Judgment : Per G. Rajasuria, J. This appeal is focused as against the judgment and decree dated 14. 1999 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Tiruvellor in O.S.No.167 of 1989, which was one for declaring the plaintiffs as the Hereditary Trustees of the suit temples. 2. Niggard and bereft of details, the case of the plaintiffs as stood exposited from the plaint could succinctly and briefly be set out thus: The plaintiffs earlier approached the Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act for declaring them as Hereditary Trustees of the group of temples in Valasaivettikadu Village as found described in the schedule of the plaint. However, the Deputy Commissioner rejected their claim as Hereditary Trustees by its order dated 111. 1986; whereupon the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments was approached by filing appeal by the plaintiffs. However, the Commissioner also by its order dated 25. 1989 dismissed the appeal with the observation that it is open for the plaintiffs to approach the authorities under Section 64(1) of the Act if so advised; whereupon the plaintiffs filed a statutory suit in O.S. No.167 of 1989 seeking the following relief; declaring that the plaintiffs are the hereditary trustees of the suit temples, by setting aside the order dated 111. 1986 by Deputy Commissioner in O.A. No.18 of 1981 and the A.P.89 of 1987 dated 25. 1989 by the Commissioner and confirm the right of the plaintiffs in the suit item. The suit temples belong to the plaintiffs or 9 pangudharas of Vanniya Community. 3. Refuting and remonstration, inveighing and impugning the allegations/averments in the plaint, the first defendant filed the written statement, the warp and woof of it would run thus: The plaintiffs are not the Hereditary Trustees; the suit temples were formed by Vanniya Community people and to that effect, there are evidence found in the stone inscription also, in addition to it being available in other records; in the Valasaivettikadu Village Vanniya Community people are more in number and they have been only maintaining the said temples and are worshipping the same as their deity and no other community people are having interest over it. The suit temple do not belong to the plaintiffs or 9 pangudharas of Vanniya Community as alleged in the plaint. The plaintiffs are not the hereditary trustees of the suit temples and they have no right of management. The suit temple do not belong to the plaintiffs or 9 pangudharas of Vanniya Community as alleged in the plaint. The plaintiffs are not the hereditary trustees of the suit temples and they have no right of management. The suit temples belong to the community at large and those suit temples are meant for the benefit and worship of the entire village people and not for the plaintiffs only and they are not entitled to hold office as trustees or hereditary trustees. Accordingly, he prayed for the dismissal of the suit. .4. The defendants 4 and 5 filed the written statement as under, disputing the claim of the plaintiffs. .The first defendant R. Perumal was appointed by the Assistant Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Kancheepuram as a non hereditary trustee as per the order in D.Dis.No.7177/78/A3 dated 12. 1980. The origin of these temples got lost in antiquity. The lands in patta No.24 stand in the name of Pidari, Ettiamman, Thanthoniamman Temple, Managers Perumal, Subbaraya Naicker and 7 others. The plaintiffs could not give a genealogy to indicate that the concept hereditary trusteeship could be pressed into service in their favour. The lands in the possession of the temples were acquired, a few by purchase in auction sales and some others as mirasi lands and pattalands. Hence, no individuals could claim hereditary trusteeship relating to the suit temples. As per the stone inscription found, the deity of Mariamman was built by Vannia Nattar of Valasai and it does not refer to any hereditary trusteeship. In the settlement deed Exhibit A-4, executed by Munusamy Naicker in favour of 8¼ pangudharas represented by V.P. Dasaratha Naicker, there is no reference to Hereditary Trusteeship. An extent of 33 cents out of 1.62 acres in S No.188/4 of Valasaivettikadu endowed in favour of Ettiamman Temple was meant for Jallikattu during Mattu pondal festival. .5. Exhibits A-2 and A-3 do not refer to the vesting of the Management on Pangudharas. One Lakshmana Naicker was in management of the temples from 10. 1977 to 30.9.1978. However, the genealogy is found defective. There is no indication that any hereditary trusteeship is being adhered to in managing the suit temples. Accordingly, the defendants 4 and 5 prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 6. Defendants 2 and 3 adopted the written statement filed by defendants 4 and 5. 7. The trial Court framed the relevant issues. However, the genealogy is found defective. There is no indication that any hereditary trusteeship is being adhered to in managing the suit temples. Accordingly, the defendants 4 and 5 prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 6. Defendants 2 and 3 adopted the written statement filed by defendants 4 and 5. 