JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—Seven individual disputes were raised by the workers with regard to the validity and legality of the order of termination w.e.f. 23rd of December, 1986. These disputes were referred to the Labour Court for adjudication which were clubbed together and a single award was passed by the Labour Court directing reinstatement with back wages and with continuity of service. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the said award, has filed the present writ petition. 2. The facts leading to the filing of the present writ petition is, that according to the workers, they were engaged from various dates in a permanent capacity and had worked for more than 240 days continuously in a year, and that, their services were arbitrarily dispensed with by the employers without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the ID Act). The workers contended that the dispensation of their services was patently illegal and that they were liable to be reinstated with continuity of service and with full back wages. 3. The petitioner, in their written statement, submitted that the workers were employed on daily rated basis on exigencies of work, and that, they had only worked intermittently and had never worked continuously, nor had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year. The petitioner further contended that no industrial dispute could be raised or referred since the employer was not an industry, as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act. 4. The Labour Court, after considering the material evidence on record, held that though complete muster roll registers were not produced by the employers, but whatever registers were produced clearly indicated that the workers had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year. The Labour Court also gave a finding that no notice or retrenchment compensation contemplated under Section 6-N was given by the employers to its workers, and therefore, concluded that the termination of the services of the workers was illegal, being violative of the provisions of Section 6-N of the ID Act, and consequently, directed that the workers were liable to be reinstated with continuity of service and with full back wages. The Labour Court also held that the employers did not lead any evidence on the question as to whether the employers come under the category of industry. 5. The Labour Court also held that the employers did not lead any evidence on the question as to whether the employers come under the category of industry. 5. Before this Court, Shri B.D. Mandhyan, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the workers in question were admittedly appointed on muster roll on daily rated basis, and in view of the definition of “employee”, as defined under Regulation 2 (e) of Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Produce Markets Board (Officers and Staff Establishment) Regulations, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as Regulations, 1984), the workmen could not have been reinstated by the Labour Court. The learned counsel further submitted that the respondent workman was not a workman contemplated under the Regulations of 1984, nor was there any post, consequently, the workman could not be reinstated. The learned counsel submitted that a daily rated workman had no right on the post in question, and therefore, such workers could not be reinstated. The learned counsel, however, conceded that at best, the Labour Court could have awarded compensation or damages, but could not have awarded reinstatement. The learned counsel submitted that such appointments made de hors the provisions of the Act, Rules and Regulations was ex facie illegal and such appointments could not be legalised by reinstating the workmen. In the end, the learned counsel submitted that the award directing full back wages was wholly arbitrary and without any basis. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on various judgments, but, in particular, has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and others, 2006 (1) SCC 667 and in the matter of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Umadevi (3) and others, 2006 (4) SCC 1 . 6. On the other hand, Shri Y.K. Sinha, the learned counsel for respondent workers submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned award, being based on findings of fact, which requires no interference in a writ jurisdiction, and that, the Labour Court was justified in reinstating the workers. 6. On the other hand, Shri Y.K. Sinha, the learned counsel for respondent workers submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned award, being based on findings of fact, which requires no interference in a writ jurisdiction, and that, the Labour Court was justified in reinstating the workers. The learned counsel further submitted that pursuant to an interim order of this Court, all the workers have been reinstated, and that, they have been working satisfactorily to the satisfaction of the employers for the last 18 years without any break in service, and therefore, the question of setting aside the order of reinstatement at this stage would be a travesty of justice. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, at some length, this Court is of the opinion that the submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri B.D. Mandhyan, is misplaced. The Court has perused the pleadings of the employers before the Labour Court and finds that no such pleadings were placed as has been raised before this Court. There is no plea that these appointments were made de hors the Act, Rules and Regulations or that these appointments were made on non-existing posts. The only plea raised by the employers before the Labour Court was that the workers had been appointed on daily rated basis, and that, they have worked intermittently. 