Judgment : 1. This Court ordered Notice before admission on 2-3-2009 and granted interim stay for a period of three weeks. 2. Sri T. Rajasekhar Rao who lodged caveat had taken notice and requested time to file counter affidavit. Subsequent thereto the interim stay was extended for a limited period. Inasmuch as counter affidavit had been filed, the Transfer C.M.P. as heard finally and while reserving orders on 1-4-2009, the interim stay already granted was extended until further orders. 3. Sri G.Ram Gopal, the learned Counsel representing the petitioner had taken this Court through the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the Tr.C.M.P. and would maintain that in the light of the facts well explained in paras 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the affidavit filed in support of the Tr.C.M.P., if the transfer as prayed for is not granted, the petitioner would be put to serious loss. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through the contents of the order made in T.O.P.No.442/2008 on the file of District Judge, Srikakulam and the learned Counsel would maintain that the reasons recorded by the learned District Judge while dismissing the said T.O.P. also being unsustainable reasons, the relief prayed for in the Tr.C.M.P. be granted. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on certain decisions. 4. Per contra, Sri Tarlada Rajasekhar Rao, the learned Counsel representing the respondent had taken this Court through the contents of the counter affidavit and would maintain that in the light of the reasons recorded by the learned District Judge while dismissing the T.O.P. and inasmuch as no fresh grounds are forthcoming and also in the light of the legal position since the ground taken in the Tr.C.M.P. cannot be a ground for transfer under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter in short referred to as "Code" for the purpose of convenience), the Tr.C.M.P. to be dismissed. The Counsel also placed reliance on certain decisions. 5. In the light of the submissions made by the Counsel representing the respective parties, the following Points arise for consideration in this Tr.C.M.P: 1. The Counsel also placed reliance on certain decisions. 5. In the light of the submissions made by the Counsel representing the respective parties, the following Points arise for consideration in this Tr.C.M.P: 1. Whether the relief prayed for in the Tr.C.M.P. praying for withdrawal of the suit O.S.No.15/2003 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Rajam and to transfer the same to any other competent Court in Srikakulam District to be granted or to be negatived in the facts and circumstances of the case ? 2. If so to what relief the parties would be entitled to ? 6. Point No.1: The petitioner filed the Tr.C.M.P. under Section 24 of the Code praying for withdrawal of the suit O.S.No.15/2003 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Rajam and to transfer the same to any other Court of Senior Civil Judge in Srikakulam District preferably at Srikakulam and to pass such other suitable orders. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S.No.15/2003 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Rajam and the said suit was filed by him for recovery of amount on the strength of a promissory note executed by the respondent in his favour. Similarly, yet another promissory note was executed by the respondent in favour of his son and his son filed O.S.No.14/2003 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Rajam for recovery of the amount. The stand taken by the respondent as defendant is that these documents are forged documents. The learned Senior Civil Judge after elaborate trial decreed the suit O.S.No.15/2003 on 14-9-2004. Hence, the defendant carried the matter by way of appeal A.S.No.105/2004 on the file of Additional District Judge, Srikakulam. However, the suit O.S.No.14/2003 was dismissed by the learned Senior Civil Judge by Judgment dated 20-8-2007. Subsequent thereto, the appeal A.S.No.105/2004 was taken up for hearing by the learned Additional District Judge and while allowing the Appeal the matter was remanded to the trial Court. However, the suit O.S.No.14/2003 was dismissed by the learned Senior Civil Judge by Judgment dated 20-8-2007. Subsequent thereto, the appeal A.S.No.105/2004 was taken up for hearing by the learned Additional District Judge and while allowing the Appeal the matter was remanded to the trial Court. It is also the case of the petitioner that the promissory notes in O.S.No.14/2003 and O.S.No.15/2003 are identical promissory notes executed by the respondent/defendant and the witnesses and the scribe of both the promissory notes being one and the same and since the learned Judge while considering the material on record in O.S.No.14/2003 had given certain findings in Judgment, in the light of the reasons explained in detail in para-4 of the affidavit, since the petitioner is apprehensive of the fact that the learned Judge may record different finding than what had been recorded already and since his apprehension is bonafide and genuine, this is a fit matter where transfer to be ordered. It is also his case that the petitioner filed T.O.P.No.442/2008 on the file of District Judge, Srikakulam praying for transfer of the suit O.S.No.15/2003 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Rajam to any other Court in Srikakulam District at Srikakulam and the learned District Judge dismissed the T.O.P. by order dated 4-2-2009. The learned District Judge, during the pendency of T.O.P.No.442/2008 called or a report from the Senior Civil Judge, Rajam. It is also the case of the petitioner that neither in the report of the learned Senior Civil Judge nor in the Judgment made by the learned District Judge, the crucial issue which had been pointed out by the petitioner while praying for transfer had not been dealt with. Further, specific stand had been taken that the promissory notes in both the suits being identical and the attestors and the scribe being the same, in the light of the apprehension being reasonable, it may be just and proper to order transfer under Section 24 of the Code. 7. In the counter affidavit filed the defence taken in the written statement that these promissory notes are forged had been again reiterated. 