JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—All these intra-Court appeals involve common questions of law and facts and, therefore, as agreed by the learned counsels for the parties, were heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, in our view, it would be appropriate, first, to give some background facts of the special appeals individually, as under : 3. Special Appeal No. 321 of 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the "first set") arises out of the orders and directions dated 11.12.2006, 18.12.2006, 22.1.2007, 1.2.2007 and 20.2.2007 of the Hon’ble Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 (Bahuri Alp Sankhyak Balika Inter College v. State of U.P. and others). 4. The writ petition was filed by Bahuri Alp Sankhyak Balika Inter College, Taruvanava, Pathkauli, District Kushi Nagar through its Manager seeking following reliefs : "(i) To, issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to grant one time recognition for intermediate in pursuance of application dated 19.10.2002. (ii) To, issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to permit the students of Bahuri Minority Girls Intermediate College in the Intermediate examination which was going to be held in the month of March-2007, otherwise the student of the College shall suffer irreparable loss and injury. (iii) To, issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to decide the application 19.10.2002 to the petitioner. (iv) To, issue any other writ order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of the case. (v) Award cost of the petition to the petitioner." 5. The writ petition came up for admission before the Court on 7.8.2006 when this Court posed the question as to whether any such institution could be established for minority community by Sri Phool Chand Yadav and passed the following order : "From the record, it transpires that Phool Chandra Yadav claims to have founded the Institution for minorities. The question is whether any such institution could be established for minority community by Phool Chandra Yadav. As prayed by learned counsel for petitioner, put up on 17th August, 2006 for further arguments." (emphasis added) 6. The question is whether any such institution could be established for minority community by Phool Chandra Yadav. As prayed by learned counsel for petitioner, put up on 17th August, 2006 for further arguments." (emphasis added) 6. On 18.8.2006 when this matter again came up before the Court, while giving time to the parties to exchange affidavits in respect to the main grievance of the petitioner, the Hon’ble Single Judge passed the order as under : "Learned Standing Counsel may file counter affidavit within three weeks. Rejoinder-affidavit may be filed within two weeks’ thereafter. List thereafter. In case, in the meantime petitioner moves a fresh application annexing all earlier applications and relevant papers the same shall be heard and decided within three weeks from the date of presentation of application." 7. On behalf of the Board of High School and Intermediate, U.P., Allahabad, respondents No. 2 and 3 in the writ petition, a counter affidavit sworn on 14.9.2006 by Sri Mahatam Singh was filed stating that the application of the petitioner for recognition was already considered and rejected by the Board, as communicated vide letter dated 6.11.2003 and no further application in the prescribed format has been made by the petitioner thereafter. Rejoinder-affidavit sworn on 8.12.2006, however, was filed stating that an application seeking one time recognition was filed under Section 9(4) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") which is pending before the State Government since 2005. 8. On 11.12.2006, however, the Hon’ble Single Judge formulated four questions and passed the following order : "Rejoinder-affidavit filed today in Court is taken on record. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel at great length. Phool Chand Yadav as Manager of Bahuri Alp Sankhyak Balika Inter College, Taruvanava, Patkhauli, District Kushi Nagar, petitioner claims that after accepting Baudh Religion, he became minority and, therefore, he rightly founded institution as a minority institution. He prayed for issuing a writ of mandamus to permanently recognize institution as a minority institution and permit students to appear in the examination. On hearing learned counsel for petitioner and learned Standing Counsel following questions arise to be considered in the present case : (i) What is the definition of minority? (ii) Who could be recognized as a member of minority religion and what would be the criteria for recognizing minority? On hearing learned counsel for petitioner and learned Standing Counsel following questions arise to be considered in the present case : (i) What is the definition of minority? (ii) Who could be recognized as a member of minority religion and what would be the criteria for recognizing minority? (iii) Whether minority could be recognised at national level, provincial level or at regional level? and (iv) Whether a community having more than 5% of the total population in the country could be recognised as minority? Accordingly, notices are issued to the State of U.P. which have already been accepted by the learned Chief Standing Counsel, State of U.P., who is represented by the learned Standing Counsel. Learned Standing Counsel is directed to assist the Court on the questions arise to be considered in the case. Put up on 18th December, 2006 for further arguments." (emphasis added) 9. Thereafter on 18.12.2006 the Hon’ble Single Judge considered the question as to whether application for recognition can be considered by the State Government under Section 9(4) of the Act and after discussing the matter in detail, it took the view that no order on such application can be passed by the State Government under Section 9(4) of the Act. After expressing its aforesaid view, the Court further held that the application for recognition, if any, pending before the State Government must be considered by the Recognition Committee of the Board in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Chapter VII of the Regulations framed by the Board under Section 15 of the Act and also directed that all such applications pending before the State Government shall be transmitted to the Board for disposal by the Recognition Committee in accordance with law. The Court also observed that since the Board has not been constituted since 1984, therefore, the State Government shall take steps to constitute Board under Section 3 of the Act and notify the same under Section 3(3) within three months from the date of the order i.e. 18.12.2006. 10. On 22.1.2007 the Court took notice of the compliance affidavit filed on behalf of the Board stating that all such applications have been received and are under process by the concerned authority. However, in respect to the question of minority the Court adjourned the matter so as to be considered on 28.1.2007. 10. On 22.1.2007 the Court took notice of the compliance affidavit filed on behalf of the Board stating that all such applications have been received and are under process by the concerned authority. However, in respect to the question of minority the Court adjourned the matter so as to be considered on 28.1.2007. Thereafter it appears that the matter was taken up on 1.2.2007 and the Hon’ble Single Judge granted time to learned Standing Counsel to file affidavit giving complete details of the information already required including total population of different communities including minority, districtwise, in the State of U.P. It also issued notice to Registrar General, Census Department, New Delhi to file affidavit giving population of different communities including all kinds of minority communities, backward, scheduled castes etc. of India on the basis of last census. 11. Again on 20.2.2007, Court directed the Secretary, Board of High School and Intermediate to file an affidavit disclosing names of all his relatives and also to make a categorical statement whether any of his relatives as defined under Chapter III Rule 4 are running any institution or managing any High School or Intermediate College recognised under the Act. He was also required to show whether any financial Audit of the Board of High School and Intermediate Education has taken place during the period. With respect to the question of minority the Court directed the Registrar General, Census Department as well as the State of U.P. to file complete report regarding population, districtwise as well as statewise respectively. It also directed the Government of India to bring on record, material as regards the policy decision of the Government of India to the effect that a group once declared minority, whether the matter of recognition of minority, religious, political or linguistic could be reconsidered after receipt of fresh census and also bring to the notice of the Court the criteria or principles of determining any group as minority. The State of U.P. and Government of India were also directed to file counter affidavit bringing on record the legislation, if any, existing on the date of enforcement of Constitution as regards the minority and also make available relevant material or its historical background alongwith copy of Sachchar Committee report, as directed by the Court earlier. 12. The State of U.P. and Government of India were also directed to file counter affidavit bringing on record the legislation, if any, existing on the date of enforcement of Constitution as regards the minority and also make available relevant material or its historical background alongwith copy of Sachchar Committee report, as directed by the Court earlier. 12. On 28.2.2007 the State Minority Commission, U.P., Lucknow was allowed to be impleaded as respondent No. 5 and while granting time to file counter affidavit the matter was posted for 14.3.2007. The Hon’ble Single Judge on 14.3.2007 appointed Sri Yashwant Verma, Advocate as "amicus curiae" to assist the Court on the questions formulated by it. Thereafter it was taken up on 16.3.2007 when again the matter was adjourned to 21.3.2007. 