22 (2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, and opined as under (paragraphs 3, 9 and 25 of the said AIR): "3. 51. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to the provisions of Rule 22 (2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, and opined as under (paragraphs 3, 9 and 25 of the said AIR): "3. Rule 22 (2) of the Railway Servants Rules provided as follows :- "22 (2 ). In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 6 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rule, the appellate authority shall consider - (a) whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been complied with, and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice; (b) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the record; and (c) whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe; and pass orders - (i) confirming, enhancing. reducing or setting aside the penalty: or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such directions as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. " 6 9. These authorities proceed upon the principle that in the absence of a requirement in the statute or the rules, there is no duty cast on an appellate authority to give reasons where the order is one of affirmance. Here, R. 22 (2) of the Railway Servants Rules in express terms requires the Railway Board to record its findings on the three aspects stated therein. Similar are the requirements under R. 27 (2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. R. 22 (2) provides that in the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in R. 6 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rule, the appellate authority shall consider as to the matters indicated therein. The word consider has different shades of meaning and must in R. 22 (2), in the context in which it appears, mean an objective consideration by the Railway Board after due application of mind which implies the giving of reasons for its decision. 25. Professor de Smith at Pp. The word consider has different shades of meaning and must in R. 22 (2), in the context in which it appears, mean an objective consideration by the Railway Board after due application of mind which implies the giving of reasons for its decision. 25. Professor de Smith at Pp. 242-43 refers to the recent greater readiness of the Courts to find a breach of natural justice cured by a subsequent hearing before an appellate tribunal. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [ (1981) 2 SCR 533 : (1981) 1 SCC 664 : AIR 1981 SC 818 ] although the Majoriry held that the expression "that immediate action is necessary" in S. 18aa (1) (a) of the Industrial Undertakings (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, does not exclude absolutely, by necessary implication, the application of the audi alteram partem rule, Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissented with the view and expressed that the expression immediate action may in certain situations mean exclusion of the application of the rules of natural justice and a post decisional hearing provided by the statute itself may be a sufficient substitute. It is not necessary for our purposes to go into the vexed question whether a post-decisional hearing is a substitute of the denial of a right of hearing at the initial stage or the observance of the rules of natural justice since the majority in Tulsiram Patels case [ air 1985 SC 1416 : (1985) 3 SCC 398 ] unequivocally lays down that the only stage at which a Government servant gets a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him i. e. an opportunity to exonerate himself from the charge by showing that the evidence adduced at the inquiry is not worthy of credence or consideration or that the charges proved against him are not of such a character as to merit the extreme penalty of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank and that any of the lesser punishments ought to have been sufficient in his case, is at the stage of hearing of a departmental appeal. Such being the legal position, it is of utmost importance after the Forty-Second Amendment as interpreted by the majority in Tulsiram Patels case that the Appellate Authority must not only give a hearing to the Government servant concerned but also pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised by him in the appeal. We wish to emphasize that reasoned decisions by tribunals, such as the Railway Board in the present case, will promote public confidence in the administrative process. An objective consideration is possible only if the delinquent servant is heard and given a chance to satisfy the Authority regarding the final orders that may be passed on his appeal. Considerations of fair-play and justice also require that such a personal hearing should be given. " (Emphasis supplied) 7 52. This decision, thus, lays down that in the absence of requirement in the statute or the rules there is no duty cast on the Appellate Authority to give reasons where the order is one of affirmance. However, in view of the requirements of Rule 22 (2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, the Appellate Authority is required to record its findings on the three aspects stated in the said Rule after due application of mind and giving reasons for its decision. 53. Laying emphasis on the use of the word consider in Rule 22 (2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, it has been laid down that the word consider has different shades of meaning and must in Rule 22 (2), in the context in which it appears, mean an objective consideration by the Railway Board after due application of mind which implies the giving of reasons for its decision. 54. In R. P. Bhatt Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 1040 = (1986) 2 SCC 651 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under (paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 of the said AIR): "1. 54. In R. P. Bhatt Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 1040 = (1986) 2 SCC 651 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under (paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 of the said AIR): "1. The short point involved in this appeal by special leave from a judgment and order of the Delhi High Court dated November 20, 1980 dismissing in limine the writ petition filed by the appellant, is whether the Appellate Order passed by the Director-General, Border Roads Organisation dated October 14, 1980, is in conformity with the requirements of R. 27 (2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (rules for short) which have been made applicable to the personnel of the Border Roads Organisation. 