JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—This is the plaintiff’s Second Appeal having lost from the trial Court as well as from the 1st Appellate Court. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal is, that there was a land measuring 6.92 acres which had buildings, a garden house and several structures located in premises No. D/57-58, Sigra, Varanasi which was originally owned by Late Bireshwar Banerji, Sri Durga Prasad Banerji and Smt. Manisha Devi Banerji and the deity Madhusudan Ashtashivaji represented by their shebaits Sri Bireshwar Banerji and Durga Prasad Banerji. The owners of the premises executed a registered lease-deed 21.2.1963 for one bigha of land for a period of 99 years to Sri Mahabir Prasad, the father of the plaintiff, for the purpose of building a residential house, after accepting a premium of Rs. 2,000/- and a yearly rent of Rs. 100/-. It was contended that the lessee was put in possession but before the building could be constructed, Sri Mahabir Prasad died in the year 1965 and, the plaintiff, being the daughter of Mababir Prasad, became the sole successor and owner of the lease hold property. It was contended that the plaintiff resided at Allahabad with her husband and occasionally visited Varanasi and that the property was managed and looked after by her servants and that in the month of January, 1973 it was reported to the plaintiff that certain persons were trying to trespass over the plaintiffs land. Upon an inquiry and inspection of the record, it came to light that defendant Nos. 11 and 12 had obtained a sale-deed dated 13.5.1969 in their favour from one of the sons of the original lessor Bireshwar Banerji. The plaintiff contended that Bireshwar Banerji died in the year 1966 leaving behind defendant Nos. 1 to 5 who were his sons and defendant No. 6 who was his daughter’s son and defendant No. 1 who was his daughter. Sri Durga Prasad Banerji, another lessor, died in the year 1964, leaving behind his son’s daughter, Sandhya Chaudhary, defendant No. 1. The plaintiff further contended that defendant Nos. 11 and 12 had submitted a layout plan to defendant No. 17, namely, the Nagar Mahapalika in which several plots had been demarcated and a road and a park had also been carved out. The plaintiff further contended that defendant Nos. 11 and 12 had submitted a layout plan to defendant No. 17, namely, the Nagar Mahapalika in which several plots had been demarcated and a road and a park had also been carved out. The plaintiff submitted that the layout plan was submitted with the intention of selling the plots to different persons for building purposes. The plaintiff further contended that the defendant Nos. 11 and 12 had sold the sub plots to defendant Nos. 13 to 20 and that some of the defendants had put temporary boundaries around sub plot Nos. 3, 16, 17 and 18 and that the defendants were threatening to construct the buildings and to take possession over the disputed property of the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted that the sale-deed executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant Nos. 11 and 12 was not binding on the plaintiff inasmuch as the vendor alone, namely, defendant No. 2 was not entitled to transfer the property. It was submitted that no title passed on to defendant Nos. 11 and 12, who in turn, could not have executed any sale-deed in favour of defendant Nos. 11 to 20. The plaintiff, on these facts, instituted a suit for a mandatory injunction praying that the temporary boundary walls constructed by defendant Nos. 15 to 18 over sub plots No. 3, 16, 17 and 18, as shown in the plan annexed to the plaint, be demolished and possession be given to the plaintiff. The plaintiff further prayed that the defendant should be directed to remove the concrete, etc. on the alleged roads and remove the boundary of the alleged park and hand over vacant possession to the plaintiff. The plaintiff further prayed that defendant Nos. 11 to 21 be restrained from making any construction over the disputed land and from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession. The plaintiff further prayed that the Nagar Mahapalika, the defendant No. 22 be restrained from sanctioning any layout plan or sanction any construction of any building over any portion of the disputed land in question. The plaintiff further prayed that in the event the plaintiff was found to be out of possession of the disputed property or any portion thereof, in that event, a decree of possession be passed in favour of the plaintiff. 3. The defendant Nos. The plaintiff further prayed that in the event the plaintiff was found to be out of possession of the disputed property or any portion thereof, in that event, a decree of possession be passed in favour of the plaintiff. 3. The defendant Nos. 16, 17 and 18 filed their written statement alleging that they had purchased the land in question from defendant Nos. 11 and 12 for value without notice of the lease deed, in good faith and that the suit was barred under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendants submitted that the plaintiff was not the owner of the land and neither her father Mahabir Prasad was recorded as the owner in the Government records nor was the plaintiffs’ father ever came in possession. It was also alleged that Mahabir Prasad was the counsel of Bireshwar Banerji and on account of the fact that he was the Advocate General of the State of Bihar, he exercised undue influence and played a fraud and obtained the lease-deed from Bireshwar Banerji who, in any case, was not authorised by the co-owners to execute the lease-deed. 4. The defendant Nos. 11 to 12 are the President and Secretary of the Co-operative Society, who also filed their written statement reiterating the same allegations and contended that they are bonafide purchasers and are in possession and that the lease-deed executed in favour of the father of the plaintiff was obtained by fraud, and that, in any case, was never acted upon nor the name of the plaintiffs father was entered in the revenue records. 