Judgment :- 1. The claimant is in appeal against the judgment and award in MVC No.141/2001 on the file of the MACT at Karwar, being dissatisfied with the grant of compensation as also the order absolving insurer of its liability. 2. We have heard the learned counsel on both sides. 3. The appellant filed a claim seeking compensation on material proposition that on 31.12.2000 at 14.30 hours, he was traveling in autorickshaw goods vehicle bearing registration No.KA-30/4442 accompanying cow and calf for transportation of which, the vehicle was hired. He was in the company of his co-brother Narayan Krishna Bhat. While they were proceeding, the driver was rash and negligent and by such act, lost control when they reached Valagalli Temple in Kumta taluk. The vehicle fell on side and capsizes. Due to the impact of such fall, the claimant suffered fracture of bones of both the legs and was immediately rushed to the hospital at Kurnta. Therefrom, he was shifted to KMC Hospital where, the doctors tried their best, but failed to save the limb and it was amputated below knee. The other leg also suffered physical disability despite best treatment in KMC Hospital, Manipal. He referred to the nature of treatment given as also the expenditure incurred. The period of treatment and expenditure is substantiated through the medical records of the hospital. 4. Appellant contended that due to physical disability which has visited him as a consequence of the accident, he lost income. He was an agriculturist and also a professional cook. From both the sources, he had earning of Rs,8,500/-per month. The work is now impossible and he has lost the income. 5. His claim was resisted by the insurer firstly contending that the accident has not occurred in the manner stated by the petitioner and secondly, even if it were to be presumed that accident did occur, it was not due to the negligence of its driver. Thirdly it was contended that the driver did not have or possess effective driving licence as on the date of accident. The insurer also questioned the claim of the petitioner with regard to his loss of earning and the physical disability that he suffered. 6. The owner of the vehicle had also resisted the claim in which, defence is denial simplicitor without any specific plea. The insurer also questioned the claim of the petitioner with regard to his loss of earning and the physical disability that he suffered. 6. The owner of the vehicle had also resisted the claim in which, defence is denial simplicitor without any specific plea. However, the insure3d has elaborately averred that the vehicle was insured validly and liability if any is on the insurer to discharge the award. 7. Based on material proposition in the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal raised relevant issues for consideration and applying the evidence tendered by the petitioner as P.W.1 and documentary evidence which comprised the copy of FIR, Motor Vehicle Inspector’s Report and other investigating papers, held the claimant had substantiated the accident was a result of negligent driving by the driver of the offending vehicle, who was respondent No.1 in the party array. The said finding has not been questioned by the insured or the insurer. Therefore, it has reached finality. 8. In this appeal, the claimant has sought for enhancement of compensation on the basis that there is no realistic determination of the compensation. The tribunal has adopted a improper approach to grant compensation under various heads notionally. 9. In support of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant would contend the following: The claimant was traveling in the vehicle accompanying the goods and therefore, was statutorily covered. The compensation was liable to be paid by the insured and the insurer together and in view of the currency of the policy, the insurer had to discharge it. Secondly, it is urged due to amputation of leg, the claimant is physically invalid and incapable of not only living a normal life, but also has suffered total loss of earning capacity. Thirdly, he had incurred heavy expenditure towards medical treatment, conveyance, diet and incidental which, the tribunal has not granted. Lastly, it was urged that despite the claimant having established that insurance policy was valid as on the date of accident, the tribunal unjustifiably absolved the insurance company on the ground that cow and calf carried in the vehicle do not come within the definition of goods and hence, he cannot be said to have accompanying the goods. 10. Lastly, it was urged that despite the claimant having established that insurance policy was valid as on the date of accident, the tribunal unjustifiably absolved the insurance company on the ground that cow and calf carried in the vehicle do not come within the definition of goods and hence, he cannot be said to have accompanying the goods. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the insurer would contend that the Tribunal has justifiably absolved the insurance company of its liability noticing that the claimant was not one of the person covered under the insurance policy. Learned counsel further contends that based on the material evidence and record, it is noticed that respondent No.1 did not have effective valid licence to drive goods vehicle as on the date of accident. The claimant, on his volition, has stated in the complaint to the police that he was sitting with the driver in the cabin and therefore, there was a clear violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy as, only one person was permitted to be seated in the vehicle i.e., the driver. 