Judgment By means of this petition, the petitioner has sought writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order dated 09-03-2000 passed by respondent No.1 Deputy Director of Consolidation-cum-Additional Collector (Nazul), Udham Singh Nagar, order dated 27-12-1996 passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation, Kichha, Camp at Kashipur, District- Udham Singh Nagar and order dated 30-03-1996 passed by Consolidation Officer, Kashipur, all contained in Annexure Nos. 7, 5 & 4 respectively to the writ petition. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner Satish Kumar son of late Bhagwan Das had filed objection under Section 9-A(2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 before the Consolidation Officer, Kashipur on 06-12-1995 to the effect that the share of the petitioner be declared one-half in plot No. 500/1 measuring 2.92 acres and plot No. 502/1 measuring 5.80 acres, total area 8.72 acres. 3. In reply thereto the respondent No.4-late Pyare Lal filed written statement stating that in Suit No. 22/25 of 1979-80 which was filed by late Bhagwan Das (father of the petitioner) in the court of Assistant Collector 1 sl Class, Kashipur under Section 229-B/176 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the parties had entered into compromise on 19-05-1981 and the Assistant Collector, Kashipur on 04-08-1981 had accepted the said compromise and held that the compromise between the parties is bonafide family settlement and has been arrived at with a view to end the family dispute. The Assistant Collector decreed the suit and passed order to prepare the final decree accordingly. In view of final decree, the Lekhpal prepared the lots. In the meantime father of the petitioner died on 20-02-1987 and Harbansh Lal died on 2009-1983. These dates are not disputed by the parties. Order dated 19-05-1988 shows that in the map Kurra No.2 of late Pyare Lal has sho"1n by red ink and Kurra No.1 of Satish Kumar son of Bhagwan Das has shown by blue dotted line. It is also mentioned in the said order dated 19-05-1988 that none of the parties have filed any objection against the Kurra and lots were made final by the Assistant Collector 1st Class, Kashipur. It is pertinent to mention here that no appeal was preferred against the final decree or preliminary decree by the petitioner or his predecessor. It is also mentioned in the said order dated 19-05-1988 that none of the parties have filed any objection against the Kurra and lots were made final by the Assistant Collector 1st Class, Kashipur. It is pertinent to mention here that no appeal was preferred against the final decree or preliminary decree by the petitioner or his predecessor. It was also pleaded by the respondent No.4 that the objections are barred by principles of res judicata and estoppel and is liable to be rejected. 4. After hearing both the parties and perusal of records, the learned Consolidation Officer, Kashipur did not accept the objections of the petitioner on the ground that there was a compromise been the parties regarding share and the lots which were made final by the Assistant Collector have been recorded in the revenue records in separate Khatas and dismissed the objections accordingly on 30-03-1996. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred the appeal under Section 11 of U .P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Udham Singh Nagar. The appeal was dismissed on the same ground on 27-12-1996. 5. Further aggrieved by the order of Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 27-121996, the petitioner preferred the revision before the respondent No.1/Deputy Director Consolidation/Add!. District Magistrate (Nazul), Udham Singh Nagar. The said revision. too was dismissed on 09-03-2000 and the orders passed by Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer (Consolidation) were affirmed. Hence this writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing of the orders passed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. 6. It is stated in para-3 of the writ petition that there were three sons of late Banka Ram, namely, Bhagwan Das, Harbansh Lal and Pyare Lal. The pedigree, as has been mentioned in Para-3, is not disputed. Satish Kumar (petitioner herein) is son of late Bhagwan Das. Harbansh Lal died issueless and respondent No. 4- Pyare Lal has also died during the pendency of writ petition and respondent Nos. 4/1 to 4/5 have been substituted as his legal heirs. 7. According to the petitioner, since Harbansh Lal died during the pendency of partition suit, the share of Bhagwan Das was enhanced by one-half. Although no amendment was made in the prayer by late Bhagwan Das and there is no dispute to this effect that the compromise was made by late Bhagwan Das, late Harbansh Lal and late Pyare Lal. 7. According to the petitioner, since Harbansh Lal died during the pendency of partition suit, the share of Bhagwan Das was enhanced by one-half. Although no amendment was made in the prayer by late Bhagwan Das and there is no dispute to this effect that the compromise was made by late Bhagwan Das, late Harbansh Lal and late Pyare Lal. It is further stated in the writ petition that in compromise the petitioner has not put his signature. The respondent No.4Pyare Lal filed counter affidavit stating therein that there is no dispute to the fact that the declaratory suit was filed. It is stated in Para-4 of the counter affidavit that Banka Ram had three sons, namely Bhagwan Das, Harbansh Lal and Pyare La!. It is also alleged that in his life time late Banka Ram had arranged land measuring 10 acres each in favour of Bhagwan Das and Harbansh Lal separately and they are living separate to their father having the land of their share. 