Judgment : Per N. KIRUBAKARAN, J The fate should not have been so cruel to the girl, who accompanied her friend brined bride for the celebration of her marriage on 30.6.1993, and the vehicle in which they travelled met with an accident and because of which, she lost her right hand. The victim filed claim petition for a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- and the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 1,45,750/-. .2. The appeal has been preferred by the Insurance Company aggrieved by the award of Rs. 1,45,750/- as compensation to the victim. .Facts: 3. The case of the first respondent/claimant was that she accompanied her friend bride whose marriage was to be celebrated on the next day i.e. on 30.6.1993 and travelled in a van. The lorry which was coming in the opposite direction was driven in rash and negligent manner and hit the van and many people injured including the first respondent/claimant. She sustained injuries on the head, face, right leg and left hand. The injuries made her right hand to be amputated. She was aged about 15 years at the time of accident. For injuries, for mental agony and for pain and sufferings, she sought Rs. 2,50,000/-. 4. Theappellant/Insurance Company contested the claim petition contending that there was no valid driving licence for the driver to drive the van in which the claimant travelled. .5. On appreciation of the pleadings, evidence and the Exhibits produced by the respective parties, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the appellant did not prove that there was no effective driving licence possessed by the driver, the second respondent herein and awarded a compensation of Rs. 1,45,750/- on various heads. Aggrieved by that only, the present appeal has been preferred by the Insurance Company. .Contention of the learned counsel for the appellant: 6. At the outset, Mr. Murugesan, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the owner of the lorry (first respondent before the Tribunal and the second respondent herein) passed away during the pendency of M.C.O.P. No. 329 of 1995 filed by the first respondent/claimant and no steps were taken to bring the legal representatives of the owner and it was incorporated even in the preamble portion of the award. In view of that, he submitted that when the case against the owner abated, there was no liability on the part of the Insurance Company to pay the amount to the claimant and in that event, the Tribunal should have dismissed the claim petition against the appellant. In nutshell, he submitted that there was no cause of action against the appellant in view of the abatement of claim against the owner who insured the vehicle with the appellant. 7. Mr. Murugesan also submitted the judgment of this Court in United India Insurance v. Vijaya (2006) 1 MLJ 688 : (2006) 1 CTC 325 in which a Division Bench of this Court remanded the matter to the Tribunal where the owner-cum-driver of the lorry passed away during the pendency of the award proceedings. Taking into consideration non-substitution of owner, the Bench of this Court held that it was improper on the part of the Tribunal to pass the award without considering the fact of non-substitution in the place of owner and accordingly, remanded the matter for fresh disposal permitting the claimants to implead the legal representatives of the deceased owner. The aforesaid judgment was produced by the learned counsel for the appellant only with bona fide intention to get the matter remanded to the Tribunal, so that the matter could be adjudicated properly. .8. The preamble of the award itself would show that the first respondent/owner already passed away and it got abated. When it was brought to the notice of the claimant that the first respondent/owner passed away, proper steps should be taken by the learned counsel for the claimant before the Tribunal. However, he slept over the matter and did not take any steps to bring the legal representatives of the owner. The duty of the advocate is to see the interest of his client who is entrusted with the matter to him with bona fide belief that his interest would be taken care by proper steps including proper arguments by placing judgments in support of his case. However, in this case, the learned counsel for the claimant did not even bother to take steps to being the legal representatives. If the contention of the Insurance Company is accepted as legally valid, the entire case goes and the poor victim would have gone without any compensation. In such a situation, it would only denote the failure of the advocate. If the contention of the Insurance Company is accepted as legally valid, the entire case goes and the poor victim would have gone without any compensation. In such a situation, it would only denote the failure of the advocate. This Court does not want to say anything more regarding the conduct of the advocate since the lower Court counsel for the claimant is not before this Court. .9. However, a perusal of Motor Vehicles Act would reveal that there is a specific provision in the Act that in case of death of the owner of the vehicle and the provision Section 155 is extracted as follows: .“Section 155: Effect of death on certain causes of action- Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925) the death of a person in whose favour a certificate insurance had been issued, if it occurs after the happening of an event which has given rise to a claim under the provisions of this chapter, shall not be a bar to the survival of any cause of action arising out of the said event against his estate or against the insurer.” 10. As per Section 155 of the Act, the death of the owner of the vehicle is not a bar to the survival of the cause of action, arising out of such event against his agent or against insurer. 