8. In any case, in the present case, existence of a post is immaterial with regard to reinstatement. The existence of a post is required when the question of regularisation of the services of a workman is raised, in which case, the Labour Court is required and is obliged to look into the existence of a post and is also required to look into as to whether the appointments had been made in accordance with the Act and the Rules. But existence of a post is irrelevant when the applicability of Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be considered. In order to see whether the provision of Section 6-N has been complied with or not, the Court is required to consider as to whether the workman had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year or not. The question of existence of a post in such a condition is immaterial and is also irrelevant. In order to see whether the provision of Section 6-N has been complied with or not, the Court is required to consider as to whether the workman had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year or not. The question of existence of a post in such a condition is immaterial and is also irrelevant. The Labour Court has directed reinstatement on the position on which the workman was working earlier, that is, as a daily wager, for which, a post is not required since as per the contention of the employer, such appointments are made on daily rated basis on exigencies of work. But, where a daily wager claims permanency of service, in that case, the existence of the post becomes essential and relevant. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of Neeraj Awasthi (supra) held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue directions for framing a scheme for the regularisation of the employees of Mandi Samiti since the daily wagers are not employees of the Mandi Samiti under Regulation 2(e) of the Regulations of 1984. Consequently, the said judgment has no application to the present facts and circumstances of the case. Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court, in Umadevi’s case (supra) relates to the regularisation of the workers appointed de hors the Rules and Regulations through a back door entry method which is also distinguishable and is not applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case. 10. In the present case, the Labour Court has given a finding that each of the workers have worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year. This is a finding of fact which has not been disputed nor has been alleged before this Court that the finding is perverse. Consequently, this being a finding of fact, cannot be interfered with in a writ jurisdiction. Based on this finding, the Labour Court had further held that the retrenchment compensation had not been paid, and therefore, the workers were liable to be reinstated. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that instead of reinstatement, compensation or damages could have been imposed. Based on this finding, the Labour Court had further held that the retrenchment compensation had not been paid, and therefore, the workers were liable to be reinstated. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that instead of reinstatement, compensation or damages could have been imposed. This Court would have been inclined to delve into the matter and consider whether the compensation in lieu of retrenchment could be paid to the workers or not, but in the present facts and circumstances of the case, the Court is not inclined to accede to this plea raised by the petitioner. The Court finds that pursuant to an interim order the employers were directed to reinstate the workers during the pendency of the writ petition. It has been stated by the learned counsel for the workmen that pursuant to the interim order, the workers in question have been reinstated, working continuously, without any break in service, and to the satisfaction of the employers, for the last 19 years and that one of the workmen has also retired in the meanwhile. In view of this, this Court is of the opinion that paying the workers any compensation in lieu of the retrenchment at this stage would be a travesty of justice, considering the fact that at this late stage of life, it would be next to possible to seek an alternate employment. This Court, therefore, declines to accede to the plea of the employers to pay damages to the workers in lieu of reinstatement. 12. With regard to the relief of back wages given by the Labour Court, the Court finds that the Labour Court has mechanically given back wages on the ground that the termination was found to be illegal. Previously, the settled norm for reinstatement was with back wages where termination was found to be illegal. But now, the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments has reversed this trend and has held that the back wages cannot be granted as a matter of right merely because the termination order was found to be illegal. The Labour Court has to consider the other factors, such as whether the workman was gainfully employed during the intervening period or not. 13. The Labour Court has to consider the other factors, such as whether the workman was gainfully employed during the intervening period or not. 13. The Supreme Court in the case of U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd. and another v. Uday Narain Pandey, 2006 (1) SCC 479 ; Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Om Pal, 2007 (5) SCC 742 , and recently, P.V.K. Distillery Limited v. Mahendra Ram, 2009 (5) SCC 705 has held that the Court must consider as to whether the workman was gainfully employed or not before granting back wages. 14. In the present case, no evidence whatsoever has been led by the workmen as to whether they were gainfully employed or not. Consequently, the Court is of the opinion that the award of full back wages was arbitrary and excessive, and on this ground, the petition deserves to succeed in part and the award to that extent cannot be sustained. 15. The award of the Labour Court in so far as it directs payment of full back wages is quashed. The Court would have remanded the matter back to the Labour Court to decide the question of back wages to the workers, but the Court finds that the dispute is pending since 1986. Twenty three years have elapsed and the matter must come to an end. The Court is of the opinion that remanding the matter back would only further delay the matter. 16. Considering the facts and circumstances that has been brought on record, the Court is of the opinion that 50% of the back wages would suffice the question of back wages and would meet the ends of justice. Consequently, the Court directs the petitioner to pay 50% of the back wages in terms of the award. The petition is partly allowed. ———