Judgment ( 1. ) THE appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 15. 7. 03 passed by 18th Addl. District Judge (Fast track Court), Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 11 -A/2002. The plaintiffs/appellants had filed the instant suit for declaring that sale deeds dated 3. 2. 82 and 20. 9. 82 executed in favour of Inder Kumar Jain/defendant no. 3 to be null and void. Prayer has also been made for grant of eyiction decree against the tenant on the grounds contemplated under Sections 12 (l) (f), (b) and (c) of M. P. Accommodation Control act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" ). ( 2. ) IT is averred in the plaint that plaintiffs are owner cum landlord of the dwelling house bearing no. 667,667/1 to 667/3 situated at Kotwali Ward, Jabalpur known as "kudratmanjil". The suit house was let out to late Shikharchand Jain, father of inder Kumar Jain vide registered lease deed dated 1. 5. 68 at the monthly rent of rs. 150/- for non-residential purposes. House is double storey building shown in red colour in the plaint map. Defendant no. 1 is widow of late Shri Shikharchand jain, other two defendants are sons of late Shikharchand Jain, they had inherited the tenancy rights in the suit house after death of Shik. l47-A/88 which was decided on 30. 7. 91 by 9th civil Judge, Class-II,jabalpur under Sections 12 (l) (f), (b) and (c) of the Act. During pendency of said ejectment suit in the life time of the original tenant shikharchand Jain, his son Inder Kumar Jain had purchased a portion of the suit house from Smt. Begum Bi (since deceased) by a registered sale deed dated 3. 2. 82. The sale deed was executed on the basis of gift deed dated 17. 4. 74. The defendant no. 3 Inder Kumar Jain further purchased undivided share in the suit house during pendency of civil suit no. 147-A/88 vide registered sale deed dated 20. 9. 82. ( 3. ) IT is also averred in the plaint that sale deed dated 3. 2. 82 and 20. 9. 82 have become null and void ab initio as the steps have not been taken by the purchaser for partition and possession, remedy has become barred by limitation now by virtue of Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963. 9. 82. ( 3. ) IT is also averred in the plaint that sale deed dated 3. 2. 82 and 20. 9. 82 have become null and void ab initio as the steps have not been taken by the purchaser for partition and possession, remedy has become barred by limitation now by virtue of Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963. Present value of the suit house is worth Rs. 25 Lacs. The right of the defendant no. 3 stands extinguished by passage of time being stranger purchaser of the suit dwelling house, therefore, collateral and incidental findings of the former suit cannot be said to be res judicata, plaintiff no. 2 is a practicing lawyer at Jabalpur, he requires the suit accommodation bona fide for non-residential purpose to start office of Advocacy. He is not having any other alternative suitable accommodation for the said purpose. He-is running office in a rented accommodation belonging to a trust namely, Duccani Muslim musafir Khana" near Clock Tower, Omti, Jabalpur. Defendants had sub-let 2nd floor of the suit house without written consent of the plaintiffs to others, they are liable to be evicted under section 12 (l) (b) of the Act. Accommodation had been sub-let to late Bala Prasad. The defendants denied the contract of tenancy as well as title of the plaintiffs in the written statement which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of plaintiffsaandlord. The decision of SA no. 813/95 cannot operate as res judicata, it is not based on law. Suit has been valued at Rs. 8 Lacs for declaring the sale deeds as null and void, for the purpose of ejectment in the MP Accommodation Control Act, it has been valued at 12 times of monthly rent. ( 4. ) IN the written statement filed by defendants 1 and 3 it is contended that decision of High Court insa No. 813/95 decided on 12. 5. 97 is res- judicata and binding between the parties. Suit for ejectment is not maintainable against co-owner, the plaintiffs should first go in for partition. There is no tenancy at present. It came to an end during the life time of Shikharchand Jain. Defendant no. 3 had purchased southern half portion vide sale deed dated 2. 2. 82. Defendant no. 97 is res- judicata and binding between the parties. Suit for ejectment is not maintainable against co-owner, the plaintiffs should first go in for partition. There is no tenancy at present. It came to an end during the life time of Shikharchand Jain. Defendant no. 3 had purchased southern half portion vide sale deed dated 2. 2. 82. Defendant no. 3 became absolute owner of the portion purchased by him, the lease, if any, after sale of the aforesaid divided portion was split up under Section 109 of Transfer of properties Act. They are paying rent under the orders of the Court. The sale deed is not hit by Section 52 of Transfer of Properties Act. Other facts with respect to civil suits relating to sale deeds have been pleaded. In the previous suit need of Alimuddin son of Jalaluddin was shown for the ground floor for business. Defendant no. 3 is a bona fide purchaser for good consideration and had purchased undivided share of Sona Begum in northern half portion. Plaintiffs have to prove that sale deed dated 20th September, 1992 is subject-matter of challenge before the Apex Court. Defendant no. 3 is in possession, it was for the plaintiff no. 2 to apply for partition. Article 65 of the Limitation Act is not applicable, no date has been given from which date possession has become adverse, sale deeds cannot be declared null and void. There is misjoinder of cause of action. Defendants no. l to 3 were not party to the contract of tenancy dated 1. 5. 98, there was no lease deed dated 1. 5. 98. The house was let out to late Shikharchand Jain for nonresidential purposes i. e. business. Even after death of Shikharchand Jain, defendant no. 1 to 3 are in possession of the suit house as LRs of late Shikharchand Jain. This Court has held defendant no. 3 to be co-owner not tenant. The previous suit has been held to be not maintainable for ejectment, co-ownership rights have been acquired. Plaintiffs are not entitled for any mandatory injunction seeking possession. The plaintiffs are not absolute owner of the suit house, Hafizullah is co-owner in respect of northern half along with Habibullah, Inayatullah and Sona begum in Kudrat Manjil, one co-owner has not the right to maintain the suit if objected to by other co-owner, hence prayer has been made to dismiss the suit. The plaintiffs are not absolute owner of the suit house, Hafizullah is co-owner in respect of northern half along with Habibullah, Inayatullah and Sona begum in Kudrat Manjil, one co-owner has not the right to maintain the suit if objected to by other co-owner, hence prayer has been made to dismiss the suit. ( 5. ) THE trial Court has dismissed the suit, bona fide need of the appellant hafizullah has been found, however, the suit has been dismissed on the ground of decision rendered by this Court in SA No. 813/95 and in CR No. 1676/01 passed by Division Bench of this Court in which this Court has held that Inder Kumar jain has become co-owner of undivided portion of the house. It would be unjust and inequitable to throw out a co-owner from possession of suit accommodation merely because a tenant had purchased the share of co-owner, his legal right to retain the possession till partition as a co-owner cannot be whittled down. In aforesaid civil revision Hameeda Begum vs. Champabai Jain 2004 (1) MPLJ 50 it has been held that co-owner and landlord cannot file a suit for eviction against a tenant if another co-owner objects. The tenant who had purchased the property from a co-owner and gets into shoes of co-owner need not file a suit for partition and separate possession. The judgment rendered in SA No. 48-A/88 operates as res judicata. Despite pure question of law decided therein; judgment inter se parties would be binding, the trial Court has also held that plaintiffs are estopped from denying title of Mst. Begum Bi and Sonabi. Inder Kumar Jain/defendant no. 3 purchaser from Mst. Begum bi and Sona bi vide registered sale deed dated 2. 2. 82 and 20. 9. 82 is co-owner and his title did not extinguish for omission to sue for partition within 12 years, consequently the instant appeal has been preferred. ( 6. ) SHRI Hafizullah/appellant has submitted that inspite of the faet that bona fide need has been upheld, the trial Court has committed an error in not passing a decree for ejectment on the ground under Section 12 (l) (f) of the Act. Decision in previous civil suit out of which SA No. 813/95 arose cannot operates as res judicata and also the decision in civil revision Hamida Begum vs. Champabai jain (supra) against which SLP is pending in Apex Court. Decision in previous civil suit out of which SA No. 813/95 arose cannot operates as res judicata and also the decision in civil revision Hamida Begum vs. Champabai jain (supra) against which SLP is pending in Apex Court. He has relied upon the decision of Apex Court in Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others v. Bibi Husn bano and others AIR 2005 SC 2857 in which the Apex Court has held that acquisition of rights of some co-owner landlords by lessee does not amount to extinguishment of tenancy by merger as postulated by S. 111 (d) of the Transfer of properties Act. Their position as tenant continues and they are bound to comply with requirements of Rent Control Act. Thus, he has submitted that in view of pronouncement of the Apex Court in Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others v. Bibi Husn Bano (supra) the previous decision in which relevant provisions were not noticed cannot operates as res judicata with respect to fresh cause of action. The law of land has to prevail. The judgment inter se parties cannot be said to be binding with respect to the need which arose subsequently and the instant suit is based on title also apart from the ground under section 12 (l) (f) of the Act, instant suit is based on fresh cause of action. He has also submitted that remedy of the purchaser Inder Kumar Jain has become barred by limitation by applying section 27 read with Article 65 of the Limitation Act as he has not filed the suit for partition and separate possession within a period of 12 years. The sale deeds be declared to be null and void. In the previous civil suit, similar prayer was not made with respect to sale deeds. He has also submitted that Smt. Hamida Begum/ plaintiff no. l has 17/100 undivided share and Hafizullah has 43/100 undivided share, thus, plaintiff jointly owned 3/5 share whereas Inder Kumar Jain had purchased 2/5 undivided share. Thus, he has submitted that there is no justification even otherwise for the purchaser to retain the possession of the property till partition is made. Even on partition tenancy of two other tenants defendants no. l and 2 would not come to an end as well as of Inder Kumar even from rest of the portion which may fall in the share of plaintiffs. Even on partition tenancy of two other tenants defendants no. l and 2 would not come to an end as well as of Inder Kumar even from rest of the portion which may fall in the share of plaintiffs. The stranger purchaser cannot retain the possession of entire property which he has not purchased for which he has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Ramdayal vs. Manaklal 1973 MPLJ 650 . ( 7. ) SHRI Ravish Agrawal, learned senior counsel appearing with Shri Pranay verma for respondents has submitted that the decision rendered in SA No. 813/95 being inter se parties operates as res judicata. Right of Inder Kumar Jain did not extinguish for omission to sue for partition within 12 years. He has also referred to the various other decisions inter se parties and submitted that with respect to tamliknama dated 17. 