JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—This writ petition has been filed by Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, North Block, New Delhi and others challenging the judgment and order passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad dated 4th March, 2009 whereunder the impugned order of punishment dated 14th September, 2006 passed by appropriate authority is quashed and set aside. The petitioners were directed to open the sealed cover and consider the case of respondent thereunder with the recommendations of D.P.C with all consequential benefits. The exercise shall be completed within three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. No order was passed as to costs. 2. By filing this writ petition, Mr. K.C. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for petitioners has contended before this Court that the order, which has been passed by Tribunal ought to be quashed for non-appreciation of facts about the incident. 3. On the other hand, Mr. K.P. Singh, learned Advocate counsel appearing for the sole respondent contended before this Court that the judgment and order, which has been passed by the Court is an appropriate judgment and order, both on account of facts and law. However, we have gone through some annexures of the writ petition to come to an appropriate finding. In the enquiry report, we find that respondent was charge-sheeted for certain act in connivance with others. They might be superior officers and one is clerk. The superior officers one being O.P. Kakkar, ASW and another Sri G.N. Trivedi, S.A-I were then retired. However, upon going through the enquiry we find that the charge against respondent with regard to existence of respective initials against charged officers on the replaced pages are ‘not proved’. However, the disciplinary authority held as follows : “And Whereas, the said representation has been examined in consultation with the CE Command and the E-in-C’s Branch, and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the Disciplinary Authority, i.e. the President has come to the conclusion that the points raised by Shri D.D. Rai in his representation are more or less the same, as raised by him during the departmental inquiry. Though he has denied the charge, he has admitted that he had signed on the replaced pages, albeit he has stated that he did this under compulsion (i.e. under pressure from the then SSW and CE AF). Though he has denied the charge, he has admitted that he had signed on the replaced pages, albeit he has stated that he did this under compulsion (i.e. under pressure from the then SSW and CE AF). That he had really acted under pressure is, however, difficult to believe, as he has not produced any concrete proof. Rather, it is quite reasonable to infer that he has only acted in connivance with his superiors. It cannot be denied that Shri D.D. Rai, as JSW, was actively involved in the tender processing as part of his duty; as such, he cannot escape the responsibility regarding contents of the replaced pages. Shri Rais signature was found on the replaced pages and he has accepted this fact before the Board of Officers, though, he later denied it during the regular hearing before the Inquiry Officer. Shri Rai has also given contradictory version about the initials of typists who typed the pages. All these actions, alongwith his responsibility as JSW, go to establish the alleged misconduct on his part; replacement of pages in the papers of the concerned Contract Agreement has created ambiguity in contract provision leading to financial implication, and the involvement/connivance of Shri D.D. Rai in the tampering of papers, is not entirely ruled out;” Now, therefore, in view of the above position, the Disciplinary Authority, i.e., the President, hereby orders for imposition of the penalty of one time cut of Rs. 500/- in the pension of Shri D.D. Rai, JSW (Retd), under Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.” 4. Mr. Sinha has cited the judgment of three Judges Bench of Supreme Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 416 , High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil and another in which the decision of disciplinary authority should not be interfered by High Court. However, in going through the judgment, we find a legal proposition which has been quoted here as under : “It is an established principle in disciplinary jurisprudence that when the disciplinary authority differs from the findings of the enquiry officer, it has to discuss the entire case threadbare and establish that each finding of the enquiry officer was totally improbable; that in the light of the materials the only conclusion that can be arrived at by an ordinary prudent man, is the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority.” 5. Apart from that, it is held that the disciplinary authority was neither an appellate nor a revisional authority over the enquiry officer’s report. The enquiry is primarily intended to afford the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him also to afford the punishing authority with the materials collected in such enquiry as well as views expressed by the enquiry officer thereon. The findings of the enquiry officer are only his opinion on the materials, but such findings are not binding on the disciplinary authority as the decision-making authority is the punishing authority and, therefore, the authority has come to its own conclusion, bearing "in mind the views expressed by the enquiry officer.” But it is not necessary that the disciplinary authority “discuss materials in detail and contest the conclusions of the officer”. Otherwise the position of the disciplinary authority would get relegated to a subordinate level. 