5. Upon the exchange of the pleadings, the trial Court framed 14 issues, namely— (1) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties? (2) Whether this Court has the jurisdiction to hear the suit as the land is agricultural land? (3) Whether the erstwhile owners had executed a lease deed dated 21.2.1963 for 99 years in favour of Late Mahabir Prasad, the father of the plaintiff? If so, its effect? (4) Whether the lease deed was acted upon and the plaintiff is in possession? If not, its effect. (5) Whether the father of the plaintiff, Late Mahabir Prasad was the counsel for Shri Bireshwar Banerjee in some other case and by influence had got the lease land executed? Its effect. (6) Whether Smt. Nirmala Verma was the sole owner of the disputed land? If not, its effect. (5) Whether the father of the plaintiff, Late Mahabir Prasad was the counsel for Shri Bireshwar Banerjee in some other case and by influence had got the lease land executed? Its effect. (6) Whether Smt. Nirmala Verma was the sole owner of the disputed land? (7) Whether Gandhi Girha Nirman Samiti was the owner of the land in dispute and the sale deeds executed by it was justified? (8) Whether the rights of the purchaser are protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act? (9) Whether the suit is barred by the principle of Estoppel? (10) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (11) Whether there was no cause of action to file the suit? (12) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any compensation from all or any of the defendants? If yes, then the rate and quantum. (13) Whether plaintiff has the right to get the constructions demolished and get possession ? (14) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled to? 6. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff moved an amendment application seeking permission of the Court to delete defendant Nos. 13 to 18 which was allowed and the plaintiff was permitted to delete these defendants. 7. The trial Court, after considering the material evidence on record and, after appreciating the evidence, decided Issues Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 in favour of the plaintiff. However, Issues No. 3, 4, 12, 13 and 14 was decided against the plaintiff. The trial Court held, that the suit was not bad for non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and that the property was not an agricultural property and that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit. The trial Court found that the father of the plaintiff did not obtain the lease-deed by exercising undue coercion nor played a fraud upon Sri Bireshwar Banerji. The trial Court, further found that Nirmal Banerji was not the exclusive owner of the property in question. The trial Court further found that defendant Nos. The trial Court found that the father of the plaintiff did not obtain the lease-deed by exercising undue coercion nor played a fraud upon Sri Bireshwar Banerji. The trial Court, further found that Nirmal Banerji was not the exclusive owner of the property in question. The trial Court further found that defendant Nos. 11 and 12, namely, the Cooperative Society were not the owners of the property and that the sale deed executed by the Society in favour of the other defendants was not a valid sale-deed and that the defendants had failed to prove their sale-deed as a valid document and that the said defendants were not entitled for the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The trial Court further found that the suit was filed within the period of limitation and was not barred by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence and that the cause of action had arisen for filing the suit which was filed within a period of limitation. 8. The trial Court, however, found that the property in question was never leased out to the father of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was never in possession and that it was not certain from the plaint or from the lease-deed as to from which place the defendants were to be evicted and therefore, held that the plaintiff was not entitled for any damages nor was entitled to get the construction demolished or to get the possession. The Court further found that the lease-deed, in any case, was never acted upon. On these findings, the trial Court dismissed the suit with costs. 9. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff filed an appeal. The defendant No. 12, namely, the Secretary of the Cooperative Society also filed a cross-objection against the findings recorded by the trial Court on Issue Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11. The lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff as well as the cross-objection of the said defendants. The lower appellate Court, found that the original lease­deed dated 21.2.1963 alleged to have been executed in favour of the father of the plaintiff was never filed nor proved before the trial Court and that no effort was made by the plaintiff to lead secondary evidence. The lower appellate Court, found that the original lease­deed dated 21.2.1963 alleged to have been executed in favour of the father of the plaintiff was never filed nor proved before the trial Court and that no effort was made by the plaintiff to lead secondary evidence. The lower appellate Court further held that in the absence of laying the foundation for secondary evidence, the certified copy of the lease-deed filed by the plaintiff could not be read in evidence. The lower appellate Court held that the plaintiff did not exercise due diligence and that she had maintained silence throughout about the location, existence, custody and control of the original lease-deed and since the plaintiff did not