4. 74 civil suit 106-A/97 has been dismissed, the decision has attained finality. In the proceedings under Section 23 -A of MP Accommodation control Act before Rent Controlling Authority, application preferred was dismissed out of which CR No. 1676/01 arose which decision is also binding between the parties against which SLP is pending before the Apex Court. The decision of apex Court in Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others v. Bibi Husn Bono (supra)takes a contrary view to the decision rendered by this Court in SA No. 813/95 decided on 12. 5. 97 and in CR No. 1676/01, Hameeda Begum vs. Champabai jain (supra ). The position is not improved as the question raised is res judicata and binding inter se parties. Decision of the Apex Court may be binding judicial precedent, the principles of res judicata have to prevail. He has also relied on various decisions to be referred later. ( 8. ) FOLLOWING questions arise for consideration in appeal :- " (i) Whether due to execution of sale deed dated 2. 2. 82 and 20. 9. 82 tenancy stood extinguished by merger as postulated under section 111 (d) of TP Act or in other words purchaser of part of* property Inder Kumar Jain and other defendants who have not purchased property continue to be the tenant and bound to comply with the requirements of Rent Controlling Act and are liable to be evicted on the grounds contemplated under the MP accommodation Control Act? (ii) Whether even by filing suit for partition the plaintiffs can recover possession of entire property from defendants no. 1,2 and 3, particularly when only part of tenanted premises has been purchased by Inder Kumar Jain, or the remedy is to recover the possession on the ground under section 12 (1) of MP accommodation Control Act? (iii) Whether the present suit can be said to be based on fresh cause of action and genuine requirement of plaintiff under section 12 (l) (f) of MP Accommodation Control Act and considering the relief for declaration that sale deeds are null and void whether the decisions in previous civil suit out of which SA No. 813/95 arose and the decision in CR No. 1676/01 (Hameeda Begum vs. Champabai Jain) can be said to be res- judicata and binding inter se parties, moreso in view of decision in Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others v. Bibi Husn Bono (supra) on question of law? (iv) Whether the sale deeds dated 2. 2. 82 and 20. 9. 82 can be declared null and void due to failure of Inder Kumar Jain to sue for partition and separate possession within 12 years of purchasing the property by applying Article 65 of Limitation Act? (v) In case defendant Inder Kumar is not tenant and in case of co-owner whether he can retain the possession of the entire house whereas he had purchased smaller portion vide registered sale deeds dated 2. 2. 82 and 20. 9. 82 from one of the co-owner? ( 9. ) IN Ref. Question No. (i): The undisputed fact, in the instant case, is that inder Kumar Jain had purchased only part of the property vide registered sale deeds dated 2. 2. 82 and 20 9. 82, the property is undivided, the original tenant Shikhar chand Jain was his father, in his life time he occupied the premises as tenant, he died in the year 1989. The tenancy right had devolved upon the LRs on death of shikharchand Jain,. Inder Kumar Jain defendant no. 3 is not the only person who inherited the tenancy, there are other tenants also, widow and her sons defendant no. 1 and 2 ,and, hi our opinion, there is no merger of the tenancy by virtue of section 111 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which provides thus : -. "111. Inder Kumar Jain defendant no. 3 is not the only person who inherited the tenancy, there are other tenants also, widow and her sons defendant no. 1 and 2 ,and, hi our opinion, there is no merger of the tenancy by virtue of section 111 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which provides thus : -. "111. Determination of lease : A lease of immovable property determines :- (d) in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right. " In Inder Kumar Jain the interest of lessee and lessor in the whole of the property has not vested, at the same time, he has purchased only part of property. There is no merger of tenancy into co-ownership right. Question is what is the status of ; the defendants, their status in the absence of determination under Section 111 of the Act is that of the tenant and Inder Kumar Jain defendant no. 3 is only a purchaser of part of the property and larger portion still belongs to the plaintiffs, defendants no. l and 2 continue in occupation as tenants. It cannot be said that defendant no. 3 is occupying the entire premises as co-owner, even entire property has not been purchased, even-part of the property cannot be said to be possessed by defendant no. 3 as co-owner as there was no partition. The property remains undivided so far, is not disputed on facts. Until and unless there is merger of tenancy rights into the co-ownership right of Inder Kumar Jain, the status of the defendant no. 3 remains as tenant in the absence of merger of tenancy beside defendants no. 1 and 2 continue to be tenant which is precisely the question decided by the Apex Court in similar facts in Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others vs. Bibi Husn Bano and others (supra) in which the lessee had acquired only the rights of certain co-owner landlords and may have the right to work out his rights against the- others. The right to work out his rights would not enable him to plead that the two rights in the whole of the property has come to vest in him. The right to work out his rights would not enable him to plead that the two rights in the whole of the property has come to vest in him. The question whether on the acquisition of the rights of some of the co-owner landlords by the tenant, there is an extinguishment of tenancy by S. 111 (d) of the Transfer of property Act. On taking an assignment from some of the co-owner landlords, the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property do not become vested at the same time in one person in the same right. Therefore, a lessee who has taken assignment of the rights of a co-owner lessor, cannot successfully raise the plea of determination of tenancy on the ground of merger of his lessees estate in that of the estate of the landlord. The Apex Court has laid down that tenancy did not come to an end, the position of the lessee as tenant continued and they are bound to comply with the requirement of Rent Control Act under which order for deposit of arrears of rent has been passed against them. The ownership of the property which is subject-matter of tenancy is certainly a larger estate than the tenancy itself. If the tenant acquires the entire interest of the owner in the whole of the estate forming the subject-matter of tenancy, tenancy could have merged into ownership and the estate of tenant stands enlarged into that of a full owner. The tenant cannot be the owner/co-owner and tenant at the same time. The apex Court has laid down in Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others vs. Bibi Husn bano and others (supra) thus :- "6. Ownership of the property which is the subject-matter of tenancy is certainly a larger estate than the tenancy itself and naturally larger than the sub-tenancy. If the sub-tenant acquires the entire interest of the owner in the whole of the estate forming the subject-matter of sub-tenancy, the sub-tenancy merges into ownership and the estate of sub-tenant stands enlarged into that of a full owner. The sub-tenant cannot be the owner and the sub-tenant both at the same time. If the sub-tenant acquires the entire interest of the owner in the whole of the estate forming the subject-matter of sub-tenancy, the sub-tenancy merges into ownership and the estate of sub-tenant stands enlarged into that of a full owner. The sub-tenant cannot be the owner and the sub-tenant both at the same time. Of course, the situation would have been different if the sub-tenant would not have acquired the entire- estate of the owner or the ownership interest in the entire estate forming subject-matter of sub-lease, as was the case in Badri narain Jha and others v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh and others, air 1951 SC 186 or in Shaikh Faqir Baksh v. Murli Dhar and others, AIR 1931 PC 63. 14. On the admitted facts and based on the arguments, the only question that requires to be considered is the effect of the purchase of the rights of certain co-owner landlords by the tenants of the building, on the lease originally taken by them and on the basis of which they held the building. A lease in terms of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act gets determined on the happening of one of the events referred to in Section 111 of the transfer of Property Act. The clause relevant for our purpose is admittedly Clause (d ). Insofar as it is relevant, the Section reads : "section 111 : Determination of lease - a lease of immovable property determines- (a) x x x x (b) xxxx (c) x x x x (d) In case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right. (e) x x x x (f) x xxx (g) X x x x" On a plain reading of the provision, it is clear that in case where a tenant takes an assignment of the rights of the landlord or the reversion, the lease is determined, only in a case where by such assignment, the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property, become vested in the tenant. The emphasis in the Section is clearly on the coalescing of the entire rights of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the property in the hands of the lessee. The above provision incorporates the doctrine of merger at common law. The emphasis in the Section is clearly on the coalescing of the entire rights of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the property in the hands of the lessee. The above provision incorporates the doctrine of merger at common law. According to Blackstone (as quoted in brooms Legal Maxims) : "when a less estate and a greater estate, limited subsequent to it, coincide and meet in one and the same person without any intermediate estate, the less is immediately annihilated; or in the law phraseology, is said to be merged, that is sunk or drowned in the greater; or to express the same thing in other words, the greater estate is accelerated so as to become at once an estate in possession. " In Cheshire and Burns Modern Law of Real Property, 16th edition, it is stated, "the term merger means that, where a lesser and a greater estate in the same land come together and vest, without any intermediate estate, in the same person and in the same right, the lesser is immediately annihilated by operation of law. It is said to be "merged", that is, sunk or drowned, in the greater estate. " It is further stated :-"the essentials are that the estates shall unite in the same person without any intervening estate, and that the person in whom they unite shall hold them both in the same right. To illustrate the first essential, if A, who is tenant for life, with remainder to B for life, remainder to C in fee, purchases and takes a conveyance of Cs fee, the intervening life interest of B, since it is vested, excludes the possibility of merger. " (See page 993 ). 