( 1 ) THE Civil revision application is admitted, and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, is heard finally. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to the civil revision application are stated thus -An agreement was executed between the respondent-Corporation and the applicant Firm whereby the Firm was to construct the first floor on the western wing of the Super Market in Sitabuldi, Nagpur at the Firm's cost. The agreement stipulated that the building so constructed shall always remain the property of the nagpur Municipal Corporation and the Finn would be deemed to be tenant on the first floor. The Firm was to pay 50% of the rent in cash and remaining 50% was to be adjusted towards the deposit i. e. the cost of construction which was incurred by the Firm. Clause 7 of the agreement stipulated that the period of lease would expire on the date of adjustment of the deposit and the Corporation reserved the right to renew the lease of the property on fresh terms and conditions. A notice was issued to the Firm on 3-12-1997 under section 134 of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1948 for the sake of brevity), thereby asking the Firm to raise objections, if any, within a period of 30 days against the assessment of taxes. The Firm lodged the objection to the notice under section 134 of the Act of 1948 and contended that there was no stipulation in the agreement dated 20-10-1986 fastening the liability upon the Firm to pay the taxes. According to the Firm, the property belonged to the Corporation and no taxes were leviable on the same. It was stated in the objection/reply that the demand made by the Corporation pertained to taxes and the Corporation was not entitled to recover the taxes under the garb of service charges. The Assessor, Nagpur Municipal Corporation, by the order dated 4-4-1998, while maintaining the assessment of taxes, modified the order of assessment by holding that the taxes were liable to be paid with effect from 1-4-1997 and not from 1989. The order dated 4-4-1998 was challenged by the Firm in an appeal under the provisions of section 130 of the Act of 1948. By the impugned judgment dated 14-8-2008. The order dated 4-4-1998 was challenged by the Firm in an appeal under the provisions of section 130 of the Act of 1948. By the impugned judgment dated 14-8-2008. The Appellate Authority, partly allowed the appeal filed by the Firm by holding that the Firm was not liable to pay the employment Guaratnee Cess and the Education Cess, but was liable to pay the conservancy Tax, Fire-Service Tax and the Light Tax. The Firm has challenged the order dated 14-8-2008 to the extent of the rejection of the appeal of the Firm in regard to the imposition of the Conservancy Tax, Fire Service Tax and Light tax. ( 3 ) SHRI M. G. Bhangde, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Firm, submitted that the Appellate Authority, committed a serious error in following the decision in the case of Union of India vs. State of U. P. and others, reported in (2007) 11 SCC 323, to hold that the three taxes i. e. Conservancy Tax, fire Service Tax and Light Tax, were, in fact, 'fees' on account of services rendered and that the expression "fee" finds place in Chapter XI of the Act of 1948 which relates to taxation. The learned senior counsel for the Firm took this court through the provisions of sections 114, 115a and 122 of the Act of 1948, to substantiate his submission that what was imposed upon the Firm was a tax and not a fee for the services rendered by the Corporation and the responsibility to pay the taxes was on the owner of the property. The learned Senior Counsel look this Court through the provisions of section 122 of the Act of 1948, which provide that the property taxes are payable by the owner thereof and in view of the explanation to section 122 of the Act of 1948, a tenant of the land or building under lease for any agreed period with a covenant for its renewal thereafter, is also a deemed owner. According to the learned Senior Counsel, there was no covenant of renewal in the agreement executed between the parties on 20-10-1986, as after the expiry of the lease period, on the adjustment of the deposit, the respondent-Corporation had reserved the right to renew the lease of the property. According to the learned Senior Counsel, there was no covenant of renewal in the agreement executed between the parties on 20-10-1986, as after the expiry of the lease period, on the adjustment of the deposit, the respondent-Corporation had reserved the right to renew the lease of the property. