JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.P. Sahi, J.—The present writ petition has been preferred against the order of Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, dated 16.2.2006 and the rejection of restoration application in the said revision whereby the Deputy Director of Consolidation has set aside the order of Consolidation Officer dated 9.10.1998 and order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation in Appeal dated 26.8.2002 and has declared Respondent No. 3 to be the co-sharer of the land of Khata Nos. 264 and 266, the disputed property in the present proceedings. 2. The respondent-Ram Ratan and one Banshi filed objections under Section 9-A (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 claiming co-tenancy rights in the Khatas aforesaid. The Consolidation Officer rejected the said objection on 9.10.1998 against which an appeal was filed before the Settlement Officer Consolidation which met the same fate. The appellate order is dated 26.8.2002. The respondent No. 3 filed a revision under Section 48 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act and the Deputy Director of Consolidation by the impugned order has reversed the order of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation and has proceeded to declare the respondent No. 3 to be a co-tenant of the property in dispute. 3. The Petitioners contend that the consolidation proceedings had been undertaken earlier and that the respondent No. 3 did not choose to stake any claim in the first round of proceedings, therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, the Respondent No. 3 was not entitled to file any objection in the second round of fresh consolidation proceedings in view of the bar operating against him under the provisions referred to herein above. To appreciate the controversy, Section 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, is quoted herein below : “[49. To appreciate the controversy, Section 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, is quoted herein below : “[49. Bar to civil jurisdiction.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of right of tenure­holder in respect of land lying in an area, for which a (notification) has been issued (under sub-section (2) of Section 4) or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceedings could or ought to have been taken under this Act:] [Provided that nothing in this section shall preclude the Assistant Collector from initiating proceedings under Section 122-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 in respect of any land, possession over which has been delivered or deemed to be delivered to a Gaon Sabha under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act.] 4. On this vital issue, the opinion of the Consolidation Officer and that of the Settlement Officer Consolidation was unanimous to the effect that the bar of Section 49 operated against the respondent No. 3 and, therefore, the objection deserves to be rejected. The Consolidation Officer, while deciding issue No. 3, has clearly recorded that Respondent No. 3 had attained majority when the previous consolidation proceedings had intervened, and his father was also alive. In the event, they had a claim of co-tenancy rights on the basis of the share claimed by them in accordance with the pedigree, they ought to have filed objections which they did not do and, therefore, the provisions of Section 49 directly stared in their face. The Settlement Officer Consolidation in appeal affirmed the said finding and also relied on the decision in the case of Dudh Nath v. Sugani and others, 2000 RD 96. The Settlement Officer Consolidation in appeal affirmed the said finding and also relied on the decision in the case of Dudh Nath v. Sugani and others, 2000 RD 96. In a revision preferred by Respondent No. 3, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, after discussing certain judgments of this Court and the Apex Court, came to the conclusion that whenever there is an allegation of fraud relating to forged entries or a claim of co-tenancy, the bar of Section 49 of the Act would not operate. He has further held that Respondent No. 3 has also claimed that he was a minor when the earlier proceedings of consolidation operations in the first round had intervened. Accordingly, he reversed the orders of Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation and allowed the objection of Respondent No. 3 declaring him to be a co-tenant. 5. Sri Maurya, learned counsel for the petitioners, urged that Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in law by treating the bar of Section 49 to be not applicable in the controversy and for that learned counsel for the petitioners has heavily relied on the decision in the case of Jagdeo and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and others, 2006 (101) RD 216. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner on the strength of the ratio in the case of Jagdeo (supra), has contended that the bar not only operates because of the first round of consolidation having been concluded but also because of the fact that long standing entries clearly demonstrate that the petitioners were the sole successors to the property and, therefore, were rightly recorded as sole tenants. For this, he invited the attention of the Court to various paragraphs of the judgment in Jagdeo’s case (supra) and urged that Deputy Director of Consolidation has grossly erred by taking a decision contrary to the law laid down by this Court. 7. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 3, Sri Chaudhary, in reply, urged that the said decision in Jagdeo’s case does not lay down the law correctly and that there are several decisions to the contrary as noticed by the learned single Judge himself in paragraph 32 of the decision in Jagdeo’s case. 7. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 3, Sri Chaudhary, in reply, urged that the said decision in Jagdeo’s case does not lay down the law correctly and that there are several decisions to the contrary as noticed by the learned single Judge himself in paragraph 32 of the decision in Jagdeo’s case. He contends that, as a matter of fact, the learned single Judge once having been confronted with judgments of co-ordinate Benches and other decisions of larger Benches and of the Supreme Court ought to have followed them or adopted the procedure for referring the dispute to a larger bench instead of taking upon himself the task of laying down a law which was in direct conflict to the decisions cited before him. It is urged that the only alternative course permissible was as laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rana Pratap Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1995 ACJ 200, subject to the limitations prescribed therein. 8. I have perused the said judgment, and in view of the submissions advanced it is evident that the crucial question to be decided in the present matter is as to whether the bar of Section 49 would operate against Respondent No. 3 and his objection was rightly rejected by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation or not. It has to be further examined as to whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in proceeding to over rule the bar of Section 49 and, therefore, had acted in the teeth of the decision of Jagdeo’s case. This necessarily takes the Court to the question of correctness of the decision in Jagdeo’s case as urged by the learned counsel for the respondents. 9. In order to appreciate the aforesaid controversy, it would be appropriate to quote para 32 of the decision in Jagdeo’s case at the very outset, which is reproduced below : “32. In some authorities a contrary view has been taken, however, no authority has considered the various aspects dealt with by me herein above.” 10. 9. In order to appreciate the aforesaid controversy, it would be appropriate to quote para 32 of the decision in Jagdeo’s case at the very outset, which is reproduced below : “32. In some authorities a contrary view has been taken, however, no authority has considered the various aspects dealt with by me herein above.” 10. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, has to be given due weight inasmuch as once the learned single Judge had himself noted decisions which were directly in conflict with the view taken by the learned single Judge then merely because certain other aspects have not been dealt with in the earlier judgment would not allow a co-ordinate Bench to render an independent decision. For this, reference may be had to the following paragraph in the case of Rana Pratap Singh (supra). Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted herein below : “16. On this aspect another relevant judicial pronouncement comes in Ambika Prasad v. State of U.P., ( AIR 1980 SC 1762 ). There, in the contest of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961, while dealing with the question as to when reconsideration of a judicial precedent is permissible, Krishna Iyer, J. so aptly put it “Every new discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent”. 17. Further, “It is wise to remember that fatal flaws silenced by earlier rulings cannot survive after death because a decision does not lose its authority ‘merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned’ (Salmond Jurisprudence, page 215, 11th Edition)” 11. It is, therefore, evident that in view of the law laid down by the Full Bench, it was necessary that the matter ought to have been referred to a larger Bench in order to resolve the conflict and the learned single Judge himself could not have rendered an independent decision on the ground that certain other aspects have not been dealt with which have been considered for the first time in Jagdeo’s case. In my opinion also, the matter did require a reference for an authoritative pronouncement. 12. In my opinion also, the matter did require a reference for an authoritative pronouncement. 12. Apart from this, what has to be examined is that the learned single Judge in Jagdeo’s case has arrived at the conclusion that not only in view of the provisions of Section 49 but also on the general principles of estoppel, waiver, acquiescence, and the silence of a claimant, the institution of such proceedings would be barred keeping in view the long standing revenue entries. For this, the learned single Judge has concluded that after the enforcement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, new tenancy rights have been created and a forum for declaration of rights as well as for correction of records has been specifically provided under the said Act. The learned single Judge concludes that once a complete machinery has been provided, then a person claiming certain rights has the opportunity to seek declaration under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and the Act having come in force in 1952, a person claiming such rights should have instituted a Suit for declaration or proceedings for correction of records under the said Act itself within a reasonable time. The natural corollary of such a conclusion appears to be that even if no consolidation proceedings have intervened then also a person has an opportunity to get his rights declared under the said statute and he need not wait for the consolidation operations to intervene. The learned single Judge has opined that if a person fails to make such an effort for a long time and allows the entries to continue then he is estopped from raising any dispute arising out of old pre-existing rights including co-tenancy rights on the basis of succession through a pedigree. The ratio, therefore, is that once a person has not shown any diligence to assert his rights then he will be presumed to have waived his rights to contest and stake his claim in future. 