13. It is at this stage that the State of U.P. and Board preferred this appeal (Special Appeal No. 321 of 2007) which was taken up by the Division Bench for admission on 21.3.2007 and after hearing learned Advocate General the appeal was admitted and further proceedings in the writ petition was stayed. The interim order is quoted as under : "It is vehemently urged that the Hon’ble Single Judge in the order dated 11.12.2006, against which primarily this appeal has been preferred, has gone beyond the pleadings and the issue involved or raised by either parties. The learned Advocate General has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of U.P. Gram Panchayat Adhikari Sangh and others v. Daya Ram Saroj and others, (2007) 2 SCC 138 and submitted that there was no reason for the Hon’ble Single Judge to go beyond the pleadings and the issue involved in the writ petition. Shri Sanjay Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-respondent fairly admitted before us that these are not the issues involved nor he sought any such relief in the writ petition. Admit. No notice is required to be issued as the sole respondent is represented by its counsel. List the appeal for hearing before the appropriate Bench in the week commencing 14.5.2007. Considering the submissions and looking to the facts of the case, it is provided that further proceeding in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006, pending before the Hon’ble Single Judge, shall remain stayed until further order of this Court." 14. List the appeal for hearing before the appropriate Bench in the week commencing 14.5.2007. Considering the submissions and looking to the facts of the case, it is provided that further proceeding in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006, pending before the Hon’ble Single Judge, shall remain stayed until further order of this Court." 14. It appears that the above order of the Division Bench was communicated to Hon’ble Single Judge on 21.3.2007 itself whereupon His Lordship disconnected the aforementioned writ petition (No. 42265 of 2006) from another connected writ petition No. 34892 of 2004. 15. Special Appeal No. 518 of 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the "second set") was preferred against the judgement dated 5.4.2007 of the Hon’ble Single Judge passed in Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004, Committee of Management, Anjuman Madarsa Noorul Islam Dehra Kalan, Ghazipur through its Manager and another v. State of U.P. and others. The appeal has been filed by respondents No. 4 to 6 (subsequently impleaded in the writ petition) namely, Madarasa Islahul Muslamin, Aliganj, Post Kokhraj, District Allahabad (At present Kaushambi) through its Manager, Irsad Ahmad; Madarasa Asharful Uloom, Akbarpur Gangaganj, Soraon, Allahabad through its Manager Mohd. Ashraf; and, Madarasa Jamia Imdadul ‘Uloom’ Jamamasjid Karari, Manjhanpur, District Kaushambi through its Manager, Saeed Ahmad. 16. The Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 was filed by the Committee of Management, Anjuman Madarsa Noorul Islam Dehra Kalan, Ghazipur through its Manager and another seeking following reliefs : "(a) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned order dated 17.5.2004 passed by the respondent No. 1 so far as it relates to those institution contained in Annexure 5 of this writ petition. (b) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to take petitioners institution for grant in aid list of State Government and make payment of salary to the petitioner’s institution from the public exchequer. (c) to issue such other and further appropriate writ order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper. (d) to award the cost of petition in favour of the petitioners. " 17. (c) to issue such other and further appropriate writ order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper. (d) to award the cost of petition in favour of the petitioners. " 17. The order dated 17.5.2004 challenged in the writ petition was issued by the State Government providing for grant in aid to 67 unaided but permanently recognised Arabi and Farsi Madarasas, listed in Enclosure-A therein and the terms and conditions were provided in Enclosure-B of the said order. 18. On 26.8.2004 when the writ petition came up for admission before Hon’ble Single Judge (Hon’ble Arun Tandon, J.) the Court directed as under : "Connect with writ petition No. 29861 of 2004. Standing Counsel may file counter affidavit within three weeks. List thereafter." 19. The order sheet of the writ petition shows that thereafter it was listed on various dates but was adjourned for one or the other reasons. On 11.4.2005, the Court (Hon’ble Sabhajeet Yadav, J.) passed an order directing the Standing Counsel to produce the original list of the institutions appended with the Government Order dated 17.5.2004 alongwith original record and the case was directed to be listed on 28.4.2005. 20. The said list was not produced and the matter was adjourned on 28.4.2005, 27.9.2005, 8.12.2005, 10.1.2006, 24.1.2006, 8.3.2006 and 27.3.2006. 21. Thereafter this Court (Hon’ble Rajes Kumar, J.) on 4.4.2006 passed the following interim order with respect to the Government Order dated 17.5.2004 : "Sri A.K. Chaudhary, Joint Director Minority Welfare Department, Lucknow appeared in person. He has stated that at present there is no Director in Minority Welfare Department, Lucknow. He stated that in the year 1995-96 no list for 135 Madarsas have been prepared and initially the list of 203 Madarsas were prepared and out of which grant-in-aid was allowed to 68 Madarsas and now by the Government Order dated 17.5.2004 grant-in-aid has been provided to 67 Madarsas. He failed to produce the list of 135 Madarsas, which was finalized in the year 1995-96. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that 67 Madarsas included in the list annexed to Government Order dated 17.5.2004 is not of those Madarsas, which were approved in the year 1995-96. Prima-facie it appears that grant-in-aid allowed by the Government to 67 Madarsas list of which has been annexed with the Government Order dated 17.5.2004, is arbitrary. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that 67 Madarsas included in the list annexed to Government Order dated 17.5.2004 is not of those Madarsas, which were approved in the year 1995-96. Prima-facie it appears that grant-in-aid allowed by the Government to 67 Madarsas list of which has been annexed with the Government Order dated 17.5.2004, is arbitrary. It appears that these Madarsas are not those Madarsas, which were approved in 1995-96. Joint Director, Minority Welfare Department, Lucknow is directed to file the written reply in this regard within three weeks annexing all the documents pertaining to the grant-in-aid to the Madarsas right from 1995-96. On the facts and circumstances of the case, until further orders, the operation of the Government Order dated 17.5.2004 (annexure No. 2 to the writ petition) is stayed. Government is restrained to allow any grant-in-aid to 67 Madarsas in pursuance of the Government Order dated 17.5.2004. List after three weeks." 22. The writ petition thereafter again was listed but adjourned on several dates and in the meantime some of the institutions, who were affected due to interim order, filed impleadment applications alongwith the counter affidavits and stay vacation applications which were taken on record. Some impleadment was also allowed but the matter, however, remained pending to be decided on merits. 23. The writ petition was listed before His Lordship (Hon’ble S.N. Srivastava, J.) on 17.10.2006, 19.10.2006, 27.10.2006, 28.10.2006, 1.11.2006, 2.11.2006 and it was adjourned for one or the other reasons. 24. On 3.11.2006 it appears that some arguments were advanced and the matter was directed to be placed on 7.11.2006 for further arguments. On 7.11.2006, however, the Court (Hon’ble S.N. Srivastava, J.) passed the following order : "Learned counsel for petitioner undertakes to serve copies of impleadment and amendment applications within 24 hours to newly added respondents. Put up day-after-tomorrow." 25. Again on 9.11.2006 the Court passed the following order : "Short counter affidavit filed today by Sri S.C. Dwivedi, learned counsel for the opposite parties is taken on record and as prayed three days’ time is granted to file rejoinder-affidavit. List on 17.11.2006." 26. Put up day-after-tomorrow." 25. Again on 9.11.2006 the Court passed the following order : "Short counter affidavit filed today by Sri S.C. Dwivedi, learned counsel for the opposite parties is taken on record and as prayed three days’ time is granted to file rejoinder-affidavit. List on 17.11.2006." 26. The questions as to whether the petitioner was entitled for grant-in-aid or not came up to be considered by the Hon’ble Single Judge (Hon’ble S.N. Srivastava, J.) on 17.11.2006 and noticing the statement of learned Standing Counsel that the petitioners’ application for grant-in-aid is not traceable, the Court directed the petitioners to file a fresh application and in the meantime the stay order already granted was modified permitting payment of salary to the teachers and employees of such institutions which were not paid pursuant to the interim order. The Court’s order reads as under : "Rejoinder-affidavit filed today by learned counsel for the petitioner is taken on record. Learned counsel for the petitioners states that petitioners’ Institution has fulfilled all the norms for getting grant-in-aid to teachers and employees of the Institution. He further urged that it was not considered in accordance with law and some other institutions, which were similarly situated, though some of them did not fulfil the required norms, have been granted aid. Learned Standing Counsel, in reply, states that petitioners’ application is not at present traceable. In such circumstance, I direct petitioners to file fresh application for grant-in-aid along with all the materials including the earlier application of the petitioners within a period of one week from today to the competent authority. In case, any such application is received, the same shall be decided in accordance with law within two weeks thereafter considering the entirety of the case and also facts given in the writ petition. List this case on 18th December, 2006. In the meantime, salary of all the teachers and employees for the month of October 2006 payable in November 2006 of such institutions, who were not getting salary under the interim order passed by this Court in this petition, shall be released." 27. On 18.12.2006 the Court while directing the matter to be placed on 22.1.2007 for further arguments passed further order modifying earlier interim order to the following effect : "Put up on 22nd January, 2007 for further arguments. On 18.12.2006 the Court while directing the matter to be placed on 22.1.2007 for further arguments passed further order modifying earlier interim order to the following effect : "Put up on 22nd January, 2007 for further arguments. In the meantime, salary of all the teachers and employees for the months of November, 2006 payable in December, 2006, December, 2006 payable in January, 2007 and January, 2007 payable in February, 2007 of such institutions, who were not getting salary under the interim order passed by this Court in this petition, shall be released." 