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that Clause 7 of the agreement dated 20-10-1986 was not a "covenant of renewal" within the meaning of the term under the explanation to section 122 of the Act of 1948. The learned Senior counsel took this Court through the Black's Law Dictionary Seventh Edition, to canvass that a covenant to renew is an executory contract that gives a lessee the right to renew the lease. Similarly, a reference was also made to the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, which recited that a covenant to renew is one under which the tenant is given the right, on termination of lease, to get the extension of lease. In this case, according to the learned senior counsel, clause 7 of the agreement did not give a right to the tenant to get the extension of the lease and the lease was not renewable at the option of the Firm. The learned Senior counsel also relied on the decision in the case of State of U. P. and ors. vs. Lalji tandon, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 1 and specially paragraph 13 thereof, to canvass that the exercise of covenant of renewal is an unilateral act of the lessee and the consent of the lessor is unnecessary. ( 4 ) THE learned Senior Counsel then submitted that while considering a fiscal statute and while determining the liability of the subject to tax, it is necessary to follow the strict letter of the law and not merely the spirit of the statute or the substance of the law. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the provisions of section 122 of the Act of 1948 should be construed strictly and in favour of the subject litigant, the Firm in this case. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the provisions of section 122 of the Act of 1948 should be construed strictly and in favour of the subject litigant, the Firm in this case. It is submitted on behalf of the firm that the Appellate Authority committed a serious mistake in holding that the expression 'fee' and 'charges' find place in Chapter XI of the Act of 1948 as chapter XI does not use the expression charges and uses the expression 'fees' only in regard to the imposition of taxes on the registration of cattle sold within the city under the provisions of section 114 (1) (d) of the Act of 1948. In such background, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the Appellate Authority could not have relied on the decision reported in (2007) 11 SCC 323, as firstly, the Act of 1948 did not make a reference to service charges or fee in regard to the taxes like Conservancy or Sewerage Tax, Fire Service Tax and Light Tax, and secondly because the taxes are payable under section 122 of the Act of 1948, by the owner of the building. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the corporation is the owner of the building and the Firm is also not a deemed owner of the building as there is no covenant of renewal in the agreement of lease executed between the parties on 20-10-1986. In any case, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the Fire Service Tax Bye-laws 1985 and Specially Bye-law No. 4 thereof, clearly stipulates that all properties belonging to the Municipal corporation shall be exempt from the payment of the Fire Service Tax and since the property in this case, admittedly, belonged to the Corporation, there was no question of imposition of Fire Service Tax, on the said property. Therefore, it is submitted on behalf of the Firm that the Corporation did not have any jurisdiction to impose the Fire Service Tax on a property owned by the Corporation and the corporation being the owner of the building and the Firm not being a deemed owner thereof, the Conservancy Tax and the Light Tax was payable by the corporation. Therefore, it is submitted on behalf of the Firm that the Corporation did not have any jurisdiction to impose the Fire Service Tax on a property owned by the Corporation and the corporation being the owner of the building and the Firm not being a deemed owner thereof, the Conservancy Tax and the Light Tax was payable by the corporation. ( 5 ) SHRI C. S. Kaptan, the learned counsel for the Corporation, supported the impugned judgment dated 14-8-2008, and submitted that the Sewerage Tax, though termed as the property tax under the provisions of section 155a of the act of 1948, was, in fact, a fee leviable on the user of the property for the services rendered by the Corporation to the user of the same. According to the learned counsel for the Corporation, the explanation to section 122 of the Act of 1948 refers to a covenant of renewal, but it does not stipulate or mention that the renewal should be at the option of the lessee only. According to the learned counsel for the Corporation, whenever there is a renewal clause or a covenant for renewal in the agreement between the owner and the tenant of the building, the tenant would be a deemed owner of the property even if the landlord reserves the right to renew the lease after the expiry period. According to the learned counsel tor the respondent-Corporation, clause 7 of the agreement dated 20-10-1986 is a covenant of renewal and the submission made on behalf of the Firm that a covenant of renewal would mean that the lessee would have the right to renew the lease, may be rejected. The learned counsel then submitted that though bye-law 4 of the Fire Service Tax Bye-laws 1985 exempts all the properties belonging to the Nagpur Municipal Corporation from the payment of Fire service Tax, there is no such exemption in regard to the levy of Light Tax under the Lighting Tax Bye- laws 1985. It is submitted by the learned counsel that in the absence of any exemption in regard to the imposition of Lighting Tax/light Tax, the Corporation was justified in demanding the same from the Firm. It is submitted by the learned counsel that in the absence of any exemption in regard to the imposition of Lighting Tax/light Tax, the Corporation was justified in demanding the same from the