JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.—Heard Sri V. Shekhar, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Pradeep Dubey and Sri Aditya Kumar Singh for the petitioners, Sri Satish Chaturvedi, assisted by Sri Anadi Krishna Narayana for respondent No. 1, Sri V.P. Varshney assisted by Smt. Suman Jaiswal for respondent No. 4. Learned Standing Counsel has been heard for respondents No. 2 and 3. 2. Brief facts, which emerge from pleadings of the parties, are; the petitioners made an application on 7th December, 2000 for allotment of an industrial plot to U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. Tronica City, Loni, District Ghaziabad. By an order dated 18th December, 2000 the petitioners were allotted Plot No. D-9/A/3 area 1800 square meters at the rate of Rs. 840/- per square meter. The petitioners was asked to deposit 25% of the amount by 16th January, 2001, i.e., an amount of Rs. 3,28,000/- after adjusting the earnest money of Rs. 60,000/-. The remaining 75% of the premium was to be paid by the petitioners in ten equal half yearly instalments with effect from 1st July, 2001. The interest at the rate of 17% per annum was also to be charged on the outstanding balance. The petitioners wrote to respondent No. 1 for possession and execution of the agreement on 31st May, 2001. Letters were issued by respondent No. 1 praying for depositing the instalments with interest. Letter dated 12th December, 2003 was issued to the petitioners by respondent No. 1 informing that an area of 1800 square meter was allotted to the petitioners on 18th December, 2000 but after tracing of the plot the area has become 2985 square meters. The petitioners were asked to deposit the amount of excess area at the rate of Rs. 1155 per square meter and Rs. 1,050 per square meter for the area in excess to 2000 square meter with location charges, total Rs. 12,65,250/-. Another letter dated 22nd January, 2004 was issued demanding Rs. 75,600/- as corner charges. Again vide letter dated 5th February, 2004 an amount of Rs. 15,14,000/- as the amount for excess area was demanded. On 29th July, 2004 a letter was written by respondent No. 1 to the petitioners informing that payment of dues has not been made. The petitioners were requested to furnish the documents and make the payment failing which cancellation of allotment shall take place. 15,14,000/- as the amount for excess area was demanded. On 29th July, 2004 a letter was written by respondent No. 1 to the petitioners informing that payment of dues has not been made. The petitioners were requested to furnish the documents and make the payment failing which cancellation of allotment shall take place. In reply to the aforesaid letter, the petitioners submitted a detail letter dated 24th August, 2004. With regard to the excess area following options were given by the petitioners : “Regarding excess area we hereby propose the following options for your kind consideration. (a) Since the excess area is very high therefore either we should not be compelled to accept the excess area or this area should be allotted to us as per our original allotment rate of above plot. (b) We also agree to divide this whole plot size approximate 3000 sq. meter into two portions and allot us one corner part (because we were allotted corner plot) of approximate 1500 sq. meter as convenient to the U.P.S.I.D.C.” 3. Again the petitioners wrote a letter dated 8th November, 2004 expressing their agreement to solve the matter by accepting the said plot with 30 meters front with insistence that corner plot shall be accepted and plot size will come approximately 1400-1500 square meters. The said letter was written in response to personal discussion with Project Manager. The respondent No. 1 thereafter issued letter dated 23rd November, 2004 allotting Plot No. D-9 area 1415.60 square meters after adjusting the amount already paid by the petitioners. The petitioners were informed that an amount of Rs. 3,15,297/- is still due against the premium and interest, which should be paid by 31st December, 2004 and thereafter lease be executed and possession be taken. By letter dated 15th March, 2005 the petitioners paid an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- by bank draft and requested to send the details of premium, interest and other levies including the pending amount. By letter dated 19th July, 2005 the petitioners were informed that an amount of Rs. 1,29,208/- is balance, which has not yet been paid and the petitioners’ case has fallen in the category of cancellation of the allotment. The petitioners on 9th August, 2005 sent a bank draft of Rs. 1,29,208/- as full and final balance payment. By letter dated 19th July, 2005 the petitioners were informed that an amount of Rs. 1,29,208/- is balance, which has not yet been paid and the petitioners’ case has fallen in the category of cancellation of the allotment. The petitioners on 9th August, 2005 sent a bank draft of Rs. 1,29,208/- as full and final balance payment. A lease deed dated 18th February, 2006 was executed in favour of the petitioners for an area of 1415 square meters. The lease deed mentioned the amount as full paid. In pursuance to the lease, the petitioners took possession on 24th February, 2006 and possession memo was issued. After taking possession of the plot, the petitioners claim to have sent a letter dated 28th