8.72 acres land remained in possession of Banka Ram. The said 8.72 acres land was recorded as hereditary tenant and after the death of Banka Ram the land was recorded separately. The suit was filed by the petitioner's father for declaration of one-third share on the land in dispute and for partition also. During the pendency of writ petition the predecessor of the petitioner and late Harbansh Lal have entered into compromise which was accepted by the court and, accordingly, order for preliminary and final decree were passed and it is stated that the share was given to the petitioner as per compromise Le. 2.50 acres of land. A copy of plaint, compromise paper, order on compromise dated 04-08-1981 and the final order to prepare the final decree which was passed by Assistant Collector and also copy of final decree have also been annexed as Annexure Nos. CA-1 to CA-5 respectively to the counter affidavit. 8. Rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioner reiterating the facts stated in the writ petition. . 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned orders passed by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 compromise deed and order passed by Assistant Collector as well as order of final decree and objections filed by the petitioner. 10. . 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned orders passed by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 compromise deed and order passed by Assistant Collector as well as order of final decree and objections filed by the petitioner. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the present proceedings are not barred by principle of res judicata because the court has not decided the lis between the parties. He has placed reliance of a case law of Hon'ble Apex Court in Pulavarthi Venkata Subha Rao and others versus Valluri Jagannadha Rao (deceased) by his heirs and legal representatives, and others, reported in AIR 1967 Supreme Court, Page 591. 11. The legal position is not disputed to the extent that a compromise decree is not a decision by the Court. It is the acceptance by the Court something to which the parties had agreed. A compromise decree merely sets the seal of the court on the agreement of the parties. The Court does not decide anything. Nor can it be said that a decision of the Court was implicit in it. Only a decision by the Court can be res judicata, whether statutory under S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or constructive as a matter of public policy on which the entire doctrine rests. Such a decree cannot strictly be regarded as decision on a matter which was heard and finally decided and cannot operate as res judicata. Such a decree might create an estoppel by conduct between the parties, but such an estoppel must be specifically pleaded. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent has contended that it was specifically pleaded before the Consolidation Officer that the petitioner is estopped by filing objection and the Consolidation Officer has also given a categorical finding that apart from the principal of res judicata, the petitioner is now stopped to raise this objection. This finding has also been affirmed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as well as by the Deputy Director, Consolidation. I have also perused the compromise order dated 04-08-1981. The Assistant Collector has given a categorical finding that the compromise was made bonafide to resolve the family dispute. After the death of Bhagwan Das, when the petitioner was substituted in the suit, no objections ever been raised that the parties have not entered into compromise. I have also perused the compromise order dated 04-08-1981. The Assistant Collector has given a categorical finding that the compromise was made bonafide to resolve the family dispute. After the death of Bhagwan Das, when the petitioner was substituted in the suit, no objections ever been raised that the parties have not entered into compromise. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the petitioner was minor at the time when the final decree was passed. This fact has not been pleaded in his objection filed before the Consolidation Officer at any stage. Now at this stage in writ jurisdiction this point cannot be raised, even though the compromise was not made by the petitioner himself. 13. It is pertinent to mention here that in the proceedings under Section 229-B of U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are made applicable. For the sake of convenience, Section 341 of Code of Civil Procedure is reproduced as under : "341. Application of Certain Acts to the proceedings of this Act.- Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the Indian Court-Fees Act, 1870 (VII of 1870), the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), and the Limitation Act, 1963 (XXXVI of 1963) including Section 5 thereof shall apply to the proceedings under this Act." 14. Rule 3-A of Order XXIII of Civil Procedure Code specifically bars the fresh suit. It is reproduced as under : "3-A. Bar to suit.- No suit lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful." 15. The finding given by the courts below that the suit is barred by principle of res judicata, if it is assumed at this stage, is treated in favour of the petitioner, the other findings come in the way to maintain the objection under Sec. 9-A(2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and the compromise which was made by the predecessor of the parties have become final in the declaration/partition suit and fresh suit either before consolidation court or any other court would be barred by Rule 3-A of Order XXIII C.P.C. and also barred by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence. The dispute before the consolidation court was whether the petitioner is entitled to get the enhanced share after the death of Harbansh Lal which was declined by the trial court that Harbansh Lal have entered into compromise and relinquished his share in favour of respondent to maintain the harmony of family. The decree was made final and that was not assailed by the petitioner himself. Hence the petitioner is now estopped to file the fresh objections and the objections are barred by principle of estoppel and acquiescence and also the provision of Rule 3-Aof Order XXIII of C.P.C. 16. In view of above, the writ petition has no merit and is dismissed. No order as to costs.