4. The word consider in R. 27 (2) implies due application of mind. It is clear upon the terms of R. 27 (2) that the appellate authority is required to consider (1) whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice; (2) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing etc. the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. Rule 27 (2) casts a duty on the appellate authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in Cls. (a), (b) and (c) thereof. 5. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director-General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director-General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only 8 applied his mind to the requirement of Cl. (c) of R. 27 (2), viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It seems that he only 8 applied his mind to the requirement of Cl. (c) of R. 27 (2), viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of R. 27 (2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director General is liable to be set aside. 6. It is not the requirement of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution of India or of the Rules of natural justice that in every case the appellate authority should in its order state its own reasons except where the appellate authority disagrees with the findings of the disciplinary authority. . . . . . . " (Emphasis supplied) 55. This decision, thus, lays down that it is not the requirement of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India or of the Rules of the natural justice that in every case the Appellate Authority should, in its order, state its own reasons except where the Appellate Authority disagrees with the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. However, the Appellate Authority is required to consider in its order the various factors mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) & (c) of Rule 27 (2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. 56. Laying emphasis on the use of the word consider in Rule 27 (2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, it has been laid down that the word consider in the said Rule implies due application of mind. 57. In S. N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 : (1990) 4 SCC 594 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as follows (paragraphs 35, 36, 37, 38 & 39 of the said AIR): "35. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decisions-making. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decisions-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons 9 would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. 36. Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donoughmore Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. The Committee expressed the opinion that "there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise" and that "where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity. " (p. 80) Prof. " (p. 80) Prof. H. W. R. Wade has also expressed the view that "natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary mans sense of justice. " (see Wade, Administrative Law, 6th Edn. p. 548 ). In Siemens Engineering Co. case ( AIR 1976 SC 1785 ) (supra) this Court has taken the same view when it observed that "the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process. " This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well-known principles of natural justice, namely (i) that no man should be a Judge in his own cause, and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCR 457 : ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ), wherein it has been held: "the concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules, namely (i) no one shall be a Judge in his own cause (nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem ). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. " [pp. 468-69 of SCR: at pp. 156-57 Of AIR]. 37. A similar trend is discernible in the decisions of English Courts wherein it has been held that natural justice demands that the decision should be based on some evidence of probative value. " [pp. 468-69 of SCR: at pp. 156-57 Of AIR]. 37. A similar trend is discernible in the decisions of English Courts wherein it has been held that natural justice demands that the decision should be based on some evidence of probative value. [see : R v. 0 Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex P. Moore, (1965) 1 QB 456 : (1965) 1 All ER 81; Mohan v. Air New Zealand Ltd. , 1984 AC 808 : (1984) 3 All ER 201]. 38. The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair play in action. " As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U. S. A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. 39. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. 39. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision. (Emphasis supplied) 58. This decision, thus, lays down that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record reasons for its decision irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. Though such reasons need not be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law but the reasons must be clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. 1 59. This decision further lays down that the need for recording of reasons by the administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The Appellate or Revisional Authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the Appellate or the Revisional Authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. 60. In State Bank of India, Bhopal Vs. S. S. Koshal, 1994 Suppl. (2) SCC 468, on which heavy reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents, the facts were as narrated in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the said SCC, which are reproduced below: "2. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent. The respondent was the Branch Manager in the State Bank of India, Bhopal branch. A disciplinary inquiry was held against him in respect of six charges. The Enquiry Officer held charges 1 and 5 established but held that charges 2, 3, 4 and 6 were not established. The respondent was the Branch Manager in the State Bank of India, Bhopal branch. A disciplinary inquiry was held against him in respect of six charges. The Enquiry Officer held charges 1 and 5 established but held that charges 2, 3, 4 and 6 were not established. After perusing the report of the Enquiry Officer the disciplinary authority agreed with the Enquiry Officer that charges 1 and 5 are established and charges 3 and 4 are not established. So far as charge 2 is concerned he disagreed with the Enquiry Officer. The disciplinary authority held that the said charge to have been fully established. So far as charge 6 is concerned, he again disagreed with the Enquiry Officer and held it partially established. Accordingly, he imposed the punishment of removal from service by an order dated 3-5-1984. The respondent filed an appeal to the appellate authority prescribed by the service regulations. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal on 25-1-1985 under the following order: "with reference to your appeal dated 31-8-1984, we have to advise that the said appeal was placed by us before the Local Board, the appellate authority, on 25-1-1985. We further advise that the Board in the meeting held on the aforesaid date, resolved as under: "the BOARD considered at length the facts of the case including the fact that the disciplinary authority has differed from the findings of the inquiring authority in respect of two charges. After having considered the appeal and other relevant papers and having applied their minds, the Board concluded that there are no grounds to sustain the appeal and accordingly RESOLVED that the order of the disciplinary authority be upheld and that the appeal made by Shri S. S. Koshal, be dismissed. " 3. The respondent then approached the High Court by way of a writ petition, wherein he urged there grounds viz. , 2 (1) [n]on-supply of copy of the Enquiry Officers report, (2) the failure to give a fresh notice to him when the appellate authority disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer on some of the charges, and (3) the fact that the appellate authority passed a non-speaking order in violation of the principles of natural justice. 4. The High Court upheld all the three grounds and allowed the writ petition against which the present appeal is preferred. " 61. 4. The High Court upheld all the three grounds and allowed the writ petition against which the present appeal is preferred. " 61. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and laid down as under (paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said SCC): "7. Now coming to the third ground on which the High Court has allowed the writ petition, the relevant rule [rule 51 (2)] reads as follows: "an appeal shall be preferred within 45 days from date of receipt of the order appealed against. The appeal shall be addressed to the appellate authority and submitted to the authority whose order is appealed against. The employee may, if he so desires, submit an advance copy to the appellate authority. The authority whose order is appealed against shall forward the appeal together with its comments and records of the case to the appellate authority. The appellate authority shall consider whether the findings are justified and/or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate. Authority may pass an order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such directions as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case. " 8. The High Court has taken the view that the rule requires the appellate authority to pass a speaking order even if it is an order of affirmance. For the purpose of this case, we shall assume the said view to be the correct one. Even so we are not satisfied that the appellate order is not a speaking order. We have already extracted the appellate order in full hereinbefore, which shows that it considered at length 3 the facts of the case including the fact that the appellate authority (sic disciplinary authority) had differed from the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the two charges. The appellate authority then says that it considered the relevant grounds of appeal and after considering the facts of the case came to the conclusion that there was no substance in the appeal. In view of the fact that it was an order of affirmance, we are of the opinion that it was not obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to say more than this as the order as it is, shows application of mind. In view of the fact that it was an order of affirmance, we are of the opinion that it was not obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to say more than this as the order as it is, shows application of mind. The order cannot be characterized as a non-speaking order. " (Emphasis supplied) 62. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the order passed by the Appellate Authority in the above case was similar to the one passed by the Appellate Authority in the present case. The Supreme Court in the above case has held that the order of the Appellate Authority cannot be characterized as a non-speaking order, hence, in the present case also the order of the Appellate Authority cannot be characterized as a non-speaking order. 63. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 64. Relevant portion of the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005 passed in the present case is as under: 65. The above-quoted paragraph shows that the Appellate Authority i. e. Board of Directors has stated that all the facts stated in the Appeal of the petitioner dated 1. 2. 2005 were deeply studied by the Board of Directors and the petitioners version was heard by personally calling the petitioner in the meeting; and that the entire matter was deeply considered and it was found that there was no such fact in the Appeal which would require any change in the punishment order dated 18. 12. 2004 passed by the Disciplinary Authority; and that therefore, the Board of Directors while confirming the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the said Appeal dated 1. 2. 2005. Thus, the order passed by the Appellate Authority in the present case is not similar to that which was considered by the 4 Supreme Court in the above decision in State Bank of India case (supra ). 2. 