28. On 22.1.2007, the Hon’ble Single Judge passed an order running in about 5 pages wherein His Lordship noticed that the petitioners and other institutions are claiming benefit of minority institutions being a group of Muslims community and since a similar controversy is involved in Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006, this writ petition is connected therewith. Thereafter, it referred to the issues framed in Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 and directed to the respondents to file their reply on certain aspects. The rest of the order is similar to that passed in writ petition involved in the special appeal (first set). The relevant extract of the order whereby the present writ petition was connected with Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 and the issues framed in that writ petition were referred may be reproduced as under : "As petitioner and other Institutions are claiming benefit of Minority Institutions being a group of Muslim community and a similar controversy is also involved in Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006, this writ petition is also connected with Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006. In Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006, this Court on 11th December, 2006 has framed certain issues, which are as under : (i) What is the definition of minority? (ii) Who could be recognized as a member of minority religion and what would be the criteria of recognizing minority? (iii) Whether minority could be recognized at national level, provincial level or at regional level? and (iv) Whether a community having more than 5% of the total population in the country could be recognized as minority?..............." 29. (ii) Who could be recognized as a member of minority religion and what would be the criteria of recognizing minority? (iii) Whether minority could be recognized at national level, provincial level or at regional level? and (iv) Whether a community having more than 5% of the total population in the country could be recognized as minority?..............." 29. Thereafter on subsequent dates exchange of affidavits took place and the matter was posted for 20.2.2007 on which date the order sheet shows the following order : "For orders see order of date passed on connected W.P. No. 42265 of 2006." 30. Only three orders passed thereafter are necessary to be mentioned i.e. 28.2.2007, 16.3.2007 and 21.3.2007 which reads as under : (A) "Sri Shashi Shekhar Tiwari, learned counsel for Union of India has filed affidavits of Sri R.S. Meena, Assistant Director of Census Operations, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow and Sri Puranjay Sharma, Legal Officer in National Commission for Minorities, 5th Floor, Lok Nayak Bhawan, Khan Market, New Delhi giving details of census report of 1951 and 2001 as well as Notification dated 23rd October, 1993 under clause (c) of Section 2 of the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992 same are taken on record. Sri Ch. N.A. Khan, learned counsel for petitioner may file rejoinder-affidavit, if any, by that date. Dr. Ashok Nigam, learned Additional Solicitor General assisted by Sri S.S. Tiwari, Advocate, prayed for some more time to furnish remaining information as directed by earlier order. U.P. State Minorities Commission represented by Sri J.K. Tiwari, who has filed Vakalatnama today, is impleaded as opposite party No. 10. As prayed, put up this case on 14.3.2007. Let copy of this order be issued by the Registry to Sri Shashi Shekhar Tiwari, learned counsel for the Union of India, Sri J.K. Tiwari, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for the petitioner within three days." (Dt. 28.2.2007) (B) "Chaudhary N.A. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners has been heard at great length. He urged that the Muslims were rightly recognized as religious minority group as the population of Muslims is less than 50% in comparison to the majority population in India. 28.2.2007) (B) "Chaudhary N.A. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners has been heard at great length. He urged that the Muslims were rightly recognized as religious minority group as the population of Muslims is less than 50% in comparison to the majority population in India. He relied upon judgments of Apex Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355 , P.A. Inamdar and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2005(3) ESC 373 and in Islamic Academy of Education and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (2003) 6 SCC 697 in support of his case. He further urged that the Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Budhists, Jains, Jews are minority in comparison to Hindus under the notification of the Government of India dated 23.10.1993. He further urged that the calculation of 50% will be made on the basis of Hindu religion (the way of worship) and as such the minority was determined in comparison with the Hindus. The questions arise to be considered (i) what is the Definition of Religion (ii) Whether Hindus are members of one religious or identity or are a combination of various religious groups born and brought up in India from time to time including Budhism, Janim, Araya Samajis, Brahm Samajis, Lingayats, Skahts, Shaivs, Escons (Worshippers of Lord Krishna), Sikhism, Kabirpanthis, followers of Shankaracharya, Ramanujacharyas and the group of followers who are involved worship of Lord Krishna and Lord Rama and other groups who perform different way of worship of the God in India. The question further arises to be considered that in case all the religions born and brought up in India could be considered within Hinduism, then how the Government of India made notification declaring Sikhism, Budhism and Jainism as religious minority groups. If these groups are treated as minority, rest of religion groups born and brought up in India if taken separately may be treated in minority in comparison to Muslims at least in Uttar Pradesh where the population of Muslims in Census is 18.6% and in some District as mentioned in the order dated 14.3.2007 population ranges from 21% to 49%. All these questions require consideration considering the historical back ground where in the British Rule the Census was made from 1851 up to 1941 on the basis of all religious groups separately and were never considered to be part of one religion. All these questions require consideration considering the historical back ground where in the British Rule the Census was made from 1851 up to 1941 on the basis of all religious groups separately and were never considered to be part of one religion. Sri Sanjay Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner-Phool Chand Yadav, Manager Bahuri Alp Sankhyak Balika Inter College, Taruvanava, Patkhauli, District Kushi Nagar in connected Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 claiming himself to be minority institution being Budhists urged that Budhist is a minority group on the basis of population below 50%. Chaudhary N.A. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners, prays for and is granted to study the matter and argue the case on 21st March, 2007. As prayed, put up on 21st March, 2007. All the teachers and employees who are getting salary shall be paid salary for the month March, 2007 payable in April, 2007." (Dt. 16.3.2007)(emphasis added) (C) "Heard learned counsel for the parties. Grant in aid for payment of salary of teachers and employees of recognized Institution on grant-in-aid shall not be lapsed for the period 1.4.2006 to September 2006 and shall be kept preserved and payment shall be subject to further orders passed by this Court. Judgment reserved." (Dt. 21.3.2007) 31. In the meantime, on 14.3.2007 also, there is a three pages order wherein referring to some of the facts with respect to population etc., the Court appointed Sri Yashwant Verma, Advocate as "amicus curiae" to assist the Court and directed the matter to be placed before it on 16.3.2007 for further arguments. 32. It is significant to note at this stage that in the special appeal (first set) (Special Appeal No. 321 of 2007) filed against certain orders, the Division Bench granted interim order on 21.3.2007 itself, but when the Hon’ble Court was informed of the said interim order, it disconnected Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 from other writ petitions and proceeded to conclude hearing on that very date and reserved judgment. 33. It further appears that this case was not notified in the printed cause list on 5.4.2007 for delivery of the order. We are informed that however it was shown in Computer List under the head "Delivery of Judgment". 33. It further appears that this case was not notified in the printed cause list on 5.4.2007 for delivery of the order. We are informed that however it was shown in Computer List under the head "Delivery of Judgment". However, on 5.4.2007 only operative part of the judgement was pronounced by the Hon’ble Single Judge observing that since His Lordship is scheduled to sit at Lucknow Bench from 9.4.2007, therefore, consider it appropriate to pronounce operative part of the judgement of the writ petition which shall be followed by the rest judgement. By the operative part His Lordship quashed the Government Order dated 17.5.2004 and held that institutions, founded either by the petitioners or opposite parties No. 4 to 6 are not entitled to be recognised for grant-in-aid as "religious minority institutions" in the State of U.P. It would be useful to quote the said order which contain some further directions also : "Since I have been scheduled to sit at Lucknow Bench of this Court from 9th April, 2007, I consider it appropriate to pronounce operative part of the judgement of the writ petition. This operative part of the judgment shall be followed by the rest judgment. For the reasons to be detailed in the body of the judgment of the writ petition, writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 17.5.2004, passed by the State of Uttar Pradesh recognising Opp. Party Nos. 4 to 6 on Grant-in-Aid as religious Muslim minority institutions is quashed and it is held that any institution founded by petitioners or Opp. Party Nos. 4 to 6 are not entitled to be recognised for Grant-in-Aid as religious minority institutions in the State of Uttar Pradesh after applying twin criteria, i.e., population and strength of a religious community as laid down by the founding fathers of the Constitution of India as is clear from proceedings of Constituent Assembly to determine any religious community as a religious minority. The Court finds that Muslims have ceased to be a religious minority community in the State of Uttar Pradesh on consideration of the materials on record which includes various Census Reports including Census Reports of 1951 and 2001 and, therefore, directs State of Uttar Pradesh to treat any member of Muslim community equal to other non-minority religious communities without discriminating in any respect in accordance with law being an integral part of citizenry of India. (i) A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued commanding State of Uttar Pradesh to consider Applications of petitioners and Opp. Party Nos. 4 to 6 or other Applications of other institutions founded by Muslim community for recognition on Grant-in-Aid in the similarly situated manner as other non-minority institutions are being dealt with in accordance with law without any discrimination. (ii) A writ of mandamus is also issued to Union of India and the State of Uttar Pradesh to take appropriate steps to modify the notification dated 23.10.1993 issued by the Union of India accordingly. (iii) A writ of mandamus is further issued commanding the Chief Secretary, Uttar Pradesh to initiate an enquiry into the serious allegations of corruption made by petitioners in Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Supplementary Affidavit dated 1.2.2007 filed by Zulfikar Ahmad, Manager, Anjuman Madarsa Noorul Islam Dehra Kalan, Ghazipur, which runs as follows : "9. That to the utter surprise the respondent in collusion particularly the Secretary Sri Chandra Prakash by taking illegal gratification of Rs. 5 lacs has taken certain more institutions on grant including Madarsa Khanam Zan of Varanasi and Madarsa Ahle Sunnat Ateequia Gonda. 