35. Here in this case, the lessee has acquired only the rights of certain co-owner landlords and may have the right to work out his rights against the others. The right to work out his rights would not enable him to plead that the two rights in the whole of the property has come to vest in him. What is involved in the present case is the question whether on the acquisition of the rights of some of the co-owner landlords by the tenant, there is an extinguishment of the tenancy by merger as postulated by Section 111 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act. What is involved in the present case is the question whether on the acquisition of the rights of some of the co-owner landlords by the tenant, there is an extinguishment of the tenancy by merger as postulated by Section 111 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act. T. Lakshmipathi answer that question and with respect, answers that question correctly. AIR 2003 SC 2427 : 2003 AIR SCW 2436. 36. A plain and grammatical interpretation of Section 111 (d)of the Transfer of Property Act leaves no room for doubt that unless the interests of the lessee and that of the lessor in the whole of the property leased, become vested at the same time in one person in the same right, a determination of the lease cannot take place. On taking an assignment from some of the co-owner landlords, the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property do not become vested at the same time in one person in the same right. Therefore, a lessee who has taken assignment of the rights of a co-owner lessor, cannot successfully raise the plea of determination of tenancy on the ground of merger of his lessees estate in that of the estate of the landlord. It is, thus, clear that there is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that in the case on hand, it should have been held that the tenancy stood determined and the application of the landlord for a direction to the tenant to deposit the rent in arrears should have been dismissed. The position of the appellants as tenants continue and they are bound to comply with the requirements of the Rent Control Act under which the order for deposit has been passed against them. The High Court has rightly dismissed the revision. " ( 10 ) IN Shantaram Laxmanrao Kekre vs. Shyam Sundar and another AIR 1972 SC MP 17a Division Bench of this Court has laid down that in a suit by co-owner/landlords for ejectment of the tenant on ground of bona fide requirement even if one of them establishes his bona fide requirement in respect of a part of the premises leased, the decree for eviction from the entire premises must follow because there can be no splitting of tenancy. The Division Bench has held thus :- " 11. The Division Bench has held thus :- " 11. There is, therefore, no reason why the decree for eviction should not extend to the whole of the demised premises. There can be no doubt that the words "if he is the owner thereof in section 12 (l) (e) do lend support to the contention that in the case of co-owners, each of the landlord must separately plead his own residential need. These words only show that for purposes of cl. (e) one of the landlords suing for eviction cannot rely upon the need of another landlord. However, where all the co-owners join in a suit for eviction, there is no logic or reason why a decree should not follow, upon the proof of the need of any one of them under Section 12 (l) (e ). Any other construction of Section 12 (l) (e)of the Act would lead to a rather anomalous situation. If that decree for eviction were to be restricted to the portion owned by the landlord whose need is established, it would mean a splitting up of the tenancy and also allow a rank trespasser to continue in possession over the remaining portion of the demised premises, in respect of which no need is established under Section 12 (l) (e ). The way we would interpret Section 12 (l) (e) is that once any of the landlords succeeds in proving his bona fide requirement, the protection of the tenant against eviction disappears. In that event, the ban against the filing of a suit is removed and the suit as a whole must be decreed under the Transfer of Property Act". ( 11 ) SECTION 44 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with the situation of transfer by one co-owner of the immovable property legally competent in that behalf transfers his share of such property or any interest therein, the transferee acquires, as to such share or interest, and so far as is necessary to give effect to the transfer, the transferors right to joint possession or other common or part enjoyment of the property, and to enforce a partition of the same, but subject to the conditions and liabilities affecting, at the date of the transfer, the share or interest so transferred. However, where the transferee of a share of a dwelling house belonging to an undivided family is not a member of the family, nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle him to joint possession or other common or part enjoyment of the house. As Inder Kumar Jain is not a member of the plaintiffs family he has no right by virtue of Section 44 to be in joint Passion or other, common or part enjoyment of the dwelling Section 109 of the TP contract to the contrary shall possess all the lesse so elects, be. long as he is the owner of it but the lessor shall not by comitial such transfer case to be subject to any of the owner of shell not by consequence transfer cease to be subject to any to any of she ponpon she bynse uniess the qessee elects to treat the transferred as the by she him in the instut cas one of there legal here of the lenar only one and purchases part of the property not all the cotenants, teancy continues and there is a seed as on date of filing of Suit which has been found, thus, eviction can be inade from the entire property as tenancy continues. The tenant continues to be tenant for the purpose of MP Accommodation Control Act and can be evicted only in accordance with the Rent Act as also held by the Apex Court in Roshan lal and another vs. Madan Lal and others AIR 1975 SC 2130 and in V. Dhanapal chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammal AIR 1979 SC 1745 . ( 12 ) IN Ref. Question No. (ii):-In the instant case when we consider the facts also Smt. Champa Bai Jain, widow of late Shikharchand Jain has also inherited the tenancy beside Puranchand Jain son of Shikharchand Jain. Inder Kumar Jain, another son of Shikharchand Jain had only purchased part of the tenanted premises and ownership on larger part still remains with the plaintiffs/appellants. It is not the case that Champabai Jain and Puranchand Jain are enjoying the possession in separate portions, their possession as tenant continues. The status of Inder Kumar jain also continues to be a tenant and he cannot be said to be in possession as co-owner, he is in possession with other legal heirs of the tenant. It is not the case that Champabai Jain and Puranchand Jain are enjoying the possession in separate portions, their possession as tenant continues. The status of Inder Kumar jain also continues to be a tenant and he cannot be said to be in possession as co-owner, he is in possession with other legal heirs of the tenant. Thus, there is no merger of tenancy into his rights of co-ownership. In case, it is held that Inder kumar Jain is in possession as co-owner, that would also defeat the protection available to Champabai Jain, Puranchand Jain, other heirs of the original tenant available under Section 12 of the MP Accommodation Control Act. On facts which are essential for the decision, there is no dispute, it is purely a legal question whether tenancy comes to an end and it was not the question decided or even resorted to in the decision rendered in SA No. 813/95. Thus, remedy of the plaintiff is only to seek ejectment under MP Accommodation Control Act of Smt. Champa bai and Puranchand Jain as tenancy had never been surrendered by champabai Jain, Puranchand Jain and they have also not purchased the property, only part of the property has been purchased by Inder Kumar Jain, Inder Kumar continues to be the tenant. Ownership of larger part still remains with the plaintiffs and there is no other person in the body of co-owners except Inder Kumar Jain along with the plaintiffs and the tenancy of Shikharchand Jain being heritable is enjoyed by his LRs and otherwise also as per Section 111 (d) of the TP Act it has not come to an end. In the previous decision, there is no finding recorded on this material aspect, consequently when status continues as tenant, obviously the recourse has to be for eviction under MP Accommodation Control Act by way of filing partition suit, tenants cannot be evicted in absence of ground under Section 12 of the Act. The tenancy has been inherited by larger body of persons whereas purchase has been made by single person out of them, and even the tenancy of inder Kumar has not merged into his co-ownership rights. ( 13 ) IN Ref. Question No. (iii) :- Coming to question of res-judicata In the previous civil suits for ejectment out of which SA No. 813/95 arose bona fide need of office and residence of Hafizullah was claimed. ( 13 ) IN Ref. Question No. (iii) :- Coming to question of res-judicata In the previous civil suits for ejectment out of which SA No. 813/95 arose bona fide need of office and residence of Hafizullah was claimed. Ground under section 12 (I) (f)was found established, ground under section 12 (l) (b) was negatived, it was also found that ground under section 12 (l) (c) of the MP Accommodation Control Act was not made out. The decision of the trial Court was affirmed by the appellate court, suit was dismissed on the ground that Inder Kumar Jain could not be evicted as he became co-owner along with plaintiff and others, first appeal was also dismissed against which SA 13/95 was filed which was dismissed by this court. In the second appeal question posed for consideration by this Court was that :- " Whether under the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellant who is a owner, is entitled to sue the defendant despite the refusal on part of other co-owner for eviction of the tenant and if yes, whether the appellant is entitled to a decree on the ground of section 12 (1 ) (f) of the Act ?" It was urged on behalf of the appellant that landlord tenant relationship did i not come to an end due to execution of sale deed dated 20th September, 1982. Partial sale of the property did not have the effect of determination of integrity of 1 tenancy. Single Bench of this Court in SA No. 813/95 came to the conclusion that there was no partition between co-owners despite that one of the co-owners has transferred her share to defendant no. 5 Inder Kumar Jain. He steps into her shoes and became a co-owner of the property without his share being specified. Reliance was placed on a decision of Apex Court in Sk. Sattar Mohd. Choudhari, appellant v. Gundappa Amabadasbukate 1996 (6) SCC 373 in which High court reversed