11. He would further contend that the insurance policy spells out that the IMT endorsements 13 and 14 have not been invoked by the parties concerned and no premium has been collected to cover the risk of non-fare paying passengers like the claimant in this case. Lastly, he would contend that viewed from any angle, violation of terms and conditions of the insurance policy are apparent and therefore, even if there be validity of the policy, it is vitiated by violation and breach of covenants. Supporting the impugned judgment absolving the insurance company, he seeks dismissal of the appeal. 12. Keeping in mind what is urged by both sides, it is necessary to first deal with the question as to whether the tribunal is justified in absolving the insurance company of its liability. 13. The arguments of the learned counsel for the insurer on the aspects referred to above are seemingly very impressing, but on closer examination, the grounds are only worth rejection for the following reasons: The driving licence issued to respondent No.1 has been seriously questioned. We have examined the copy of the licence which is at Ex.R.3. 13. The arguments of the learned counsel for the insurer on the aspects referred to above are seemingly very impressing, but on closer examination, the grounds are only worth rejection for the following reasons: The driving licence issued to respondent No.1 has been seriously questioned. We have examined the copy of the licence which is at Ex.R.3. Its perusal reveals that respondent No.1 has been issued with a permanent driving licence valid from 28.1.2000 to 27.1.2020 with further endorsement that it permits him to drive transport vehicle for the period up to 5.1.2004. Learned counsel for the insurer, referring to the other entries in Ex.R.2, contended that the autorickshaw in question was a transport vehicle, but the licence granted to respondent No.1 was to drive a non-transport vehicle. He has been permitted to drive transport vehicle only from 6.1.2001. Therefore, it has to be construed that he had no valid driving licence to drive a goods vehicle like the one in question. 14. The enforcement we have referred above spells out clearly that permanent licence issued has valid from 28.1.2000 up to 27.1.2020 and it is undoubtedly issued to the claimant much prior to the occurrence of the accident in this case. This document also substantiates undoubtedly that respondent No.1 is authorized to drive transport vehicle up to 5.1.2004. This is only a condition on which licence with a validity from 28.1.2000 up to 27.1.2020 is issued, which means that respondent No.1 was duty authorized to drive a transport vehicle for the period indicated above. The accident in this case has occurred on 31.12.2000 which is certainly after the issuance of the driving licence to respondent No.1. Therefore, the contention of the insurer that 6.1.2001 should be taken as the date to reckon the validity of licence is untenable and we reject the same. 15. We also reject the contention of the insurer that as per the Regulations of the Motor Vehicles Act, licences are issued initially for a period of three years after which, the licence expires. This is because the insurance company has on its own produced Ex.R.3 in its evidence for placing reliance on it. It is therefore bound by the documentary evidence which it has produced. This is because the insurance company has on its own produced Ex.R.3 in its evidence for placing reliance on it. It is therefore bound by the documentary evidence which it has produced. Since the same is not brought into question and as no official from the Motor Vehicles Department has been examined by the insurance company to elicit as to whether such an issuance is legally permissible or not, we reject the arguments to the contrary advanced in this case and hold that there was a valid driving licence possessed by respondent No.1 effective as on the date of the accident i.e., 31.12.2000. This point is therefore answered in favour of the appellant and against the insurer. 16. The other issue to be considered is with regard to the position of the claimant. Was he a fare paying passenger, a non-fare paying passenge3r or a person accompanying goods. It is assertively urged on behalf of the insurer that the claimant has to be construed as a non-fare paying passenger because the vehicle in question, as per the permit, has only one seating capacity in the cabin. Therefore, it was urged that only one person who is driver is averred and no other person is permitted to travel in the vehicle. It was also urged that even if it s is presumed that the claimant was accompanying the goods, the Apex Court has held that he should travel only in the cabin. Since in this case, he could not have travelled in the cabin as there was only one seating capacity, he would not be covered under the policy. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LTDE., vs SURESH K.K. AND ANOTHER ( 2008 ACJ 1741 ). He has also placed reliance on the decision in the case of ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., vs DELIREDDY KONDA REDDY AND OTHERS (I(2003) acc 214]. Reliance is also placed on the decision in the case of NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO.LTD., vs VEDWATI AND OTHERS (CD) 2007 SC 187) and the decision in the case of NATIONAL INSURANCE CO.LTD., vs CHOLLETI BHARATAMMA AND OTHERS (CD) 2007 SC 1122) to contend that except driver and cleaner who are permitted to be carried in the vehicle, no other person is covered under the policy, be it a fare paying or non-fare paying passenger. 