10. That same demand is being done in respect of Petitioners institution as well and demand of Rs. 8 lacs is being done in respect of other newly prepared 100 institutions vide G.O. Dated...whereas the consideration of Madrsa recognised in year 1996 is being harass that its case was refused on basis of delay vide order .......The copies of order cancelling the Madrsa taken on grant amongst 67 and allotment of fresh Madarsa at its place vide order dated 13.12.2006 are also being annexed as.....to this affidavit along with copy of order of this High Court...." The enquiry shall be made for orders passed recognising the institutions for Grant-in-Aid from the year 2003 upto now. Such enquiry shall be conducted by an Officer not below the rank of Principal Secretary which shall be completed within three months’ from the presentation of a certified copy of this order and further action shall be taken accordingly. There shall be no order as to cost." (emphasis added) 34. Such enquiry shall be conducted by an Officer not below the rank of Principal Secretary which shall be completed within three months’ from the presentation of a certified copy of this order and further action shall be taken accordingly. There shall be no order as to cost." (emphasis added) 34. The operative part of the order became available to the appellants as stated in para 2 of the Amendment Application No. 200777 of 2007 on internet on 2.5.2007 and thereafter for assailing the same also an amendment application was filed which was allowed by this Court on 3.11.2008. 35. It is this judgment where against the said appeal (second set) has been preferred by the respondents No. 4 to 6 (of the writ petition). 36. Special Appeal No. 388 of 2007 has been filed by the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 challenging the orders dated 18.12.2006, 22.1.2007, 1.2.2007, 20.2.2007, 28.2.2007, 14.3.2007, 16.3.2007 and 21.3.2007. We have already dealt with these orders in detail in the special appeal (second set) above and, therefore, omitting repetition of these facts. However, we would deal with this appeal alongwith special appeal (second set). However, it would be appropriate to mention at this stage that this appeal was preferred before the judgement dated 5.4.2007 could be delivered in Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 and while admitting this appeal on 3.4.2007 and connecting it with Special Appeal No. 321 of 2007, the Hon’ble Division Bench (presided by the Hon’ble Chief Justice) passed the following order (relevant extract) : "5. Though the appeal is admitted, there will not be any stay as such, because the judgment in the main proceeding is now reserved before the learned Single Judge. We however, clarify that in the meanwhile, it will be open to the State Government to consider the application of the appellants’ Institution for further grant-in-aid. Mr. Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel states that the State Government is considering the application of the appellants and the decision is pending only because of the State Elections, which are presently being held." 37. Special Appeal No. 517 of 2009 is by State of U.P. and its authorities aggrieved by the judgment dated 5.4.2007 in Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 and, therefore, shall be dealt with hereinafter with special appeal (second set). Special Appeal No. 517 of 2009 is by State of U.P. and its authorities aggrieved by the judgment dated 5.4.2007 in Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 and, therefore, shall be dealt with hereinafter with special appeal (second set). Suffice it to mention at this stage that this appeal was admitted on 6.4.2007 and the effect and operation of the judgment dated 5.4.2007 was stayed. 38. Special Appeal No. 519 of 2009 has been preferred by one of the subsequently impleaded respondent, namely, Madarsa Arabia Kafiyatul Uloom, District Pratapgarh through its Principal Shabbir Ahmad in Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 and has assailed the judgement dated 5.4.2007 passed therein by the Hon’ble Single Judge, therefore, it shall also be dealt alongwith special appeal (second set). 39. Special Appeal No. 520 of 2009 has been filed by one of the subsequently impleaded respondent, namely, Madarsa Asharful Uloom, Pure Ghauhar Rani Ganj, Sultanpur, through its Manager Tahoor Ahmad in Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 assailing the judgement dated 5.4.2007 passed therein by Hon’ble Single Judge, therefore, it shall also be dealt alongwith special appeal (second set). 40. Special Appeal No. 521 of 2009 is filed by 41 institutions who are not party in the writ petition but are aggrieved by the judgement dated 5.4.2007 passed in Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 and, therefore, have preferred this appeal alongwith an application seeking leave of the Court to file appeal since they were not party to the writ petition. The appeal was admitted by the Court on 1.5.2007 and was connected with Special Appeal No. (348) of 2007. This appeal shall also be dealt with special appeal (second set). 41. Special Appeal No. 1410 of 2007 is filed by Union of India and Registrar General of Census, Government of India, New Delhi assailing the judgement dated 5.4.2007 and, therefore, shall be dealt with alongwith special appeal (second set). 42. Special Appeal No. 522 of 2009 is filed by National Commission for Minorities of India assailing the judgment dated 5.4.2007 and, therefore, shall be dealt with special appeal (second set). 43. 42. Special Appeal No. 522 of 2009 is filed by National Commission for Minorities of India assailing the judgment dated 5.4.2007 and, therefore, shall be dealt with special appeal (second set). 43. Special Appeal No. 776 of 2007 has been preferred by three appellants, namely, Madarsa Islamia Sarfarhjia Qurania Maulaganj Gonda through its Principal; Abu Bakr, Madarsa Darool Uloom Rabbania Aliganj, District Banda through its Principal, Sayeed Abarar Ahmad; and Madarsa Al Jamiatul Islamia Mambaul Maarif who claims to be adversely affected by the judgment dated 5.4.2007 though they were not party in the writ petition. This appeal shall also be dealt with special appeal (second set). 44. Special Appeal No. 1407 of 2007 has been preferred by four appellants, namely, Madarasa Arbia Ahle Sunnat Izharul Uloom Arzi, Siddharth Nagar through its Principal; Madarasa Jame-ul-Uloom Nizwa Kopaganj, District Maur through its Manager; Madarasa Khairul Almin, Allahganj through its Manager; and Madarasa Arabia Ataur Raool Siswa Bazar, Maharajganj through its Manager, who claims to be adversely affected by the judgment dated 5.4.2007 though they were not party in the writ petition. This appeal shall also be dealt with special appeal (second set). 45. Special Appeal No. 523 of 2009 has been preferred by nine appellants, namely, Madarasa Majia Karimai Karimpur, through its Principal; Madarasa Faruqia, 5/227 Purana Kanpur Nagar through its Principal; Madarsa Arbiya Jiyaul Uloom Mande Jafarpur, Azamgarh through its Manager; Madarasa Arabia Islamia, Miftaul-Uloom, Maharajganj through its Manager; Madarasa Miswahul Uloom Dhanapur, Chandauli through its Manager; Madarasa Kaiful Uloom Mirpur Barabanki through its Manager; Madarasa Madarul Uloom Madintul Aulia Makanpur, Kanpur Nagar through its Manager; Madarasa Madni Darul Uloom Niswa, Deoria through its Manager; and Madarasa Ansar Junior High School, Niswa, Kanpur Nagar through its Manager, who claims to be adversely affected by the judgment dated 5.4.2007 though they were not party in the writ petition. This appeal shall also be dealt with special appeal (second set). 46. Special Appeal No. 650 of 2007 has been preferred by three appellants, namely, Madarasa Islamia Sadarpur, Sitapur through its Principal; Madarasa Salam Oriental College, Thulendi, Rai Bareilly through its Manager; and Madarasa Edara-A-Sharia Uttar Pradesh Khinni Talla, Rai Bareilly through its Manager, who claims to be adversely affected by the judgment dated 5.4.2007 though they were not party in the writ petition. This appeal shall also be dealt with special appeal (second set). 47. This appeal shall also be dealt with special appeal (second set). 47. Special Appeal No. 679 of 2007 has been preferred by U.P. Commission of Minorities, Lucknow through its Secretary, assailing the judgment dated 5.4.2007 and, therefore, shall be dealt with special appeal (second set). 48. Special Appeal No. 524 of 2009 has been preferred by Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), U.P. Branch through its General Secretary assailing the judgment dated 5.4.2007 and, therefore, shall be dealt with special appeal (second set). 49. Sri J.K. Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel stated at the Bar that he has been informed by Sri Bhola Nath Yadav another Standing Counsel who was present in the Court representing the State in the matter before the Hon’ble Single Judge on 21.3.2007 that in fact no arguments were advanced by either party on the issues formulated by the Hon’ble Single Judge vide order dated 11.12.2006. The Court was only informed about the interim order passed by the Division Bench in the special appeal (first set) and thereafter the Court delinked the two writ petitions and reserved its judgement in Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004. Sri Tiwari also refers to para 25 of his affidavit filed in support of the stay application in Special Appeal No. 517 of 2009 as also the ground No. 50 thereof. 