the judgment on the ground that despite partition between the co-owners lease was not effected, it remains indivisible. The Apex Court has observed that the tenancy cannot. be split up either in estate or in rent or any other obligation by unilateral act of one of the co-owners. The Apex Court has observed that the tenancy cannot. be split up either in estate or in rent or any other obligation by unilateral act of one of the co-owners. If, however, all the co-owners or the co-lessors agree among themselves and split by partition the demised property by metes and bounds and come to have definite, positive and identifiable shares in that property, they become separate individual owners of each severed portion and can deal- with that portion as also the tenant thereof as individual owner/ lessor. The right of joint lessors contemplated by Section 109 comes to be possessed by each of them separately and independently. There is no right in the tenant to prevent the joint owners or co-lessors from partitioning the tenanted accommodation among themselves. Whether the premises, which is in occupation of a tenant, shall be retained jointly by all the lessors or they would partition it among themselves, is the exclusive right of the lessors to which no objection can be taken by the tenant, particularly where the tenant knew from the very beginning that the property was jointly owned by several persons and that, even if he was being dealt with by only one of them on behalf of the whole body of the lessors, he cannot object to the transfer of any portion of the property in favour of a third person by one of the owners or to the partition of the property. It will, however, be open to the tenant to show that the partition was not bona fide and was a sham transaction to overcome the rigour of Rent Control laws which protected eviction of tenants except on specified grounds set out in the relevant statute. Relying upon the aforesaid decision of Apex Court,single Bench of this Court came to the conclusion that unless a. portion of reversion is assigned by virtue of transfer or partition to a co-owner, he cannot unilaterally file a suit for eviction from a portion of the reversion. He can file a suit for and on behalf of all the owners in respect of entire demise with express or implied consent of the owners. In the decision of apex Court in Sk. He can file a suit for and on behalf of all the owners in respect of entire demise with express or implied consent of the owners. In the decision of apex Court in Sk. Sattar Mohd, Choudhari, Appellant v. Gundappa Amabadas bukate (supra) the respondent had purchased the remaining portion of shop which fell in the share of appellants brbther,thus, after partition it was held that tenancy merged in his right as owner of that portion, he remained tenant only with respect to disputed portion and consequently the suit filed by appellant in respect of that portion was clearly maintainable. Single Bench of this Court concluded thus :-"25. It is obvious that the plaintiffs face a similar position here with a rider that the property is not partitioned. The defendant no. 5 has become a co-owner, albeit, of undivided portion of the house. How can he be evicted ? His share qua sole owner has not been specified. It would be most unjust and inequitable to throw out a co-owner from the possession of the suit accommodation merely because as a tenant he had purchased the share of a co-owner. His legal right to retain possession till partition, qua co-owner cannot be whittled down. The Supreme Court case -Sarvinder Singh vs. Dalip Singh and others reported in 1997 (1) MPLJ 324 (supra) relied upon by the appellants; is not applicable to the facts of this case. It is not necessary to deal with other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellants in view of the decision in Sk. Sattar Mohd. Choudhari, Appellant v. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate (1996 ). 6 SCC 373 (supra ). In this case, the cases of Mohar Singh, AIR. 1988 SC 1365 and Badri narain Jha, AIR 1951 SC 186 (supra) were considered and distinguished. 26. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the Court below rightly held that the suit filed by plaintiffs was not maintainable. The judgment and decree passed by the Court below are confirmed. The suit filed by the appellants is dismissed. No costs. " No doubt about it that single Bench of this Court has held that it would be unjust and inequitable to throw out a co-owner from possession of suit accommodation merely because as a tenant he had purchased the share of a co-owner. The suit filed by the appellants is dismissed. No costs. " No doubt about it that single Bench of this Court has held that it would be unjust and inequitable to throw out a co-owner from possession of suit accommodation merely because as a tenant he had purchased the share of a co-owner. His legal right to retain possession till partition qua co-owner cannot be whittled down. Suit filed was held to be not maintainable. ( 14 ) ANOTHER decision on which plea of res- judicata is build up relates to the proceedings before RCA, Jabalpur initiated in revenue case no. 2-A/90 (7) 97-98 by Hamida begum and others which was dismissed as untenable vide Order dated 11. 10,01 passed by RCA out of which CR No. 1676/01 arose which was filed by hamida Begum in this Court. Case was remitted to the RCA who recorded the finding on the need which was negatived, thereafter the decision was rendered by this Court in Hameeda Begum vs. Champabai Jain 2004 (1) MPLJ 50 , civil revision was dismissed against which SLP No. 2436/04 has been filed by Hamida begum before the Apex Court which is pending, the Apex Court has granted the leave to appeal against the decision rendered in civil revision. ( 15 ) IN CR No. 1676/01 Hameeda Begum vs. Champabai Jain (supra) following questions were referred for consideration :- " (1) Whether a co-owner (co-landlord) can file a suit for eviction against the tenant even if the other co-owner objects to the eviction of the tenant; (2) Whether the tenant who has purchased the undivided share of one of the co-owners is liable to eviction at the instance of other co-owners and- then it is for him to bring a suit for partition and separate possession; (3) Whether the decision in the Second Appeal on the aforesaid pure questions of law operates as res judicata in the subsequent eviction proceedings under Section 23-A of the Act on a different cause of action (bona fide need of the son of the applicant ). The Division Bench thereafter discussed the matter thus :-" (1) Aco-awner/landlord cannot file a suit for eviction against the tenant if the co-owner objects. The Division Bench thereafter discussed the matter thus :-" (1) Aco-awner/landlord cannot file a suit for eviction against the tenant if the co-owner objects. (2) If a tenant who purchased the property from co-owner and gets into the shoes of the co-owner need not file a suit for partition and separate possession and there is no obligation on his part to handover possession and thereafter sue for partition and separate possession. Any co-owner who wants to have possession, by meets and bounds may file a suit for partition and claim separate possession and thereafter seek eviction of the tenant from the part of reversion falling to his share after partition. (3) The judgment rendered in the second Appeal operates as res judicata despite pure questions of law decided therein. We may also add here that the judgment having been delivered inter se parties, the same would have been otherwise binding on us, in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of shyamacharan vs. Sheojee Bhai 1964 MPLJ 502 as well as the conception in the case of Mulam Chand (supra) that the doctrine of res judicata over weighs the binding precedent. " (16) IT is not in dispute that the aforesaid decisions this Court has taken the view contrary to the decision of Apex Court in Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others v. Bibi Husn Bano and others (supra) without considering various material aspects and provisions of Section 111 (d) of TP Act and the question whether tenancy continues. (17) QUESTION arises whether a decision can operate as res judicata in the facts of the instant case, suit has been filed for the purpose of declaration that sale deeds dated 2. 2. 82 and 20. 9. 82 are void and fresh cause of action for need under section 12 (l) (f) which existed as on the date of filing of the suit. It is also not disputed that Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others v. Bibi Husn Bano and others (supra) may have the effect of binding precedent, but submission raised by respondents is that rule of res judicata has to prevail over the binding precedent. (18) IN the previous decision rendered by this Court in SA No. 813/95 this Court has held that Inder Kumar Jain has stepped into the shoes of co-Qwner of undivided portion of the house. (18) IN the previous decision rendered by this Court in SA No. 813/95 this Court has held that Inder Kumar Jain has stepped into the shoes of co-Qwner of undivided portion of the house. It would be unjust and inequitable to throw out a co-owner from possession of suit accommodation merely because as a tenant he had purchased the share of co-owner. His legal right to retain the possession cannot be whittled down. This Court did not consider at all the question of merger of tenancy into the co-ownership right. Provisions of Section 111 (d) of The Transfer of Property Act was not even referred to. Similarly in civil revision 1676/01 (Hameeda Begum vs. Champa Bai Jain and other (supra)) provisions of Section 111 (d) of Transfer of Property Act was not even referred to. Division Bench of this Court did not take into consideration the aforesaid aspects and the decision of civil revision rendered by this Court has not attained finality as leave to appeal has been granted by the Apex Court and the matter is pending consideration. The question which has been raised in the instant matter that there is no merger of the tenancy rights and the defendants purchaser and other heirs of Shikharchand Jain continues to be tenant inspite of purchase of part of the property was not decided in previous matters. (19) FIVE following conditions must co-exist to constitute a matter as res judicata. The five tests have been laid down by the Apex Court in Sheldon Singh vs. Daryao Kunwar AIR. 1966 SC 1332, (i) The matter directly substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit; (ii) The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim; (iii) The parties must have litigated under the same title in the former suit; (iv) The court which decided the former suit must be a Court competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue is subsequently raised; and (v) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court in the first suit. In order, therefore, that the decision is res judicata it will have to be seen whether all the five conditions mentioned have been satisfied. In Mysore State Electricity Board vs. Bangalore woollen. Cotton, and Silk Mills Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 1128 in order to decide whether a decision in an earlier litigation operates as res judicata, the court must look at the nature of the litigation, what were the issues raised therein and what was actually decided in it. ( 20 ) ANOTHER question is