13. The learned single Judge has also taken notice of the bar created by the legislature for institution of litigation before the civil and revenue Courts and has further extended the principle of ‘could’ or ‘ought’ to be available in Section 49 of the Act relying on the decision in the case of Narendra Singh and others v. Jai Bhagwan and others, AIR 2005 SC 582 . A perusal of the decision in the case of Narendra Singh (supra) would indicate that the Court has proceeded to record that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was barred on the facts of that case as the jurisdiction to decide a dispute of rights and title over agricultural land has to be adjudicated in the consolidation proceedings if they have intervened, as the Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the consolidation authorities to decide the same. For that, the Apex Court relied on its earlier decision in the case of Sita Ram v. Chhota Bhondey and others, 1995 Suppl. (1) SCC 556. The said decision nowhere lays down that if consolidation operations have intervened then merely because no rights have been asserted under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, a rightful claimant would be precluded from raising such an issue before the consolidation Court. In view of the aforesaid position, with the utmost respect to the learned single Judge I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the view expressed in paragraph 13 of the judgment in Jagdeo’s case (supra). 14. Further the doctrine of estoppel and acquiescence which has been inferred to be applicable impliedly would also not be attracted inasmuch as the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act is a special Act which has been conferred with the jurisdiction to decide matters relating to rights, title and entries of land tenures of every sort. The Act, nowhere provides for any such bar of estoppel and acquiescence and, therefore, the inference drawn by the learned single Judge, in my humble opinion, is unsupported by law. There is neither any express nor any implied provision which would imply the application of the principle of estoppel and acquiescence. 15. The opportunity to assert a right under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act is an independent right which cannot be curtailed either on a plain reading of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act or even otherwise in view of the existing provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It would be worth repeating that no such embargo is contained under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act as well. It would be worth repeating that no such embargo is contained under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act as well. It would be a different thing that once an objection is filed, the same would be decided on the merits of such a claim but merely because long standing entries have not been disputed, the same would not extinguish the rights of a claimant to file an objection. 16. There is yet another aspect which deserves mention. A suit for partition under Section 176 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would not be barred under Section 49 of the Act. A co­tenant, who remains, unrecorded can also seek partition of his share. Such disputes are not uncommon. Can in such a situation it be said that the bar of Section 49 would operate? The obvious answer in my opinion would be in the negative. This aspect has also been not considered by the learned single Judge in Jagdeo’s case. 17. The presumption in respect of long standing entries especially prior to the abolition of Zamindari has to be tested on the basis of the then existing laws and the present social context. Even if there were provisions under the U.P. Tenancy Act which would indicate the applicability of estoppel and acquiescence, such a bar has not been borrowed and transplanted under the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act. The social contexts, in which these laws were framed, have to be understood that there were joint families that lived together particularly Hindu families and such family compulsions did exist which prevented any such rights being asserted. In such a situation, the mere non-availability of entries in favour of a rightful claimant as a direct evidence would not automatically raise a waiver against a silent inheritor by operation of law. Such estoppel and acquiescence being a trait of conduct has to be examined by leading evidence and cannot be a matter of presumption in law. This is to say that there would be no such bar as stipulated under Section 49 of the Act. 18. Such estoppel and acquiescence being a trait of conduct has to be examined by leading evidence and cannot be a matter of presumption in law. This is to say that there would be