lay any foundation for leading secondary evidence, the certified copy of the lease-deed could not be relied upon nor could be taken as secondary evidence. The lower appellate Court, while arriving at this finding, relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras and another, AIR 1966 SC 1457 (para 8), which will be referred hereinafter at the appropriate place. The lower appellate Court consequently, held that the certified copy of the lease-deed was not admissible as secondary evidence. The lower appellate Court, further found that Bireshwar Banerji had no power to execute the lease-deed for and on behalf of the deity or on behalf of Durga Prasad Banerji. The lower appellate Court, further found that the presumption of the execution of the lease-deed could not be accepted nor could it be admitted in evidence under Section 90 or Section 90-A of the Evidence Act on the ground that the said document was 20 years old. The lower appellate Court held that the lease deed was alleged to have been executed on 21.2.1963 whereas the suit was filed on 5.2.1973 i.e., approximately 10 years after the execution of the alleged document and therefore, the document was not 20 years old on the date of the institution of the suit and therefore, the provision of Section 90 and 90-A of the Evidence Act was not applicable. The lower appellate Court consequently dismissed the appeal with costs. The cross-objection of the defendant was also dismissed on merit. 10. The lower appellate Court consequently dismissed the appeal with costs. The cross-objection of the defendant was also dismissed on merit. 10. The plaintiff, being aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal, filed the present Second Appeal under Section 100 of the C.P.C., which was admitted on the following substantial question of law, namely : (1) Whether the certified copy of the lease-deed of 1963 was admissible in evidence in the case? 11. Heard Sri A.D. Saunders, the learned counsel for the appellant. The order sheet indicates that the defendants have been served not only by post but also through a publication in the newspaper. Inspite of service, no one has appeared on behalf of the defendants. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the order of the lower appellate Court is manifestly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel submitted that the finding that the plaintiff had not explained the whereabouts of the original lease deed nor had laid the foundation for leading secondary evidence was patently erroneous and against the material evidence on the record. The learned counsel further submitted that the finding that the plaintiff did not exercise due diligence and did not lay any foundation for leading secondary evidence and the finding that the certified copy of the lease deed could not be read in evidence was patently erroneous and against the provisions of the Evidence Act. The learned counsel submitted that paper No. 96-Ga, dated 16.9.1985, was filed indicating that the original lease-deed had been lost and that permission was sought by the plaintiff to file the certified copy of the lease-deed as secondary evidence, which application, was neither considered by the trial Court or by the lower appellate Court. The learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff-appellant had indicated that the original lease-deed had been lost and consequently laid the foundation for leading secondary evidence and that the lower appellate Court committed a manifest error in holding that the appellant had not laid any foundation and further committed an error in holding that the certified copy of the lease-deed could not be read in evidence. The learned counsel further submitted that the findings of the lower appellate Court that the presumption of admissibility of the document under Section 90 of the Evidence Act could not be accepted, was patently erroneous. The learned counsel further submitted that the findings of the lower appellate Court that the presumption of admissibility of the document under Section 90 of the Evidence Act could not be accepted, was patently erroneous. The learned counsel submitted that the document was 20 years old on the date when the document was tendered in evidence. 13. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and upon a perusal of the record and, upon perusing the orders of the Court below, the Court is of the opinion that the order of the lower appellate Court on the findings on the issues relating to the appeal of the appellant cannot be sustained and, to that extent, the order of the lower appellate Court is liable to be set aside. 14. Admittedly the original lease deed was not filed. The first question that arises for consideration is, whether the whereabouts of the original lease-deed was explained by the plaintiff, and thereafter, a question would arise as to whether the plaintiff had laid the foundation for leading the secondary evidence. Chapter-V of the Evidence Act relates to the documentary evidence. Section 61 provides that the contents of a document may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Section 62 provides that primary evidence is the original document which is produced for the inspection of the Court. Secondary evidence has been explained in Section 63 as under : “63. Secondary evidence.—Secondary evidence means and includes : (1) certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained; (2) copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies; (3) Copies made from or compared with the original; (4) counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them; (5) oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it. 15. Section 64 of the Evidence Act provides that a document could be proved by primary evidence or by a secondary evidence. Section 65 provides that secondary evidence could be given in certain circumstances which reads as under : “65. 