7. The trial Court framed the relevant issues. During the trial, the first plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2 and Exhibits A-1 to A-52 were marked on the plaintiffs’ side. On behalf of the defendants, the first defendant Perumal was examined as D.W.1 along with D.Ws2 to 4 and Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were exhibited on the defendants’ side. 8. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with, the judgment and the dismissal decree of the trial Court, the plaintiffs have filed this appeal on various grounds, the gist and kernel of them would run thus: .(a) The judgment and decree of the trial Court is against law, weight of evidence and all probabilities of the case. .(b) Without properly scrutinising the evidence on record, the lower Court disbelieved the theory of Hereditary Trustees in governing the suit temples. .(c) The sub Judge failed to note that the plaintiffs have been managing the suit temples in their capacity as Hereditary trustees and the representatives of 8 1/8th share in the village and as such the concept of hereditary trusteeship could rightly be pressed into service in respect of managing the suit temples. .(d) The so-called appointed trustees by HR & CE Department, viz., 1 and 2 also never acted as trustees and they never managed the suit temples. Accordingly, the appellants/plaintiffs prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and for decreeing the suit as prayed for. 9. The parties are referred to hereunder, for convenience sake, according to their litigative status before the trial Court. 10. The points for determination are as to: 1. Whether the suit temples have been managed by adhering to the concept of hereditary trusteeship pertaining to 8 1/8th Pangudharas of Valasaivettikadu Village? 2. Whether before the trial Court adequate evidence was placed by the plaintiffs to prove their contention that from time immemorial the suit temples have been managed by such hereditary trustees? 3. Whether there is any infirmity in the judgment and decree of the trial Court? 2. Whether before the trial Court adequate evidence was placed by the plaintiffs to prove their contention that from time immemorial the suit temples have been managed by such hereditary trustees? 3. Whether there is any infirmity in the judgment and decree of the trial Court? Point Nos.1 and 2: 11. These two points are inter-linked and interwoven, interconnected and entwined with each other and hence taken together or discussion. 12. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs would develop his argument to the effect that the documents exhibited before the trial court would unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and spotlight the fact that those suit temples are small temples in the small village occupied by Vanniya community people. The documentary evidence also evidenced and demonstrated that 8-1/8the pangudharas of that village were given with the right of management over the suit temples; no other community people ever approached Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, for they being, appointed as trustees or claiming hereditary trusteeship. As such, in the absence of any rival claim as hereditary trustees, the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department could have very well accepted the theory of Hereditary trusteeship and recognized the plaintiffs as the hereditary trustees and the lower Court also failed to appreciate the relevant facts. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs prayed for decreeing the original suit after setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 13. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs prayed for decreeing the original suit after setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 13. The learned Special Government pleader appearing on behalf of D3 to D5 would submit that absolutely there is no morsel or iota, shard or shred, speck or dot of evidence much less clinching evidence to fortify and buttress the contention of the plaintiffs that they are the hereditary trustees of the suit temples; absolutely, no evidence was adduced on the side of the plaintiffs that at least for three generations, viz., grand father, father and son, such hereditary trusteeship continued and they have been managing the suit temples; the village in which the suit temples are situated is the habitate of various community people; those temples are used as places of worship by the village people in general and the plaintiffs alone cannot claim specifically that the 8-1/8th pangudharas are having the right of management of the suit temples; the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Authorites, correctly and appropriately appointed D1 and D2 as non hereditary trustees to manage the suit temples and the trial Court properly appreciating the evidence on record, arrived at a just and proper conclusion and dismissed the suit. 14. In this factual matrix, it is just and necessary to call up and recollect the relevant decision pertaining to hereditary trusteeship. (i) Kaklnanda Annadana Samajam v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments AIR 1971 SC 891 : (1970) 3 SCC 359 . An excerpt from it would run thus: “8. In cases in which the office of hereditary trusteeship has been held to be property within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f) the true character and incidents of that office do not appear to have been fully kept in view. It was common ground before the High Court and has not been disputed before us that the hereditary trustees of the institutions with Which we are concerned have only claimed a bare right to manage and administer the secular estate of the institution or the endowment and in no case any hereditary trustee has claimed proprietary or beneficiary interest either in the corpus or in the usufruct of the estate. The position of a hereditary trustee does not appear to be in any way different from that of a D(sic)harmakartha or a mere manager or custodian of an institution or endowment. There is one exception only. The hereditary trustee succeeds to the office as of right and in accordance with the rules governing succession. But in all other respects his duties and obligations are the same as that of Dharmakartha. No one has ever suggested that a hereditary trustee can be equated to a Shebait of a religious institution or a Matadhipati or the Mahant. The ingredients of both office and property, of duties and personal interest are blended together in the rights of a Mahant as also a Shebait and a Matadhipati. The position of Dharmakartha, on the other (sic) hand is not that of a Shebait of a religious institution or of the head of a Math. These functionaries have a must higher right with larger power of disposal and administration and they have a personal interest of beneficial character; (See Srinivasa Chariar v. Evalappa Mudaliar). There would thus be no justification for holding that since the office of the aforesaid functionaries has been consistently held by this Court to be property the office of a hereditary trustee is also property within Article 19(1)(f). 9. In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan the distinction between the office of Mahant and that of the Tilkayat of Nathdwara Temple was clearly enunciated. It was pointed out that the Mahant or Shebait was entitled to be maintained out of the property of the Math or the temple. The Tilkayat never used any income from the property of the temple for his personal need or private purposes nor did he claim any property interest therein. What he claimed was merely the right to manage the property, to create leases in respect of it in a reasonable manner and the right to alienate it for the purposes of the temple. These rights were exercised by him under the absolute and direct supervision of the Durbar of Udaipur. It was laid down by this Court that the aforesaid rights could not be equated with the totality of the powers generally possessed by the Mahant or the Shebait. These rights were exercised by him under the absolute and direct supervision of the Durbar of Udaipur. It was laid down by this Court that the aforesaid rights could not be equated with the totality of the powers generally possessed by the Mahant or the Shebait. In our judgment the hereditary trustee cannot in any way claim any higher rights of managing the properties of the institution or the endowment than the Tilkayat. His rights fall far short of those of the Mahant and the Shebait. It may be that in the case of the Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan (supra) his rights were governed by the Farman issued by the Durbar which had the force of law but the ratio of decision essentially is that a bare right to manage an institution or an endowment cannot be treated as property within Article 19(1) and Article 31. In Raja Birakishore v. State of Orissa the constitutionality of Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954 (Act 2 of 1955), was challenged. The attack was based mainly on the ground that that Act took away the perquisites of Raja of Puri which had been found to belong to him in the record of rights. The Raja had two-fold connection with the temple, to the first place he was the Adyasevak i.e. the chief servant of the temple and in that capacity he had certain rights and privileges. He was also the sole superintendent of the temple and was in charge of the management of the secular affairs of the temple. After reviewing the provisions of Act 2 of 1955 this Court observed that it provided for the management of the secular affairs of the temple and did not interfere with the religious affairs thereof. The rights which the Raja possessed had been exercised by the predecessor also but because he had been deprived only of the rights of management which carried no beneficial interest in the property the attack based on the provisions of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) could not be sustained. One of the features common to that case and the present one is that the management had been transferred from the sole control of the Raja to the control of a committee. This was regarded as a purely secular function which did not carry with it any right to property and could not be hit by Article 19 (1)(f). One of the features common to that case and the present one is that the management had been transferred from the sole control of the Raja to the control of a committee. This was regarded as a purely secular function which did not carry with it any right to property and could not be hit by Article 19 (1)(f). 