that previous decision which was rendered only on pure question of law, whether such a decision without considering whether tenancy had merged into the co-ownership right can be said to be res judicata. When on question of law and its alteration when decision will not operate as res- judicata the Apex Court in Isabella Johnson (smt.) vs. M. A. Susai (1991) 1 SCC 494 : air 1991 SC 993 following the decision in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal vs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 has laid down that it is well settled that there can be no estoppal on a pure question of law and in this case the question of jurisdiction is pure question of law. In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal vs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy (supra) the Apex Court has laid down that where the decision is on a question of law, i. e. , the interpretation of a statute, it being res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression "the matter in issue" means the fight litigated between the parties, i. e, the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the court or a decision of the court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land. Under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land. Under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land. The Apex Court has laid down in Mathura Prasad bajoo Jaiswal vs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy (supra) thus :- "6. The authorities on the question whether a decision on a question of law operates as res judicata disclose widely differing views. In some cases it was decided that a decision on a question of law can never be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties: Parthasardhi Ayyangar v. Chinnakrishna Ayyangar, ILR 5 Mad 304; Chamanlal v. Bapubhai, ILR 22 Bom 669; and Kanta Devi v. Kalawati, AIR 1946 Lah 419. On the other hand Aikman, J. , in Chandi Prasad v. Maharaja Mahendra Singh, ILR 23 All 5 held that a decision on a question of law is always res judicata. But as observed by rankin, C, J. , in Tarinccharan Bhattacharjee v. Kedar Nath haldar, ILR 56 Cal 723. "questions of law are of all kinds and cannot be dealt with as though they were all the same. Questions of procedure, questions affecting jurisdiction, questions of limitation may all be questions of law. In such questions the rights of parties are not the only matter for consideration. " we may analyse the illustrative cases relating to questions of law, decisions on which may be deemed res judicata in subsequent proceeding. In Bindeshwari Charan Singh v. Bageshwari charan Singh, LR 63 IA 53 ,the Judicial Committee held that a decision of a Court in a previous suit between the same parties that Section 12-A of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act 6 of 1876 which renders void a transaction to which it applies was inapplicable, was res judicata. In that case the owner of an impartible estate, after his estate was released from management, executed a maintenance grant in favour of his minor son B, but without the sanction of the Commissioner as required by Section 12-A of the Act. B on attaining majority sued his father and brothers for a maintenance grant at the rate of Rs. 4,000 per annum. The claim was decreed, and the plaintiff was awarded a decree for a grant of Rs. 4,000/- inclusive of the previous grant of 1909, and the Court held that the grant of 1909 was valid in law. B on attaining majority sued his father and brothers for a maintenance grant at the rate of Rs. 4,000 per annum. The claim was decreed, and the plaintiff was awarded a decree for a grant of Rs. 4,000/- inclusive of the previous grant of 1909, and the Court held that the grant of 1909 was valid in law. The father implemented the decree and made an additional maintenance grant upto the value of the decreed sum. In an action by the sons of Bs brothers challenging the two grants on the plea that the grants were illegal and not binding upon them, the Judicial Committee held that the plea was barred as res judicata in respect of both the grantsin respect of the first because there was an express decision on the validity of the first grant in the earlier suit, and in respect of the second the decision in the first suit was res judicata as to the validity of the second grant which was made in fulfilment of the obligation under the Courts decision. The Judicial Committee held that in respect of the first grant, the decision that Section 12-A did not apply to the grant, was res judicata, and in respect of the second grant the constriction between the same parties of Section 12-A was res judicata. Validity of the second grant was never adjudicated upon in any previous suit: the second grant was held valid because between the parties it was decided that to the grant of maintenance of an impartible zamindari Section 12-A of the chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act had no application. This part of the judgment of the Judicial Committee is open to doubt. 7. Where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties: tarini-C. ha. ran Bhattacharjees case (supra ). It is obvious that the matter in issue in a subsequent proceeding is not the same as in the previous proceeding, because the law interpreted is different. 8. 7. Where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties: tarini-C. ha. ran Bhattacharjees case (supra ). It is obvious that the matter in issue in a subsequent proceeding is not the same as in the previous proceeding, because the law interpreted is different. 8. In a case relating to levy of tax a decision valuing property or determining liability to tax in a different taxable period or event is binding only in that period or event, and is not binding in the subsequent years, and therefore the rule of res judicata has no application; see Broken Hill Proprietary Co, Ltd. v. Municipal council of Broken Hill, 1926 AC 94. 9. A question of jurisdiction of the Court, or of procedure, or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. Rankin. C. J. , observed in Tarini Charan Bhattacharjees cose (supra): "the object of the doctrine of res judicata is not to fasten upon parties special principles of law as. applicable to them inter se, but to ascertain their rights and the facts upon which these rights directly and substantially depend; and to prevent this ascertainment from becoming nugatory by precluding the parties from reopening or recontesting that which has been finally decided. " 10. A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment operate as res judicata. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise. 11. It is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question law, i. e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression "the matter in issue" in Section 11, Code of civil Procedure, means the right litigated between the parties, i. e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of the order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land. " HAMEEDA BEGUM (SMT.) Vs. SMT. CHAMPA BAJAIN ( 21 ) CONSIDERING similar question in Isabella Johnson (Smt.) vs. M. A. Susai (supra), the Apex Court has held thus :- "5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Judge of the High Court was in error, as the earlier decisions of the Rent Controller to the effect that it was the city civil Court and not the Rent Controller who had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction filed by the appellant against the respondent, constituted res judicata between the parties on the question of jurisdiction. It was submitted by him that, even if that decision was wrong, the issue of jurisdiction was finally decided between the parties and that decision was that it was the Civil court and not the Rent Controller that had the jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the suit for eviction. It was submitted by him that, even if that decision was wrong, the issue of jurisdiction was finally decided between the parties and that decision was that it was the Civil court and not the Rent Controller that had the jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the suit for eviction. He further submitted that the respondent could not be permitted to take inconsistent pleas as he was barred by the principles of estoppel from taking up the plea before the Civil Court that it was the Rent Controller who had the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He placed reliance on a decision rendered by a Division Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh, (1979) 4 SCC 83 , which took the view that the Civil Courts decision regarding lack of jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. In that case the Civil Court declined jurisdiction. The Civil Court took the view that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit in question and directed the return of the plaint for representation to the appropriate Revenue Court. When the claim was filed in the Revenue Court, the Court took the view that it had no jurisdiction to try the claim. Thereupon, a suit was again instituted in the Civil Court for the same relief. This suit failed throughout on the ground of res judicata. The High Court affirmed the dismissal and the Division Bench of this Court took the view that the High Court was right in taking the view that the principles of res judicata were-applicable to the issue of jurisdiction. In our opinion, the contention of learned counsel for the appellantcannot be upheld. We find that in Mathura Prasad Baioo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613 : (1970) 3 SCR 830 , a Bench comprising three learned Judges of this Court has taken the view that a decision on the question of jurisdiction of the court or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. The court observed:- (SCC p. 619,parall ). "it is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The court observed:- (SCC p. 619,parall ). "it is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in -the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between. the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of law, i. e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression "the matter in issue" in S. 11 of the Code of civil Procedure means the right litigated between the parties, i. e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land. f. The same view has been reiterated by a Bench comprising three learned Judges of this court in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobindram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC 193 . We find that the decision of three learned Judges of this Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo jaiswal v. Dossibai, N. B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 : (1970)3 SCR 830 has not been noticed at all by the Division Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court which delivered the judgment in Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh (1979) 4 SCC 83 and hence, to the extent, that the judgment in Avtar Singhs Case takes the view that the principle of res judicata is applicable to an erroneous decision on jurisdiction, it cannot be regarded as good law. In our opinion a court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. It is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law and in this case