50. From the pleadings of the parties and the proceedings of the Writ Court what does appear to be crystal clear is that the issues formulated by the Hon’ble Single Judge vide order dated 11.12.2006 and decided vide judgment dated 5.4.2007 did not arise at all. The Court has made out a case on its own without there being any pleadings between the parties, without there being any dispute covering those issues and without any occasion for adjudication of the said issues. The four issues formulated by the Hon’ble Single Judge vide order dated 11.12.2006 in Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 were not at all relevant for deciding the writ petition on merits. In our view, the Hon’ble Single Judge erred in law and travelled beyond pleadings and issues actually arisen between the parties which it ought not to have done especially when the order of the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 321 of 2007 dated 21.3.2007 was brought to the notice of the Court. 51. In Trojan and Co. In our view, the Hon’ble Single Judge erred in law and travelled beyond pleadings and issues actually arisen between the parties which it ought not to have done especially when the order of the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 321 of 2007 dated 21.3.2007 was brought to the notice of the Court. 51. In Trojan and Co. v. R.M. N. N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235 the Apex Court says that a decision of the case cannot go beyond the pleadings of the parties and this is the basic principle of adjudication of a dispute by a Court of law. In Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh and others, AIR 1961 SC 1097 the above view was reiterated. 52. In M/s. J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills, Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur and another, AIR 1965 SC 1310 while observing that the High Court should not expand the scope of writ petition it was said : "It was not open to the High Court to expand the scope of the petition challenging the correctness of the order of the Sales Tax Officer, and to deal with matters which were never in issue or to decide that other categories of goods which the Sales Tax Officer had not ordered to be deleted did not fall within the terms of Section 8(3)(b) read with Rule 13." 53. In Siddu Venkappa Devadiga v. Smt. Rangu S. Devadiga and others, 1977(3) SCC 532 , in para 8 of the judgment, the Court observed as under : "There was thus no plea that the business was ‘benami’ for Shivanna. We also find that the parties did not join issue on the question that the business was ‘benami’.…….. It is well-settled, having been laid down by this Court in Trojan and Co. Ltd. v. Nagappa Chettiar, 1953 SCR 789 : ( AIR 1953 SC 235 ) and Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1097 that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the plea of the parties, and that it is the case pleaded which has to be found. The High Court therefore went wrong in ignoring this basic principle of law, and in making out an entirely new case which was not pleaded and was not the subject-matter of the trial." 54. The High Court therefore went wrong in ignoring this basic principle of law, and in making out an entirely new case which was not pleaded and was not the subject-matter of the trial." 54. In Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority v. S. Vasudeva and others, 2000(2) SCC 439 in para 6 of the judgment deprecating the approach of the High Court in travelling beyond the scope of the writ petition, the Court said as under : "6. At the outset, we are of the opinion that the High Court travelled way beyond the scope of the writ petition which was before it. ........................There was neither any prayer in the writ petition to this effect nor do we find any affidavit having been filed by the respondents before the High Court in relation to such allotments of land to the society and other. The writ petitioner had not chosen to enlarge the scope of the writ petition by amending his petition and, therefore, the High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in issuing the type of directions which it did." 55. In National Building Construction Corpn. v. S. Raghunathan, 1998 (7) SCC 66 , deprecating the approach of the Court of considering the plea of legitimate expectation raised at the stage of argument without there being any plea and affidavit in support thereof, the Apex Court said as under : "31. Incidentally in this case, the question of "legitimate expectation" was not raised in the petition and no foundation was laid in the pleadings for such a plea being advanced before the Court. Strangely, the High Court allowed this plea at the stage of argument and allowed the petitions only on the ground of "legitimate expectation" without the least realising that there was hardly any legitimacy in the claim of the respondents. In the absence of pleading and the affidavit of the respondents in support thereof, the whole exercise done by the High Court cannot but be termed to be speculative." 56. In V.K. Majotra v. Union of India and others, 2003 (8) SCC 40 , again a similar aspect came up for consideration before the Apex Court and in para 8 and 9 of the judgment the Court said as under : "8. We have perused the pleadings of the writ petition and the counter affidavits filed by the respondents before the High Court. We have perused the pleadings of the writ petition and the counter affidavits filed by the respondents before the High Court. Counsel for the parties are right in submitting that the point on which the writ petition has been disposed of was not raised by the parties in their pleadings. The parties were not at issue on the point decided by the High Court. Counsel for the parties are also right in contending that the point raised in the writ petition was neither adverted to nor adjudicated upon by the High Court. ......................................With respect to the learned Judges of the High Court, we would say that the learned Judges have overstepped their jurisdiction in giving a direction beyond the pleadings or the points raised by the parties during the course of the arguments. The writ courts would be well advised to decide the petitions on the points raised in the petition and if in a rare case keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case any additional points are to be raised then the concerned and affected parties should be put to notice on the additional points to satisfy the principle of natural justice. Parties cannot be taken by surprise. We leave the discussion here. 9. ............................. Such a finding could not be recorded without appropriate pleadings and notifying the concerned and affected parties." 57. This view is further reiterated in Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector and another, JT 2005(6) SC 540. 58. In U.P. Gram Panchayat Adhikari Sangh and others v. Daya Ram Saroj and others, 2007 (2) SCC 138 again the Court reiterated the above principle and said "There is no pleadings in the original petition, not even a whisper, about the legitimate expectation. It appears that the High Court, at the appellate stage made observations which induced some of the appellants at the last minute to urge the ground of legitimate expectation which was permitted and on the basis of it such finding has been recorded. Such an approach is not permissible. [See National Building Construction Corpn. v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1770]." 59. Recently in Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka, 2008(3) SCC 574 a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court expressed the word of caution that : "While rendering judgments, courts should only deal with the subject matter of the case and issues involved therein. v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1770]." 59. Recently in Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka, 2008(3) SCC 574 a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court expressed the word of caution that : "While rendering judgments, courts should only deal with the subject matter of the case and issues involved therein. Courts should desist from issuing directions affecting executive or legislative policy, or general directions unconnected with the subject matter of the case. A court may express its views on a particular issue in appropriate cases only where it is relevant to the subject matter of the case." 60. From the bare reading of the writ petitions and the counter affidavit filed by the parties concerned it does not appear as to how and in what circumstances the Hon’ble Single Judge find it necessary to formulate the four questions vide order dated 11.12.2006 in Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 for deciding the dispute involve in the writ petition on merits. We apparently, with due respect to Hon’ble Single Judge find incoherence and lack of any relation between the two. 61. Though the power under Article 226 are very wide but it requires Court to observe caution in its exercise. It would be useful to refer at this stage the observations of the Apex Court in Asha Bai Machindra Adhagale v. State of Maharashtra and others, JT 2009 (2) SC 441 (a three Judges judgment) while considering wide power of the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. : "The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material.............." 62. In Sri M. Purandara and others v. Mahadesha S. and others, 2005(6) SCC 791 it was held that where an issue was not before the Court and none had raised the question, adjudication on such issue is not proper. 63. The importance of pleadings and evidence was considered by the Apex Court in Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by L.Rs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College and others, 1987(2) SCC 555 and it was said : "It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it." 64. In Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and others, 2008(15) Scale 158 after referring to Ram Sarup (supra) the Apex Court said : "Without pleadings and issues, evidence cannot be considered to make out a new case which is not pleaded. Another aspect to be noticed, is that the court can consider such a case not specifically pleaded, only when one of the parties raises the same at the stage of arguments by contending that the pleadings and issues are sufficient to make out a particular case and that the parties proceeded on that basis and had led evidence on that case. Where neither party puts forth such a contention, the court cannot obviously make out such a case not pleaded, suo moto." (emphasis added) 65. The question as to whether Muslims constitute minority in the State of U.P. is not only a vital constitutional question of importance to the nation as such but is also highly sensitive and ought not to have been formulated and decided unless it is raised directly and the Court found it necessary to adjudicate for deciding the case before it. In Minerva Mills Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, 1980(3) SCC 625 it was said : "The courts do not anticipate constitutional issues so as to assume in advance that a certain law may be passed in pursuance of a certain constitutional amendment which may offend against the provisions of the Constitution. In Minerva Mills Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, 1980(3) SCC 625 it was said : "The courts do not anticipate constitutional issues so as to assume in advance that a certain law may be passed in pursuance of a certain constitutional amendment which may offend against the provisions of the Constitution. Similarly, our court has consistently taken he view that we will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. It is only when the rights of persons are directly involved that relief is granted by this court." 