March, 2006 to the Project Officer by post requesting to re-allot the remaining area of Plot No. D-9 as per original plan basis. The petitioners again sent a reminder on 27th May, 2006 making request for allotment. It was stated in the letter that 1800 square meters is barest minimum requirement, hence the remaining plot be also allotted. The petitioners have sent thereafter two letters under Right to Information Act which according to the petitioners were not considered except informing that their application has been sent to the Project Director. The petitioners filed this writ petition praying for following reliefs: “(a) call for original records in respect of allotment of plot No. D-9, Sector A-3, Tronica City, in the Industrial Area of UPSIDC, Ghaziabad and after perusing the same, issue appropriate writ or order or direction to the respondent to allot the remaining portion of the said plot earlier offered for allotment to the petitioner on terms and conditions on which it was offered. (b) direct the respondents that they should not finalise and allot the remaining part of the plot mentioned supra to any other party and give first preference to the petitioner who is already in possession of part of the said plot and if it has been allotted, after giving opportunity the said party adjudicate the right of the petitioner qua the said third party.” 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri V. Shekhar, Senior Advocate, in support of the writ petition contended that petitioner having allotted plot of 1800 square meters vide letter dated 18th December, 2000, the respondents had no authority or jurisdiction to reduce the area to 1415 square meters. Learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri V. Shekhar, Senior Advocate, in support of the writ petition contended that petitioner having allotted plot of 1800 square meters vide letter dated 18th December, 2000, the respondents had no authority or jurisdiction to reduce the area to 1415 square meters. The respondent No. 1 cannot unilaterally change the terms of the contract and the respondents were bound to allot 1800 square meters plot to the petitioners and the action of the respondents in allotting plot of lesser area is invalid. The petitioners have legitimate expectation of receiving plot of 1800 square meters. It is contended that there was no division of Plot No. D-9 and the division of plot was made subsequently to harm the interest of the petitioners. The respondent No. 4 was never an applicant in whose favour the lease has now been executed of rest of the area of Plot No. D-9 (renumbered as Plot No. 8-A). Reliance has been placed by counsel for the petitioners on judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2006)8 SCC 702 ; MRF Ltd. Kottayam v. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) Sales Tax and others and the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2008)2 SCC 672 ; Delhi Development Authority and another v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats. It has further been contended by the counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners had paid the amount for 1800 square meters whereas they have been allotted plot of only 1415 square meters and the amount, which was paid by the petitioners was in excess to the amount required to be paid for 1415 square meters plot. 5. Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1, refuting the submission of counsel for the petitioners, contended that it is true that petitioners were initially allotted an area of 1800 square meters but plot size having been increased as 2985 square meters, the petitioners were offered to take entire plot, which was not accepted by the petitioners. Thereafter petitioners themselves gave option that plot be divided into two portions and the petitioners are ready to take one portion, i.e., corner plot. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has referred to the letter dated 24th August, 2004 (Annexure-25 to the writ petition) by which an option was given by the petitioners themselves. Thereafter petitioners themselves gave option that plot be divided into two portions and the petitioners are ready to take one portion, i.e., corner plot. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has referred to the letter dated 24th August, 2004 (Annexure-25 to the writ petition) by which an option was given by the petitioners themselves. Reliance has also been placed upon the letter dated 8th November, 2004 of the petitioners (Annexure-26 to the writ petition) in which the petitioners themselves mentioned that plot size shall be approximately 1400-1500 square meters. It is submitted that petitioners accepted the plot of 1415 square meters without any protest, lease deed was executed and the petitioners have taken possession thereafter. It is contended that another part of the plot, i.e., Plot No. 8-A, was allotted on 2nd May, 2006 in favour of one Indra Pal Singh. It is submitted that allotment in favour of Indra Pal Singh was never questioned by the petitioner. Subsequently the said plot was transferred with the approval of respondent No. 1 by Indra Pal Singh and a lease deed in favour of respondent No. 4 was also executed on 25th September, 2007. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submitted that allotment in favour of Indra Pal Singh has not been challenged in the writ petition and the prayer of the petitioners that the respondents be directed not to finalise and allot the plot has become infructuous. He has placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1996 SC 2244 ; Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Limited v. Indrajeet Sawhney. 6. Sri V.P. Varshney, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4, submitted that allotment in favour of respondent No. 4 having not been challenged in the writ petition, no relief can be granted to the petitioners. He has placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2008(4) AWC 3786 (SC); Skyline Contractors Pvt. Ltd. and another v. State of U.P. and others. 7. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 8. The submission, which has been much pressed by the petitioners’ counsel is that the respondents committed error in allotting the plot of lesser area, i.e., 1415 square meters whereas the petitioners were proposed allotment of 1800 square meters. 7. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 8. The submission, which has been much pressed by the petitioners’ counsel is that the respondents committed error in allotting the plot of lesser area, i.e., 1415 square meters whereas the petitioners were proposed allotment of 1800 square meters. The submission is that when the allotment order was already issued allotting 1800 square meters of land, there was no justification in allotting lesser area of 1415 square meters. It has been contended that the terms of allotment having been mentioned in the letter dated 18th December, 2000, the same could not have been unilaterally changed by respondent No. 1. He submitted that the petitioners had legitimate expectation of allotment of 1800 square meters of land and the allotment of lesser area was unjustified. 9. There is no dispute that petitioners were initially offered allotment of 1800 meters of land by letter dated 18th December, 2000. The correspondence between the parties took place regarding payment of instalments and interest. The petitioners had claimed possession of the plot in the year 2001 itself but possession was not given by the respondents and they insisted for payment of the instalments with interest. In the meantime the respondents communicated to the petitioners vide letter dated 12th December, 2003 that at present the area of plot had become 2985 square meters and the petitioners were offered to take the excess area at the rate of Rs. 1155 per square meter from 1800 to 2000 square meters and at the rate of Rs. 1050/- per square meter from 2000 to 2985 square meters. The petitioners did not accept the offer nor paid the amount for excess area, rather they themselves came with the proposal vide letter dated 24th August, 2004 that they be not allotted the excess area and further the whole plot be divided in two portions and one portion of corner plot be allotted to them. After the said letter personal discussion also took place with the Project Officer and a letter was given on 8th November, 2004 by the petitioners to the Project Officer copy of which has been filed by the petitioners as Annexure-26 to the writ petition. After the said letter personal discussion also took place with the Project Officer and a letter was given on 8th November, 2004 by the petitioners to the Project Officer copy of which has been filed by the petitioners as Annexure-26 to the writ petition. It is useful to refer to the said letter, which was to the following effect : “With reference to our Plot No. D-9 we would like to inform you that some dispute was lying since long back against this plot due to non-possession and excess area. Now as per our personal discussion with you I hereby agree to solve this matter by accepting the said plot with 30 mtr front part whatever the area will come. However we will accept corner plot only and we presume that the plot size will now come approximate 1400-1500 square mtr.” 10. After the aforesaid letter dated 8th November, 2004 the petitioners were allotted an area of 1415 square meters and after adjustment of the amount already paid a balance amount of Rs. 3,15,297/- towards premium and interest was demanded. As noticed above, the petitioners subsequently paid the said amount and a lease was also executed in favour of the petitioners on 18th February, 2006 and possession was taken by the petitioners on 24th February, 2006. From the above facts, it is clear that petitioners themselves accepted the lesser area of 1415 square meters and made the balance payment towards the said area. The petitioners having themselves accepted the lesser area, they cannot be heard in saying that respondents committed error in not allotting 1800 square meters of land to the petitioners. From the correspondences as brought on the record, it is clear that petitioners were asked on several occasions to make the payment of instalments and interest. It is only after taking the possession that petitioners have made a request vide letter dated 28th March, 2006 for allotment of remaining plot. Again on 27th May, 2006, the petitioners sent a reminder. In the letter dated 27th May, 2006 (Annexure-39 to the writ petition), the petitioners stated following : “As submitted earlier, vide our letter dated 28.3.2006, (copy enclosed for ready reference) the above said plot was originally allotted to us measuring 1800 