11. Section 155 of the Act, supplies oxygen which is very much required for surviving the case of the first respondent/claimant. The Motor Vehicles Act is a special Act. It has been well settled by the Honourable Supreme Court that special law alone will prevail over the general law. In this case, the Motor Vehicles Act being a special law, it will override the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as the Limitation Act 1963. Hence, the application under Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Article 137 of Limitation Act will not have any application in this case. 12. Unfortunately, when the matter was argued before the Division Bench, in United India Insurance, Company Limited v. Vijaya (supra), Section 155 of the Motor Vehicles Act was not brought to the knowledge of the learned Judges and that is the reason why the Honourable Division Bench remanded as the matter to the Tribunal. 12. Unfortunately, when the matter was argued before the Division Bench, in United India Insurance, Company Limited v. Vijaya (supra), Section 155 of the Motor Vehicles Act was not brought to the knowledge of the learned Judges and that is the reason why the Honourable Division Bench remanded as the matter to the Tribunal. The Division of Bench of Karnataka High Court in New India Insurance Limited v. H. Siddalinga Naika AIR 1984 Kar. 228 dealt with similar case. Of Course, the matter arises under the old Act under Section 102 which is similar to Section 155 of the new Act (1988 Act). In that case, it was held that when the claim petition was pending before the Tribunal, the death of the owner does not abate the proceedings and the Tribunal has got the right to pass orders in relation to Section 102 of the old Act. Similarly, in Suresh v. Lokesbagowda AIR 1998 Kar. 17 , the learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court held that non-brining of legal representatives on record, would not make the claim petition as not maintainable. 13. Since there is a specific provision in the statue with regard to the survival of cause of action irrespective of the death of the owner, the claim petition is maintainable in spite of the fact that the legal representatives were not brought on record while pendency of the proceedings. Hence, this Court finds that the claim petition is maintainable against the insurer and the claim against the owner does not abate as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. .14. The learned counsel for the appellant assailed the award contending that the driver of the lorry (offending vehicle) did not have effective driving licence and it would amount to violation of policy conditions and that if the driver did not have the driving licence, there is no question of any payment by the Insurance Company. He relied upon the evidence of R.W.1 and R.W.2 and also Exhibit R-3 to drive home the point that there was no effective licence by the driver of the insured lorry. 15. The burden of proof that there was violation of policy condition by non-possession of effective driving licence by the driver of the insured vehicle is primarily on the Insurance Company. 15. The burden of proof that there was violation of policy condition by non-possession of effective driving licence by the driver of the insured vehicle is primarily on the Insurance Company. In a number of judgments, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that it is the burden cast upon the Insurance Company to prove the violation of policy conditions. It has been held by three Judges Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited v. Swaran Singh AIR 2004 SC 1531 : (2004) 3 SCC 297 that the breach of policy conditions (e.g.) disqualifications of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149 has to be proved to have been committed by the insured avoiding the liability by the insurer. 16. In this case, what has to be seen is as to whether the Insurance Company discharged its burden regarding violation of policy condition by producing evidence, even though in paragraph 2 of the additional counter statement, there was a mention about the non-possession of driving licence by the driver of the insured vehicle. However, the Insurance Company did not take proper steps calling upon the owner or the driver or the Regional Transport Officials to produce the driving licence. No such steps was taken by the appellant to discharge its burden. 17. The Tribunal while dealing with the defence taken by the Insurance company in paragraph 6 of the award, rightly concluded that the Insurance Company did not prove the non-possession of valid driving licence by the driver of the insured vehicle. The Tribunal observed that Exhibit R-2, the investigation report was not marked through the person who prepared it. But it was marked through another Officer who was not the author of the investigation report. Apart from that, one witness was examined as R.W.2 by the appellant Company. The said R.W.2 was the Head Constable, Geeyapuram police Station, who spoke about Crime No.472 of 1993 relating to the accident involved in this case. The following portion of the evidence would reveal that there was driving licence to the driver when he was arrested for the accident: Negligence: TAMIL The witness who was examined on the side of the appellant itself, would prove that there was driving licence possessed by the driver of the insured vehicle. The following portion of the evidence would reveal that there was driving licence to the driver when he was arrested for the accident: Negligence: TAMIL The witness who was examined on the side of the appellant itself, would prove that there was driving licence possessed by the driver of the insured vehicle. Hence, the finding/conclusion given by the Tribunal in this regard, is confirmed. Quantum: .18. As far as quantum is concerned, the first respondent/claimant claimed a sum of Rs.2,50,000/-(Rupees two lakhs fifty thousand only). Her contention was that she was working as a coolie earning about Rs.40/-(Rupees forty only) per day. Though she claimed Rs.1,200/-(Rupees one thousand two hundred only) per month as her earning, taking into consideration her age and also the number of days she would have worked, the Tribunal fixed the monthly income as Rs.1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) and after deduction one-third towards her personal expenses, a sum of Rs .670/-(Rupees six hundred and seventy only) was fixed as loss of income. 