2005. Thus, the order passed by the Appellate Authority in the present case is not similar to that which was considered by the 4 Supreme Court in the above decision in State Bank of India case (supra ). In the above case before the Supreme Court, the order passed by the Appellate Authority showed that the Appellate Authority "considered at length the facts of the case including the fact that the Disciplinary Authority has differed from the findings of the Inquiring Authority in respect of two charges"; and that "after having considered the Appeal and other relevant papers and having applied their minds", the Appellate Authority "concluded that there are no grounds to sustain the Appeal and accordingly resolved that the order of the Disciplinary Authority be upheld" and that the Appeal "be dismissed. " 66. Thus, the Appellate Authority, interalia, considered the facts of the case, the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority, the order of the Disciplinary Authority differing from the findings of the Inquiring Authority in respect of two charges, the Appeal filed by the delinquent officer and other relevant papers, and applied its mind to the same. 67. Hence, as noted above, the facts of the above case before the Supreme Court are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 68. In National Fertilizers Ltd. and another Vs P. K. Khanna, AIR 2005 SC 3742 : 2005 AIR SCW 4333, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as under (paragraphs 9, 10, 11 & 12 of the said SCW): "9. Apart from misreading the Enquiry Officers report, the High Court also misapplied the law. The various decisions referred to in the impugned judgment make it clear that the Disciplinary Authority is required to give reasons only when Disciplinary Authority does not agree with finding of the Enquiry Officer. In this case the Disciplinary Authority had concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer wholly. In Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1987 (Suppl.) SCC 582 (= AIR 1987 SC 2043 ), the Disciplinary Authority after quoting the content of the charge-sheet, the deposition of witnesses as recorded by the Enquiry Officer, the finding of the Enquiry Officer and the explanation submitted by the employee passed an order which, in all material respects, is similar to the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority in this case. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent sought to draw a distinction on the basis that the Disciplinary Authority had, in Ram Kumars case itself quoted the details of the material. The mere quoting of what transpired would not amount to the giving of any reasons. The reasons were in the penultimate paragraph which we have said virtually used the same language as the impugned order in the present case. This Court dismissed the challenge to the order of punishment in the following words :- 5 "in view of the contents of the impugned order, it is difficult to say that the punishing authority had not applied his mind to the case before terminating the services of the appellant. The punishing authority has placed reliance upon the report of the Enquiry Officer which means that he has not only agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, but also has accepted the reasons given by him for the findings. In our opinion, when the punishing authority agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings, it is not necessary for the punishing authority to again discuss evidence and come to the same findings as that of the Enquiry Officer and give the same reasons for the findings. We are unable to accept the contention made on behalf of the appellant that the impugned order of termination is vitiated as it is a non-speaking order and does not contain any reason. When by the impugned order the punishing authority has accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the reasons given by him the question of non-compliance with the principles of natural justice does not arise. It is also incorrect to say that the impugned order is not a speaking order". (Emphasis supplied) 10. We respectfully adopt the view. The position is further clarified by Rule 33 of the Employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules. It reads as follows :- 1. The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the Enquiring Authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing remit the case to the Enquiry Authority for fresh or further Enquiry and report and the Enquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further Enquiry according to the provisions of Rule 32 as far as may be. 2. The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the Enquiring Authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing remit the case to the Enquiry Authority for fresh or further Enquiry and report and the Enquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further Enquiry according to the provisions of Rule 32 as far as may be. 2. The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Enquiring Authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. 3. If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Rule-29 should be imposed on the employee shall, notwithstanding any- thing contained in Rule 31, make an order imposing such penalty. 4. If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that no penalty is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the employee concerned. " 6 11. It is apparent from sub-rule (2) that the Disciplinary Authority is not required to record its reasons if it concurs with the Enquiry Officers findings in contradiction with the situation in which the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. Only in the latter case does sub-rule (2) expressly mandate that the Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer record its reasons for such disagreement as well as its own findings on such charges. 12. The respondents reliance on the decision in Managing Director v. V. Karunakaran, (1993) 4 SCC 727 (= 1994 AIR SCW 1050: AIR 1994 SC 1074 : 1994 Lab IC 762) is misplaced. That decision relates to the right of a delinquent officer to a copy of the Enquiry Officers report. In the course of the judgment the Court had no doubt said that the report of the Enquiry Officer is required to be furnished to the employee to make proper representation to the Disciplinary Authority before such authority arrives at its own finding with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the employee and the punishment if any to be awarded to him. By using the phrase "its own finding" what is meant is an independent decision of the Disciplinary Authority. It does not require the Disciplinary Authority to record separate reasons from those given by the Enquiry Officer. The concurrence of the Disciplinary Authority with the reasoning and conclusion of the Enquiry Officer means that the Disciplinary Authority has adopted the conclusion and the basis of the conclusion as its own. It is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to restate the reasoning. " (Emphasis supplied) 69. This decision, thus, lays down that in case the Disciplinary Authority does not agree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer on various charges levelled against the delinquent officer, the Disciplinary Authority must record its reasons for such disagreement as well as its own findings on such charges. However, where the Disciplinary Authority agrees with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority is required to come to an independent decision of its own but the Disciplinary Authority is not required to record separate reasons from those given by the Inquiry Officer. The concurrence of the Disciplinary Authority with the reasoning and conclusion of the Inquiry Officer means that the Disciplinary Authority has adopted the conclusion and the basis of the conclusion as its own. It is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to restate the reasoning. 