sq. mtr. However on our request at that time due to our financial difficulties a part size of 1415 sq. mtr. mtr. However on our request at that time due to our financial difficulties a part size of 1415 sq. mtr. was allotted to us and the possession taken over by us. At present the construction of the industrial shed and other related activity is in full swing, on the said plot.” 11. From the above statement of the petitioners in the letter dated 27th May, 2006, it is clear that on their own request they were allotted an area of 1415 square meters and they at that time were also suffering from financial difficulty. The judgment relied by counsel for the petitioners in Delhi Development Authority’s case (supra) laid down the proposition that terms and conditions of the contract cannot be unilaterally change and a party to the contract cannot at a later stage impose terms and conditions, which were not part of the offer. Following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs 62 and 66 of the said judgment : “62. It is well known principle of law that a person would be bound by the terms of the contract subject of course to its validity. A contract in certain situations may also be avoided. With a view to make novation of a contract binding and in particular some of the terms and conditions thereof, the offeree must be made known thereabout. A party to the contract cannot at a later stage, while the contract was being performed, impose terms and conditions which were not part of the offer and which were based upon unilateral issuance of office orders, but not communicated to the other party to the contract and which were not even the subject-matter of a public notice. Apart from the fact that the parties rightly or wrongly proceeded on the basis that the demand by way of 5th instalment was a part of the original scheme, DDA in its counter-affidavit either before the High Court or before us did not raise any contra plea. Submissions of Mr. Jaitley in this behalf could have been taken into consideration only if they were pleaded in the counter-affidavit filed by DDA before the High Court. 66. The stand taken by DDA itself is that the relationship between the parties arises out of the contract. The terms and conditions therefor were, therefore, required to be complied with by both the parties. Jaitley in this behalf could have been taken into consideration only if they were pleaded in the counter-affidavit filed by DDA before the High Court. 66. The stand taken by DDA itself is that the relationship between the parties arises out of the contract. The terms and conditions therefor were, therefore, required to be complied with by both the parties. Terms and conditions of the contract can indisputably be altered or modified. They cannot, however, be done unilaterally unless there exists any provision either in contract itself or in law. Novation of contract in terms of Section 60 of the Contract Act must precede the contract making process. The parties thereto must be ad idem so far as the terms and conditions are concerned. If DDA, a contracting party, intended to alter or modify the terms of contract, it was obligatory on its part to bring the same to the notice of the allocatee. Having not done so, it, relying on or on the basis of the purported office orders which is not backed by any statute, new terms of contract could thrust upon the other party to the contract. The said purported policy is, therefore, not beyond the pale of judicial review. In fact, being in the realm of contract, it cannot be stated to be a policy decision as such.” 12. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition as laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case. However, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable and the above proposition is not applicable in facts of the present case. As noticed above, in the present case the area of plot was altered with the consent and agreement of the petitioners, rather on the option given by the petitioners themselves. In paragraph 66 of the above judgment, the Apex Court has held that terms and conditions of the contract can indisputably be altered or modified, however, they cannot be done unilaterally unless there exists any provision either in contract itself or in law. In the present case the area of plot having been changed with the consent of the petitioners, the present is not a case where terms of contract has been unilaterally changed by the respondents. The said case, thus, does not help the petitioners. 13. The next judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners is MRF Ltd., Kottayam’s case (supra). The said case, thus, does not help the petitioners. 