17. 17. We have bestowed our serious concern to these points urged. Necessarily, examination of the terms and conditions and covenants of the insurance policy becomes important to decide the issue. 18. There is no dispute that the policy issued in this case is a Package policy and not Act policy. The said policy is at Ex.R.1. Reading of Ex.R.1 reveals that, apart from collecting the basic premium prescribed by the TRCA, the insurer has collected additional premium to enlarge its liability and to cover certain category of persons. One such endorsement that we notice reads as follows: Add: for LL to persons employed in connection with the operation and/or loading, unloading of Motor Vehicle IMT 17, premium collected is 15. 19. The learned counsel, referring to this endorsement, contends that the additional premium collected is for the purpose of covering the risk of the driver of the vehicle and none else. Perhaps, this argument is advanced on the presumption that the driver, as is not covered under the Act Policy and hence additional premium was collected. It is totally a misconception of the conspectus of the provisions of the Act. To remind ourselves, we need to refer to the provisions of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It reads thus: “147. It is totally a misconception of the conspectus of the provisions of the Act. To remind ourselves, we need to refer to the provisions of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It reads thus: “147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.-(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which- .(a) is issued by a person who is an authorized insurer; and .(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)- .(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; .(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place: Provided that a policy shall not be required- .(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, rising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee- .(a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or .(b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or .(c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or .(d) to cover any contractual liability. .Explanation.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place. .(2) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance referred to in subsection (1), shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, up to the following limits, namely:- .(a) save as provided in clause (b), the amount of liability incurred; .(b) in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand; .Provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such commencement or till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier. .(3) A policy shall be of no effect for the purposes of this Chapter unless and until that is issued by the insurer in favour of the person by whom the policy is effected a certificate of insurance in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars of any condition subject to which the policy is issued and of any o other prescribed matters; and different forms, particulars and matters may be prescribed in different cases. .(4) Where a cover note issued by the insurer under the provisions of this Chapter or the rules made thereunder is not followed by a policy of insurance within the prescribed time, the insurer shall, within seven days of the expiry of the period of the validity of the cover note, notify the fact to the registering authority in whose records the vehicle to which the cover note relates has been registered or to such other authority as the State Government may prescribe. .(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an insurer issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons.” 20. From the extracted portion of the provisions of Section 147, it is clear that in respect of the goods vehicle, the insurance company is statutorily liable to cove the risk against death or bodily injury to the driver, cleaner, loader, unloader and employees of the insured to the extent provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Undoubtedly, the driver of the vehicle and other employees named in the provision are covered “statutorily”. Once the insurance policy is issued as is required under Section 146 of the Act, the insurance company has no escape, but to indemnify the insured against eh claim from driver and other category of persons mentioned in the provision. Hence, there is no question of any additional premium being collected to cove the such risk. Of course, the insurance company can collect extra premium to enlarge its liability which is otherwise statutorily restricted to the claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. To this extent, collection of extra premium is permissible. For the test to find out whether the premium collected is to enlarge this liability more than the statutory limit provided or does it cover any other category of persons. We need to examine the clause in the policy itself. The insurance policy being a contractual transaction, terms and conditions of the policy bind the parties. In the instant case as referred to above, the insurance company has collected Rs.15/-additional premium specifically indicating that it covers persons employed in connection with operation and loading and unloading of the motor vehicle. Thus, it is a different category of persons covered