70. In Cyril Lasrado (D) by LRs. and others v. Juliana Maria Lasrado and another, AIR 2005 SC 1367 : (2004) 7 SCC 431, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said AIR): "11. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of its mind, all the 7 more when its order is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Courts judgment not sustainable. 12. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M. R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971 (1) All E. R. 1148) observed "the giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration. " In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was observed: "failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". 12. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M. R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971 (1) All E. R. 1148) observed "the giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration. " In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was observed: "failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at". Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the inscrutable face of the sphinx, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The inscrutable face of a sphinx is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. " 71. This decision, thus, lays emphasis on the importance of giving reasons in an order. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. Reasons must be sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter by the concerned authority. 72. In M. V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 2006 SC 3475 = 2006 SCC (L&s) 919, their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the nature of departmental enquiry and the standard of proof required in such enquiry. The duty of the Appellate Authority was also taken note of by the Apex Court. The relevant portions of the decision are quoted below [paragraphs 18, 25 and 26 of the said AIR]: "18. The appellate authority totally ignored the evidences adduced before the disciplinary authority and in particular the evidence of Shri K. C. Sariya in favour of the Appellant in this behalf. The appellate authority was required to apply its mind on the materials placed on record. The appellate authority totally ignored the evidences adduced before the disciplinary authority and in particular the evidence of Shri K. C. Sariya in favour of the Appellant in this behalf. The appellate authority was required to apply its mind on the materials placed on record. It failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary authority purported to have relied upon the police report which was not proved. 25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i. e. , beyond 8 all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with. 26. The report of the Enquiry Officer suffers from the aforementioned vices. The orders of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority which are based on the said Enquiry Report, thus, cannot be sustained. We have also noticed the way in which the Tribunal has dealt with the matter. Upon its findings, the High Court also commented that it had not delved deep into the contentions raised by the Appellant. The Tribunal also, thus, failed to discharge its functions properly. " (Emphasis supplied) 73. This decision, thus, lays down that the disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and the Inquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The Inquiry Officer upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. He is required to keep in mind various aspects indicated in the above decision. It has further been laid down that the Appellate Authority is required to apply its mind on the materials placed on record. 74. He is required to keep in mind various aspects indicated in the above decision. It has further been laid down that the Appellate Authority is required to apply its mind on the materials placed on record. 74. In Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. , AIR 2006 SC 1748 : (2006) 4 SCC 713 , considering the provisions of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36 of the said AIR): "31. We may for the aforementioned purpose take note of the extant rules operating in the field. Requirements of consideration in an appeal from an order of the disciplinary authority by the appellate authority is contained in Rule 37 whereas the provisions as regards filing of a memorial are contained in Rule 40 thereof, which read as under: "37. Consideration of Appeals- (1) In case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of Rule 20 and having regard to the 9 circumstances of the case the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the other accordingly. (2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 23, the appellate authority shall consider: (a) Whether the procedure prescribed in these Rules has been complied with and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in failure of justice; (b) Whether the findings are justified; and (c) Whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate, and pass orders: I. setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty; or II. remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. "40.- Memorial.