13. The next judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners is MRF Ltd., Kottayam’s case (supra). In paragraph 38 of the said judgment the principle of legitimate expectation was elaborated, which is quoted below : “38. The principle underlying legitimate expectation which is based on Article 14 and the rule of fairness has been re-stated by this Court in Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, 2005 (1) SCC 625 . It was observed in paras 8 and 9: “8. A person may have a ‘legitimate expectation’ of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has an important place in the developing law of judicial review. It is, however, not necessary to explore the doctrine in this case, it is enough merely to note that a legitimate expectation can provide a sufficient interest to enable one who cannot point to the existence of a substantive right to obtain the leave of the court to apply for judicial review. It is generally agreed that ‘legitimate expectation’ gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation to be confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightway from the administrative authorities as no crystallized right as such is involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, where a person’s legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. [See Union of India and others v. Hindustan Development Corporation and others, AIR 1994 SC 988 ]. 9. In other words, where a person’s legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. [See Union of India and others v. Hindustan Development Corporation and others, AIR 1994 SC 988 ]. 9. While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heart beat of fair play. Actions are amenable, in the panorama of judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for discernible reasons, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. The meaning and true import and concept of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely defined. A question whether the impugned action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case. A basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness." (Emphasis supplied) 14. The petitioners having been offered a plot of 1800 square meters, it is true that they had legitimate expectation of allotment of 1800 square meters’ plot. However, mere having legitimate expectation cannot mean that the petitioners have indefeasible right to get the expected. The legitimate expectation furnishes a person to seek judicial review of the action and a person is entitled for relief only when it is found that action by which the legitimate expectation has been frustrated, has been irrational and arbitrary. The legitimate expectation gives a person right to be heard. The principle of legitimate expectation has been elaborated by the Apex Court in the Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, 1993(3) SCC 499. The legitimate expectation gives a person right to be heard. The principle of legitimate expectation has been elaborated by the Apex Court in the Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, 1993(3) SCC 499. Paragraph 34 of the said judgment, which is relevant for the purpose, is quoted below : “34. We find in Attorney General for New South Wales’ case (1990 (64) Aus LJR 327), that the entire case on the doctrine of legitimate expectation has been considered. We also find that on an elaborate and erudite discussion it is held that the courts’ jurisdiction to interfere is very much limited and much less in granting any relief in a claim based purely on the ground of ‘legitimate expectation’. In Public Law and Polities edited by Carol Harlow we find an article by Gabricle Ganz in which the learned author after examining the views expressed in the cases decided by eminent Judges to whom we have referred to above, concluded thus : “The confusion and uncertainty at the heart of the concept stems from its origin. It has grown from two separate roots, natural justice or fairness and estoppel, but the stems have become entwined to such an extent that it is impossible to disentangle them. This makes it very difficult to predict how the hybrid will develop in future. This could be regarded as giving the concept a healthy flexibility, for the intention behind it is benign; it has been fashioned to protect the individual against administrative action which is against his interest. On the other hand, the uncertainty of the concept has led to conflicting decisions and conflicting interpretations in the same decision.” However, it is generally accepted and also clear that legitimate expectation being less than right operate in the field of public and not private law and that to some extent such legitimate expectation ought to be protected though not guaranteed.” 15. Further in the case of Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, 2005 (1) SCC 625 , the Apex Court elaborating the principles of legitimate expectation laid down following in paragraph 15 of the judgment : “15. As observed in Attorney General for New Southwales v. Quinn to strike the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. As observed in Attorney General for New Southwales v. Quinn to strike the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover, the negotiation of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law. If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider, but the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the recognised general principles of administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the Courts for the review of administrative action must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular case. It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is “not the key which unlocks the treasure of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shut the Court out of review on the merits”, particularly, when the elements of speculation and uncertainty are inherent in that very concept. As cautioned in Attorney General for New Southwales case the Courts should restrain themselves and respect such claims duly to the legal limitations. It is a well-meant caution. Otherwise, a resourceful litigant having vested interest in contract, licences, etc. can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by directing principles thwarted to further his own interest. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario becomes all the more important.” 16. We have scrutinised the allotment order issued in favour of the petitioners by which an area of 1415 square meters has been allotted. can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by directing principles thwarted to further his own interest. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario becomes all the more important.” 16. We have scrutinised the allotment order issued in favour of the petitioners by which an area of 1415 square meters has been allotted. We do not find that decision to allot lesser area to the petitioners is irrational or arbitrary. It has come on the record that Plot No. D-9 on tracing was found to have an area of 2985 square meters. The respondents first offered the entire plot to the petitioners including the excess area, which was not accepted by the petitioners. Thereafter personal discussion was made and the petitioners themselves offered to divide the plot into two parts with the condition that they be given the corner plot. The petitioners fully realised and were conscious that after division the area of plot will become somewhere 1400-1500 square meters, which was also noticed in their letter dated 8th November, 2004. The decision to allot lesser area cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational nor the principle of legitimate expectation can come to any rescue of the petitioners in facts of the present case. 17. The judgment relied by learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 in Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation’s case (supra) fully supports the case of the respondents. In the said case the respondent was offered allotment of an area of one acre in the industrial area by the Corporation. Subsequently the said plot was divided into two and the respondent was offered only half acre plot. After certain correspondences the respondent accepted to take half acre plot. After accepting the half acre plot allotment letter was issued and thereafter agreement was signed. Subsequently the writ petition was filed after four years. The High Court allowed the writ petition and thereafter the Apex Court allowed the appeal of the Corporation. Following was laid down in paragraphs 12 and 14 of the said judgment : “12. From the facts as narrated above, it appears that the High Court erred in directing that a further plot of half acre should be allotted to the respondent. Following was laid down in paragraphs 12 and 14 of the said judgment : “12. From the facts as narrated above, it appears that the High Court erred in directing that a further plot of half acre should be allotted to the respondent. The High Court did not appreciate that the correspondence on record of the case clearly shows that the respondent was estopped from making the claim for a further area of half acre after he had accepted the allotment of plots Nos. 1 and 2 measuring 2000 sq. metres in total. In the present case even though in the letter dated 27-12-1984 the respondent had been offered a plot of land measuring one acre yet by subsequent letter dated 5-1-1989, a revised offer was made whereby he was offered a plot measuring half acre at the old rate of Rs. 120/- per sq. metre as a special case. In this letter, it was stated that while making this offer the case would be considered as closed and the respondent was requested to confirm the acceptance of the area of 2000 sq. metres. Vide letter dated 14-1-1989, a conditional acceptance was conveyed by the respondent whereby he had stated that he accepted the half acre of plot but he reserved the right to claim further half acre of plot. To this, the appellant wrote letter dated 24-2-1989 again stating that half acre of land was offered to him and that he was clarified that this offer was made in his favour as per the consent given by him to the appellant’s Managing Director during the course of discussion on 3-12-1990. It is in response to this letter seeking the aforesaid clarification that the respondent wrote the letter dated 4-3-1989 wherein he unconditionally accepted the plot Nos. 1 and 2. It is only thereafter that the formal allotment letter dated 6-7-1990 was issued to him which was followed by a formal agreement and handing over possession of the said plot Nos. 1 and 2 to the respondent. There can be no manner of doubt that the appellant had categorically stated that it was unable to offer the respondent an area larger than half an acre and acceptance of this was insisted upon and the same was given by the respondent vide letter dated 4-3-1989. 1 and 2 to the respondent. There can be no manner of doubt that the appellant had categorically stated that it was unable to offer the respondent an area larger than half an acre and acceptance of this was insisted upon and the same was given by the respondent vide letter dated 4-3-1989. Had this unconditional acceptance not been given, it would appear, the appellant would not have made the allotment in favour of respondent. 