JUDGMENT Raj Mani Chauhan, J.—This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioner, for issuing a writ of certiorari, quashing the judgment and order dated 10.4.1996, passed by the State Public Services Tribunal, Indira Bhawan, Lucknow in Claim Petition No. 107/1/1989, Sita Ram v. State of U. P. and others, by which the Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition of the petitioner. 2. The relevant facts giving rise to the present writ petition may be summarised as under : The petitioner Sita Ram son of Mishri Ram, resident of Palto, Post Office Bhimbar, district Azamgarh, was appointed as temporary Class IV employee in Industrial Training Institute, Azamgarh w.e.f. 11.1.1967 (wrongly mentioned in the petition w.e.f. 11.1.1987) and he was made permanent w.e.f. 1.1.1974. The petitioner was Secretary of the U. P. Rajya Karamchari Mahasangh Shakha, Azamgarh. In the year 1988, a new branch of Industrial Training Institute was opened by the State Government in the town Mohnagar, Tehsil Lalganj, which was about 20 kilometers away from the District Head-quarter, Azamgarh. The opposite party No. 2 Principal, Industrial Training Institute, Azamgarh transferred the petitioner from Industrial Training Institute, Azamgarh to Industrial Training Institute, Mohnagar, vide transfer order dated 2.5.1988 and the transfer order was sent to him through a Class IV employee in an envelope. The petitioner refused to accept the envelope containing the transfer order. He tried to meet the Principal on 4, 5 and 6.5.1988 at his residence but he refused to meet him. However, he on 6.5.1988 meet the Principal in his Office and explained his personal and domestic problems on account of transfer. He requested for cancellation of his transfer order. But the Principal did not consider his request. The Principal, thereafter, vide order dated 7.5.1988 (Annexure-4) placed him under suspension initiating disciplinary proceeding against him. He appointed Sri R. Y. Ram as Inquiry Officer by the same order. The order was served to the petitioner by affixing copy of the order at his residence. 3. The petitioner moved an application before opposite party No. 2 to change the Inquiry Officer as Sri R. Y. Ram, Inquiry Officer was bearing personal grudge with him. He appointed Sri R. Y. Ram as Inquiry Officer by the same order. The order was served to the petitioner by affixing copy of the order at his residence. 3. The petitioner moved an application before opposite party No. 2 to change the Inquiry Officer as Sri R. Y. Ram, Inquiry Officer was bearing personal grudge with him. Although opposite party No. 2 rejected his application but later on he, vide order dated 1.6.1988 (Annexure-12) constituted a Committee of three members replacing Sri R. Y. Ram to conduct the inquiry against him in which one of the member of Committee was Sri R. Y. Ram. The petitioner further moved an application before opposite party No. 2 to disband the inquiry committee on the ground that the committee had been constituted against the rules as there was no provision for conducting the inquiry by a committee. He also raised objection against Sri R. Y. Ram, who was one of the member of the Inquiry Committee on the ground that he had personal bias against him. Although opposite party No. 2 rejected his application but later on disbanded the committee and appointed one Sri Nageshwar Thakur as Inquiry Officer, who proceeded with the inquiry. The petitioner raised objection before the opposite party No. 2 against appointment of Sri Nageshwar Thakur on the ground that he had earlier been a prosecution witness in a criminal case pending against him. He was biased with him. He further requested to change the Inquiry Officer but his application was rejected by the opposite party No. 2. The Inquiry Officer concluded the inquiry with the finding that all the four charges levelled against the petitioner were fully established. The opposite party No. 2/Disciplinary Authority agreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer issued show cause notice to him and he after considering the reply given by him in response to the show cause notice found that in view of nature of charges levelled against him, he did not deserve to remain in service. Consequently, he vide order dated 30.8.1988 (Annexure-29) passed an order of his removal from service allowing him three months advance pay. 4. The petitioner challenged the order of his removal from the service before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal by filing Claim Petition No. 107/1/1989, Sita Ram v. State of U. P. and others. Consequently, he vide order dated 30.8.1988 (Annexure-29) passed an order of his removal from service allowing him three months advance pay. 4. The petitioner challenged the order of his removal from the service before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal by filing Claim Petition No. 107/1/1989, Sita Ram v. State of U. P. and others. The Public Services Tribunal, vide judgment and order dated 10.4.1996, dismissed his claim petition which has given rise to the present writ petition. 