15. Section 64 of the Evidence Act provides that a document could be proved by primary evidence or by a secondary evidence. Section 65 provides that secondary evidence could be given in certain circumstances which reads as under : “65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.—Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in the following cases— (a) When the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power—of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in Section 66, such person does not produce it; (b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest; (c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time; (d) when the original if of such a nature as not to be easily moveable; (e) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in (India) to be given in evidence; (g) when the originals consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection. In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the documents is admissible. In case (b), the written admission is admissible. In case (e) or (f) a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible. In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.” 16. In the light of the aforesaid provisions, the Court finds that the original lease deed was not filed. In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.” 16. In the light of the aforesaid provisions, the Court finds that the original lease deed was not filed. The learned counsel for the plaintiff­appellant has filed an application supported by an affidavit, bringing on record a copy of Paper No. 96-Ga, dated 16.9.1985, in which it was stated that the original lease-deed has been lost and that permission may be given to the plaintiff to file the certified copy of the lease-deed as secondary evidence. The Court finds that the original application 96-Ga is not on the record and there is a noting that file ‘C’ and ‘D’ has been weeded out which contained this application 96-Ga. The Index shows that paper No. 96-Ga was filed on 16.9.1985. The office copy of paper No. 96-Ga of the plaintiff was shown to the Court which the Court finds to be an old and withered piece of paper, the genuineness of which could not be doubted. Consequently, the Court permitted the learned counsel for the appellant to bring on record a copy of paper No. 96-Ga. The order sheet of the trial Court does not indicate that any order was passed on this application. 17. In the light of the aforesaid, the Court finds that the appellant had explained the reasons for not filing the original document and had also laid the foundation for leading secondary evidence. The lower appellate Court has committed a manifest error in holding that the appellant had not laid any foundation to lead secondary evidence. The lower appellate Court further gave a finding that the certified copy of the lease deed was not admissible in evidence because it was only a copy on the strength of the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1457 . The lower appellate Court held : “In paragraph 8 on page 1461 of this judgment it was held certified copies of certain leases were not admissible in evidence because they were only copies.” 18. The lower appellate Court held : “In paragraph 8 on page 1461 of this judgment it was held certified copies of certain leases were not admissible in evidence because they were only copies.” 18. The Court has read paragraph 8 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Roman Catholic Mission’s case (supra) and finds that no such finding or observation has been given by the Supreme Court to the effect that certified copies of the lease-deed are not admissible in evidence because they are only copies. The Supreme Court has only held that if the original document has not been filed nor any foundation has been laid for the establishment of the right to give secondary evidence in that case, certified copies of the lease could not be taken in evidence. It is quite clear that the lower appellate Court has given this finding without reading the judgment of the Supreme Court. The finding given by the lower appellate Court, on this aspect of the matter is perverse and cannot be sustained. 19. In the present case, the appellant has laid the foundation for leading the secondary evidence. Consequently, under Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act, if the original document has been lost, secondary evidence of the contents of the document was admissible in evidence. Quite apart from the aforesaid, the certified copy of the lease deed was admissible in evidence also under Section 65(f). The certified copy was issued by the Sub-Registrar under Section 57(5) of the Registration Act which is admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original document. For facility, Section 57(5) of the Registration Act is quoted herein under : “57(5) All copies given under this section shall be signed and sealed by the registering officer, and shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original document.” 20. Consequently, the Court is of the opinion that the certified copy of the original lease-deed, issued by the Sub Registrar, under Section 57(5) of the Registration Act was admissible for the purposes of proving the contents of the original document and could be received as secondary evidence of the original document under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. 21. Consequently, the Court is of the opinion that the certified copy of the original lease-deed, issued by the Sub Registrar, under Section 57(5) of the Registration Act was admissible for the purposes of proving the contents of the original document and could be received as secondary evidence of the original document under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. 