10. It is true that in the latest decision of this Court in Sambandamurthi Mudaliar v. State of Madras it was taken to be well established that the office of a hereditary trustee is in the nature of “property” and this is so whether the trustee has beneficial interest of some sort or not. This observation, we apprehend, was not necessary for a decision of that case. There the question was whether the appellant was a hereditary trustee within the meaning of section 6(9) of the Madras Act, 1951 and there was no discussion or determination of the point that the office of the hereditary trustee was property within Article 19(1)(f) or any other article. Nor do we consider that the various pronouncements of the Privy Council that the rule in the Tagore’s case, applies to succession of hereditary trustees can afford must assistance in deciding whether an office holder who has a bare right of management can claim to have any right or interest in the nature of property within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f). Following the principles laid down in the Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan (supra) and Raja Birakishore v. State of Orissa (supra) cases, we are unable to endorse the view that the office of hereditary trusteeship is property within Article 19(1)(f) or any other article of the Constitution.” (ii) Venkataraman v. L.A. Thangappa Gounder AIR 1972 Madras 119. “6. It is the case of the plaintiffs in their respective suits that they and their ancestors have been performing poojas in their respective temples and managing the lands attached to them as trustees and that they were exercising such right or control for over three generations and that the public had no control over them. In the written statements filed on behalf of the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments it has been admitted that the predecessors in title of the plaintiffs in the olden days had not only performed the pooja for the temples but also managed the properties as de facto trustees. In the written statements filed on behalf of the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments it has been admitted that the predecessors in title of the plaintiffs in the olden days had not only performed the pooja for the temples but also managed the properties as de facto trustees. The allegation in the plaint is that for over three generations the trusteeship had been in the family of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title. This has been admitted in the written statement filed on behalf of the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments. Though this allegation is denied by the non-hereditary trustees appointed in pursuance of the resolution of the Area Committee, the Endowment Board having conceded this right, it can be safely held that the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-title were in possession and enjoyment of the lands attached to the respective temples as de facto trustees. It has been held in Ramados v. Hanumantha Rao (1913) ILR 36 Mad 364 that where an office of trustees was held by the members of a certain family for nearly 100 years and by nobody else the office must be held to be hereditary in their family.” (ii) Babu Gurukkal v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board, Mount Road. Madras-2 (1964) 1 MLJ 384 at p. 385 of MLJ: “ …….. This I think is a working view to take in the circumstances, quite apart from the presumption arising in such cases. The other evidence which will be referred to presently clearly points to the fact that the plaintiff, His brother Ramanatha Gurukkal, their father Vedagiri and grand father Ramalinga Gurukkal alias Babu, were functioning as poojaris of the Vinayagar Temple and also looking after its affairs. Exhibit A-12 was a patta granted to “Dharmakartha Subramania Gurukkal” in 1896. He is said to be the grandfather of the plaintiff. Exhibit A-2 is a copy of the Inam B Register extract in which too reference is to be found to Babu Gurukkal as “Dharmakartha of Tirumudi Vinayakar Koli.” In Exhibit A-14, a communication sent by the Department the brother of the plaintiff was addressed as trustee of Tirumudi Vinayakar Temple. He is said to be the grandfather of the plaintiff. Exhibit A-2 is a copy of the Inam B Register extract in which too reference is to be found to Babu Gurukkal as “Dharmakartha of Tirumudi Vinayakar Koli.” In Exhibit A-14, a communication sent by the Department the brother of the plaintiff was addressed as trustee of Tirumudi Vinayakar Temple. The cist receipts relating to the property endowed for the Vinayakar Temple and filed in the case also show that in 1916 the plaintiffs mother Muniammal paid the cist and in 1948 to 1953 it was paid by Ramanatha, the plaintiffs brother. Though there is a gap in the evidence between about 1896 and 1916, there is no doubt that in the Vinayakar Temple the plaintiff and his ancestors had been functioning as poojaris cum trustees. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that there was nothing to show that Dalavai Subramania Gurukkal mentioned in the extract form the Inam Fair Register was an ancestor of the plaintiff. But the trial Judge relying upon the evidence of the plaintiff himself observed that there was absolutely no doubt that Dalavai Subramania Gurukkal was an ancestor of the plaintiff. I see no reason to reject the evidence of the plaintiff on this matter. The documentary evidence shows that for more than three generations the poojariship cum trusteeship in the Vinayakar Temple has been in the family of the plaintiff from father to son. My attention has not been drawn to any other documentary evidence to show that this was not or could not to be so. It may be that Ramanatha employed some one to function as a poojari and paid his remuneration. But that in itself will not militate against the plaintiffs claim that he is not only poojari but also a hereditary trustee of Vinayakar Temple.” (emphasis supplied) A bare perusal of those decisions would leave no doubt in the mind of the Court that the concept of hereditary trusteeship could be pressed into service, if at all there is precise evidence concerning the origin of the temple; the founder of the temple; the original trustees and the fact of the original trustees’ descendants by practice and convention governing the temples. In this background, the evidence on record should be scrutinized and if done, it is explicitly clear that precisely there is no evidence to buttress and fortify the stand of the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs are the descendants of their ancestors, who allegedly, managed continuously the suit temples; No doubt, the plaintiffs placing reliance on certain documents such as Exhibit A-12 (photo-Vinayagar Koil Kalsasanam) A-13 (Kalsasanam Translation) A-14 (Photo), A-14 (Negative) and A-16 (Settlement deed) would contend that reference were made in those documents about the community called Vanniya Nattar but, the lower Court correctly raised the query that there is no reference to any hereditary trusteeship. However, the learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs would submit that even though there might not by any reference to the hereditary trusteeship, the practice could have been considered by the lower Court and held that those temples have been managed only by the trustees hereditarily. 15. Whereas the learned Special Government pleader Special Government pleader would contend that in the absence of any precise evidence that the suit temples had been managed by hereditary trustees, absolutely, there was no scope for decreeing the suit and the lower Court correctly dismissed it. .16. The plaintiffs also relied on various receipts concerning the payment of the electricity consumption charges relating to those temples by the plaintiffs, but in my opinion, such payment of electricity consumption charges and even managing the temples at one point of time would not enure to their benefit to claim hereditary trusteeship. It is an admitted fact by the plaintiffs themselves that the suit temples are small temples having no big structures and in such a case, even if some of the village people had participated in managing the temple, yet, they would not be able to claim hereditary trusteeship. 17. Whereupon, the broad question arises as to whether the entire community people of the said village or the Vanniya Nattar community people only worship in those temples. .18. The learned Special Government pleader correctly observed that such a rowing enquiry is beyond the scope of the suit. Au this juncture, I would like to refer to the order of the Commissioner dated 25. 1989, which is a brier one and which could be reproduced here under for ready reference: .“the appeal under Section 69(1) of the Tamil Nadu HR & CE Act, 1959 be an is hereby dismissed. Au this juncture, I would like to refer to the order of the Commissioner dated 25. 1989, which is a brier one and which could be reproduced here under for ready reference: .“the appeal under Section 69(1) of the Tamil Nadu HR & CE Act, 1959 be an is hereby dismissed. The appellants may file an application under Section 64(1) of the Act, if so advised.” 19. A bare perusal of the said order would indicate and exemplify that as early as in the year 1989, the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments himself gave liberty to the plaintiffs, if they so advised, to file an application under Section 64(1) of the Act. As such, I could see no infirmity in the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner as well as the Commissioner and the judgment passed by the lower Court. .20. Accordingly, Point Nos.1 and 2 are answered as against the plaintiffs. .Point No.3: 21. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments has already thought it fit to make a probe under Section 64(1) of the Act, if the plaintiffs desires so. In such a case, while dismissing this appeal, I would like to give liberty to the plaintiffs, as per the order of the Commissioner to invoke Section 64(1) of the Act and accordingly get the matter processed. 22. Point No.3 is answered accordingly. 23. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.