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2009 DIGILAW 2649 (MAD)

State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur rep. by its Chief Manager Chennai & Another v. S. Vijaya Kumar

2009-07-24

K.RAVIRAJA PANDIAN, P.P.S.JANARTHANA RAJA

body2009
Judgment :- K. RAVIRAJA PANDIAN, J. It is very unfortunate that the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur has come forward with Original Side Appeal against the order dated 26. 2009 passed by the learned trial Judge in Application No.5750 of 2008 condoning the delay of 728 days in seeking restoration of C.S.No.478 of 1999 to the file by compensating the appellants herein for the inconvenience caused to them by imposing terms in a sum of Rs.5,000/-. 2. We heard Mr.Sukumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. 3. It is needless to say that there are number of judicial pronouncements which say that length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. Refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. The Supreme Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss. Useful reference can be had to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of N.BALAKRISHNAN VS. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss. Useful reference can be had to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of N.BALAKRISHNAN VS. M.KRISHNAMURTHY, (1998) 7 SCC 123 . 4. In this case the delay has been explained by the respondent by stating that the suit was handled by another set of counsels and there were proceedings pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after gathering the necessary details for preparation of written statement, the written statement was prepared and filed. Because of the change of the counsel only, the dismissal for non-prosecution has not been brought to the notice of the respondent. Immediately, when the same is brought to the notice of the respondent the respondent engaged a new set of counsels and they filed the application. The trial Judge is satisfied that the reasoning so stated are sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the Court. The learned trial Judge after considering the valuation of the suit, court fee paid and also considering the fact that the previous set of counsels have given change of vakalat, considered the case as a fit case and condoned the delay, however directing the respondent herein to to pay a sum of Rs.5,000/-as costs to the counsel. Thus, the inconvenience caused to the appellants herein has also been compensated by imposing cost. There are also catena of decisions that when the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court, the appellate Court should not interfere with the discretion so exercised unless the exercise has been found to be perverse. 5. In this case, we are of the view that the learned trial Judge has exercised his discretion in a judicious and conscious manner having regard to the stake involved in this case. Therefore, we do not find any reason to entertain this appeal. The appeal deserves to be dismissed and accordingly the same is dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected M.P.No.1 of 2009 is also dismissed.