by the insurer by collecting additional premium excluding the driver who is statutorily covered under the Act as referred to above. Therefore, it is for the insurance company to spell out, as to cover the risk of which category of persons, they had collected Rs.15/-. The insurance company is totally silent on this aspect. It is for this reason, we have to apply the doctrine of contra proferentum to interpret this clause. Therefore, it is for the insurance company to spell out, as to cover the risk of which category of persons, they had collected Rs.15/-. The insurance company is totally silent on this aspect. It is for this reason, we have to apply the doctrine of contra proferentum to interpret this clause. Since an attempt is made to contend that this clause refers only to the risk of the driver, we are constrained to hold that it is to be interpreted in favour of the insured and also to hold that it covers the risk of persons other than the driver like those who are employed for loading, unloading and for the purpose of maintenance of the vehicle. 21. At this juncture, it is material to note that the insurance company availed full liberty before the Tribunal to resist its liability through its Senior Officer who has been examined as R.W.1. The said Officer in his ocular testimony before the Court was so vague and so unexplanatory in his version that he hardly stated any restriction in the policy to absolve the insurance company. In fact, he makes no mention of the additional premium collected and the purpose for such collection. Though it may not be necessary, for the purpose of clarity, we feel it appropriate to extract the evidence tendered by him, which is as follows: “The vehicle in question insured with the respondent insurance company was a goods carrying vehicle meant for carrying of goods and the petitioner was an unauthorized passenger in the said vehicle and his risk is not covered under the relevant policy. The vehicle in question is meant solely for carrying of goods and no person is allowed to travel in the said vehicle.” 22. It is therefore clear that the insurance company itself has not placed before the Court either a specific defence or substantive evidence to point out that this policy is only to the extent the Act provides. The vehicle in question is meant solely for carrying of goods and no person is allowed to travel in the said vehicle.” 22. It is therefore clear that the insurance company itself has not placed before the Court either a specific defence or substantive evidence to point out that this policy is only to the extent the Act provides. It is to our examination we found that the policy is undoubtedly a package policy and once it is seen that it is a package policy, then subsection 5 of Section 147 comes into operation which mandates: “notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an insurer issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons.” 23. Thus, it is clear that the category of persons mentioned in the policy for whose risk additional premium is collected are of different category/classes than the driver and hence, in terms of the policy, the insurer is liable to indemnify the insured against any claim from him. 24. We must further notice that apart from all that is referred to, the case appears to be much more than simpler. The claimant has specifically contended that he was accompanying the goods i.e., cow and calf for transporting from one destination to another. It is during transit that the unfortunate accident occurred. He therefore claimed to have accompanied the goods. The provisions of Section 147 extracted above undoubtedly covers the person accompanying the goods as also his representative. Therefore, statutorily also, the person accompanying the goods is covered. 25. The question now is whether cow and calf carried in the vehicle can be taken as goods. An attempt is made by the insurer to contend that carrying of small size animals or small quantity of goods does not give benefit of such protection. Therefore, statutorily also, the person accompanying the goods is covered. 25. The question now is whether cow and calf carried in the vehicle can be taken as goods. An attempt is made by the insurer to contend that carrying of small size animals or small quantity of goods does not give benefit of such protection. It is relevant to refer to the definition of goods as found under Section 2 clause (13) which reads thus: “Goods” includes livestock, and anything (other than equipment ordinarily used with the vehicle) carried by a vehicle except living persons, but does not include luggage or personal effects carried in a motor car or in as trailer attached to a motor car or the personal luggage of passengers traveling in the vehicle. 26. It is thus clear that goods statutorily include livestock. In the instant case, cow and calf carried in the vehicle being live stock is covered under the definition of goods. 27. When this provision was confronted to the learned counsel for the insurer, he responded relying on Rule 74 of the Motor Vehicle Rules which reads thus: 74. Carriage of animals in goods vehicle.-(1) No cattle shall be carried in a goods vehicle in a public place unless._ .(A) in the case of goat, sheep, deer or pig.- .(i) a minimum floor space of 0.2 square meter per head of such cattle is provided in the vehicles; (ii) proper arrangements for ventilation are made; and (iii) if carried in a double decked goods vehicle.- .