Judgment ( 1. ) WITH consent, the matter is finally heard. ( 2. ) THIS is an application, under S. 378 (4)of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for grant of leave to appeal against the order of acquittal recorded on 2-11-2007 by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khandwa in Criminal Case no. 1845/2005 in respect of the offence punishable under S. 138 of the Negotiable instruments Act. In that case, cognizance of the offence was taken upon complaint made against the respondent by applicant-complainant. It contained the following allegations -On 31-3-2004, the respondent borrowed an amount of Rs. 60,000/- from the applicant and, for repayment thereof, issued the cheque in question in her favour. However, upon the requests made by the respondent, who is none other than her cousin, the applicant permitted him to revalidate the cheque for a further period of six months and, accordingly, date of the cheque was changed from 31-3-2004 to 21-9-2004. On a subsequent occasion also, acceding to a similar request made by the respondent, the applicant again allowed revalidation of the cheque for a further period of six months by getting the date changed to 15-3-2005. Ultimately, on 29-8-2005, at the instance of the respondent only, the cheque was presented for encashment but was dishonoured by the bank due to stop payment instructions. Thereafter, despite service of the demand notice, the amount covered by the cheque was not paid by the respondent. ( 3. ) ALTHOUGH, the respondent did not deny issuance of the cheque on 31-3-2004 yet, he further pleaded that he had already repaid the amount to the husband of the complainant after selling his house. ( 4. ) TO substantiate the allegations, the complainant examined herself whereas kadwa Bhalekar, the Daftari posted in the umarkhadi Branch of the State Bank of indore was called in defence to. prove contents of letter dated 3-9-2005 written by the branch Manager requiring the respondent to verify the changed dates and the corresponding signatures as the drawer of the cheque. ( 5. ) ON consideration of the entire evidence, learned Magistrate proceeded to compare the disputed signatures said to have been authored by the respondent for the purpose of its re-authentication from time to time with his standard signatures available on the cheque itself and came to the conclusion that cheque was not revalidated at all by the respondent. ( 5. ) ON consideration of the entire evidence, learned Magistrate proceeded to compare the disputed signatures said to have been authored by the respondent for the purpose of its re-authentication from time to time with his standard signatures available on the cheque itself and came to the conclusion that cheque was not revalidated at all by the respondent. She, accordingly, recorded the impugned finding of not guilty. ( 6. ) LEARNED counsel for the applicant has strenuously contended that the reasoning assigned by the learned Magistrate is apparently contrary to law. According to him, the trial Magistrate could not make her opinion on the disputed signatures as the sole ground of the decision. ( 7. ) IN response, learned counsel for the respondent, while making reference to the decision of the Apex Court in Murarilal v. State of M. P. , AIR 1980 SC 531 : (1980 Cri lj 396), has submitted that the trial Magistrate was competent under law to make the comparison of signatures. According to him, there is no provision in the Negotiable Instruments Act enabling revalidation of the cheque. However, as explained by the Supreme Court in Veera Exports v. T. Kalavathy, AIR 2002 SC 38 : (2002 Cri LJ 203), it is always open to a drawer to voluntarily revalidate a negotiable instrument, including a cheque. ( 8. ) ADVERTING to the merits of the case, it may be observed that the offence is a strict liability offence, which excludes the defence other than permissible as the conditions set out in S. 138 of the Act. Moreover, S. 139 of the Act creates a presumption, in favour of the holder of the dishonoured cheque that it was issued in discharge of a debt or other liability. " In addition, S. 118 of the Act also contemplates certain presumptions as to the negotiable instruments but the presumption as to revalidation is not included therein. In this view of the matter, since the revalidation was denied by the respondent, the burden was certainly on the applicant, who was claiming fresh period of limitation based thereon, to prove it by cogent expert evidence. However, she did not even apply for getting the cheque examined by a handwriting expert. In such a situation, learned trial magistrate was fully justified in comparing the questioned signatures pertaining to revalidations of the cheque with the standard signatures of the respondent. However, she did not even apply for getting the cheque examined by a handwriting expert. In such a situation, learned trial magistrate was fully justified in comparing the questioned signatures pertaining to revalidations of the cheque with the standard signatures of the respondent. ( 9. ) THIS finding can be fortified in no better words than the following -The argument that the Court should not venture to compare writings itself, as it would thereby assume to itself the role of an expert is entirely without force. Section 73 of the Evidence Act expressly enables the court to compare disputed writings with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether a writing is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written. If it is hazardous to do so, as sometimes said, we are afraid it is one of the hazards to which judge and litigant must expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary. There may be cases where both sides call experts and the voices of science are heard. There may be cases where neither side calls an expert, being ill able to afford him. In all such cases, it becomes the plain duty of the Court,to compare the writings and come to its own conclusion. The duty cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the Court is no expert. Where there are expert opinions, they will aid the Court. Where there is none. the Court, will have to seek guidance from some authoritative textbook, and the Courts own experience and knowledge. Put dig-charge it must, its plain duty, with or without expert, with or without other evidence. (Extracted from the judgment in murarilals case (1980 Cri LJ 396) (supra) (Emphasis supplied) ( 10. ) IT is also well settled that the order of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the evidence on record, are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable. ( 11. ) TAKING into consideration the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the view taken by the learned trial Magistrate was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the order of acquittal in question. ( 12. ) THE leave application, therefore, stands dismissed. Application dismissed.