JUDGMENT Manjula Chellur, J.— Heard Mr. Parathasarathi, the learned Counsel for the appellant and so also Mr. Aravind, appearing for the Revenue. 2. This appeal is filed challenging the concurrent findings of the three authorities including the Tribunal, holding that the income earned by the appellant firm for the year 1997-1998 has to be taxed, by raising the following substantial questions of law: a) Whether the interest income derived by the firm from lending its capital only to its partners where no outsiders have been involved is exempted from taxation on the principles of mutuality? b) Whether the fact that the firm is treated as a different entity from its partners would deprive exemption of interest income from taxation on the principles of mutuality? c) Whether the Tribunal was justified in deviating from its own order on the principles of mutuality which was decided by it with regard to the appellant firm itself while deciding the issue of taxability of income in the hands of one of its partners, which decision has become final having been accepted by the Revenue? d) Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that there was a valid firm in existence liable to be taxed in the status of firm when there was no business activity carried on by the firm while providing funds to its own partners and earning interest income therefrom? 3. The undisputed facts are as under: The appellant is a partnership firm constituted for the purpose of lending money; the four partners of the firm belong to the same family, i.e. two brothers and their respective wives. The contention of the appellant throughout is that the firm and the partners are two different entities and the very partnership firm was meant only for the benefit of the partners, therefore in the light of the firm lending money only to the partners, the doctrine of mutuality applies, hence the income received in the form of interest from the partners by landing money to the partners could not be brought to tax. The interest income of the firm for the relevant year was assessed at Rs. 6,24,784/-. 4. The interest income of the firm for the relevant year was assessed at Rs. 6,24,784/-. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends, in the case of individual assessment of one of the partners, by name Meera Govind, such benefit was extended, therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in not extending such benefit so far as interest income of the firm is concerned. According to the learned Counsel, the firm did not do business of lending money to outsiders and it had done the business of money lending only to the partners of the firm. In support of his contention, he relies upon the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Nataraj Finance Corporation reported in (1988) 169 ITR 732 (AP). 5. In the said case money lending was in respect of only the members of AOP and the distribution of interest received from members was for the benefit of the members. Therefore, their Lordships held that in the absence of the assessee carrying on the activities of money lending to any person other than the members of AOP the interest income is not liable to be taxed. As a matter of fact, even Nataraj Finance case pertained to a partnership firm doing money lending business. Their Lordships while narrating the facts of the case also felt that very strangely and peculiarly the benefit like interest or whatever may be earned by the firm was only meant for the partners as the lending was only meant to the partners of the firm. 6. No doubt the doctrine of mutuality is applicable to a money lending partnership firm but again one has to see the facts of the particular case knowing the objects of and the constitution of the firm itself. In the present case, the assessee has relied upon two documents, one is referred to as Deed of Partnership dated 26.8.1994 and another document is referred to strangely as a Deed of Codicil dated 30.8.1994. From the contents of these two documents, it is seen that the first document does not refer to any kind of business other than money lending business of the firm. There is no indication from any of the Clauses of the partnership document that the money lending shall be restricted to the partners of the firm alone. From the contents of these two documents, it is seen that the first document does not refer to any kind of business other than money lending business of the firm. There is no indication from any of the Clauses of the partnership document that the money lending shall be restricted to the partners of the firm alone. In other words, in the absence of such indication in any of the Clauses of the partnership deed, one cannot presume that the object was to do money lending business only with the partners of the firm. However, the contents of the second document would indicate that the assessee firm intended to do "additional business", i.e. activity of polling their resources and making them available to the partners inter se on mutual fund and association basis so that the income from such activity would enure to the benefit of the partners for the time being and partners of the firm shall be the contributors and the recipients of the fund. This covenant in the document would indicate that apart from money lending business, with third parties, the firm also intended to do the activity of pooling the resources so as to help the partners. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant however, contends that from the inception of the business, the firm bad never lent money to third parties and the entire money lending business was only with its partners at any given point of time. Therefore, the principle applied in the case of Nataraj Finance deserves to be applied to the facts of the present case as well. 8. In order to give benefit of mutuality, one has to see the objects of the firm, the reasons for its constitution and ultimately the nature of business of the firm. From the two documents referred to above, one can ascertain that the firm was constituted to do money lending business with third parties and also activity of pooling funds for the benefit of the firm. Even if infact the firm has not lent any money to any third party, it cannot be a ground to accept the contention of the appellant to hold that the very object of the constitution of the firm was only to lend money to its partners and not outsiders, leather the position is otherwise as we have noticed above by comparing the two covenants in the two documents. In that view of the matter, the facts of the present case are entirely different from the facts of the case in Nataraj Finance Corporation and hence is our view, the doctrine of mutuality cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 9. Coming to the other argument that in the case of Meera Govind's assessment, such benefit under the doctrine of mutuality was extended by treating the firm as AGP is concerned, it is not in dispute that in the individual assessment of one of the partners by name, Meera Govind, such benefit was extended to the assessee by the Tribunal as at that time the Tribunal had not yet decided the case of this assessee i.e. M/s. Govindraj Ganesh Enterprises, the firm. Even otherwise, the orders of the Tribunal pertaining to Meera Govind's case would indicate that it was altogether on a different footing i.e. whether the interest income was from the firm or from AOP. As we have already stated above, looking to its constitution and purpose behind the business carried on, one has to extend the benefit of doctrine of mutuality. Merely because the Tribunal decided the case of Meera Govind - one of the partners of the assessed firm by giving such benefit, the Tribunal is not precluded from deciding in the subsequent matter by applying the correct principle of law. Even otherwise, by virtue of Section 268A of the IT Act, which was brought in by an amendment w.e.f. 1.4.1999, the appellant hereunder cannot contend that merely because the Revenue did not challenge the orders of the Tribunal pertaining to Meera Govind's case, they could not have challenged the orders of the assessee pertaining to the partnership firm. 10. Raving regard to all these facts and circumstances and also in the light of the facts placed before us, we are of the opinion that the arrangement was mutual between the parties, in the guise of partnership firm only to escape from the liability of payment of tax and the doctrine of mutuality does not apply to the facts of the present case. 11. Reliance is also placed on the decision of this court in the case of Anupam Enterprises in ITA 600/2004, disposed of on 28.7.2008. 12. Therefore, the appeal stands dismissed. The substantial questions of law referred to above are answered against the appellant-assessee.