no such bar as stipulated under Section 49 of the Act. 18. Such a claim may be accepted or rejected on the merits of the claim or on account of latches or on account of principles of res-judicata or even on account of presumptions being drawn upon trial on the strength of long standing entries, but an objection cannot be thrown out as being barred from being presented under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act. In my humble opinion, the learned single Judge has laid down a law which is contrary to the scope and object of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as well as the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act. 19. It is to be noted that ordinarily an estoppel operates either through a Statute or by a conduct of a party. When it is an estoppel by Statute then it is a bar under the Statute itself, but where it is an estoppel by conduct, then it has to be inferred from the provisions of the Act and further on the strength of the adjudication of the conduct of the party. In my opinion neither of these ingredients are available under any provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act or of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The pre-existing rights by way of succession under a common pedigree to be asserted for obtaining a declaration of co-tenancy rights do not get automatically eclipsed unless and until there is a declaration under any law for the time being in force. 20. Similarly, a right to agitate such a claim cannot also be held to have got automatically extinguished under the garb of Section 49 of the Act. Not only this, it is a matter of evidence, as has been observed by the learned single Judge himself, to establish as to whether the property was ancestral or acquired by a common ancestor or not. Not only this, it is a matter of evidence, as has been observed by the learned single Judge himself, to establish as to whether the property was ancestral or acquired by a common ancestor or not. Taking an example, like the present case in hand, which reflects such a dispute on facts, the claim has to be examined on the strength of the rights of the parties as per the tenancy and personal laws governing succession that existed prior to the abolition of Zamindari. This, being a question of fact, cannot be presumed or concluded on the basis of mere standing of long entries and the same, therefore, cannot be made the basis for creating a bar against a rightful claimant to present his objection before the appropriate authority in accordance with law. The declaration of such right has to be made on the basis of the assessment of evidence even if there is a strong presumption in favour of long standing entries. The right of a claimant to seek a remedy of judicial review under the Statute cannot be automatically taken away on the strength of long standing entries. It is to be remembered that if entries were all, then the pen of the Patwari or the Lekhpal would be the final verdict and Courts intervention may not be required. It is true that the record-keeper wields a powerful pen but under the law, and is supposed not to do otherwise. Such entries are often challenged and the presumption in their favour are often upturned on evidence being led. To presume that such evidence may not be available for rebuttal, would in my opinion, be assuming a fact the existence whereof cannot be ascertained except by allowing evidence to be led. The parties may find it difficult or even impossible to gather evidence, but such a difficulty will not operate as estoppel in law. Whether the evidence can come forth or not cannot be prejudged by an assumption and the matter has to be permitted to be adjudicated. 21. One will have to go back in history to remind oneself of the maladies of revenue administration existing in the pre-Zamindari Abolition era. The society that existed then consisted of a vast majority of uneducated rural folk who dare not reach the Patwari for correction of records. 21. One will have to go back in history to remind oneself of the maladies of revenue administration existing in the pre-Zamindari Abolition era. The society that existed then consisted of a vast majority of uneducated rural folk who dare not reach the Patwari for correction of records. There were many social injunctions and embargoes backed up by threatening forces of the ruling upper class, who though a handful, had a definite say and virtually ruled the villages. The Patwari was no exception to such a rule and worked to the tune of such influential people. 22. At the same time those who needed help, were either neglected or they could not muster courage or enough wealth to achieve their rightful claim. Correction of records was often a casualty and it stands reflected not only in cases decided by Courts but also in contemporary history and literature of our State. Most of the time simpletons, who were victims of circumstances, like widows, orphans and minors, lived under a bona fide belief that they would not be duped by their own kith and kin. On the contrary, they felt protected and lived under the protective umbrella of an united family with no barrier of distrust coming in between. Such was the family union that a thought of distrust was looked down with contempt and this unflinching faith in the family superiors was revered. It was rarely that such trust was betrayed by the Karta, who was invariably recorded in the revenue records, that gave rise to litigation. But where such a trust survived for generations, particularly in the pre-independence era, then to raise a presumption that the entries are gospel truth would be negating reality. A strong presumption in favour of an uncorrected entry is fraught with an inherent weakness, namely that it is rebuttable by evidence. If this presumption is assumed to be a final proof, as if it were the law itself, then it would be resisting the very right of a claimant which cannot be culled out from any provision of existing revenue law governing land tenures. At least if the bar as suggested in Jagdeo’s case is accepted then it would in my opinion be denying opportunity to establish a fact through evidence. The existence of a right cannot be jeopardized by a final presumption in favour of entries as if it was the law itself. 