21. In Nani Bai v. Gita Bai Kom Rama Gunge, AIR 1958 SC 706 , the Supreme Court held that in the absence of a registered sale-deed for any reason, a certified copy could be filed as secondary evidence. 22. In Bhinka and others v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 , the Supreme Court held that a rebuttable presumption of the genuineness of a certified copy arises under Section 79 of the Evidence Act provided that (as stated in the proviso thereto), the document was executed substantially in the form and manner provided by law. 23. In Kalyan Singh v. Smt. Chhoti and others, JT 1990(1) SC 396, the Supreme Court held that a certified copy of a registered sale-deed could be produced as secondary evidence in the absence of the original sale-deed. The Supreme Court further held that the correctness of the certified copy referred to in Clause (1) of Section 63 of the Evidence Act is presumed under Section 79 of the said Act. 23. In Land Acquisition Officer, Vijayawada Thermal Station v. Nutalapati Venkata Rao, AIR 1991 AP 31 , the Full Bench held that a certified copy granted by the Sub-Registrar under the Registration Act is to be treated as secondary evidence. The Full Bench held as under : “Summarising the position, we hold firstly that if secondary evidence is allowed to be marked for one party without objection at the trial, no objection can be permitted to be raised by the opposite party at any later stage in the same Court or in appeal that conditions for adducing secondary evidence have not been made out initially. Secondly, we hold that though ordinarily copies of copies are not to be treated as secondary evidence unless such copies are again compared with the original, the said principle does not apply to certified copies granted by the Sub-Registrar under the Registration Act. Secondly, we hold that though ordinarily copies of copies are not to be treated as secondary evidence unless such copies are again compared with the original, the said principle does not apply to certified copies granted by the Sub-Registrar under the Registration Act. These certified copies are, under law, to be treated as secondary evidence and once they have acquired such a status, the marking of such documents at the trial without objection result in such documents and their contents being evidence in the case. No objection can be raised in the same suit or proceeding or in appeal later by the opposite party that before marking the certificate copies, the necessary conditions for adducing secondary evidence have not initially been established.” 25. In Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) through L.Rs. v. Sohan Lal (Dead) by L.Rs., 2000 (1) SCC 434 , the Supreme Court held that in view of the provision of the proviso to Section 68 and 65(a) of the Evidence Act, any document which is registered except in a case of a will, the execution of the document is not required to be proved unless the execution is denied specifically. In this regard, Section 114 of the Evidence Act read with illustration (e), provides that the Court may presume the existence of certain facts, namely, that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. 26. In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that the lower appellate Court committed a manifest error in holding that the certified copy of the original lease deed was not admissible as secondary evidence. The Court holds that the certified copy of the lease deed of 1963 was admissible in evidence and that the plaintiff had laid the foundation for leading the secondary evidence. In the light of the aforesaid, Issue Nos. 3, 4, 12, 13 and 14 are required to be decided again by the lower appellate Court. 27. The Court further finds that the lower appellate Court has observed that the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act was not available to the appellant on the ground that the documents filed was not 20 years old. 3, 4, 12, 13 and 14 are required to be decided again by the lower appellate Court. 27. The Court further finds that the lower appellate Court has observed that the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act was not available to the appellant on the ground that the documents filed was not 20 years old. The lower appellate Court held that the lease-deed was executed on 21.2.1963 and that the suit was filed on 5.2.1973, i.e., approximately 10 years after the execution of the alleged document and therefore, the document was not 20 years old on the date of the institution of the suit and therefore, the provisions of Section 90 and 90-A of the Act was not applicable. In my opinion, the finding of the lower appellate Court is not correct. For facility, Sections 90 and 90-A of the Evidence Act, as applicable in the State of U.P., reads as under : “90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old.—Where any document purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person’s handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. 90-A. Presumption as to electronic record five years old.—Where any electronic record, purporting or proved to be five years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the digital signature which purports to be the digital signature of any particular person was so affixed by him or any person authorised by him in this behalf.” 