(a) the upper deck flooring is covered with metal sheets with a minimum height of 7.62 cms. Raised on all four sides so as to prevent the animal waste matter such as urine, litter, etc., falling on the animals on the lower deck; .(b) proper arrangements for drainage are made on each floor; .(c) wooden battens are provided on each floor, to prevent slipping of hoofs of the animals .(B) in the case of any other cattle.- .(i) a minimum floor space of 2mx1m per head of cattle and half of such floor space for a young one of cattle which is wearied is provided in the vehicle; .(ii) the lead body of the vehicle is constructed of strong wooden planks or or iron sheets with a minimum height of 1.5 metres measured from the floor of the vehicle on all sides and the back; (iii) floor battans are provided to prevent slipping of hoofs; .(iv) every projection likely to cause suffering to an animal is removed, and (v) the cattle are properly secured by ropes tied to the sides of the vehicle. Explanation.-“Cattle” for the purposes of this sub-rule includes goat, sheep, buffalo, bull, ox, cow, deer, horse, pony, mule, ass, pig or the young ones thereof. .(2) No animal belonging to or intended for a circus, menagene or zoo shall be carried in a goods vehicle in a public place unless.- .(i) in the case of wild or ferocious animal, suitable cage, either separate from or integral with the lead body of the vehicle used or sufficient strength to contain the animal securely at all times is provided; and .(ii) reasonable floor space for each animal is provided in the vehicle. .(3) No goods vehicle when carrying any cattle or any animal shall be driven at a speed in excess of 24 kms. Per hour. 28. This Rule to which the learned counsel has referred, only postulates and deals in what manner live stock could be carried. It does not refer to prohibition of carrying of livestock in any vehicle in any circumstance except the minimum requirement that is necessary for the purpose of transporting the livestock. This proposition in defence by the insurance company certainly is of no avail because the question that we are deciding is whether cow and calf carried in the vehicle comes under the definition of goods. This proposition in defence by the insurance company certainly is of no avail because the question that we are deciding is whether cow and calf carried in the vehicle comes under the definition of goods. Being satisfied that livestock comes under the definition of goods, this contention which was admittedly not taken before the tribunal and is urged for the first time in this appeal is also worth rejection. 29. Having thus concluded that livestock carried in the vehicle was “within the meaning of goods” mutadis mutandis, the provisions of Section 147 becomes applicable and a person accompanying such goods becomes statutorily covered. 30. A last attempt is made by the learned counsel to contend that as held by the Apex Court in the decision cited by him, a person accompanying the goods would be covered under the policy if he were to travel in a cabin in a seat provided apart from the driver’s place. Since the seating capacity of this vehicle was only one, he submits that the person accompanying goods could not have traveled and therefore, there is no statutory coverage. 31. In the decision relied upon by the learned counsel, what is considered by the Apex Court is different set facts. The Apex Court noticed that along with goods, the person was found to have carried a luggage. Besides, he was not traveling in the cabin along with the driver, but was in the carrier portion. In such circumstances, the Apex Court held that if a person were to claim protection under the statute, he must not only accompany “gods” as defined, but also must be shown to have sat in a vehicle with a permissible seating capacity. In that context, the Apex Court held that seating capacity of the vehicle is important. In the instant case. If the insurance company was conscious of the fact that only one seat is provided to the vehicle, then it has to explain how it decided to collect extra premium to cover different category of persons like loaders, unloaders and employees in connection with the vehicle. Therefore, the contention that coverage of insurance is relatable to the seating capacity of the vehicle Is certainly untenable. 32. For the reasons discussed above, we are satisfied that the claimant comes under the category of persons agricultural activity is impossible so also his avocation of cook. Therefore, the contention that coverage of insurance is relatable to the seating capacity of the vehicle Is certainly untenable. 32. For the reasons discussed above, we are satisfied that the claimant comes under the category of persons agricultural activity is impossible so also his avocation of cook. He does not claim to have any income from the landed property, but has assertively contended that he was an agriculturist which involve physical fitness. We are, therefore, satisfied that the claimant has established that there is a relatable diminishing effect in his earning capacity. The doctor has assessed the physical disability at 80% of the whole body and therefore, loss of income has to be determined keeping in mind the functional incapacity to which, the claimant has become victim. Having noted that loss of limb has the effect on earning through, manual labour is impossible. The claimant would been titled to 100% loss of income through agriculture. Since cooking also required physical fitness, that job is also now impossible. We are therefore satisfied that even though the doctor has stated physical disability of 80% of one limb, the earning capacity must be proportionate to it. We find sufficient force in the contention of learned counsel for the claimant that the tribunal has been totally irrational in taking 6% as the accompanying the goods, covered statutorily under Section 147 of the Act. 33. The tribunal fell totally in error in absolving the insurance company, without taking into consideration all the factors discussed above. The direction directing insured to discharge the award is unsustainable and we fasten the insurance company with liability to indemnify the insured in respect of the award in favour of the claimant. 