5. The petitioner has challenged the order of his removal from the service dated 30.8.1988 as well as impugned judgment and order dated 10.4.1998, passed by the Tribunal on the ground that he was secretary of Class IV employees and being Secretary, he used to put the grievances of the employees before the Principal of the Institution, therefore, he was annoyed with him. He on account of his annoyance and prejudices transferred him from Industrial Training Institute, Azamgarh to Industrial Training Institute, Mohnagar on 2.5.1988. The order of transfer was sent to him. He did not accept the transfer order and inform the peon that he would accept the transfer order after meeting with opposite party No. 2. He tried to meet him at his residence on 4/5/6.5.1988 but he was not allowed to meet him. However, he on 6.5.1988 met him in his Office and explained his personal and domestic problems in compliance of the transfer order. He requested for cancellation of his transfer order but he did not pay any attention on his request. He was on casual leave on 6.5.1988 on account of his illness. He on account of his illness proceeded on medical leave w.e.f. 7.5.1988. The opposite party No. 2, who had prejudices against him put him under suspension on 7.5.1988 and initiated disciplinary proceeding against him. He was not allowed any subsistence allowance during suspension period. The Inquiry Officer Sri Nageshwar Thakur had been a prosecution witness in a Criminal Case No. 123 of 1996, State v. Sita Ram, under Section 380/411, I.P.C. Police Station Kotwali Azamgarh, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Phoolpur, Azamgarh which had been lodged by one K. N. Seth against him. Sri Nageshwar Thakur being witness in a criminal case against him was bearing personal bias with him. Sri Nageshwar Thakur being witness in a criminal case against him was bearing personal bias with him. Therefore, he had moved an application to the opposite party No. 3, the then Principal, Industrial Training Institute, Azamgarh to change him but opposite party No. 3 rejected his application, vide order dated 4.8.1988 (Annexure-21) on the ground that Inquiry Officer could not be changed frequently. The Inquiry Officer Sri Nageshwar Thakur conducted the inquiry despite his objection. The inquiry was, therefore, bad in law as being against the principle of natural justice. His further allegation is that the Inquiry Officer had neither recorded any statements of the witnesses nor he was permitted to cross-examine any witness. He was also not allowed to adduce any evidence in his defence. The Inquiry Officer had conducted inquiry in a biased manner without following the established procedure under the rules. The inquiry being contrary to the legal procedure as well as against the natural justice is vitiated. The petitioner has further alleged that although all the points were raised by him in his claim petition before the State Public Services Tribunal but the Tribunal did not appreciate his contentions while the contentions raised by him were well founded. The Tribunal had failed to exercise its power to quash the inquiry proceeding conducted by the Inquiry Officer against him which was illegal and vitiated in the eyes of law. 6. The Principal of Industrial Training Institute, Azamgarh has filed counter-affidavit wherein he has not disputed the material facts as mentioned above. However, he has stated that the petitioner was ordered to look after the work of Class IV employee in the new institute, i.e., Industrial Training Institute, Mohnagar, Azamgarh for some time. The order was sent to him through office peon which was refused by him. The petitioner did not comply the transfer order, therefore, a disciplinary inquiry was initiated against him and he was placed under suspension. One Sri R. Y. Ram was appointed as Inquiry Officer. On the objection raised by the petitioner, he cancelled the order of appointment of Sri R. Y. Ram as Inquiry Officer and constituted a Committee of three members to enquire into the charges levelled against him. Thereafter, on the application of the petitioner, Inquiry Committee was also disbanded and one Sri Nageshwar Thakur was appointed as Inquiry Officer. On the objection raised by the petitioner, he cancelled the order of appointment of Sri R. Y. Ram as Inquiry Officer and constituted a Committee of three members to enquire into the charges levelled against him. Thereafter, on the application of the petitioner, Inquiry Committee was also disbanded and one Sri Nageshwar Thakur was appointed as Inquiry Officer. He after following the procedure provided under C.C.A. Rules conducted the inquiry. The petitioner was allowed to cross-examine the witnesses. He was also allowed opportunity to lead evidence in his defence. The Inquiry Officer, on the basis of evidence, found all the four charges levelled against the petitioner proved and he accordingly submitted his inquiry report. The disciplinary authority agreeing with the finding of the Inquiry Officer issued show cause notice to the petitioner alongwith the copy of the inquiry report. The petitioner submitted his reply in response to the show cause notice. The disciplinary authority after considering the reply of the petitioner and gravity of the charges levelled against the petitioner found that he did not deserve to remain in service. Consequently, he, vide order dated 30.8.1988, removed the petitioner from service allowing him advance pay of three months. The petitioner challenged the order of his removal from the service by filing Claim Petition No. 107/1/1989, Sita Ram v. State of U. P. and others, before the State Public Services Tribunal. The Tribunal after considering the entire facts of the case and procedure followed by the Inquiry Officer in conducting the inquiry found that the Inquiry Officer had properly conducted the inquiry. The Inquiry Officer could not be said to be biased with the petitioner only on the ground that he had been a witness in a criminal case pending against him. The impugned order passed by the opposite party No. 2 does not call for any interference. 7. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned standing counsel and perused the materials on record. 8. The impugned order passed by the opposite party No. 2 does not call for any interference. 7. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned standing counsel and perused the materials on record. 8. In the present petition although the petitioner has challenged the inquiry report as well as the impugned judgment and order passed by the Tribunal on so many grounds but learned counsel for the petitioner at the time of argument pressed the only point that the inquiry is vitiated on the ground that the Inquiry Officer had been a prosecution witness in a criminal case against the petitioner, therefore, he had personal bias and mala fides against him. The inquiry is, therefore, vitiated as being against the principle of natural justice. 9. Now in the present petition, the following two points crop up for consideration : 1. Whether the inquiry against the petitioner was vitiated, on account of personal bias and mala fides of the Inquiry Officer against him? 2. Whether the Tribunal failed to consider the personal bias of the Inquiry Officer as contended by the petitioner? 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner, who was working as Class IV employee in the Industrial Training Institute, Azamgarh and quite senior among the Class IV cadre of the 28 employees had mala fidely been transferred by the opposite party No. 2 on 2.5.1988. He had some personal and domestic problems. He, therefore, met opposite party No. 2 and explained him his problems. He requested for cancellation of his transfer order but he did not pay any attention. The petitioner was on casual leave on 6.5.1988 on account of his illness. He proceeded on medical leave w.e.f. 7.5.1988. The opposite party No. 2 on 7.5.1988 placed him under suspension and ordered for initiating departmental proceeding against him. Sri R. Y. Ram was appointed as Inquiry Officer, who had been a witness in a criminal case against him. Therefore, he had personal grudge against him. The petitioner, therefore, represented before opposite party No. 2 for changing the Inquiry Officer but his representation was turned down by him. However, opposite party No. 2, later on, constituted a Committee of three members to enquire into the charges levelled against him in which one of the members of the Committee was Sri R. Y. Ram. The Committee constituted by the opposite party No. 2 was against the Rules. However, opposite party No. 2, later on, constituted a Committee of three members to enquire into the charges levelled against him in which one of the members of the Committee was Sri R. Y. Ram. The Committee constituted by the opposite party No. 2 was against the Rules. The petitioner, therefore, represented him to disband the Committee as it had been constituted against the Rules as well as the earlier Inquiry Officer Sri R. Y. Ram was a member of the Committee, who had personal bias against him. His representation was rejected by the opposite party No. 2 but later on, the opposite party No. 2 disbanded the Inquiry Committee and appointed one Sri Nageshwar Thakur as Inquiry Officer. Sri Nageshwar Thakur had been prosecution witness in a criminal case under Section 380/411, I.P.C. against the petitioner. He had strong personal bias as well as mala fides against him. He, therefore, represented again to the opposite party No. 2 to change the Inquiry Officer but his representation was turned down by him. Sri Nageshwar Thakur, Inquiry Officer concluded the inquiry against the petitioner. 11. The learned counsel argued that although Sri Nageshwar Thakur was not witness to the charges levelled against the petitioner during the inquiry ; rather he had been prosecution witness in a criminal case against him but being witness in a criminal case against the petitioner he had been interested in getting him convicted and sentenced like the complainant. He had personal bias as well as mala fides against him. The petitioner represented to the opposite party No. 2 to change the Inquiry Officer, Sri Nageshwar Thakur but he rejected his application. The established principle of law is that it is not only the justice be done but it should appear to have been done. The petitioner had levelled the serious charges of bias and mala fides against the Inquiry Officer, which was based on solid facts. The established principle of law is that it is not only the justice be done but it should appear to have been done. The petitioner had levelled the serious charges of bias and mala fides against the Inquiry Officer, which was based on solid