JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—Heard Shri B.D. Mandhyan, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Shri S.N. Dube, the learned counsel for respondent workman. 2. The petitioners have assailed the validity and legality of the award directing reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages. The facts leading to the filing of the present writ petition is, that as per the stand of the petitioner, the workman was engaged on a daily rated basis on exigency of work as a water boy, and that his services was dispensed with since there was no requirement of work. In the written statement, filed by the petitioner, it was categorically stated that the appointments are made on the post of clerk as per the Regulations framed under the Mandi Adhiniyam, and that, the workman was never appointed as a clerk nor does he hold the necessary qualifications. 3. On the other hand, the workman contended that he was made to do the work of a clerk, and that, he had worked for more than 240 days for the period 1.5.1991 to 31.5.1992, and that, his services was arbitrarily dispensed with without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 4. The Labour Court, after considering the matter, found, on the basis of the documents produced by the workman, that he was doing the work of a clerk. The Labour Court, further found that the workman had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year, and consequently, held that the provisions of Section 6-N had been violated by the employers since no retrenchment compensation was paid at the time when the services of the workman was dispensed with. The Labour Court found that during the pendency of the proceedings before it, the workman had been reinstated on 9th February, 1995, and accordingly, directed that the workman should be paid full back wages. The petitioner, being aggrieved, has filed the present writ petition. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the workman was never appointed as a clerk and that such appointments are made as per the Regulations framed under the Mandi Samiti Act. Further, the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualification, and consequently, no reinstatement on the post of clerk could be made where such appointment, if any, was made, de hors the Rules. 6. Further, the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualification, and consequently, no reinstatement on the post of clerk could be made where such appointment, if any, was made, de hors the Rules. 6. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and others, 2006 (1) SCC 667 . The learned counsel further submitted that there was no post of a clerk, and therefore, the workman could not be reinstated on that post. Further, the learned counsel submitted that the Labour Court, at best, could only grant damages if it came to a conclusion that the workman had worked for more than 240 days, but the question of reinstatement does not arise. In support of his submission the learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula and another, 2008 (1) SCC 575 . The learned counsel also made an attempt to argue that the workman was appointed for a limited period, and therefore, the provision of Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would be applicable, being a fixed term appointment, consequent to which, retrenchment compensation was not payable. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not required to be answered in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Court finds that even before the Labour Court, the workman was reinstated w.e.f. 9th February, 1995. According to the petitioner, a fresh appointment was given to the workman. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the workman contends that it was a case of reinstatement. 8. Whatever may be the situation, the fact remains that the workman has been re-engaged in some capacity or the other. The details with regard to reinstatement/reengagement are lacking before this Court. The Court, however, finds that the mere fact that the workman proved that he was working as the clerk would not entitle him to be reinstated on the post of clerk, inasmuch as the post of a clerk can only be filled up under the Rules and Regulations framed under the Act. The appointment on the post of clerk is required to be made by the Board. The appointment on the post of clerk is required to be made by the Board. In the present case, the workman has not indicated anywhere that he was appointed by a competent authority under the Act. From the record, it is clear that the workman was engaged in some capacity or the other. According to the petitioner, he was engaged on a daily rated basis as a water boy. 9. On the other hand; the workman has proved that he had worked as a clerk, but working as a clerk will not entitle the workman for reinstatement on that post, especially when there is nothing to prove that his appointment was made in accordance with the Rules and Regulations framed under the Act. The workman at best would be entitled to the wages of a clerk for the period he had worked, but will not be entitled for the post of a clerk. 10. This Court finds that the Labour Court has given a categorical finding of fact that the workman had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year. This being a finding of fact and there is nothing to indicate that this finding is perverse, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the said finding. However, the back wages for this period should not be granted as a matter of right. There is nothing to indicate that the workman was not gainfully employed during this period. 11. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that the award of the Labour Court directing payment of back wages is arbitrary. Considering the facts and circumstances that has been brought on record, this Court is of the opinion that a lump sum amount should be paid towards back wages instead of remanding the matter back to the Labour Court for computation. Consequently, I modify the award directing that the period which the petitioner had worked from 1st May, 1991 to 31st May, 1992 would be added to the length of service which the workman has performed and, in lieu of the back wages from the date of termination till the date he was again employed/reinstated w.e.f. 9th February, 1995, the workman would be entitled to a lump sum amount of Rs. 10,000.00. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their costs. The writ petition is partly allowed. ———