- An employee whose appeal under these Rules has been rejected by the Chairman/chairman-cum-Managing Director or in whose case such appellate authority has enhanced the penalty either on appeal under Rule 24 or on review under Rule 39 (2) may address a memorial to the Chairman/chairman-cum-Managing Director in respect of that matter within a period of 6 months from the date the appellant received a copy of the order of such appellate authority. " 32. " 32. The appellate authority, therefore, while disposing of the appeal is required to apply his mind with regard to the factors enumerated in sub-rule (2) of Rule 37 of the Rules. The judgment of the civil court being inter partes was relevant. The conduct of the appellant as noticed by the civil court was also relevant. The fact that the respondent has accepted the said judgment and acted upon it would be a relevant fact. The authority considering the memorial could have justifiably come to a different conclusion having regard to the findings of the civil court. But, it did not apply its mind. It could have for one reason or the other refused to take the subsequent event into consideration, but as he had a 0 discretion in the matter, he was bound to consider the said question. He was required to show that he applied his mind to the relevant facts. He could not have without expressing his mind simply ignored the same. 33. An appellate order if it is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority may not be a speaking order but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind on his part as regards the compliance with the requirements of law while exercising his jurisdiction under Rule 37 of the Rules. 34. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A. K. Chopra [ 1999 (1) SCC 759 ] which has heavily been relied upon by Mr. Gupta, this Court stated [scc P. 770 (Para 16):1999 AIR SCW 274 (Para 17)] "the High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. " (Emphasis supplied) 35. The appellate authority, therefore, could not ignore to exercise the said power. 36. The order of the appellate authority demonstrates total non-application of mind. " (Emphasis supplied) 35. The appellate authority, therefore, could not ignore to exercise the said power. 36. The order of the appellate authority demonstrates total non-application of mind. The appellate authority, when the rules require application of mind on several factors and serious contentions have been raised, was bound to assign reasons so as enable the writ court to ascertain as to whether he had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the statute requires him to do. The expression consider is of some significance. In the context of the rules, the appellate authority was required to see as to whether (i) the procedure laid down in the rules was complied with; (ii) the Enquiry Officer was justified in arriving at the finding that the delinquent officer was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him; and (iii) whether penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority was excessive. " (Emphasis supplied) 75. This decision, thus, lays down that the appellate order if it is in agreement with that of the Disciplinary Authority may not be a speaking order but the Appellate Authority passing the same must show that there has been proper application of mind on its part to the factors enumerated in sub-rule (2) of Rule 37 of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975. 1 75. In Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem and others Vs. Madhusudhan Rao, 2008 AIR SCW 1356, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said AIR SCW): "18. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and also having regard to the detailed manner in which the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal had dealt with the matter, including the explanation given regarding the disbursement of the money received by the respondent, we see no reason to differ with the view taken by the Administrative Tribunal and endorsed by the High Court. No doubt, the Divisional Forest Officer dealt with the matter in detail, but it was also the duty of the appellate authority to give at least some reasons for rejecting the appeal preferred by the respondent. A similar duty was cast on the revisional authority being the highest authority in the Department of Forests in the State. No doubt, the Divisional Forest Officer dealt with the matter in detail, but it was also the duty of the appellate authority to give at least some reasons for rejecting the appeal preferred by the respondent. A similar duty was cast on the revisional authority being the highest authority in the Department of Forests in the State. Unfortunately, even the revisional authority has merely indicated that the decision of the Divisional Forest Officer had been examined by the Conservator of Forests, Khammam wherein the charge of misappropriation was clearly proved. He too did not consider the defence case as made out by the respondent herein and simply endorsed the punishment of dismissal though reducing it to removal from service. 19. It is no doubt also true that an appellate or revisional authority is not required to give detailed reasons for agreeing and confirming an order passed by the lower forum but, in our view, in the interests of justice, the delinquent officer is entitled to know at least the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in dismissing his appeal and/or revision. It is true that no detailed reasons are required to be given, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order affirming the views of the lower forum. " (Emphasis supplied) 77. This decision, thus, lays down that while it is true that an appellate or revisional authority is not required to give detailed reasons for agreeing and confirming an order passed by the lower forum but some brief reasons should be indicated so that the delinquent officer would know at least the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in dismissing his Appeal and/or Revision. 78. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7285 of 2003 (Shri Ajab Singh Tevatia and another Vs. Board of Directors, Kisan Gramin Bank and others), decided on 27. 2. 2007, a Division Bench of this Court considered the validity of an order dated 25. 11. 2002 passed by the Appellate Authority. No reason was recorded in the said order by the Appellate Authority. The Division Bench quashed the said order dated 25. 11. 2002 holding as under: 2 "it is clear from the record that the appellate order dated 25. 11. 2002 (Annexure 13 to th writ petition) appears to be communicated to the petitioner regarding decision of the appeal, no reasons have been recorded. The Division Bench quashed the said order dated 25. 11. 2002 holding as under: 2 "it is clear from the record that the appellate order dated 25. 11. 2002 (Annexure 13 to th writ petition) appears to be communicated to the petitioner regarding decision of the appeal, no reasons have been recorded. We have also perused order dated 12. 