facts. It was not a case of likelihood of bias ; rather it was a case of real likelihood of bias, therefore, opposite party No. 2 in all fairness was expected to change the Inquiry Officer and appoint an independent officer in his place so that the inquiry could be conducted in a fair manner to the satisfaction of the petitioner but the opposite party No. 2 without considering the grievances of the petitioner rejected his representation for change of Inquiry Officer. Therefore, the entire inquiry proceeding was vitiated as being against the principle of natural justice which is liable to be set aside. The disciplinary authority agreeing with the report of the Inquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty of charges levelled against him. He accordingly issued show cause notice to the petitioner who submitted his reply in response of show cause notice. But he with the prejudice mind without considering the reply of the petitioner arbitrarily passed the impugned order dated 30.8.1988, terminating his services. The termination order was passed on the basis of inquiry report which was void as being against the principle of natural justice, therefore, the termination order of the petitioner from the service dated 30.8.1988 is also illegal and void. The petitioner challenged the termination order before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal by filing Claim Petition No. 107/1/1989, Sita Ram v. State of U. P. and others. The Tribunal failed to consider the submission raised by him that the total inquiry proceeding was based on the biased and mala fide attitude of the Inquiry Officer, therefore, the termination order is null and void. The impugned judgment and order passed by the Tribunal is bad in law and is liable to be set aside. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his argument has placed reliance on the following cases decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 1. Tilak Chand Mangatram Obhan v. Kamla Prasad Shukla and others, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 21 ; 2. Union of India and others v. Prakash Kumar Tandon, (2009) 2 SCC 541 ; and 3. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his argument has placed reliance on the following cases decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 1. Tilak Chand Mangatram Obhan v. Kamla Prasad Shukla and others, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 21 ; 2. Union of India and others v. Prakash Kumar Tandon, (2009) 2 SCC 541 ; and 3. Indrani Bai (Smt.) v. Union of India and others, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 256. 13. The learned standing counsel supporting the impugned judgment and order, passed by the Tribunal argued that although Sri Nageshwar Thakur, Inquiry Officer had been prosecution witness in a criminal case under Section 380/411, I.P.C. against the petitioner but he had not been witness of any charges levelled against the petitioner during the inquiry. The fact of being witness of the Inquiry Officer in a criminal case against the petitioner, which was pending against him before the alleged inquiry, had no relevance to the inquiry in question. The Inquiry Officer could not be said to have personal bias with the petitioner on account of being prosecution witness in a criminal case against him. The Inquiry Officer could be said to be biased with the petitioner only if he had been either a witness of any charge levelled against the petitioner during inquiry or he was in any other way interested in subject-matter of the inquiry to get him punished. But in this case it was not so. 14. The learned counsel argued that in the case of Tilak Chand Mangatram Obhan (supra) referred by the counsel for the petitioner, a disciplinary inquiry was initiated against a teacher. The Inquiry Committee included the Principal of the School who had deep rooted strong bias against the delinquent teacher, therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that the inquiry was vitiated on account of being based on the personal bias of the Principal. The learned counsel relying the case, State of Uttranchal and others v. Kharak Singh, (2008) 2 SCC (L & S) 698, contended that in this cited case the Hon'ble Apex Court had held the inquiry to be void on the ground that the Inquiry Officer who was Divisional Forest Officer, himself had inspected the area where the illegal feeling of forest trees were found. The delinquent employee was forest guard. The delinquent employee was forest guard. The Apex Court keeping in view of the fact that the Inquiry Officer himself was a witness to the charges against the delinquent employee, held the inquiry to be vitiated as it was based on personal bias of the Inquiry Officer. 15. The learned standing counsel argued that in the present case Inquiry Officer was neither witness to the charges levelled against the petitioner nor he was in any way interested in holding the petitioner guilty. 