23. At least if the bar as suggested in Jagdeo’s case is accepted then it would in my opinion be denying opportunity to establish a fact through evidence. The existence of a right cannot be jeopardized by a final presumption in favour of entries as if it was the law itself. 23. After all the Statute itself has been created for the adjudication of such a controversy and, therefore, merely because a controversy rests on pre-existing old rights, the same cannot operate as a bar for the claimant to present his claim. Apart from this, it has to be remembered that over and above specific Statutory rights, the right to judicial review forms the Basic Structure of the Constitution and is at par with a fundamental right. No waiver or estoppel can be pleaded against the availability of such a right. 24. Learned single Judge has also referred to the question of public policy. In my humble opinion, it would be against public policy to allow someone to become the sole owner by a mere default of claim by a co-sharer. The continuance of joint Hindu families is not uncommon even today. The fact, as to who had created the corpus of the property, goes to the root of the matter and, therefore, the right to succeed to such property cannot be shut out by reading a fiction into the law relating to land tenures as existing on today. The proof of title has to be examined in order to ascertain the source of the title and for that, in my humble opinion, there is no bar preventing a person from staking his claim. The bar of Section 49 was created in order to avoid multiplicity of forums. The creation of a separate forum, therefore, was also an important factor which, in my opinion, has been over looked in Jagdeo’s case. 25. In order to understand the applicability of the bar of Section 49, reference may be had to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Attar Singh and others v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 564 . The said decision clearly traces out the scope and object of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and the purpose for which it was enacted namely, being a piece of legislation brought forward which, in effect, recognizes fresh settlement proceedings of tenures. The said decision clearly traces out the scope and object of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and the purpose for which it was enacted namely, being a piece of legislation brought forward which, in effect, recognizes fresh settlement proceedings of tenures. The impact of declaration of consolidation proceedings to have intervened under Section 5 of the Act, have been considered in detail in the case of Ram Adhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh and others, 1968 RD 83. The salient features of the Act have been discussed to conclude that such litigations affecting the rights of persons have to be initiated before the consolidation authorities. The nature of finality of the decision rendered by a consolidation authority has been discussed in the case of Smt. Shakuntala Devi v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P. and others, 1968 RD 187. In Shakuntala Devi’s case, this Court has held that the Consolidation of Holdings Act have been enacted later on as a special Act and would prevail over the Zamindari Abolition Act. The Apex Court in the case of Sita Ram v. Chhota Bhondey and others, 1990 RD 439, also reasserts the exclusive jurisdiction of the consolidation Courts for declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders. The existence of the remedies under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act even though may have been existing before intervening of consolidation operations, the same would not take away the right of a tenure holders to assert his claim in view of the law referred to herein above. In a reference, the said question was answered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Indal v. Sheo Mohan and another, 1969 RD 499. 26. It would be worthwhile to note the ratio of the decision in the case of Budhlal and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur and others, 1982 RD 324, wherein it has been held that there is no way by which a person could become a co-tenant by acquiescence or estoppel under the Zamindari Abolition Act. This judgment, which reflects on the principles which have been invoked by the learned single Judge in Jagdeos case, appear to have been overlooked or was not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge. This judgment, which reflects on the principles which have been invoked by the learned single Judge in Jagdeos case, appear to have been overlooked or was not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge. This question has been again dealt with elaborately in a matter of co-tenancy rights in the case of Dudh Nath Kori and another v. Smt. Dhamrajja and another, 1964 RD 324. The aforesaid aspects, therefore, also having not been considered by the learned single Judge, in my humble opinion, requires a re-consideration of the decision in Jagdeo’s case. 27. To understand the impact of estoppel, one may have to refer to Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act which is quoted herein below for ready reference : “115. Estoppel.