6. Against this background, let us see what judgment has been challenged in the Central Administrative Tribunal. We find that the Central Administrative Tribunal has arrived at a conclusion on three grounds. Firstly, the ground of delay, since the charge-sheet was issued after lapse of five years of the incident whereas naturally his retirement and the delay is unreasonable and held that inordinate delay violates constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, presence of the charged officer at the relevant point of time and violation of Article 14 are quoted hereunder : “14. As argued by learned counsel for the applicant that the persons, who are really responsible for the present controversy have not been touched. From the record it is amply clear that the applicant has been discriminated inasmuch as that the tender was issued on 22.5.1995, the tender was received on 24.8.1995, the tender was accepted on 8.9.1995 and the original alongwith CTC was sent to the various formations 8.12.1995 whereas he was on leave w.e.f. 20.8.1995 to 27.8.1995 and was transferred vide letter dated 11.8.1995 and movement order dated 6.9.1995. It is also seen from the charge-sheet that name of several other persons are mentioned therein, who have processed the entire tender and made the CTC but no disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against them. It is also seen from the charge-sheet that name of several other persons are mentioned therein, who have processed the entire tender and made the CTC but no disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against them. The main person Sri O.P. Kakkar, who wrote letter dated 8.12.2005 has also not been given any charge-sheet by the respondents, which clearly goes to show that in order to protect the persons, who were actually involved in case, the applicant has only been chosen by the respondents. 15. Having given my anxious thought to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for applicant, I see no justification for treating the applicant differently. The respondents have utterly failed to explain to the Court the distinguishing features of the applicant’s case. In my considered opinion, the treatment meted to the applicant suffers from vice of arbitrariness, which tantamount to denial of equality as guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, the action of the respondents deserves to be quashed and set aside. Logically the applicant must receive the same benefit, which has been given to those persons, whose names were in the charge-sheet and no action were taken against them. It is also settled principle of law that here can be no discrimination while treating two persons unless it is found that they are guilty of more serious misconduct or the degree of indiscipline in their case was higher than compared to those who were reinstated. Respondents have also failed to give any reply to the averments made by the applicant that the applicant was not involved in any disciplinary proceedings when the DPC held for promotion against the vacancies of 1992-1993 and 1993-94, therefore, there was any hardly justification for keeping the case of the applicant in sealed cover.” 7. Admittedly, coming to conclusion the Tribunal which is factually the last finding Court apart from granting other reliefs by the Constitution Court, cannot be ignored, therefore, when the Court found that delay is enormous, virtually respondent was not present at the relevant point of time and violation of principle of Article 14 of the Constitution, no order could have been passed when Central Administrative Tribunal arrived at right conclusion. 8. We are independently checked up the order of the disciplinary authority as quoted above. We find that it is based on any materials but on probability. 8. We are independently checked up the order of the disciplinary authority as quoted above. We find that it is based on any materials but on probability. Therefore, the disciplinary authority was actually apprehended that the charge against the respondent hereunder “is not entirely ruled up”. According to us, a proof against a delinquent officer or staff is to be made up to the hilt otherwise the career of an employee will be doomed. Mere imposition of penalty of one time cut of Rs. 500/- is not an end of the matter because by virtue of such imposition, he is not entitled for various other benefits which he is entitled to get in accordance with law. 9. Therefore, even independently the finding of the disciplinary authority cannot be accepted, if we loosely discussed that issue at the time of coming to the conclusion. 10. So far as Article 14 of the Constitution of India is concerned, he has tried to establish his case that one Mr. N.L. Khan Lower Division Clerk was recommended for minor penalty by letter dated 25th August, 2004. That minor penalty was in the nature of censure entry. If it is so, what impediment was there before the Union of India to raise this issue before Tribunal, is unknown to this Court. The Tribunal has taken all possible measures to come to a finding yet such point is available before the Union of India but they did not do so. Both the jurisdiction of the writ Court against the order which as before us, is correct in appreciation of facts and law. 11. Therefore, in totality, we cannot pass any order in favour of writ petitioners. Hence, the writ petition fails and is dismissed however, without imposing any cost. Honble Shishir Kumar, J.—I agree. ———