16. The learned counsel further argued that the allegation of the petitioner against the bias and mala fides of the Inquiry Officer is a question of fact which has to be established by the petitioner. Mere allegation of likelihood of bias or mala fides of the Inquiry Officer will not sufficient to hold that the Inquiry Officer was biased with the petitioner. In this case, the Inquiry Officer had earlier been a prosecution witness in a criminal case against the petitioner but this fact will itself not be sufficient to prove that he had bias or mala fides against the petitioner. The incident of criminal case and the subject-matter of inquiry, in question, were two different matters. The petitioner has not proved that the Inquiry Officer being cited as a witness in the charge-sheet giving rise a criminal case against him had actually deposed against him before the trial court during the trial. Unless it has been established by the petitioner that the Inquiry Officer had deposed against him before the trial court, it cannot be said that he had personal bias against the petitioner. The incident of criminal case is too remote to co-relate the Inquiry Officer with bias and mala fides in relation to present inquiry. The petitioner has therefore, failed to establish that the Inquiry Officer had bias as well as mala fides against him. The Inquiry Officer after allowing sufficient opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses during inquiry and after affording him sufficient opportunity to lead his evidence in his defence concluded the inquiry. He found the petitioner guilty of all the four charges levelled against him. The inquiry proceeding, therefore does not suffer from bias or mala fides of the Inquiry Officer. The Tribunal has considered the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner before it. He found the petitioner guilty of all the four charges levelled against him. The inquiry proceeding, therefore does not suffer from bias or mala fides of the Inquiry Officer. The Tribunal has considered the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner before it. The Tribunal has specifically held that mere being prosecution witness of the Inquiry Officer against the petitioner in a earlier criminal case will itself not be sufficient to raise any presumption that the Inquiry Officer was biased with the petitioner. The impugned judgment and order passed by the Tribunal does not suffer from any illegality which does not call for any interference under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 17. We have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel as well as perused the materials available on record. We have also gone through the case laws cited by the learned counsel for the parties and other relevant case laws too on the point in issue. 18. In the case of State of Uttranchal and others v. Kharak Singh (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court, considering a number of its earlier case laws on the point of inquiry as cited in the judgment, has laid down guidelines how the inquiry should be conducted. Those guidelines are being extracted as below : (i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not become empty formalities ; (ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the subject-matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness he should not the enquiry officer. If the said position becomes known after the appointment of the enquiry officer, during the enquiry steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer ; (iii) In an enquiry, the employer/department should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman/delinquent charged and give an opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses of the employer. Only thereafter, the workman/ delinquent be asked whether he wants to lead any evidence and asked to give any explanation about the evidence led against him ; and (iv) On receipt of the enquiry report, before proceeding further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/ punishing authority to supply a copy of the enquiry report and all concerned materials relied on by the enquiry officer to enable him to offer his views, if any. 19. The learned standing counsel relying on the second guideline mentioned above laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court argued that in this case the Inquiry Officer had neither been a witness to any of the charges levelled against the petitioner during inquiry nor he had reported against him. He might have been witness in any criminal case pending against him earlier, but this fact itself will not be sufficient to show that the Inquiry Officer was not independent or impartial. The Inquiry Officer in this case did not participate in any way in the inquiry ; rather he being independent officer conducted the inquiry in a fair manner as per rules allowing sufficient opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses and to lead his evidence. The inquiry, therefore, cannot be said to be biased as alleged by the petitioner. 20. Indisputedly, the Inquiry Officer, Sri Nageshwar Thakur had been prosecution witness in a criminal case against the petitioner pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Phoolpur, Azamgarh. The criminal case was already pending before the inquiry was initiated against him. 21. Now, the question to be considered is whether the Inquiry Officer being a witness against the petitioner in earlier criminal case, can be said to be biased and had mala fides against the petitioner? In this context, it will be most relevant to consider the meaning of word 'bias'. 