19. It is the admitted case that the claimant’s right hand was amputated and the disability as per Exhibit P-3 was fixed at 90%. Exhibit P-2 is the wound certificate. Exhibit P-3 would reveal that her right hand was amputated from shoulder joint level. She was aged about 15 years at the time of accident. By the accident and the disability, her matrimonial prospects were completely ruined. The lady has to undergo mental agony, pain and sorrow to lead a forced spinster life. Apart from that, there will be a social stigma attached to physically handicapped. Whether we accept or not, the society is not treating handicapped equally and they are looked down by the society and they are subject to discriminative treatment. We have to hang our head in shame with regard to the treatment meted out to the physically handicapped people. Many Statutes have been enacted by the Parliament to recognise their rights and to give separate reservation for them. This Court expects that the discrimination would disappear soon and handicapped would be treated equally and honourably. 20. The accident occurred on 30.6.1993. The Second Schedule was appended to the Motor Vehicles Act and as per Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicle Act, by way of an amendment Act 54 of 1994 took effect from 111. 1994. The question arises is, whether the amendment Act would take effect from 111. 20. The accident occurred on 30.6.1993. The Second Schedule was appended to the Motor Vehicles Act and as per Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicle Act, by way of an amendment Act 54 of 1994 took effect from 111. 1994. The question arises is, whether the amendment Act would take effect from 111. 1994 and whether it would cover the accident which occurred prior to 111. 1994. 21. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of Honourable Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Bhajan Kaur and Others 2008 (2) TN MAC 463 SC. In that case, the accident occurred on 1. 1983 and the Honourable Supreme Court held that the Statute is prospective unless it is held to be retrospective either expressly or by necessary implications. In another judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Pepsu Road Transport Corporation v. Kulwant Kaur and Others (2009) ACJ 1329 (SC), the accident took place on 110. 1982. In that case, the Tribunal dismissed the case for lack of evidence. On appeal, the learned single Judge affirmed the Tribunal’s award and against which L.P.A. was preferred before the Division Bench. The Division Bench awarded Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) and the review application filed was dismissed against which the appeal was filed before the Honourable Supreme Court. The Honourable Supreme Court held that for the accident which occured on 110. 1982, the provisions of 1988 Act will not be applicable. The learned counsel relied upon the Division Bench judgment in Cholan Roadways Corporation Limited v. S. Perungovai and 3 Others (1997) 2 LW 223 . In that case, it was held that the Act cannot applied retrospectively. .22. On the Other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent/claimant relied upon the judgment of the Hionourable Supreme Court passed in Lata Wadhwa and Others v. State of Bihar and Others AIR 2001 SC 3218 : (2001) 8 SCC 197 : 2001-II-LLJ-1559: II (2001) ACC 316 (SC) in which, the accident occurred on 3. 1989 in which a number of people died. The Committee headed by Mr. Justice CHANDRACHUD filed the report and various amounts were recommended to be paid to the death of the people. The adoption of multiplier according to the Second Schedule was upheld by the Honourable Supreme Court in that case. 1989 in which a number of people died. The Committee headed by Mr. Justice CHANDRACHUD filed the report and various amounts were recommended to be paid to the death of the people. The adoption of multiplier according to the Second Schedule was upheld by the Honourable Supreme Court in that case. In other judgment in R. Sulochana v. Ullgannal and Another (1998) 8 SCC 688 , the accident took place on 6. 1979 and the award passed by the Tribunal adopting the multiplier and awarded Rs. 18,000/-(Rupees eighteen thousand only). On appeal, the Honourable Supreme Court not only approved the adoption of multiplier, but also enhanced the compensation from Rs. 18,000/- (Rupees eighteen thousand only) to Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only). 23. A single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court held in L.K. Kousalyadevi and Another v. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and Others (2007) ACJ 301 wherein the accident occurred on 24. 1993 and after analysing the judgments of the Hounourable Supreme Court and various High Courts, the single Judge held that the Second Schedule is a guideline which should be taken as existing on the date of the accident that is 24. 1993. The amendment Act came into force with effect from 111. 19994. 24. An analysis of the judgments produced by the respective parties, shows that even for the accidents which occurred before the amendment Act, the Second Schedule was applied and accordingly, the compensation was paid. Apart from that, the Second Schedule is only a guideline to be followed by the Tribunal for awarding compensation. The Second Schedule contains a table prescribing the compensation to be awarded with reference to the age and income of the victim. There is no prohibition for the Tribunal to follow the Second Schedule for the accidents which occurred prior to 111. 1994. It is only a formula to be adopted and by following the Second Schedule, no prejudice is caused to the Insurance Company. The beneficial act should be interpreted in the manner which is more beneficial to the victim. In view of that, this Court confirms the application of Second Schedule by the Tribunal for calculating the compensation. 