66. Similarly, in the Government of Andhra Pradesh and another v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd., 1975(2) SCC 274 the Apex Court said : "This Court does not answer academic questions." 67. The question of status of minority was never raised either by the petitioners or by the respondents before the Hon’ble Single Judge. It was not at all necessary directly or indirectly for deciding the writ petition which was up for consideration before the Hon’ble Single Judge. Whether a particular community is a minority, what would be the meaning of minority in the Constitution and how a class of community to be declared to be minority are the questions of Constitutional importance and can be decided if raised in a proper well pleaded writ petition where all concerned parties are also impleaded. Such questions cannot be decided in a writ petition where they are neither directly nor indirectly nor even ancillarily arises for adjudication of the dispute in the main case. The Hon’ble Single Judge was also alive of this situation as is apparent from the impugned judgment where he has said as under : "Further, the question whether Muslims constitute religious minorities in India, though initially did not arise, but arose during the course of hearing as parties are claiming minority status being Muslim, could be decided by the Court by framing issues." 68. It is no doubt true that if during the course of argument some issue arises which did not arise initially, the Court would be competent to answer the same also but we are afraid that no such situation has arisen in this matter. It is no doubt true that if during the course of argument some issue arises which did not arise initially, the Court would be competent to answer the same also but we are afraid that no such situation has arisen in this matter. The petitioners claimed themselves to be a minority institution established by Muslims and the fact that the institution was established by petitioners is a minority institution was not disputed by the respondents. If that be the position, the question about the status of minority of Muslims, we fail to understand as to how it has arisen before the Hon’ble Single Judge. Moreover, we are also surprised to see that it is the Hon’ble Single Judge himself who connected the Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 with Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 as is evident from His Lordship’s order dated 22.1.2007 in Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 but when the proceeding in Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 was stayed by the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 321 of 2007 on 21.3.2007, His Lordship on page 13 of the judgment has been pleased to observe as under (probably to justify delinking of the two writ petitions) : "The issues involved in Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 were altogether different to the issues involved in the present case. The only common question involved was what is the definition of Minority." 69. It is also evident from the impugned judgment that on 21.3.2007 the Hon’ble Single Judge did not hear the matter in Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 but in respect to another writ petition His Lordship on page 14 has observed as under : "Neither the State of U.P. nor any party to the present writ petition raised any objection on the hearing or prayed to postpone the hearing. Learned counsel for the parties participated in the hearing and were heard at great length and after hearing concluded, the judgment was reserved." 70. Learned counsel for the parties participated in the hearing and were heard at great length and after hearing concluded, the judgment was reserved." 70. Though in the affidavit and grounds in this appeal the appellants have disputed the factom that any hearing took place on 21.3.2007 but we prefer to believe in what has been said by the Hon’ble Single Judge instead of what has been said by the appellants in their affidavits or in grounds of appeal before this Court and have proceeded treating what has been said by the Hon’ble Single Judge to be correct yet we find it difficult to sustain the view of Hon’ble Single Judge that such important constitutional question could have been decided in such manner and that too in the Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 which, in our view, by no stretch of imagination can be extended to include the issue which have been decided by the Hon’ble Single Judge i.e. the status of Muslim minority. We find it appropriate at this stage to refer certain observations of the Apex Court in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and another, 1983(1) SCC 147 where it has been said : "We have serious reservations on the question whether it is open to a Court to answer academic or hypothetical questions on such considerations, particularly so when serious constitutional issues are involved. We (judges) are not authorised to make disembodied pronouncements on serious and cloudy issues of constitutional policy without battle lines being properly drawn. Judicial pronouncements cannot be immaculate legal conceptions. It is but right that no important point of law should be decided without a proper lis between parties properly ranged on either side and a crossing of the swords. We think it is inexpedient for the Supreme Court to delve into problems which, do not arise and express opinion thereon." 71. Judicial pronouncements cannot be immaculate legal conceptions. It is but right that no important point of law should be decided without a proper lis between parties properly ranged on either side and a crossing of the swords. We think it is inexpedient for the Supreme Court to delve into problems which, do not arise and express opinion thereon." 71. We also would like to record our disapproval of the view of the Hon’ble Single Judge that simply by delinking one matter from another His Lordship could have proceeded to decide the issues pertaining to meaning of minority and the status of Muslim minority when the objections which were raised in the special appeal filed against the common orders in the connected Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 and the arguments advanced before the Division Bench in the appeal clearly show that the objection up for consideration before the Division Bench was as to whether the order dated 11.12.2006 whereby the four issues were framed are beyond the pleadings and the issues involved or raised by either parties and whether the Hon’ble Single Judge was right in proceeding to consider those four issues formulated vide order dated 11.12.2006 and it is on this ground that the special appeal was admitted. Having noticed argument advanced before the Division Bench in the special appeal on 21.3.2007 which admittedly were placed before the Hon’ble Single Judge also on the same date whereupon he passed order for delinking another matter, the propriety demanded that His Lordship ought to have waited for the decision of the Division Bench as to whether it was open to Hon’ble Single Judge to go beyond the pleadings and the issues involved in the writ petition by deciding the issues formulated by order dated 11.12.2006. In all propriety, in our view, the Hon’ble Single Judge ought to have waited the decision of the Division Bench instead of proceeding to reserve the judgment on that very date and go ahead to pronounce the same on 5.4.2007. 72. Further, simply the ground that since he is scheduled to sit at Lucknow and, therefore, he is pronouncing operative part of the judgment could not have been such urgency for that reason alone. The High Court Rules provides the manner in which a judgment can be pronounced by a Judge. Chapter VII Rule 1 of the High Court Rules reads as under : "1. The High Court Rules provides the manner in which a judgment can be pronounced by a Judge. Chapter VII Rule 1 of the High Court Rules reads as under : "1. Pronouncing of judgment.—(1) After a case has been heard judgment may be pronounced either at once or one some future date of which notice shall be given to the Advocates of the parties. Provided that notification in the Cause List shall be deemed to be sufficient notice. (2) Where a case is heard by two or more Judges and judgment is reserved, their judgment or judgments, may be pronounced by any one of them. If no such Judge be present such judgment or judgments may be pronounced by any other Judge. (3) Where a case is heard by a Judge sitting alone and judgment is reserved, his judgment may, in his absence, be pronounced by any other Judges." (emphasis added) 73. Sub-rule (3) as above makes is very clear that even if the Hon’ble Single Judge was not available at Allahabad, the judgment could have been pronounced by any other Judge in his absence. Thus, mere sitting at Lucknow could not have been made a reason to show extraordinary hurry in such an important issue by delivering only operative part of the judgment without reasons. We are clearly of the opinion that there was no legal or technical complication before the Hon’ble Single Judge even if he was scheduled to sit at Lucknow from 9.5.2007 to hurriedly pronounce the operative part of the judgment on 5.4.2007 by notifying the same in the computer list. 74. In two cases up for consideration before the Hon’ble Single Judge one was where an institution had admitted students for a course though did not possess the requisite recognition from the Board and, therefore, a mandamus sought for one year only to grant recognition to the said institution so that the students it had already admitted may appear in the examination. By no stretch of imagination the four questions formulated by the Hon’ble Single Judge vide order dated 11.12.2006, in any manner arose or could have arisen for deciding the aforesaid writ petition. 