22. As per Government legal glossary the word 'bias' means : "a one sided inclination of mind, any special influence that sways the mind". As per law lexicon by P. Ram Nath Aiyer the word 'bias' means : "leaning of mind : prepossession : inclination : propensity towards an object, bent of mind a mental power, which sways the judgment : that which sways the mind towards one opinion rather than another ; as, bias of arbitrator, of Judge, or Jury or witness". 23. As per law lexicon by P. Ram Nath Aiyer the word 'bias' means : "leaning of mind : prepossession : inclination : propensity towards an object, bent of mind a mental power, which sways the judgment : that which sways the mind towards one opinion rather than another ; as, bias of arbitrator, of Judge, or Jury or witness". 23. In the case of Secretary to Government, Transport Department v. Munuswamy Mudaliar, 1988 Supp SCC 651, the Hon'ble Apex Court has defined the word 'bias' "as predisposition to decide for or against one party without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute". Going through the meaning of bias mentioned above, it is borne out that the bias means inclination or leaning of mind of Judge or Inquiry Officer in favour or against any person which sways his mind to form an opinion on the point in issue before him. 24. In the case of Ratan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School and others, (1993) 4 SCC 10 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has given three kinds of bias namely, (i) personal bias, (ii) pecuniary bias and (iii) official bias. The present case relates to the personal bias of the Inquiry Officer. 25. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that it is not always necessary that the Inquiry Officer would have in any way participated or given evidence in the inquiry against the delinquent employee and later on he conducted inquiry only then the Inquiry Officer can be said to be biased against the delinquent employee. In case of bias it has to be seen whether the Inquiry Officer had got any set up of his mind against the petitioner which could sway his judgment against him. The learned counsel argued that the Inquiry Officer had already been a prosecution witness against the petitioner in a criminal case pending against him. He being prosecution witness was interested to get him convicted. He could hardly be treated as fair and impartial person. He being a prosecution witness would have bearing mala fides against the petitioner. Therefore, it will be presumed that he had bias and mala fides against the petitioner. 26. He being prosecution witness was interested to get him convicted. He could hardly be treated as fair and impartial person. He being a prosecution witness would have bearing mala fides against the petitioner. Therefore, it will be presumed that he had bias and mala fides against the petitioner. 26. The learned counsel further argued that since from the very beginning after the appointment of Sri Nageshwar Thakur, the petitioner raised his objection before opposite party No. 2, that Sri Thakur being a prosecution witness in a criminal case against him was having bias and mala fides against him. He was not an impartial person, therefore, he had no confidence in him. He requested opposite party No. 2 for changing the Inquiry Officer but he rejected his application. The petitioner in his reply to the show cause notice issued by the opposite party No. 2 had specifically alleged that the Inquiry Officer was biased with him and he had mala fides too, on account of being witnessed in a criminal case against him, even then, this fact was not considered by him while awarding the punishment to him. The petitioner has not only alleged that the Inquiry Officer was biased with him and had mala fides against him but this fact had also been established by him by filing documentary evidence. The Inquiry Officer being biased with the petitioner had concluded the inquiry which is vitiated in the eyes of law as being against the principle of natural justice. 27. In case of Ratan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in case the inquiry is challenged on the principles of bias and mala fides, the petitioner is required to establish the real likelihood of bias not the likelihood of bias. The Hon'ble Apex Court in this case has considered a number of its earlier judgments on the points in issue. The Hon'ble Apex Court has cited the case law of R. V. Sussex Justices, 1924 (1) KB 256, wherein it had been held that "answer to the question whether there was a real likelihood of bias depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be done." 28. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also cited Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also cited Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 2, para 551 in its judgment wherein it has been indicated that "the test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances would feel a serious apprehension of bias." 29. The same principle had been laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, 1957 SCR 575 , in which it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that "the test is not whether in fact, a bias has affected the judgment ; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the Tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done". 