25. Though, the claimant stated as Rs. 40/-(Rupees forty only) as her daily income, the Tribunal fixed her monthly income as Rs. 1,000/-(Rupees one thousand only) as there is no evidence in this regard. In view of that, this Court confirms the application of Second Schedule by the Tribunal for calculating the compensation. 25. Though, the claimant stated as Rs. 40/-(Rupees forty only) as her daily income, the Tribunal fixed her monthly income as Rs. 1,000/-(Rupees one thousand only) as there is no evidence in this regard. It has been decided in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Kalpana (Smt) and Others (2007) 3 SCC 538 : (2007) 2 MLJ 1173 by the Hounourable Supreme Court in the absence of any proper definite evidence regarding income, Rs. 3,000/-(Rupees three thousand only) was found to be monthly contribution. However, considering the fact, the accident occurred on 30.6.1993, it would be appropriate to go by the national income given in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. Hence, her annual income is fixed as Rs. 18,000/- (Rupees eighteen thousand only). 26. As far as the notional income of Rs. 1,500/-(Rupees one thousand and five hundred only) is to be fixed for the monthly income. Considering the age of the lady, at the time of accident as 15, the proper multiplier according to the Second Schedule is Considering the loss of her hand, other injuries sustained by her and considering her age, the deduction of one-third from the income is unwarranted. Hence, no deduction could be made from the monthly income. Accordingly, the loss of income is calculated as follows: Monthly Income Rs. 1,500.00 Annual Income Rs. 18,000.00 Adopted Multiplier 16 x Rs. 18,000/- Rs. 2,88,000.00 27. Regarding pain and sufferings, a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) was awarded and for loss of enjoyment of life, a sum of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) was awarded. One important factor which has to be considered for the lady is that the loss of her right hand affects her marital prospects. It is very difficult to get the lady married considering her status, without her hand. Even if it is there, it is very dim. Hence, she has to be suitably compensated for that. For loss of matrimonial chances, it is appropriate to grant Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only). In view of granting aforesaid amount, Rs. 20,000/-(Rupees twenty thousand only) awarded towards loss of enjoyment is deleted. 28. The learned counsel for the respondent/claimant relied upon the judgment in New India Assurance Company Limited., Chennai v. 1.K. Kartheeswaran 2. For loss of matrimonial chances, it is appropriate to grant Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only). In view of granting aforesaid amount, Rs. 20,000/-(Rupees twenty thousand only) awarded towards loss of enjoyment is deleted. 28. The learned counsel for the respondent/claimant relied upon the judgment in New India Assurance Company Limited., Chennai v. 1.K. Kartheeswaran 2. R.T. Prince (2002) 2 LW 109 in which a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) was awarded towards pain and sufferings and a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) was awarded towards mental agony. The pain and sufferings underwent by the respondent/claimant could not be underestimated. However, this Court considers that a sum of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) is appropriate instead of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) as given by the Tribunal. 29. Accordingly, the award of the Tribunal is enhanced as follows: i) For loss of income Rs. 2,88,000.00 ii) For loss of marital prospects and enjoyment to life Rs. 1,00,000.00 iii) Towards pain and sufferings Rs. 30,000.00 Rs. 4,18,000.00 30. The award of the Tribunal at Rs. 1,45,750/- (Rupees one lakh forty five thousand seven hundred and fifty only) is enhanced to Rs. 4,18,000/- (Rupees four lakhs eighteen thousand only). The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the rate of interest granted by the Tribunal at 12% is on the higher rate. Considering the lending rate, the rate of interest is reduced to 9%. 31. Though a question may arise as to whether this Court has jurisdiction and power to enhance the compensation amount in the absence of appeal by the claimant, once the matter is brought to the notice of the Court and if the Court finds that relief was not granted properly, this Court cannot close its eyes and go by the technical pleas. It is bounden duty of this Court to independently apply its mind and decide the case of the victims who underwent the mental agony and loss of parts of their body. Apart from that, legally also under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, this Court has jurisdiction to enhance the compensation amount. Apart from that, legally also under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, this Court has jurisdiction to enhance the compensation amount. It was already decided by the Three Judges Bench of the Hounourable Supreme Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh (2003) 2 SCC 274 , and recently in the TNSTC v. Saroja (2008) 1 TNMAC 234 (SC), this Court has jurisdiction to enhance the compensation even in the absence of appeal or cross appeal by the claimant. 32. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the entire award amount as per the Tribunal’s award was deposited before the Tribunal. The Tribunal has directed to pay the amount to the claimant within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of a copy of 23 this order or on production of the copy of the order by the claimant whichever is earlier. As far as the enhanced amount is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant seeks four weeks’ time. On such deposit, the deposited amount has to be paid to the claimant within ten days. 33. Accordingly, the award of Rs. 1,45,750/- is enhanced to Rs. 4,18,000/- (Rupees four lakhs and eighteen thousand only) in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed by the appellant Insurance Company and the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition closed.