34. With this, we shall consider the determination of compensation. Claimant has successfully established sufferings of injuries and thus, has established nexus between the accident and the injuries suffered by him and permanent physical incapacitation. The fact that the claimant has suffered amputation of one lower limb below knee and fracture of the other limb and injuries to other parties of the body is fully evidenced from the testimony of the claimant as also the Medical Officer P.W.2-Dr.Suresh G.Bhat. The evidence is so clear that it fully establishes the claimant is now physically wrecked. Having lost one lower limb, percentage of physical disability in respect of the injuries suffered by the claimant. 35. The evidence is so clear that it fully establishes the claimant is now physically wrecked. Having lost one lower limb, percentage of physical disability in respect of the injuries suffered by the claimant. 35. At this stage, the learned counsel for the insurer would submit that be it as it may, even if the claimant has suffered any physical disability, the disability must be only in terms of the schedule provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 36. We regrettably note that the insurers have misconstrued the very concept of grant of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act and have indulged in litigus conduct. The insurance company is either deliberately or intentionally ignoring the fact that the claimant/appellant has sought determination of compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act and not under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. They seem to ignore the provisions of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act which mandates that determination of compensation and award must be “just”. Therefore, the tribunal was required to award compensation “just”, Compensation, neither high nor low. 37. We therefore disapprove the conduct of the insurance company in trying to impede the process of grant of ‘Just’ compensation by untenable defence as taken above which we have rejected. 38. Coming to the actual determination, we notice that 80% physical disability of limb must be evaluated in relation to whole body and as it is possible for the claimant to carry out some other avocation like business with the disability he has suffered, it would be appropriate to take his loss of earning capacity at 70%. We have to determine the income which the claimant had prior to the accident. The two avocations which he has stated has not been disputed and it is well established, at the modest calculation he would not have had earning of less than Rs.3,000/-per month. The tribunal has again unrealistically taken his income at Rs.70/-per day and on that basis, determined the compensation. We set aside the said mode and methodology and we take the income at Rs.3,000/-p.m. and 36,000/-p.a. The age of the claimant at the time of accident was 53 years and the multiplier applicable would be 11. Therefore, loss of future income will be Rs.2,77,200/-which we award modifying the award of the tribunal. 39. We set aside the said mode and methodology and we take the income at Rs.3,000/-p.m. and 36,000/-p.a. The age of the claimant at the time of accident was 53 years and the multiplier applicable would be 11. Therefore, loss of future income will be Rs.2,77,200/-which we award modifying the award of the tribunal. 39. Since it is a case relating to personal injury, the claimant has to be compensated for loss of amenities, loss of enjoyment of life, towards reimbursement of medical expenditure, future medical treatment as also the artificial limb, conveyance, diet, attendant charges and above all, towards pain and suffering. We are satisfied from evidence and other attending circumstances that the Tribunal has not awarded proportionate to pain and suffering the claimant has endured as also on other heads. Therefore, we award to the claimant a sum of Rs.30,000/-towards pain and suffering, Rs.50,000/-towards medical expenditure, conveyance, attendance charges and special diet, Rs.25,000/-towards loss of amenities of life, Rs.40,000/-towards future medical expenses and replacement of artificial limb. In all, the claimant would be entitled to a sum of Rs.4,22,200/-with interest @6% on the enhanced compensation as against the sum of Rs.1,28,840/-awarded by the Tribunal. 40. We set aside the direction of the Tribunal with regard to payment of compensation by the insured and we direct the amount of compensation to be paid by the insurance company within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 41. Out of the amount of compensation awarded, we direct 70% amount with proportionate interest to be kept in Fixed Deposit initially for a period of five years, but the balance amount with proportionate interest to be paid over to the claimant. Appeal stands disposed of in terms of this order. No cost.