the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law. ( 22 ) IN case there is a fresh cause of action,interpretation of law in previous case cannot operate as res judicata. The Apex Court in Anwar Khan Mehboob co. vs. State of M. P. AIR 1966 SC 1637 has laid down that a decision cannot constitute a bar on the principle of res judicata when new circumstances have come to exist which require a reappraisal of the true legal position. The Apex court considering the fact that the Division Bench did not refer to right to property in the previous decision that true position of law was not taken into consideration. The attention of the Division Bench was not directed to the reference, hence, it was laid down by Apex Court that such a decision cannot constitute a bar on principle of res judicata. The Apex Court held thus :- "12. We have explained above that the Divisional Bench did not refer to right to property although it is possible that it thought in terms of property in leaves, timber etc. On their being severed from earth as existing even before leaves, timber etc. were so severed. This was not the true position in law because the agreements then considered betokened a licence coupled with a grant but no right in any property movable or immovable of any kind. The petitioner firm like the others had a licence to go to the forests to pick and carry away tendu leaves but had no other right. The attention of the Divisional Bench was not directed to this difference. Such a decision cannot constitute a bar on the principle of res judicata when new circumstances have come to exist which require a reappraisal of the true legal position. The attention of the Divisional Bench was not directed to this difference. Such a decision cannot constitute a bar on the principle of res judicata when new circumstances have come to exist which require a reappraisal of the true legal position. " ( 23 ) PRINCIPLE of res judicata will not apply when the entire matter was still in appeal and the matter had not attained finality and was still in dispute, thus the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in civil revision which arose out of RCA proceedings cannot operate as res judicata on the basis of principles laid down by the Apex Court in K. Muthuswami Gounder vs. N. Palaniapa gounder (1998) 7 SCC327 : AIR 1998 SC 3118 . As leave to appeal has been granted by the Apex Court against the decision rendered in civil revision, it cannot be said to operate as res judicata, the decision has not attained finality. Provisions of Section 111 (d) of Transfer of Property Act have not been taken into consideration. ( 24 ) IN the previous decision aforesaid question as to whether tenancy stood determined was not even resorted to, principles of estoppel or res judicata do not apply where to give effect to them would be to counter some statutory direction or prohibition, a statutory direction cannot be overridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the parties. In P. G. Eskwarappq vs. M. Rudrappa and others (1996) 6 SCC 96 the aforesaid principle has been laid down by the Apex Court thus :- "4. The principles of estoppel or res judicata do not apply where to give effect to them would be to counter some statutory direction or prohibition. A statutory direction or prohibition cannot be overridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the parties. "( 25 ) THE Apex Court has laid down in Allahabad Development Authority vs. Nasiruzzaman and others (1996) 6 SCC 424 that Section ll-A does not apply to cases of acquisitions under S. 17 where possession was already taken and the land stood vested in the State. The notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act do not lapse due to failure to make an award within two years from the date of the declaration. The notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act do not lapse due to failure to make an award within two years from the date of the declaration. Principle of res judicata does not apply where to give effect to them would be to counter some statutory direction or prohibition. It cannot be defeated by a previous judgment between the parties. The Apex Court has held that when the previous decision is found to be erroneous on its face, the principle of res judicata will not apply to counter some statutory direction. The Apex Court has held thus :- "6. In view of the above ratio, it is seen that when the legislature has directed to act in a particular manner and the failure to act results in a consequence; the question is whether the previous order operates as res judicata or estoppel as against the persons in dispute. When the previous decision was found to be erroneous on its face, this Court held in the above judgment that it does not operate as res judicata. We respectfully follow the ratio therein. The principle of estoppel or res judicata does not apply where to give effect to them would be to counter some statutory direction or prohibition. A statutory direction or prohibition cannot be overridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the parties. In view of the fact that land had already stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances, the question of lapse of notification under Section 4 (1) and the declaration under Section 6 would not arise. Considered from this perspective, original direction itself was erroneous and the later direction with regard to delivery of possession of the land, in consequence, was not valid in law. Further, it is made clear that the respondents are entitled to interest at 9% for one year from the date of taking possession and thereafter at 15% per annum till the date of deposit into court. The respondents are not entitled to market value as on the date of award. " ( 26 ) IN Hope Plantations Ltd. vs. Taluk Land board, Peermade and another (1999) 5 SCC 590 the Apex Court has laid down that even a wrong decision is binding. The respondents are not entitled to market value as on the date of award. " ( 26 ) IN Hope Plantations Ltd. vs. Taluk Land board, Peermade and another (1999) 5 SCC 590 the Apex Court has laid down that even a wrong decision is binding. It is, however, different if an issue which had been decided in an earlier litigation again arises for determination between the same parties in a suit based on a fresh cause of action or where there is continuous cause of action. The parties then may not be bound by the determination made earlier if in the meanwhile, law has changed or has been interpreted differently by a higher forum. The Apex court has laid down thus :- "31. Law on res judicata and estoppel is well understood in india and there are ample authoritative pronouncements by various courts on these subjects. As noted above, the plea of res judicata, though technical, is based on public policy in order to put an end to litigation. It is, however, different if an. issue which had been decided in an earlier litigation again arises for determination between the same parties in a suit based on a fresh cause of action or where there is continuous cause of action. The parties then may not be bound by the determination made earlier if in the meanwhile, law has changed or has been interpreted differently by a higher forum. But that situation does not exist here. Principles of constructive res judicata apply -with full force. It is the subsequent stage of the same proceedings. If we refer to Order xlvh of the Code (Explanation to Rule 1) review is not permissible on the ground "that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. " in the instant case, there is a fresh cause of action with respect to necessity of plaintiff no. " in the instant case, there is a fresh cause of action with respect to necessity of plaintiff no. 2, there is fresh cause of action and law of land is available in the shape of decision of Apex Court in Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others vs Bibi husn Bono (supra) taking into consideration the intendment of Section 111 (d) of the TP Act laying down that there is no determination of tenancy by factum of purchase by the tenant from one of co-owner of the part of tenanted premises and liability to comply with the Rent Act continues. Previous decision cannot be said to operate as res judicata. Otherwise it would not be possible to get the accommodation vacated forever on the basis of landlord tenant relationship as there is no determination of tenancy,even after partition there are other co-tenants defendants no. l and 2 who will remain tenant,thus, the decision rendered earlier cannot operate as res judicata. ( 27 ) THE point of law when neither raised in the High Court nor decided by the apex Court can be raised in any other proceedings and raising of such point of law is not barred in subsequent proceedings has been laid down by the Apex court in Sockieting Tea Co, (Private) Ltd. v. Under Secretary to the Govt, of assam and others (1973) 3 SCC 729 . In Union of India and another vs. Manik lai Banerjee AIR 2006 SC 2844 the Apex Court has held that if a decision has been rendered without taking into account the statutory provision, the same cannot be considered to be a binding precedent. The previous decision was rendered without taking into consideration the effect of Section 111 (d) of TP Act. The instant suit is based on fresh cause of action, if the decision in previous proceedings be regarded as conclusive, it will assume status of special rule of law applicable to the party in derogation to law of land declared by the Apex Court in Pramod kumar-Jaiswal and others vs. Bibi Husn Bano (supra ). ( 28 ) IN Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and another, v. Janapada Sabha chhindwara and others AIR 1964 SC 1013 the Apex Court has laid down that liability to pay tax year to year is based on different cause of action. ( 28 ) IN Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and another, v. Janapada Sabha chhindwara and others AIR 1964 SC 1013 the Apex Court has laid down that liability to pay tax year to year is based on different cause of action. If any point of fact or law is considered in determining the liability for a given year, they can generally be deemed to have been considered and decided in collateral and incidental way. It would not prevent fresh adjudication by bar of res judicata on similar questions of liability for subsequent years. The Apex Court in c. M. Arumugam vs. S. Rajgopalan others AIR1976 SC 939 has laid down that when a mixed question of law and fact was decided by the Apex Court in an-earlier case relating to 1967, elections do not operate as res judicata when the same questions are agitated which relates to 1972 General Election when fresh evidence is adduced and all the parties were not the same. The question was whether on conversion to Christianity a particular candidate ceased to be a member. of SC. The Apex Court held that the question can be reagitated as there is fresh cause of action and on the same question fresh adjudication can be made. ( 29 ) SECTION 11 of CPC intended to cover the suit over which the Civil Court was given jurisdiction under the provisions of the Code has been laid down by the apex Court in Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh vs. State of Gujrat AIR 1965 sc 1153 . In Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association vs. Union of India and others AIR 1990 SC 334 the Apex Court has laid down that the decision on an abstract question of law or question of jurisdiction would not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding if the cause of action is different. In jaisingh Jairam Tyagi and others vs. Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal and others (1980) 3 SCC 162 the Apex Court has laid down the decision cannot operate res judicata against legislative mandate/direction. Decision cannot be permitted to attain special rule or law in derogation of the rule declared by legislature. In jaisingh Jairam Tyagi and others vs. Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal and others (1980) 3 SCC 162 the Apex Court has laid down the decision cannot operate res judicata against legislative mandate/direction. Decision cannot be permitted to attain special rule or law in derogation of the rule declared by legislature. ( 30 ) THE rule of res judicata is not applicable where nature of proceedings and authority before such claims were made were different as laid down in Theandhra pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad vs. P. Venkateswara rao and others (1976) 4 SCC 47 and subsequent suit means the whole suit not part of it as laid down by the Apex Court in Mst. Gulab Bai and others vs. Manphool Bai AIR 1962 SC 214 . ( 31 ) THE Apex Court has laid down in Surajmal vs. Radheshyam (1988) 3 scc 18 : AIR 1988 SC 1345 that bona fide need of landlord must be considered with reference to the time when a suit for eviction is filed and it cannot be assumed that once the question of necessity is decided against the plaintiff it has to be assumed that he will not have a bona fide and genuine necessity ever in future. Thus, in the instant case need has to be seen as to the time suit was filed. In Richpal singh and others vs. Dalip (1987) 4 SCC 410 subsequent civil suit for restoration of possession on ground of plaintiff being mortgagee in possession and not tenant thereby disputing relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the Apex court has held that suit was not barred by res judicata. ( 32 ) IN the instant case, question of title has also been raised beside fresh cause of action on the grounds under Section 12 (l) (f) of MP Accommodation Control act. In the previous suit only question involved was that of ejectment as a tenant, the Apex Court has held in Rameshwar Dayal vs. Banda (Dead) Through His lrs and another (1993) 1 SC 531 that even if question of title is incidentally determined by Small Cause Court does not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit based on title. In the previous suit only question involved was that of ejectment as a tenant, the Apex Court has held in Rameshwar Dayal vs. Banda (Dead) Through His lrs and another (1993) 1 SC 531 that even if question of title is incidentally determined by Small Cause Court does not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit based on title. In Smt. Gangabai, Appellant v. Smt. Chhabubai AIR 1982 sc 20 , the Apex Court has held that determination by Small Cause Court regarding the title of immovable property would only be incidental to the main issue in the suit. Finding of title cannot be res judicata in a regular civil suit for determination of enforcement of any right or interest in immovable property. In Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha vs. Ujagar Singh and others (2000) 7 SCC 543 it has been laid down where the earlier suit was for injunction only and no question of title was gone into or decided, the earlier suit could not be binding on the question oftitle. ( 33 ) IN Sarwan Kumar and another vs. Madan Lai Aggarwal AIR 2003 SC 1475 the Apex Court has laid down that decree passed by the Civil Court on the basis that commercial tenancy is not heritable, subsequently commercial tenancy was held to be not heritable. The declaration of the law was not made prospective by the Supreme Court. The Apex Court has held that decree earlier passed by the Civil Court becomes without jurisdiction and objection -as to its executability can be raised before the Executing Court. In N. RNarayan Swamy vs. B. Francis jagan AIR 2001 SC 2469 the Apex Court has held that successive suits can be filed by landlord on a ground of bona fide requirement or non-payment of rent. Due to withdrawal of first suit as not pressed, second suit will not be barred by order 23 Rule 1 CPC or by Section 45 of Karnataka Act. ( 34 ) IT would be appropriate to refer the decisions relied upon by Shri Ravish agarwal, learned Sr. Advocate, appearing for respondents. He has referred to the decision in Derrick vs. Williams (1939) 2 AU. E. R. 559. ( 34 ) IT would be appropriate to refer the decisions relied upon by Shri Ravish agarwal, learned Sr. Advocate, appearing for respondents. He has referred to the decision in Derrick vs. Williams (1939) 2 AU. E. R. 559. The Court of Appeal has laid down in the context of the facts that child of the respondent was killed by a motor lorry, an action was brought claiming damage under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, some amount was paid with denial of liability, that sum was taken out. At that time reliance was placed on the decision of Court of Appeal in Rose vs. Ford (1937) AC 826, it was thought that damages could not be recovered in respect of expectation of life, but that decision was in 1937 reversed in the House of Lords. Respondent brought the action in 1938 based upon same facts and claimed damages for loss of expectation of life, the Court applied the law as it was at the time when decision was given and the fact that law was subsequently altered by a decision of higher Court or by the legislature gives no right to have an action retried. Said decision has no application as the instant suit is based on fresh cause of action beside it is based on question of title which was not involved in the previous suit and along with fresh cause of action of bona fide requirement which has to be seen in such cases on the date of filing of the suit. He has also relied upon decision of Chancery Division in Re Waring. Westminster Bank vs. Burton Butler 1948 Ch. D. 221 in which the earlier decision was over ruled later on and it became clear that decision of Court of Appeal was wrong, later on trustees asked whether in view of provisions of Section 20 of the finance Act, 1945 two tax free annuities ought to be paid in full. It was held that in the case of the annuitant who was a party to the previous proceedings the principle of res judicata applied and it was bound by the decision of the Court of appeal. However, annuitant wiho had not been a party to the previous decision, was not bound by the order of the Court of Appeal and was entitled to claim retrospectively the full amount of her annuity. However, annuitant wiho had not been a party to the previous decision, was not bound by the order of the Court of Appeal and was entitled to claim retrospectively the full amount of her annuity. It was held that though the decision has been over ruled, it is nevertheless a subsisting order which is binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it was made. But in the instant case, ratio has no application as it is based on fresh cause of action and tenancy continues, tenant can be evicted on availability of grounds under Section 12 of MP Accommodation control Act and question of title is also agitated, ( 35 ) ANOTHER decision relied upon is rendered by the House of Lords in Watt vs. Ahsan (2007) UKHL 51. In the aforesaid case, question arose on Section 12 of the Race Relations Act, 1976. The submission was made that they were party and that All vs. Mcdonagh (2002) ICR 1026 was wrongly decided. In any case, the interpretation given to Section 12 by the EAT in Sawyer v. Ahsan (2000) ICR 1 is res judicata between him and the Labour Party, not only for the purposes of his first complaint but for the other two as well. It was opined that the EAT was wrong in Sawyer vs. Ahsan (2000) ICR 1 to hold that the Labour Party was a qualifying body, but there was no appeal against the decision of EAT , it was held that decision was binding upon the parties though wrong in law. When the Tribunal was-having the jurisdiction to decide the question, it is binding upon the parties though erroneous. There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition, but here we are concerned with the fresh cause of action on which suit is based and previously relevant statutory provision of Section 111 (d) of TP Act was not taken into consideration, question of determinatipn of tenancy was also not decided. ( 36 ) SHRI Agarwal has also relied upon decision of this Court in State of MP. vs. Mulamchand 1973 MPLJ 832 in which it has been laid down that question of law in relation to given set of facts attains finality, it operates as res judicata in a later suit or proceeding between same parties, even if it was erroneous. vs. Mulamchand 1973 MPLJ 832 in which it has been laid down that question of law in relation to given set of facts attains finality, it operates as res judicata in a later suit or proceeding between same parties, even if it was erroneous. Even if in the earlier case issue of law was wrongly interpreted to ignorance of binding precedent or if in a subsequent binding precedent the law has been interpreted otherwise the earlier decision on the question of law which has attained finality will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties. The rule admits of certain exceptions. One is that where the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding it will not operate as res judicata if in the subsequent suit it is found to be erroneous because the question of jurisdiction is unrelated to rights claimed by one party and denied by other. Another exception is where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties. Third exception is that a decision of a Court sanctioning something which is illegal does not operate as res judicata and a party affected by the decision is not precluded from challenging its validity. In the instant case, the earlier decisions rendered by this Court were not on the question of law of merger of tenancy into co-ownership and section 111 (d) of the TP Act was not considered, thus, it cannot be said to be operating as res judicata in the present suit based on fresh cause of action of ejectment of tenant and title. Tenant has protection under Rent Act, he can be evicted only on availability of ground under Section 12 of the Act. It is a question pertaining to jurisdiction to evict. There is no finding of fact which is coming in the way in the instant suit. The main question is that of the status of the defendants and beyond iota of doubt, they are tenants and tenancy is not determined by the fact that only portion of the property had been purchased by one of the heirs of the original tenant. The main question is that of the status of the defendants and beyond iota of doubt, they are tenants and tenancy is not determined by the fact that only portion of the property had been purchased by one of the heirs of the original tenant. ( 37 ) RELIANCE has also been placed on decision in Abdul Salam vs. State of jammu and Kashmir and others AIR 1981 Jammu and Kashmir 21 , it has been laid down that a judgment interse parties of a competent Court in a previous writ petition would operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties even if it was contrary to the decision of Apex Court in a different