30. In the case of Cantonment Executive Officer and others v. Vijay Deewani and others, (2008) 12 SCC 203, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that "question of bias is always question of fact. The Court has to be vigilant while applying the principle of bias as it primarily depends upon the facts of each case, the Court should only act on the real bias and not merely likelihood of bias”. 31. In view of above principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is well established that the petitioner has to establish real likelihood of bias which could affect the inquiry as well as the finding of the Inquiry Officer on account of bias or mala fides. 32. In case of Union of India and others v. Prakash Kumar Tandon, (2009) 2 SCC 541 , the Hon'ble Apex Court found that the raid against the respondent was conducted by the vigilance department and the Chief of the vigilance department was appointed as Inquiry Officer. Keeping in view of this fact Hon'ble Court held that the inquiry was not fair. The appointment of Chief of Vigilance Department as Inquiry Officer should have been avoided. The Tribunal as well as High Court held the inquiry to be vitiated. The Hon'ble Apex Court confirmed the judgment of the High Court. In view of the observation of Hon'ble Apex Court it is settled that the Inquiry Officer should be fair and impartial. The appointment of Chief of Vigilance Department as Inquiry Officer should have been avoided. The Tribunal as well as High Court held the inquiry to be vitiated. The Hon'ble Apex Court confirmed the judgment of the High Court. In view of the observation of Hon'ble Apex Court it is settled that the Inquiry Officer should be fair and impartial. It is not necessary that he would have been witness in the inquiry or he would have in any way interested in the subject-matter of the inquiry. If the Inquiry Officer has prejudices against the employee, he cannot be said to be fair and impartial. The bias of Inquiry Officer may not relate to subject-matter under inquiry. It may relate to different matter too which really causes apprehension to the delinquent employee that he will not get justice from him. 33. In this case, although the Inquiry Officer had neither been witness in the inquiry nor he was in any way concerned with the charges levelled against the petitioner but he had been prosecution witness in a criminal case under Section 380/411, I.P.C. pending against him. He being a prosecution witness against the petitioner will be supposed to have been interested to get him convicted like the complainant. Being prosecution witness in a criminal case against the petitioner, the Inquiry Officer would have made up of his mind against the petitioner. The petitioner since from the very beginning after the appointment of Sri Nageshwar Thakur as Inquiry Officer had raised objection dated 1.8.1988 (Annexure-18 to the writ petition) before the opposite party No. 2 that Sri Nageshwar Thakur had been prosecution witness in a criminal case under Section 380/411, I.P.C. pending against him and he had mala fides and personal bias against him. Therefore, he requested the opposite party No. 2 to change him but his request was turned down by the opposite party No. 2. The disciplinary authority after receipt of the inquiry report issued show cause notice to the petitioner for awarding punishment. In paragraph 7 of the reply (Annexure-27 to the writ petition) to the show cause notice, the petitioner had specifically alleged that the Inquiry Officer had been prosecution witness against him in a criminal case pending against him under Section 380/411, I.P.C., Police Station Kotawali, district Azamgarh. In paragraph 7 of the reply (Annexure-27 to the writ petition) to the show cause notice, the petitioner had specifically alleged that the Inquiry Officer had been prosecution witness against him in a criminal case pending against him under Section 380/411, I.P.C., Police Station Kotawali, district Azamgarh. He was biased with him as well as had mala fides against him even then opposite party No. 2 did not consider this fact while awarding the sentence against him. Further, the petitioner in paragraphs 13-16 of the writ petition has specifically alleged that Sri Nageshwar Thakur had been a prosecution witness in a criminal case against him, therefore, he had represented to the opposite party No. 2 to change the Inquiry Officer even then his request was turned down. 34. In the counter-affidavit filed by Sri P. K. Srivastava, the Principal, Industrial Institute of Training, Azamgarh, it has been stated that the contents of paragraphs Nos. 13 and 16 of the writ petition are denied. It has been alleged that the petitioner's requests for change of the Inquiry Officer were allowed twice. The Inquiry Officer was changed, thereafter a committee of enquiry was constituted which too was desolved. The petitioner had requested for change of last Inquiry Officer Sri Nageshwar Thakur. His application was rejected on the ground that it was not possible to change Sri Nageshwar Thakur as the Inquiry Officer. The Principal in his counter-affidavit has not specifically explained as to why Sri Nageshwar Thakur Inquiry Officer could not be changed while the petitioner has represented before him to change him on solid grounds. It appears that the Principal of I.T.I. did not pay any attention towards the allegation of the petitioner that Sri Nageshwar Thakur being a prosecution witness in a criminal case against him had bias and mala fides against him. He was not fair and impartial to the satisfaction of the petitioner. 