14. The respondent was not only estopped from claiming an additional half acre of land but even the letter dated 27-12-1984 did not give the respondent any legal right to insist upon the allotment of one acre of land because the only letter of final allotment which was issued in favour of the respondent, was the one dated 6-7-1990 whereby only half acre of land was allotted and the said allotment was accepted by the respondent without demure, till he chose to file the Writ Petition four years thereafter.” 18. Now comes the submission of the petitioners regarding re-allotment of excess area of the plot in pursuance of his application dated 28th March, 2006. In the counter affidavit filed by the Corporation it has been stated that the excess area of the plot, which was given Plot No. 8-A, was allotted to one Indra Pal Singh on 2nd May, 2005. The allotment letter in favour of Indra Pal Singh has been filed as Annexure CA-1 to the counter affidavit. Subsequently permission was granted on 13th December, 2006 to Indra Pal Singh to transfer the said plot in favour of respondent No. 4 (Smt. Priyanka Kochar) and thereafter the lease deed was executed on 25th September, 2007 in favour of respondent No. 4. The present writ petition was filed in this Court on 15th December, 2007. In the writ petition initially respondent No. 4 was not even impleaded and it was on her own application that she was permitted to be impleaded. The allotment made in favour of Indra Pal Singh has not been specifically challenged in the writ petition nor there are any pleading challenging the allotment in favour of Indra Pal Singh. Indra Pal Singh has not even been impleaded in the writ petition. The respondent No. 4 is only a subsequent transferee of the plot by Indra Pal Singh. The allotment made in favour of Indra Pal Singh has not been specifically challenged in the writ petition nor there are any pleading challenging the allotment in favour of Indra Pal Singh. Indra Pal Singh has not even been impleaded in the writ petition. The respondent No. 4 is only a subsequent transferee of the plot by Indra Pal Singh. The petitioners having once accepted not to take the excess area, which was offered to him, they cannot as a matter of right claim allotment of the other part of the land, which was divided after consent of the petitioners. The judgment relied by counsel for the respondents in Skyline Contractors’ (supra) do support the contention of the respondents that no relief can be granted to the petitioners since no prayer has been made for cancellation of the allotment in favour of Indra Pal Singh nor he was impleaded as party. In Skyline Contractors’ case (supra) allotment was made in favour of the appellant but on account of non-deposit of certain instalments the allotment was cancelled and subsequently allotment was made in favour of respondent No. 5. One of the arguments raised before the Apex Court was that no relief can be granted in favour of the appellant since no relief has been claimed for cancellation of allotment in favour of respondent No. 5. The said argument was considered in paragraph 18 of the judgment. The petitioners have not placed any rule or any other material to prove that they had preferential right for allotment of the other portion of the plot No. 9-A, which was earlier offered to them and was not accepted. 19. Lastly learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the amount paid by the petitioners was for 1800 square meters whereas they were made allotment of 1415 square meters of land and in fact there was excess payment made by the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that premium for 1800 square meters land was required to be made as 1800 x 840 = Rs. 15,12,000/- whereas the total payment made by the petitioners up to 9th August, 2005 was Rs. 15,79,763/-. A perusal of the letter dated 18th December, 2000 indicates that although Rs. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that premium for 1800 square meters land was required to be made as 1800 x 840 = Rs. 15,12,000/- whereas the total payment made by the petitioners up to 9th August, 2005 was Rs. 15,79,763/-. A perusal of the letter dated 18th December, 2000 indicates that although Rs. 840/- per square meter was rate for the land and 25% of the amount was to be deposited by 16th January, 2001 but rest of the amount, i.e., 75% was to be deposited in ten equal half yearly instalments, i.e., in the next five years with 17% interest per annum. The total amount thus to be deposited by the petitioners was not only Rs. 15,12,000/- as calculated by the petitioners but it was to include 17% interest on the instalments. Further when the respondents issued letter for allotment of 1415 square meters of land on 23rd November, 2004 indicating the balance of Rs. 3,15,297/- after adjustment of the amount already paid by the petitioners, no objection or protest appears to have been made by the petitioners that they have made any excess payment, rather the petitioners subsequently deposited the amount demanded, got the lease deed executed and took possession. Thus the submission of the petitioners that they have made excess payment also cannot be accepted. 20. In view of the foregoing discussions, the petitioners are not entitled for any relief in the writ petition. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed. 21. Parties shall bear their own costs. ————