Firm. According to Shri Kaptan, the Appellate Authority rightly relied on the decision reported in (2007) 11 SCC 323 to hold that what was charged by the Corporation was not a tax, but was a fee for the services rendered by the Corporation. The learned counsel for the Corporation also relied on Clause 5 of the agreement to canvass that the service charges and other charges were payable by the Firm only. The learned counsel for the Corporation sought for the dismissal of the revision. ( 6 ) I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have also perused the impugned judgment dated 14-8-2008. The Appellate authority had mainly relied on the decision reported in (2007) 11 SCC 323 to uphold the order of the Appellate Authority in regard to the imposition of sewerage Tax, Fire Service Tax and the Light Tax. The Appellate Authority held that mere use of the word "tax" is of no consequence if the tax imposed on the subject, in fact, is the 'fee' on account of services rendered. The Appellate authority held that the expression "fee" finds place in Chapter XI of the Act of 1948 and, therefore, the Corporation was entitled to levy fee on account of providing services of lighting, fire and sewerage to the public including the Firm and, therefore, it cannot be said that the Corporation was levying property taxes on the Firm under the garb of service charges. It appears that while making these observations, the Appellate Authority had mainly relied on the decision reported in (2007) 11 SCC page 324, without perusing the relevant provisions of the Act of 1948 or considering whether the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in (2007) 11 SCC 324 was similar to the one involved in this case. The provisions of the Act of 1948 and specially sections 114, 115-A and 122 deal with the various taxes imposed under the Act and the responsibility to pay the same. The provisions of the Act of 1948 and specially sections 114, 115-A and 122 deal with the various taxes imposed under the Act and the responsibility to pay the same. Section 114 of the Act of 1948 refers to the Property Taxes and the other taxes mentioned in sub-section (2): Section 115a of the Act of 1948 refers to Sewerage Tax, additional Sewerage Tax, Water Tax, etc. and stipulates that these taxes shall be called "property taxes". Section 122 of the Act of 1948 imposes the liability to pay the property taxes on the owner of the land or building. The provision of section 122 read thus : "the property taxes leviable upon any land or building shall be paid by the owner thereof. Explanation - For the purpose of this section a tenant of land or building or both under a lease for any agreed period with a covenant for its renewal thereafter, shall be deemed to be owner thereof. " ( 7 ) THUS, the liability to pay the -taxes is on the owner of the building or a tenant of land or building under a lease for an agreed period with a covenant for its renewal as the tenant in such a case is also a deemed owner under the explanation. It is rightly submitted on behalf of the Firm that the taxes cannot be made payable by the Firm as the Corporation is admittedly the owner of the building and the Firm is not the deemed owner of the building in view of the absence of covenant of renewal in the agreement dated 20-10-1986. Clause 7 of the agreement dated 20-10-1986 reads thus : "7. That the period of lease with the Party No. II would expire on the date the deposits are adjusted and the Corporation reserves the right to renew the lease of the property on fresh terms and conditions. " According to the Corporation, clause 7 is the covenant of renewal and according to the Firm it is not. It is now necessary to consider what is a "covenant of renewal". It would now be useful to refer to the Law dictionary and the Law Lexicon to find out the meaning and connotation of the term "covenant of renewal" in the legal sense. It is now necessary to consider what is a "covenant of renewal". It would now be useful to refer to the Law dictionary and the Law Lexicon to find out the meaning and connotation of the term "covenant of renewal" in the legal sense. Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, provides that a covenant to renew is an executory contract that gives a lessee the right to renew the lease. Similarly, the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar refers to "covenant to renew" as one under which the tenant is given the right, on termination of lease, to get the extension of the lease. It would now be necessary to consider whether clause 7 of the agreement dated 20-10-1986 is a "covenant of renewal". Under clause 7, the right to renew the lease of the property after the expiry of the lease period on the date of the adjustment of the deposit is reserved by the Corporation. It is rightly submitted on behalf of the Firm that the provisions of section 122 of the Act of 1948 fastens the liability of payment of property taxes on the deemed owner of the building or premises and, therefore, it is necessary to strictly construe the provisions of explanation to section 122. In view of the explanation to section 122, a tenant is a deemed owner if there is a covenant for renewal of the lease after the expiry of the agreed term. It is clear that the term "covenant of