JUDGMENT :- Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the petition is heard finally. 2. The petitioners are original accused in private complaint case filed by the respondent for offence punishable under section 13(1) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short, "MEPS Act"). 3. The respondent was terminated from service on account of certain misconduct alleged against him. He filed an appeal before the School Tribunal (appeal No. DHL/07/2004). The School Tribunal allowed his appeal by order dated 12-4-2007. He filed complaint (S.T.C. No. 158/2007) for offence punishable under section 13(1) of the MEPS Act in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate (F.C.), on 20th June, 2007. The learned Magistrate recorded his verified statement on 30th June, 2007 and, thereafter, issued process against the petitioners. It is pertinent to note that the respondent had filed a caveat application in the High Court on 20-4-2007 prior to filing of the criminal complaint in contemplation of purported writ petition which was likely to be filed by the Management of the school. The respondent also filed a contempt application due to non-compliance of the order of the School Tribunal. By the order rendered on 12-6-2008, the contempt application was disposed of because the respondent made a statement that he did not wish to press the same because the order of the School Tribunal was set aside. The contempt petition accordingly came to be disposed of on 12-6-2008. 4. The order rendered by the learned Judicial Magistrate on 20-7-2007 to issue process against the petitioners was challenged by filing a revision application (Cri. Revn. Application No. 105/2007). The learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the revision application. 5. Indisputably, in the meanwhile, the Management preferred a writ petition in the High Court. The writ petition No. 3780/2007 was filed on 27-42007 i.e. prior to filing of the private complaint and within a week after the caveat application was filed by the respondent. The writ petition No. 3780/2007 was allowed by the learned Single Judge (Deshmukh, J.) on 29-10-2007. The learned Single Judge held that the enquiry could be held afresh and the School Tribunal ought to have remitted the case for afresh decision. The learned Single Judge further observed that the respondent would be entitled to get the subsistence allowance as per provisions of law. 6. The learned Single Judge held that the enquiry could be held afresh and the School Tribunal ought to have remitted the case for afresh decision. The learned Single Judge further observed that the respondent would be entitled to get the subsistence allowance as per provisions of law. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. Clinching question is as to whether the Management failed without any reasonable excuse to comply with the direction issued by the School Tribunal. The question of "reasonable excuse" would depend upon intention and when the order was subject-matter of the challenge in the writ jurisdiction, the intention was quite clear. The Management of the school did not wish to comply with the order of the School Tribunal for the reason that the judicial remedy was sought to be explored. The writ petition was filed within a reasonable time and moreover when the caveat was filed by the respondent, it is legitimately expected that he would have been served with the notice of the writ petition. The complaint was filed on 20th June, 2007. The order of the School Tribunal was rendered on 12-42007 and the compliance was directed by the School Tribunal to be made within the period of forty (40) days from receipt of the order. There is no record to show as to when was the order served on the Management. It was not the statement of the respondent that he personally served such order on a particular date and requested the Management to comply with the same. Unless there is tangible evidence to attribute knowledge of such directions, it could not be inferred that there was intentional non-compliance. The period of forty (40) days could be counted from the date of such knowledge, but the complaint application would show that for the first time, the complainant gave an application dated 27-4-2007 to the Management and gave complaint application on 27-4-2007 to the Education Officer. 8. It is worthy to be noted that in the month of May, 2007, the High Court was closed due to vacation and apparently, the writ petition was filed on 27-42007 which is the date on which the intimation was given by the respondent/complainant to the Management about the adverse decision. 8. It is worthy to be noted that in the month of May, 2007, the High Court was closed due to vacation and apparently, the writ petition was filed on 27-42007 which is the date on which the intimation was given by the respondent/complainant to the Management about the adverse decision. Obviously, even assuming that the period commenced from date of such intimation i.e. 27-4-2007, then also, period of forty (40) days was available for the Management to comply with the directions and within such period, the writ petition was filed. The private complaint was, however, filed on 20-6-2007, even before the reasonable period had elapsed. It is pertinent to note that section 13(1) of the MEPS Act would come into play if it is shown that the Management failed without having any reasonable excuse to comply with the directions of the School Tribunal. Needless to say, the element of mens rea ought to be prima facie shown and that the complaint should show that there was absence of any reasonable excuse for the non-compliance of the directions. The revisional Court dismissed the revision application simply on the ground that as on the date of issuance of process, there was no compliance and the order rendered by this Court in writ petition could not be looked into. This is improper approach. Once the directions issued by the School Tribunal were wiped out by order of the High Court, then the very genesis of the offence was not available and, therefore, the revisional Court ought to have taken into account such subsequent development. The observation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that as on the date of presentation of the complaint, there was material to issue process and, therefore, the order of this Court did not cause any effect on the complaint case is rather improper and incorrect. For, this kind of observation is likely to lead to anomalous position. For, the order which was to be complied with came to be quashed by this Court, may be at a later point of time, and if the criminal complaint is allowed to proceed, then it would tantamount to abuse of the process of law. The very genesis of the complaint is no more in existence. For, the order which was to be complied with came to be quashed by this Court, may be at a later point of time, and if the criminal complaint is allowed to proceed, then it would tantamount to abuse of the process of law. The very genesis of the complaint is no more in existence. The absence of any direction of which compliance could be made will indicate that the noncompliance cannot be deemed to have constituted necessary ingredients of the offence. The High Court, no doubt, observed that the respondent will be entitled to seek subsistence allowance as per provisions of law. However, this is not a direction issued for the purpose of compliance under section 11 of the MEPS Act. Once it is found that the order issued by the School Tribunal is quashed, then it will have to be assumed that it is not in existence from very inception of the date of the order. It cannot be assumed that the order remained in force for short purpose of the complaint for offence under section 13(1) of the MEPS Act and is set aside for other purposes. 9. Considering the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders rendered by the learned Magistrate and by the learned Additional Sessions Judge arc unsustainable and liable to be quashed. I hold that the necessary ingredients of the offence punishable under section 13(1) of the MEPS Act are not in existence and, therefore, it would amount to abuse of judicial process, if such complaint is continued. Hence, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders are quashed. The proceedings of the criminal complaint are also quashed. Rule made absolute. 10. The observations made hereinabove be not considered in any other proceedings. Order accordingly.