case. The correctness or otherwise of the earlier decision is wholly irrelevant where the conditions for the application of the rule of res judicata are satisfied in the latter case. The decision is distinguishable for the aforesaid reasons. Learned counsel for respondent has also relied upon decision in Tarini Charan bhattacharjee and others vs. Kedar Nath Haldar AIR 1928 Calcutta 777 where the matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit was not an abstract question of law but a mixed question of fact and law is res judicata. Alteration of law by subsequent decisions and different interpretation of law by judicial decision does not affect the principle of res judicata but legislative change might affect it. There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition, but the ratio has no application in the instant case in the facts of the case for the aforesaid reasons. ( 38 ) YET another submission has been raised by Shri Ravish Agarwal, learned senior counsel that Division Bench of this Court in civil revision has taken a different view though leave to appeal has been granted and the appeal is pending before the Apex Court against the decision, it would be appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench. We would have referred the matter to a larger Bench,but for the availability of decision of Apex Court in Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others v. Bibi Husn Bano and others (supra) which clinches the issue and that Section 111 (d) of TP Act was not taken into consideration by single Bench of this Court while deciding SA No. 813/95 and by Division Bench of this Court while deciding the Civil Revision No. 1676/01, moreover instant suit being based on fresh cause of action, we are not inclined to accept the submission to refer the case for decision to a larger Bench in view of availability of decision of Apex Court which is squarely applicable in the facts of the instant case to hold that defendants continue to be tenant, there is no determination of tenancy and they can be evicted in accordance with MP Accommodation Control Act. ( 39 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, we reiterate that rule of res judicata cannot prevail in the instant case as tenancy continues apart from that, present suit is based on question of title and fresh cause of action under Section 12 (l) (f)of the Act. Moreover it is based on fresh cause of action for which decision on question of law cannot operate as res judicata and in the previous judgment rendered by this Court, relevant statutory provision and question of determination of tenancy was not gone into. Question is what is the status of the defendants as on today. In answer to the query made to Shri Ravish Agarwal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents simply stated that this is for the Court to determine. In our considered opinion,they are tenant, partition with one of tenants will not determine the tenancy in facts of case. The tenants cannot be denied protection under Rent Act nor can be evicted except in accordance with MP Accommodation control Act. No special law in derogation to decision of Apex Court in Pramod kumar Jaiswal and others vs. . Bibi Husn Bano (supra) and statutory direction under Section 111 (d) of TP Act by virtue of rule of res judicata can be permitted to prevail between parties in view of fresh cause of action. No special law in derogation to decision of Apex Court in Pramod kumar Jaiswal and others vs. . Bibi Husn Bano (supra) and statutory direction under Section 111 (d) of TP Act by virtue of rule of res judicata can be permitted to prevail between parties in view of fresh cause of action. Merely because one of co-tenant Inder Kumar Jain purchased part of tenanted premises, the tenancy has not come to an end and this Court did not conclude in the previous decision that tenancy has come to an end due to purchase of part of tenanted property. The decision of Apex Court is binding precedent on question of law which was not decided by this Court in previous decisions. Even erroneous decision on question of law would not operate as res judicata cause of action being different. Rule of res judicata on facts of instant case cannot prevail. ( 40 ) IN Ref. Question No. (iv):-Coming to the next submission raised by Shri hafizullah that sale deeds have become void as no suit has been filed for possession by Inder Kumar within 12 years of purchase,remedy of Inder Kumar has become barred by limitation as per Section 27 and Article 65 of the Limitation Act. With respect to portion purchased by him,section 27 provides for extinguishment of right to property in case suit is not filed within the prescribed period of limitation. Article 65 has been pressed into service which provides period of 12 years limitation when the possession of defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. There is no question of adverse possession in the instant case by the plaintiffs, actual possession is with the defendants, they are enjoying premises as tenant. Appellant has relied upon a decision in Dulal Chandra Chatterjee vs. Gosthabehari Mitra AIR 1953 Calcutta 259 meaning of "dwelling house" has been interpreted. In Gautam paul vs. Debi Rani Paul and others AIR 2001 SC 61 it has been held that dwelling house belonging to undivided family merely because a person is related by blood through common ancestor does not make him member of family. ( 41 ) HE has also relied upon decision of Apex Court in M. V. S. Manikayala Rao vs. M. Narasimhaswami and others AIR 1966 SC 470 . ( 41 ) HE has also relied upon decision of Apex Court in M. V. S. Manikayala Rao vs. M. Narasimhaswami and others AIR 1966 SC 470 . It was also observed by the Apex Court that it is clear that in the absence of a clear acknowledgment of the right of the alienee or participation in the enjoyment of the family property by. the alienee, the possession of non-alienating coparceners would be adverse to the alienee, from the date on which he became entitled to sue for general partition and possession of his alienors share. The fact that the alienee has purchased an undivided interest of joint family property is not inconsistent with the conception of adverse possession of that interest. In the instant case, defendants are in possession and it could not be said that the plaintiffs have perfected the title by adverse possession. ( 42 ) SHRI Hafizullah has also relied upon decision of Apex Court in Wuntakal yalpi Chenabasavana Gowd vs. Rao Bahadur Y. Mahabaleshwarappa and another AIR 1954 SC 337 in which the Apex Court has dealt with the concept when possession of one co-owner becoming adverse to another by ouster. The mere assertion of his joint title by the dispossessed co-sharer will not interrupt the running of adverse possession. In the instant case there is no ouster of the defendants, they are enjoying the property as tenants as such there is no question of adverse possession. Even if it is taken as dwelling house for the residential purposes of the family as the defendants are in possession as tenant, it cannot be said that plaintiffs have perfected their title by adverse possession. Concept of section 27 of Limitation Act has been dealt with in Prem Singh and others vs. Birbal and others AIR 2006 SC 3608 . The Apex Court has observed that limitation Act bars a remedy, but does not extinguish the right. The only exception is to be found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act which provides that at the determination of the period prescribed thereby, limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. The only exception is to be found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act which provides that at the determination of the period prescribed thereby, limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. In the instant case, as there is no adverse possession of the plaintiffs, it cannot be said that sale deeds have become void for the reasons that there is failure to sue within a period of twelve years on the strength of sale deed, in the absence of there being adverse possession, it cannot be held as contended that sale deeds have become void due to failure to sue within prescribed period of limitation under article 65 of Limitation Act. ( 43 ) IN our opinion, it cannot be said that by virtue of adverse possession the plaintiffs have perfected their right, title and interest on the basis of adverse possession as such sale deeds could not be said to be void and ineffectivc. The defendants are admittedly in possession as tenants, thus, it cannot be said that efficacy of sale deed has been lost. ( 44 ) IN Ref. Ouestion No. (v) :-Examining the question from yet another angle, though, we have found that status of defendants is that of tenant inspite of purchase by the defendants of the share of the property which is in their occupation. The full Bench of this Court in Ramdayal vs. Manaklcd 1973 MPLJ 650 has laid down that the purchaser can retain the possession only of the share and can ask the other co-owners to sue for partition only in case possession on the portion of property is not in excess of the share, but here the possession is not that of co-owner but continues to be that of tenant, in case of co-owner possession could not have been retained in view of decision of Full Bench of this Court. ( 45 ) WITH respect to need it is not disputed that the finding has been given in favour of plaintiff no. 2 Hafizullah that he is running the office of Advocacy in tenanted premises. The need is genuine one and has not been rightly disputed. Only his entitlement has been disputed due to decisions rendered in previous civil suit and the proceedings before the RCA. 2 Hafizullah that he is running the office of Advocacy in tenanted premises. The need is genuine one and has not been rightly disputed. Only his entitlement has been disputed due to decisions rendered in previous civil suit and the proceedings before the RCA. ( 46 ) GROUNDS under Sections 12 (l) (b) and (c) were taken in the previous suits which were negatived on merits as such we refrain ourselves from entering into aforesaid grounds as grounds were based on same facts which formed part of the present suit. However, with respect to need, the need has to be considered with reference to the date on which the suit was filed, it was fresh cause of action. ( 47 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that tenancy was inherited on death of Shikharchand Jain and in the life time of Shikharchand Jain original tenant, by purchase of portion of house by his son, the tenancy did not come to an end, thereafter tenancy was inherited by LRs including Inder Kumar jain, the defendants 1,2 and 3 continue to be the tenant even as on today and are liable to be evicted as per MP Accommodation Control Act. In view of the fact that need has been made out which fact is not disputed, we grant a decree of ejectment under Section 12 (l) (f) of MP Accommodation Control Act. ( 48 ) RESULTANTLY, the appeal is allowed,decree of ejectment is granted against the defendant respondents on the grounds envisaged under Section 12 (1) (f) of mp Accommodation Control Act. However, ejectment is subject to safeguards provided under Section 12 (6) of MP Accommodation Control Act. The Executing court to ensure the compliance of the aforesaid provision. Parties to bear their own costs as incurred in the appeal. Appeal allowed. .