11. 2002 of the Board, as it has been submitted by Sri Grover that this detailed and reasoned order was passed on the appeal of the petitioner. The said order is for consideration of various persons for the purpose of promotion. There is nothing in the said order regarding taking a decision of the grievances of the petitioners regarding their appeal which was to be decided in accordance with law. The submission of the petitioners to this effect has got force that the order passed by the respondents is an order arbitrary in nature without application of mind to the real controversy involved in the case. It is not the case of the respondents that except the order dated 25. 11. 2002 any order has ever been communicated to the petitioners. The learned counsel for the respondents is not able to defend and place any argument in defence of the same regarding non-assigning any reason. It is well settled that an order having civil consequences even though passed by administrative authority must contain reasons so as to enable the aggrieved party to challenge the reasoning of the administrative authority because in writ jurisdiction it is reasoning which has to be decided. In the absence of reasons no foundation can be laid by the petitioners and only argument remains is that order is passed upon non-application of mind. We are also of the view if the reasons is not communicated it will be presumed that no order has been passed upon the appeal filed by the petitioners. From the perusal of the order dated 25. 11. 2002, it is clear that no reason has been assigned only it is a communication regarding the decision taken by the respondents on the appeal filed by the petitioners. We are of the further view also that if the order has not been communicated it will be presumed that no order has been passed and the appeal filed by the petitioners will be treated to be alive. " (Emphasis supplied) 79. We are of the further view also that if the order has not been communicated it will be presumed that no order has been passed and the appeal filed by the petitioners will be treated to be alive. " (Emphasis supplied) 79. This decision, thus, lays down that in case, the Appellate Authority does not record its reasons in its order, the order will be treated to be arbitrary in nature having been passed without application of mind. 80. From the propositions laid down in various judicial decisions, noticed above, it follows that the Appellate Authority is required to apply its mind on the materials placed on record and then conclude as to whether it agrees or disagrees with the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. In case the Appellate Authority disagrees with the findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority is required to state its own reasons. However, when the Appellate Authority agrees with the findings of the Disciplinary Authority, it is not required to give detailed reasons but there should be sufficient indication in its order that it has applied its mind to the materials on record and then has agreed with the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. 3 81. Coming to the present case, the relevant portion of the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005 passed by the Appellate Authority (Board of Directors- respondent no. 3) is as under: (Compulsory retirement)" 82. The above-quoted paragraph shows that the Appellate Authority, i. e. , Board of Directors has stated that all the facts stated in the Appeal of the petitioner dated 1. 2. 2005 were deeply studied by the Board of Directors and the petitioners version was heard by personally calling the petitioner in the meeting; and that the entire matter was deeply considered and it was found that there was no such fact in the Appeal which would require any change in the punishment order dated 18. 12. 2004 passed by the Disciplinary Authority; and that therefore, the Board of Directors while confirming the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the said Appeal dated 1. 2. 2005. 83. Thus, the Appellate Authority merely considered the facts stated in the Appeal of the petitioner and concluded that there was no such fact as would necessitate any change in the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority by its order dated 18. 12. 2004. 2. 2005. 83. Thus, the Appellate Authority merely considered the facts stated in the Appeal of the petitioner and concluded that there was no such fact as would necessitate any change in the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority by its order dated 18. 12. 2004. There is, thus, no sufficient indication in the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005 that the Appellate Authority (Board of Directors - respondent no. 3) applied its mind to the materials on record and agreed with the findings of the Disciplinary Authority in regard to various charges after such application of mind. 84. Hence, the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005 passed by the Appellate Authority (Board of Directors- respondent no. 3) is vitiated and cannot be sustained. 85. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the Writ Petition deserves to be allowed, and the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005 passed by the Appellate Authority (Board of Directors - respondent no. 3), extract whereof has been quoted in the Communication dated 20. 10. 2005 (Annexure-17 to the Writ Petition), and complete copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-CA-1 to the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the respondents, is liable to be quashed, and the matter is liable to be sent back to the 4 Appellate Authority (Board of Directors - respondent no. 3) for deciding the Appeal of the petitioner afresh in accordance with law. 86. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed, and the order/resolution dated 18. 10. 2005 passed by the Appellate Authority (Board of Directors - respondent no. 3), extract whereof has been quoted in the Communication dated 20. 10. 2005 (Annexure-17 to the Writ Petition), and complete copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-CA-1 to the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the respondents, is quashed, and the matter is sent back to the Appellate Authority (Board of Directors - respondent no. 3) for deciding the Appeal of the petitioner afresh in accordance with law. 87. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. .