75. In the second one the validity of a Government Order i.e. 17.5.2004 was under challenge whereby it had provided grant-in-aid to 67 Madarsas of Arabi and Farsi. By no stretch of imagination the four questions formulated by the Hon’ble Single Judge vide order dated 11.12.2006, in any manner arose or could have arisen for deciding the aforesaid writ petition. 75. In the second one the validity of a Government Order i.e. 17.5.2004 was under challenge whereby it had provided grant-in-aid to 67 Madarsas of Arabi and Farsi. The ground of challenge was that the petitioner is also one of such kind of institution and must have been granted the said aid but has wrongly been excluded. For this case also the four issues formulated by the Hon’ble Single Judge vide order dated 11.12.2006, by no stretch of imagination did arise or could have arisen. We fail to understand as to how and why the aforesaid four issues were formulated. Ch. N.A. Khan, Advocate who had appeared before the Hon’ble Single Judge made a statement before us that he did not raise such issues at all and the said issues came to be formulated by the Court itself. 76. Further analysis of the judgment amazed us to find more strange ways of covering the four issues formulated by His Lordship on 11.12.2008 about definition of minority, who should be recognized as minority etc. In the first paragraph of the impugned judgment, His Lordship has referred to the dispute raised in the writ petition filed by Committee of Management of Anjuman Madarsa Noorul Islam but thereafter in the very next paragraph, His Lordship has said that "petitioners were claiming themselves as minority institution founded by the Muslim religion minority under Section 2(c) of the National Minority Commission Act, 1992 by Notification dated 23.10.1993, the question arose to be considered what is the definition of Minority and who could be recognised as religious minority and its criteria for recognition." 77. There is no mention as to who raised this question and how this question cropped up when the fact that the petitioners were Muslims was not disputed by the respondents. The Muslimis were notified as minority by Notification dated 23.10.1993 and that being the state of position how and when and in what manner the above questions found to have arisen does not borne out from the record. The Muslimis were notified as minority by Notification dated 23.10.1993 and that being the state of position how and when and in what manner the above questions found to have arisen does not borne out from the record. From the judgment and the record of the writ petition, it is also clear that nobody challenged either the validity of any provision of National Minority Commission Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as "1992 Act") or the notification dated 23.10.1993 issued under Section 2(c) of the said act notifying Muslims as minority. In Para 21 and 22 of the judgment, we find that His Lordship noticed that the parties relied on the Notification dated 23.10.1993 whereby Muslims were declared "minority community" under Section 2(c) of 1993 Act. In the absence of any challenge what was expected is that the Court ought to have proceeded as if the said Notification is valid and needs no further investigation, but despite the fact that there was no challenge to the said Notification by any of the party and nobody felt aggrieved, yet his Lordship proceeded to consider as to how and in what circumstances Union of India had declared "Muslims" as minority vide Notification dated 23.10.1993 by directing the Union of India to file its affidavit disclosing the basis, as is evident from the following : "Our Parliament has enacted National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992 (Act No. 19 of 1992). By a notification dated 23rd October, 1993, in exercise of power under Section 2(c) of the National Commission for Minority Act, 1992, the Central Government notified follower religious communities as minority communities : 1. Muslims, 2. Christians, 3. Sikhs, 4. Buddhists 5. Zoroastrians Though this Court by a specific direction directed Union of India and other Opp. Parties to inform the Court what are the basis or reasons or criterion for declaring any community as religious minority community, but neither Union of India not the State of Uttar Pradesh brought any material on record to show criterion for determining a community as religious minority community and as such this Court while considering the question whether Muslim community is a religious minority has to see the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly and various judgments of Apex Court and other Court. Minority has not been defined in the Constitution of India." 78. Minority has not been defined in the Constitution of India." 78. In order to find out the definition of minority, His Lordship has referred to the Apex Court decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 356. However its finding is just contrary to what is said by the Apex Court on the question as to who would constitute minority. In any case, His Lordship, thereafter, did not proceed to confine the issue to the definition of minority, but from Page 44 what transpires to us is that after referring to the Apex Court decision in Bal Patil and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 2005 SC 3172 and T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), His Lordship observed as under : "Considering the matter in its entirety, criterion for minority, i.e., population and strength and also judgments of the Apex Court referred above that the intention was to provide protection to a non-dominant group, this Court is of the view that at present Muslim religious community in U.P. is not a religious minority as there is no sense of insecurity or lack of confidence prevailing amongst them in present scenario. According to the finding of the Apex Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case (supra) that Muslim minority is not weaker or unprivileged section of the society." 79. His Lordship has considered the historical background of Muslim minority though we do not find any reason in the case in hand to look in such history and how that was relevant for deciding the issue in the writ petition. Thereafter, His Lordship has also considered the population of Muslims in the various parts of the Country as well as in the State of U.P. itself, i.e., in various Districts in order to hold that being more than 13% in all India basis, the Muslims constitute dominant group in all respect. Thereafter, His Lordship has also considered the population of Muslims in the various parts of the Country as well as in the State of U.P. itself, i.e., in various Districts in order to hold that being more than 13% in all India basis, the Muslims constitute dominant group in all respect. What we have peculiarly find from the judgment is that no occasion or reason has been mentioned in the entire judgment as to how the Notification dated 23.10.1993 could be doubted by the Hon’ble Court when its validity was not at all challenged before the Hon’ble Court, yet on page 76 of the judgment, His Lordship has gone to the extent that by issuing Notifications under 1992 Act, the State of U.P. as well as Union of India have not applied mind as is evident from the following : "It is surprising that Union of India by Notification dated 23.10.1993 recognized Sikhism, Jainism and Buddhism as minorities and did not consider any other religion like Bahabi, Sufism, Aryasamaj, Kabirpanthi, Aghorpath and other religions born and broughtup in India as minorities, though the Apex Court in the case of Arya Samaj has considered as Arya Samajis as a religious minority group in the State of Punjab. The State of U.P. and Union of India by issuing the notification under the National Minority Act, 1992, have not applied mind as to any other Religious group at all. In fact, Buddhism and Jainism are also part of the Indian culture. They were born and developed as a reformative religion in Indian society. The Apex Court in Bal Patil and another v. Union of India and others (supra) referred above considered question of minority and laid down law." 80. We also do not find as to how it was open to Hon’ble Single Judge to direct the Government of India to take appropriate steps to modify the Notification dated 23.10.2003 issued under 1992 Act, though it was not at all challenged before His Lordship. 81. We also do not find as to how it was open to Hon’ble Single Judge to direct the Government of India to take appropriate steps to modify the Notification dated 23.10.2003 issued under 1992 Act, though it was not at all challenged before His Lordship. 81. On page 77 of the judgment, despite of quoting para 95 of the judgment in P.A. Inamdar and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2005 (6) SCC 537 and also noticing the view of Hon’ble Khare, J. (as His Lordship then was) in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, 2002 (8) SCC 481 His Lordship yet held that for constituting religious minority, 50% of the population cannot be a relevant criterion though it may be valid for determining linguistic minority. This view is directly opposed by what has been held by the Apex Court in para 95 of the judgment in P.A. Inamdar (supra) extract whereof is quoted as under : "According to Khare, J., take the population of any State as a unit, find out its demography and calculate if the persons speaking a particular language or following a particular religion are less than 50% of the population, then give them the status of linguistic or religious minority. The population of the entire country is irrelevant for the purpose of determining such status." 82. In T.M.A. Pai (supra), in para 76 of the judgment, the Apex Court clarified that for linguistic minority as well as other religious minority, the unit of determining status would be a State as is apparent from the following : "76. If, therefore, the State has to be regarded as the unit for determining ‘linguistic minority’ vis-a-vis Article 30, then with ‘religious minority’ being on the same footing, it is the State in relation to which the majority or minority status will have to be determined." 83. To the same extent is the observation in para 81 which reads as under : "Language being the basis for the establishment of different States for the purposes of Article 30, a ‘linguistic minority’ will have to be determined in relation to the State in which the educational institution is sought to be established. The position with regard to the religious minority is similar, since both religious and linguistic minorities have been put on a par in Article 30." 84. The position with regard to the religious minority is similar, since both religious and linguistic minorities have been put on a par in Article 30." 