7. In the counter affidavit filed the defence taken in the written statement that these promissory notes are forged had been again reiterated. It is also further stated that that the suit O.S.No.15/2003 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Rajam was decreed and the respondent preferred appeal A.S.No.105/2004 on the file of Additional District Judge, Srikakulam and he filed I.A.No.35/2005 to send the suit document to an expert and also filed I.A.No.185/2007 to receive the decree and judgment in O.S.No.14/2003 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Rajam as additional evidence. In the light of the said applications, the learned I Additional District Judge was pleased to allow the appeal while making an order of remand to the trial Court for fresh consideration. It is also stated that T.O.P.No.442/2008 filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the learned District Judge and before dismissing the said T.O.P., the learned District Judge called for report of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Rajam and the learned Senior Civil Judge, Rajam had stated that each case would be decided on the merits of the particular case. It is also stated that the apprehension of the petitioner being baseless and since each matter would be decided on its own merits, there are no grounds to allow the Tr.C.M.P. 8. In Shakthi Enterprises Vs. Sri Maruthi Oil Traders, Proddatur Town, Cuddapah 2003 (4) A.L.D. 329 it was held in para-8 : "........ A proceeding under Section 24 of the Code in my considered opinion cannot be equated with a suit. A careful reading of the language of Section 141 of the Code also in a way supports this view. The language employed is ".... As far as it can be made applicable...". Hence, in my considered opinion, in view of the express language of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code, read along with Section 26 of the Code, I am of the considered order that the bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code cannot be extended to a transfer proceeding under Section 24 of the Code. Hence, I am not inclined to accept with the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent Sri Ganshyamdas Mandani. Hence, I am not inclined to accept with the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent Sri Ganshyamdas Mandani. However, in view of the facts and circumstances, except making allegation that the learned Senior Civil Judge had arrived at a particular conclusion in some other matter, no other allegations had been made, and also in view of the submission made by Sri Ganshyamdas Mandani that the said Presiding Officer who had disposed of the prior matter is no longer there, on facts I do not see any merit in the Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition and accordingly the Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed". 9. In G.Issac Dayardhana Rao Vs. Andhra Evangelical Luthern Church, Guntur and others 2002(1) An.W.R. 154 (A.P.) it was held at para-2 : "I fail to understand as to how any transfer can be sought on the ground as is made out in the affidavit accompanying the petition. Merely because the Court of competent jurisdiction declined to grant any interim relief, the same cannot be a ground for seeking transfer under Section 24 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908. If that were be so, this Court would be fostering the situation where for the purpose of interlocutory orders one set of Courts would be of competent jurisdiction and for final disposal there will be another set of Courts of competent jurisdiction. Further, admittedly there are four District Courts in Guntur and what is sought is transfer of the case from the First Additional District Judge, Guntur to any other District Court for reasons, which are neither germane nor substantial." 10. In Pasupala Fakruddin, Chittoor and another Vs. Jamia Masque, B.Kothakota and another 2003(2) L.S. 275 it was observed at para-12 : "I have already observed in the foregoing discussion that the petitioners did not make out any case to prove their contention that there is every likelihood of bias to the Presiding Officer due to the acquaintance with the parties and their Counsel. Unless there are specific instances of bias, unless the Presiding Officer has personal interest in the subject matter of the suits, he cannot be branded as a biased Officer. This would demoralize the Officers in the eye of the public and it becomes very difficult for such officers to work in a free and unbiased atmosphere. The mere apprehension of the petitioners on imaginary grounds cannot be accepted". 11. This would demoralize the Officers in the eye of the public and it becomes very difficult for such officers to work in a free and unbiased atmosphere. The mere apprehension of the petitioners on imaginary grounds cannot be accepted". 