35. In view of the facts of the case it is clear that the petitioner had no faith on the Inquiry Officer as he had been prosecution witness in a criminal case against him. The Inquiry Officer being a prosecution witness will be presumed to have bias and mala fides against him. 35. In view of the facts of the case it is clear that the petitioner had no faith on the Inquiry Officer as he had been prosecution witness in a criminal case against him. The Inquiry Officer being a prosecution witness will be presumed to have bias and mala fides against him. In this way it is not a case of mere likelihood of bias to the petitioner rather it appears to be a case real likelihood of bias of the Inquiry Officer against the petitioner. 36. From a perusal of impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal it appears that this point was raised by the petitioner before the Tribunal that the Inquiry Officer had been a prosecution witness in a criminal case against him, therefore, he had personal bias against him. The inquiry conducted by him, therefore, stood vitiated on this ground. The learned Tribunal did not consider this point in its true import rather in a casual way held that the Inquiry Officer could not be said to be biased only on the ground that he had been a prosecution witness in a criminal case against the petitioner. The finding of the Tribunal on this point is being extracted below : "The only point to be considered is whether the Inquiry Officer could be called prejudiced against him just because he had been named as prosecution witness against the petitioner in a criminal case. Now in the present case the charge-sheet was given by somebody else, Inquiry Officer should give only inquiry report proceeded after that stage during conduct of proceeding, there is nothing to show the bias or prejudice. It is sweet will of the appointing authority to appoint the Inquiry Officer." 37. From the above observations it is clear that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate the points raised by the petitioner that the inquiry was vitiated on the ground of bias of the Inquiry Officer. The impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal is, therefore, not based on the proper appreciation of the points raised above by the petitioner and therefore, does not deserve to be sustained. 38. In view of the above discussions, the points for consideration before this Court are answered as below : 1. Sri Nageshwar Thakur, the Inquiry Officer had personal bias and mala fides against the petitioner, therefore, the inquiry against him is vitiated in the eyes of law. 2. 38. In view of the above discussions, the points for consideration before this Court are answered as below : 1. Sri Nageshwar Thakur, the Inquiry Officer had personal bias and mala fides against the petitioner, therefore, the inquiry against him is vitiated in the eyes of law. 2. The Tribunal has failed to consider the point of personal bias as raised by the petitioner before it. The impugned judgment and order dated 10.4.1996, passed by the Tribunal is bad in law and is, therefore, liable to be quashed. 39. Accordingly, writ petition deserves to succeed. 40. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 10.4.1996, passed by the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow in Claim Petition No. 107/1/1989, inquiry report dated 16.8.1988 and the order dated 30.8.1988, passed by the disciplinary authority on the basis of inquiry report dated 16.8.1988, terminating the services of the petitioner are quashed. 41. The petitioner was appointed w.e.f. 11.1.1967. It is not clear from the records as to whether he has superannuated from service or he is still in service. If he has not superannuated, he be reinstated forthwith. The Principal, Industrial Training Institute, Azamgarh will be at liberty to initiate a fresh inquiry against the petitioner appointing an independent officer to be Inquiry Officer. If a fresh inquiry is initiated, it will be concluded within six months from the date of certified copy of this judgment is produced before opposite party No. 2 or before the date of superannuation of the petitioner from the service whichever is earlier. As regards the payment of back wages of the petitioner is concerned, it will be subject to the final outcome of the inquiry. 42. However, in case the petitioner has been superannuated, then Office shall not be just to hold fresh inquiry in such situation. The petitioner shall be restored in service notionally without back wages for the purposes of payment of post retiral dues in accordance with Rules. The petitioner shall be deemed in service without back wages and be paid post retiral dues expeditiously and preferably within six months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Judgment has been delivered under Chapter VII, Rule 1 (2) of the Allahabad High Court Rules.