84. Referring to the above in Bal Patil (supra), the Apex Court in para 16 said as under : "16. After the verdict in the eleven-Judge Bench in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case 2002 (8) SCC 481 , the legal position stands clarified that henceforth the unit for determining status of both linguistic and religious minorities would be a State." 85. In view of the aforesaid categorical finding by the eleven-Judge Bench of the Apex Court and three-Judges Bench of the Apex Court, it was wholly inappropriate for the Hon’ble Single Judge to hold that for linguistic minority, different consideration would prevail then that would be applicable to religious minority when the Apex Court said that since the position with respect to linguistic and religious minority is similar, the same yardstick/basis would be applicable and they have to be treated at par. Moreover, the status of Muslims as minority has been noticed and recognised by the Apex Court in Bal Patil (supra) in para 25 as under : "25. It is with the above aim in view that the framers of the Constitution engrafted group of Articles 25 to 30 in the Constitution of India. The minorities initially recognised were based on religion and on a national level e.g. Muslims, Christians, Anglo-Indians and Parsis. Muslims constituted the largest religious minority because the Mughal period of rule in India was the longest followed by the British Rule during which many Indians had adopted Muslim and Christian religious." 86. Besides, from the 1992 Act, it is clear that Minority Commission has been set up with the statutory status and the Apex Court having read Section 9 of the said Act and taken a view that it is illustrative and not exhaustive about the functions of the Commissions, and, it can also aid and advise the Government in respect to identification of any community as minority, though the ultimate power in this regard shall vest in the Central Government alone under Section 2 (c) of the Act, it is always open for the Commission to consider this aspect. But in our view it ought not to have been examined by learned Single Judge in the way it has been done. But in our view it ought not to have been examined by learned Single Judge in the way it has been done. The validity of the 1992 Act was challenged before this Court in Renaissance Forum v. Union of India, 1999 All CJ 1245 but this Court upheld the vires of the Act. Notification under Section 2(c) of the said Act has been issued by the Central Government notifying the various communities which are minority in view of the Central Government, which includes Muslims and the said notification was not challenged before the Hon’ble Single Judge. In these circumstances, it was not open to the Hon’ble Single Judge to consider the correctness of the said notification at all. 87. Sri J.K. Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant, State of U.P. and others who was also appearing as counsel for the respondents before the Hon’ble Single Judge also said that no such objection was ever raised by the respondents that Muslims were not minority in the State of U.P. 88. It appears that the aforesaid issues were formulated by the Hon’ble Single Judge without there being any necessity thereof. The parties were required to address the said issues though there was no occasion for the same. This is really unfortunate and we find it expedient not to say more than that; the least which could be said that Court out of zeal cannot go astray and it is expected to be more cautious and faithful while considering vital questions of importance so that the people’s confidence in our Constitution and Court is not shaken. We find it appropriate to reproduce some words of caution expressed by the Apex Court though in a slightly different context, in B.P. Moideen Sevamandir and another v. A.M. Kutty Hassan, 2008 (16) Scale 264 : "Every Judge should constantly guard against prejudice, bias and prejudging, in whatever form. Judges should not only be unbiased, but seem to be unbiased. Judiciary can serve the nation only on the trust, faith and confidence of the public in its impartiality and integrity." 89. Judges should not only be unbiased, but seem to be unbiased. Judiciary can serve the nation only on the trust, faith and confidence of the public in its impartiality and integrity." 89. We also find from the record as if the Court was in hurry to decide the issue particularly when in the connected matter where actually the said four questions were framed, the Division Bench had stayed further proceedings on 21.3.2007 itself, yet the Hon’ble Single Judge on the same date reserved judgment in another case by delinking it from the one which was stayed by the Division Bench. 90. The extraordinary hurry in a matter of such importance, particularly to decide the issues which may have their repercussions on the national integrity, peace, law and order etc., much more patience was expected. The matter if so deserved to be decided should be in a more considered and careful manner. 91. Sometimes undue haste results in omission of certain other important aspects is also evident from the record. In Writ Petition No. 48541 of 2005, Committee of Management, Madarasa Gausiya Imadadul Oloom Tamkuhi Raj District Kushinagar and another v. State of U.P. and others, the Government Order dated 17.5.2004 was challenged. The writ petition, however, was dismissed by the Hon’ble Single Judge vide judgment dated 26.9.2006 reproduced as under : "It was brought to my notice by Sri S.C. Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of affected Institutions that all such institutions who were granted aid by order 17.5.2004 are not parties in this writ petition. It was also brought to the notice of this Court that no explanation has been given for laches of two years. In view of the fact brought to the notice of this Court that neither petitioners impleaded in this petition those institution who were affected nor petitioners have explained laches of two years, this petition is liable to be dismissed. It was also not brought to the notice of this Court that how petitioner’s Institution is affected if other Institutions were granted aid. No ground is made out for interference. Writ petition is dismissed. Stay order dated 5.9.06 is vacated." 92. Similar judgment was passed dismissing another similar Writ Petition No. 49537 of 2006, Committee of Management, Madarsa Islahia, Bara, Ghazipur and another v. State of U.P. and others. No ground is made out for interference. Writ petition is dismissed. Stay order dated 5.9.06 is vacated." 92. Similar judgment was passed dismissing another similar Writ Petition No. 49537 of 2006, Committee of Management, Madarsa Islahia, Bara, Ghazipur and another v. State of U.P. and others. A third Writ Petition No. 15750 of 2006, Managing Committee of Madarasa under Manager Ijaj Ahmad Siddiqui and the Teachers alongwith Students and Guardians v. State of U.P. and others was dismissed on 20.8.2007. A Special Appeal No. (854) of 2007 was filed which was dismissed by this Court on 22.9.2008. The effect of the above judgments, if any, appears to have not been considered by the Hon’ble Single Judge in the judgment though the aforesaid judgments were also placed before him as is evident from the record. 93. Even the observations made by the Hon’ble Single Judge in respect to the high office like Advocate General do not appear to be just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. He was never called upon to argue by the Court. The vires of any statute was not under challenge. It is not clear as to how the Advocate General was expected to argue the case when there was no such occasion. The Judges bench is a seat of power. They have the absolute and unchallenged control of the Court but it does not empower them or authorize them to misuse such high prerogative by intampering comment, undignified manner, or scathing criticism of counsel, parties or witness. 94. In this regard we find it useful to refer the Apex Court’s observations in A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta, JT 1990(1) SC 545 : "We concede that the Court has the inherent power to act freely upon its own conviction on any matter coming before it for adjudication, but it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that derogatory remarks ought not to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct." 95. Though we have made certain observations in respect to the questions formulated by the Hon’ble Singe Judge regarding the statutes of minority and its meaning, but we clarify at this stage that it was only to find out whether the approach of the Hon’ble Single Judges in deciding the above questions vide the judgment impugned in these appeals was even prima facie has any basis or not, but we make it clear that since we have held that these questions did not arise from the dispute up for consideration before the Hon’ble Single Judge in the two writ petitions and, therefore, their adjudication was unwarranted, the aforesaid questions may not be treated as such to have been finally adjudicated and decided by us on merits. 96. In the result, these appeals are allowed to the following effect : (i) The judgement dated 5.4.2007 in Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 is hereby set aside. The order dated 11.12.2006 passed in Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 in so far as it formulates the four questions, and, gives further directions concerning the aforesaid issues; and the orders dated 18.12.2006, 22.1.2007, 1.2.2007, 20.2.2007, 28.2.2007, 14.3.2007, 16.3.2007 and 21.3.2007 which were passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge in aid and assistance for directing the parties to place information before the Court for the purpose of the aforesaid four issues are hereby set aside. (ii) The Writ Petition No. 42265 of 2006 was filed seeking a mandamus for recognition from the Board for Intermediate Examination for the year 2007 and, therefore, the same, in our view, has rendered infructuous. Dismissed. (iii) The Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 is hereby remitted back to the Hon’ble Single Judge for deciding on merits after hearing the concerned parties. (iv) The appellants who were allowed permission to file special appeals against the judgment dated 5.4.2007 since they felt aggrieved due to wider ramification of the said judgment and having achieved their purpose after setting aside the judgment dated 5.4.2007 by this order and, therefore, they shall not be treated to be party in the main dispute i.e. in the Writ Petition No. 34892 of 2004 which has been remitted back to the Hon’ble Single Judge who will decide the same hearing only the parties in the writ petition and were impleaded by the petitioner therein during the pendency of the writ petition before the Hon’ble Single Judge. (v) There shall be no order as to costs. ————