11. In Rajkot Cancer Society Vs. Municipal Corporation (AIR 1988 Gujarat 63) it was held at para-4 as hereunder:- "It must be stated that neither of the possible grounds urged Mr.Tama is convincing. There is absolutely no reason whatsoever for transferring the case from one Court to another. It must be borne in mind that transfer of a case from one Court to another is a pretty serious matter because it casts indirectly doubt on the integrity or competence of the Judge from whom the matter is transferred. This should not be done without a proper and sufficient cause. If there are good and sufficient reasons for transferring a case from one Court to another, they must be clearly set-out. Mere presumptions or possible apprehension could not and should not be the basis for transferring a case from one Court to another. Only in very special circumstances, it may be necessary to transfer a case from one Court to another. Such a power of transfer of a case from one Court to another has to be exercised with due care and caution bearing in mind that there should be no unnecessary, improper and unjustifiable stigma or slur on the Court from which the case is transferred. Hence, the submission of Mr.Raval deserves to be upheld. The order of the learned Assistant Judge with regard to transferring the case from the Court of 2nd Joint Civil Judge (J.D.) Rajkot, to the Court of the 1st Joint Civil Judge (J.D.) Rajkot, is set aside. The matter will be heard by the 2nd Joint Civil judge (J.D.) Rajkot, before whom the matter was pending before the transfer. Rule made absolute. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs". 12. In Krishna Kanahya and another Vs. Vijay Kumar and others (AIR 1976 Delhi 184) it was held by the learned Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court that the mere fact that the Judge had expressed an opinion on question of fact in a previous case does not warrant transfer of subsequent case involving the same point. 13. In Gujarat Electricity Board and another Vs. Vijay Kumar and others (AIR 1976 Delhi 184) it was held by the learned Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court that the mere fact that the Judge had expressed an opinion on question of fact in a previous case does not warrant transfer of subsequent case involving the same point. 13. In Gujarat Electricity Board and another Vs. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani (AIR 1989 S.C. 1433), the Apex Court at para-3 observed : B. K. Mehta, Advocate appearing for the appellants and Sh. Vimal Dave, Advocate, "This appeal came up for hearing before us on 28th January, 1988 and on that day Sh. appearing for the respondent were fully heard. After hearing learned counsel for the parties we were satisfied that the learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench both had committed error in allowing the writ petition and granting relief to the respondent. We expressed our view in the Court and suggested to Mr. Vimal Dave, counsel for the respondent, that if he agreed the original writ petition of the respondent could be dismissed without directing him to refund the amount which he had already been paid by the appellants in pursuance to the orders of the High Court and of this Court as during the pendency of the appeal, the appellants were directed by means of interim order of this Court to continue to pay salary to the respondent which was being paid to him regularly. The hearing was adjourned to enable Sh. Vimal Dave, to obtain instructions from the respondent. The appeal came up for hearing before us on 16-2-1988 when another counsel appeared to argue the appeal on behalf of the respondent on merits. We refused to hear the counsel as we had already completed hearing. Thereupon, the respondent himself appeared in person and sought permission to make his submissions personally. We refused to accede to his request as oral hearing had already been completed and the matter had been adjourned only to enable the respondent's counsel to obtain instructions. However, in the interest of justice we permitted the respondent to file written submissions, if any, in support of his case. Thereafter, the case was listed several times but no written submissions were filed instead the respondent adopted an unusual course by sending an application by post expressing his no confidence in us with a prayer to transfer. the case to some other Bench. Thereafter, the case was listed several times but no written submissions were filed instead the respondent adopted an unusual course by sending an application by post expressing his no confidence in us with a prayer to transfer. the case to some other Bench. Since this was unusual, uncalled for and unjustified request we ignored the same and reserved the order. We are constrained to note that instead of utilising the opportunity granted to him for filing written submissions the respondent has misused adjournments for the purposes of raising frivolous objections for getting the case transferred to some other Bench. No party is entitled to get a case transferred from one Bench to the other, unless the Bench is biased or there are some reasonable grounds for the same, but no right to get a case transferred to any other Bench can legitimately be claimed merely because the Judges express opinion on the merits of the case on the conclusion of hearing. In the instant case on the conclusion of the oral hearing we had expressed our opinion on 28-1-1988 in the open court, that we were inclined to allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition but taking a sympathetic view we requested Sh. Vimal Dave, learned counsel appearing for the respondent to obtain instructions as aforesaid. The opportunity granted to the respondent has, however, been misused by raising mischievous and frivolous objections instead of filing written submissions. The respondent's prayer is accordingly rejected and since oral hearing has already been completed, and in spite of several adjournments respondent failed to appear before the Court or to file the written submissions we proceed to decide the case on merits." 14. In the light of the legal position referred to supra, this Court is of the considered opinion that the ground on which the transfer is being prayed for cannot be said to be a substantial ground. In the light of the same, the Tr.C.M.P. is hereby dismissed as being devoid of merit. No order as to costs.