28. In Ram Jas and others v. Surendra Nath and another, AIR 1980 All 385 , the Full Bench held : “The presumptions available under Sections 90 and 90-A are also not similar. Section 90(2) permits the raising of the presumption in respect of the signature, handwriting, execution and attestation, while Section 90 permits a presumption only in respect of execution. Section 90 deals with documents which are more than 20 years old while Section 90-A places no such restriction and includes also documents from judicial record. Section 90(2) permits the raising of the presumption in respect of the signature, handwriting, execution and attestation, while Section 90 permits a presumption only in respect of execution. Section 90 deals with documents which are more than 20 years old while Section 90-A places no such restriction and includes also documents from judicial record. Neither of the two Sections, therefore, can be said to be occupying a field which the other exclusively occupies. They deal with different fields and different circumstances and permit different types of presumptions to be raised. For the reasons given above it is not possible to hold that sub-section (2) of Section 90-A will override and nullify Section 90 if the document, though more than twenty years old, is the basis of the suit or the defence or is relied upon in the plaint or written statement. We are, therefore, of opinion that Om Prakash v. Bhagwan, AIR 1974 All 389 , does not lay down the correct law." 29. In Smt. Vidya Devi and others v. Nand Kumar, AIR 1981 All 274 , it was held : "A deed of adoption, however, does not require attestation and if the document is registered and is produced from proper custody, the provisions of Section 90-A could have applied thereto. In this case, however, the deed of adoption is a document which was referred to and has been relied upon in the written statement. Even though the original document has been filed, yet on account of the proviso to Section 90-A (1) the presumption which could have been raised under Section 90-A (1) of the Evidence Act will not apply in such a case. In my opinion there is no conflict between the provisions of Section 90 as amended in U.P. and Section 90-A as added in U.P. though they are designed to operate in different fields, yet they can operate simultaneously over a limited common area also. They do not mutually exclude the applicability of one by the other. A document which is registered and is also more than 20 years old cannot be admitted in evidence under Section 90-A if it is the basis of the suit or of defence, yet it can still be held proved in view of the provisions of Section 90 and a presumption referred to therein can be raised in respect of such a document. In my opinion, therefore, the lower appellate Court was absolutely incorrect in discarding this document as inadmissible as the same was, in fact, admissible under Section 90 as amended in U.P. being the original document which was more than 20 years old and had been produced from a proper custody." 30. In Manjoor Ali and another v. Kishmat Ali and others, AIR 2004 All 395 , I had the occasion to deal with the provisions of Section 90 and 90-A of the Evidence Act. The Court held : “From the aforesaid it is clear that Section 90-A(2) does not override Section 90 of the Evidence Act. Both the sections operate in different fields. A document which is registered and which is more than 20 years old could not be admitted in evidence under Section 90-A(2) if the said document is the basis of the suit or of defence. However, the presumption, if available under Section 90, can therefore be raised by the Court even after holding that the presumption is not available under Section 90-A of the Act. Thus, I hold, that the presumption under Section 90(2) of the Evidence Act is not taken away by the provisions of Section 90-A(2) of the Act. The question therefore, that arises in the present case is whether the presumption under Section 90(2) of the Act was available on the certified copy of the sale deed dated 16-5-1933 to the plaintiff. It is relevant to state here that Section 90 of the Act removes the strict rule of proof of private documents. Presumption of genuineness may be raised where the document is produced from a proper custody. However, in view of the provisions of Section 90 of the Act, it is the discretion of the Court to accept the presumption flowing from Section 90. In the present case, the mere production of the certified copy of the sale deed was not by itself sufficient to justify the presumption of the execution of the original under Section 90. The provisions of Section 90 has to be read along with Section 65 of the Act. Mere production of a certified copy of the said deed is not sufficient to draw a presumption under Section 90. It must be shown that the document produced was a copy admitted as secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Act.” 31. The provisions of Section 90 has to be read along with Section 65 of the Act. Mere production of a certified copy of the said deed is not sufficient to draw a presumption under Section 90. It must be shown that the document produced was a copy admitted as secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Act.” 31. In Surendra Krishna Roy and another v. Mirza Mahammad Syed Ali Mutawali and others, AIR 1936 PC 15, it was held that the period indicated under Section 90 of the Evidence Act was to be reckoned not from the date upon which the deed was filed in the Court but from the date on which it had been tendered in evidence and its genuineness or otherwise became subject of proof. Similar view was again held in Babu Nandan and others v. Board of Revenue and others, AIR 1972 All 406 . 32. Consequently, the material date for admissibility of a document is the date on which the document was tendered in evidence and that the period is not reckoned from the date of the institution of the suit. The lower appellate Court misdirected itself on this question. 33. For the reasons stated aforesaid, the Second Appeal is allowed. The order of the lower appellate Court, in so far as it relates to the appeal of the appellant, is set aside and the matter is remitted again to the lower appellate Court to decide the appeal of the appellant in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above after hearing all the parties concerned within six months from the date of the production of a certified copy of this order. 34. The Registry is directed to remit the record at the earliest within three weeks from today. ———