renewal" means that the option of renewal must be with the lessee. Clause 7 of the agreement is not a "covenant of renewal" as the corporation has reserved the right to renew the lease. Clause 7 of the agreement did not give a right to the lessee, the firm in the instant case, to get the lease extended and the right, if any, was subject to the reservation of the right to renew, by the Corporation. Though the expression "covenant of renewal" did not fall for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and was not an issue in the case of State of U. P. vs. Lalji Tandon, the Supreme Court observed, as if it was a settled principle of law, that exercise of renewal clause in the lease was a unilateral act of the lessee and the consent of the lessor was unnecessary. Clause 7 of the agreement is not a covenant of renewal as the lease could be renewed at the mercy of the Corporation. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that there was a covenant of renewal in the agreement dated 20-10-1986 and the Firm was a deemed owner of the land or building in view of the provisions of explanation to section 122 of the Act of 1948. ( 8 ) THE Appellate Authority could not have followed the judgment reported in (2007) 11 SCC 323 to uphold the order of the Assessor for more reasons than one. It is necessary to note that the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid reported judgment was not as regards the liability of the party or person to pay the taxes. The issue was whether the Jalsansthan was precluded by the provisions of Article 285 of the Constitution of India from levying the taxes on the property of the Central Government. After referring to the provisions of the u. P. Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975 and specially section 52 thereof, the hon'ble Supreme Court held that Jalsansthan was not charging any tax on the property of the Union and what was being charged in the said case was a fee for services rendered to the Union through the Railways. It is necessary to consider that section 52 of the Act of 1975 under which the levy was made, provided for the levy of 'taxes', 'fee' and 'charge' for water supply and for Sewerage Services rendered by the Jalsansthan as Water Tax and Sewerage Tax at the rates mentioned therein. Such is not the case here as the Act of 1948 does not provide for the levy of fee and charge except for the use of the word "levy" in section 114 (2) (d) in regard to the fees on the registration of cattle sold within the city. Such is not the case here as the Act of 1948 does not provide for the levy of fee and charge except for the use of the word "levy" in section 114 (2) (d) in regard to the fees on the registration of cattle sold within the city. Thus, in U. P. Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975, the Jalsansthan was empowered to levy 'tax', 'fee' and 'charge' for water supply and for sewerage services whereas section 115a of the Act of 1948 clearly provides that the sewerage Taxes would be called the "property taxes" and none of the provisions in Chapter XI of the Act of 1948, which pertains to taxation, uses the word "fee" or "charge" as was specifically used in section 52 of the U. P. Water Supply and sewerage Act, 1975. Moreover, as already stated hereinabove, the question in the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the Sewerage Tax and water Tax is a tax or fee, but in the instant case, the issue is about the responsibility or liability of the Firm to pay the tax. Since section 122 provides that the taxes are to be paid by the owner and since the applicant Firm is neither an owner nor a deemed owner within the meaning of section 122 of the Act of 1948, the Appellate Authority was not justified in holding that the order of the assessor in regard to the imposition of Conservancy Tax, Light Tax and Fire services Tax, was just and proper. The reliance placed by the Corporation on clause 5 of the agreement to state that the Service Charges and any other charges were to be borne by the Firm, is not of any relevance for deciding the issue in question, under the provisions of the Act of 1948. The provisions of Clause 5 of the agreement are referable to a contractual right between the Firm and the corporation and the contractual rights and liabilities of the parties, if any, could be enforced in appropriate proceedings and cannot be a matter in issue in an appeal under section 130 of the Act of 1948. The provisions of Clause 5 of the agreement are referable to a contractual right between the Firm and the corporation and the contractual rights and liabilities of the parties, if any, could be enforced in appropriate proceedings and cannot be a matter in issue in an appeal under section 130 of the Act of 1948. ( 9 ) IN the result, the impugned orders passed by the Appellate Authority and the Assessor, on 4-4-1998 are hereby set aside, so far as they hold that the imposition of the Conservancy Tax, Fire Service Tax and the Light Tax against the Finn was just and proper. The objection raised by the applicant Firm on 29-12-1997 is allowed as regards the payment of Conservancy Tax. Fire Service tax and Light Tax. The civil revision application is allowed in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs. Application allowed.