—When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.” 28. In my opinion, a perusal of the aforesaid provision would leave no room for doubt that this applicability of doctrine of estoppel would be essentially a question of fact to be adjudicated upon and not a matter of automatic law to prevent the filing of an objection. With all due respect to the ratio in the case of Jagdeo’s case, in my opinion, the law has been too widely stated therein. 29. From a perusal of the background of the legislation and also from a historical perspective, it is to be noted that the object of introducing the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was to do away with the maladies of land settlement and to create fresh rights in order to bring about uniformity in land tenures. The object to bring about the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was to ensure compactness of holdings and at the same time to provide a forum for settlement of the disputes of all nature. In effect, it is the Consolidation of Land Holdings Act which provides for adjudication of disputes relating to pre-existing rights and the new rights under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. In effect, it is the Consolidation of Land Holdings Act which provides for adjudication of disputes relating to pre-existing rights and the new rights under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It is for this reason, that the jurisdiction of the consolidation Courts, has been accepted to be the final forum for the decision of such rights. It is a forum for the settlement of land which was long over due and the object was to introduce permanency of settlement by adjudication of rights. The Consolidation of Holdings Act, therefore, is a special Act and it is for this reason that the Courts have interpreted the jurisdiction of the consolidation Courts to have over riding effect. The bar, created under Section 49, has also to be, therefore, understood in the aforesaid backdrop. It is something different that once the consolidation Courts have finally decided something after contest that the bar would certainly operate. However, the bar would not operate if any rights were got declared fraudulently through forged entries or by an alleged default. In my opinion, if a default is being alleged which is voluntary or otherwise, then such an aspect has also to be adjudicated. Estoppel or acquiescence would not by automatic operation debar a person from presenting a claim. The same conclusion may be drawn after the matter is adjudicated but, in my opinion, the presentation of a claim cannot be barred and the consolidation Courts cannot be prevented from entering into such issues or giving an opinion thereon. The law, relating to Section 49 of the Act, has been too widely stated in Jagdeo’s case and the expanded interpretation thereof requires a reconsideration. 30. Accordingly, the following questions, in my opinion, arise to be considered by a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement : (i) Whether the law laid down by the learned single Judge in the case of Jagdeo and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and others, 2006 (101) RD 216, is in conflict with the other decisions of this Court referred to herein above and as noticed by the learned single Judge himself in paragraph 32 of the said judgment? (ii) Whether the learned single Judge merely because of having arrived at a different conclusion as against the decisions cited to the contrary, on a consideration of additional aspects, could have rendered the decision himself, instead of referring the matter to a larger Bench in view of the law laid down in the case of Rana Pratap Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1995 ACJ 200? (iii) Whether the learned single Judge in Jagdeo’s case was justified in invoking the principles of the doctrine of estoppel and acquiescence for creating an implied bar merely because a co-tenant had failed to assert his rights under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act and was, therefore, barred from raising an objection under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 and the rules framed thereunder? (iv) Whether the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act have an over riding effect over all other Acts for the time being in force keeping in view the provisions of Section 49 and have the exclusive jurisdiction to decide right, title and interest of claimants relating to land tenures upon a notification under Section 4 or not? (v) Whether long standing entries which are questioned in an objection filed under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act hold only a presumptory value or they can be taken to be an absolute proof in law on the principle of estoppel, acquiescence and waiver and thereby attract an automatic bar of Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act. 31. Let the papers be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice under Chapter V Rule 6 of the Allahabad High Court Rules for passing appropriate order referring the matter to a larger Bench. ————