JUDGMENT Honble Anil Kumar, J.—We have heard Sri M.A. Khan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Mohd. Aslam for the petitioners, Sri R.P. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs : (i) A direction may be issued to the respondent Nos. 1 and 6 to restore back the possession of the properties in dispute to the petitioners which have been illegally taken over by the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 by putting a lock as well as by constructing a boundary wall within the time frame fixed by this Hon’ble Court and further they may be restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of the petitioners till the final adjudication is made by the competent Court of law, namely, Civil Judge (Senior Division) Bahraich wherein Regular Suit No. 286 of 1991 filed by the petitioner No. 1 and Civil Judge (Junior Division) Bahraich wherein Regular Suit No. 1058 of 1991 filed by the petitioner No. 2 is pending for adjudication. (ii) Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 may be punished for wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order dated 29.4.1991 and 18.4.1991 passed by Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bahraich in Regular Suit No. 286 of 1991 as well as order dated 11.11.1991 passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bahraich in Regular Suit No. 1058 of 1991 by taking law in their own hands, despite the knowledge of the order by dispossessing the petitioners from the properties in dispute. 3. The un-controverted facts of the present Writ Petition are to the effect, that the dispute relates to house No. 2369-N situate in Mohalla Steelganj, Bahraich, district Bahraich.. 4. Sri Abdul Majeed, father of the petitioner No. 1 acquired the land in question from Late Raja Nanpara, who was ex-intermediary for construction of a house under written permission dated 7.8.1968 as the Zamindari had yet not been abolished in the urban areas and thereupon constructed a house thereon. He had executed a will on 3.1.1976 with respect to the house in dispute in favour of the petitioner No. 1. 5. He had executed a will on 3.1.1976 with respect to the house in dispute in favour of the petitioner No. 1. 5. Sri Abdul Majeed died in the year 1976 and since then the petitioner is in peaceful possession over the house and the land in dispute, thus the petitioner No. 1 is the owner of the same. 6. Nagar Palika, Bahraich and Executive Officer of Nagar Palika Bahraich (respondent Nos. 5 and 6) having no concern with the land in question tried to take forcible possession of the property in question. 7. As such, the petitioner after seeking exemption of service of notice under Section 326 of Nagar Palika Adhiniyam filed a suit for permanent injunction on 29.4.1991. 8. The said suit was registered as Regular Suit No. 286 of 1991 in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bahraich. An application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure was moved for grant of injunction and on 29.4.1991 the Court concerned had granted ex-parte injunction thereby restraining the Nagar Palika Bahraich and the Executive Officer Nagar Palika Bahraich, (respondent Nos. 5 and 6) not to interfere with the peaceful possession of the petitioner over the land in question. The said injunction order was made absolute on 14.8.1991. The suit No. 286 of 1991 is still pending for adjudication on merits. 9. Respondents No. 5 and 6 in utter defiance and disobedience of the order of injunction granted in Regular Suit No. 286 of 1991 tried to construct a room and a latrine on the southern side of the property in question by filling the foundation. 10. In view of the said development, the petitioner No. 1 had filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A before the Trial Court for taking action against respondent Nos. 5 and 6 as they are wilfully and deliberately disobeying the injunction orders passed by the Court, which is registered as Misc. Case No. 2 /70 of 2005. 11. Later on, the petitioner No. 1 had let out two rooms to one Sri Shakeel on rent who thereafter had carried a business of hard ware. 5 and 6 as they are wilfully and deliberately disobeying the injunction orders passed by the Court, which is registered as Misc. Case No. 2 /70 of 2005. 11. Later on, the petitioner No. 1 had let out two rooms to one Sri Shakeel on rent who thereafter had carried a business of hard ware. However, the City Magistrate, Basic Shiksha Adhikari and the Executive Officer Nagar Palika, Bahraich under the directions of the then District Magistrate, Bahraich along with Circle Officer, on 22.6.2006 had evicted Sri Shakeel (defendant) forcibly by throwing his entire articles from the shop in question which was let out by the petitioner. In view of the said development, petitioner No. 1 had filed a writ petition bearing No. 4051 (MB) of 2006 Abdul Moid v.Shankar Lal Pandey and others before this Court and the said writ petition was finally disposed of on 10.7.2006 with the following directions : “In the circumstances and the interest of justice will suffice if the petitioner moves an application under Section 151, C.P.C. before the Trial Court, it would be open to the trial Court to record evidence if so desired and thereafter shall decide the application so moved by the petitioner within four weeks. Learned counsel for Basic Siksha Adhikari failed to inform that under which provision of law, the Basic Siksha Adhikari locked the room for which there was temporary injunction from Civil Court. Accordingly Basic Siksha Adhikari is directed to open the lock of the room within 48 hours and restore its possession to the petitioner, which is the subject matter of the suit. It is clarified that the petitioner will not give possession of any portion of the disputed side (which is governed by temporary injunction) to Shakeel or to any other person”. 12. Thereafter, the petitioner No. 1 moved an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A as well as under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure which are still pending and not decided by the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bahraich as the same are lying vacant. 13. Further late Sri Abdul Khaliq father of the petitioner No. 2 (Mohd. Zameel) had purchased land from Raja Syed Mohd. Saadat Ali Khan of Nanpara on 6.2.1970 and had constructed a building on the east west side of the land which was purchased by him. 14. However respondent Nos. 13. Further late Sri Abdul Khaliq father of the petitioner No. 2 (Mohd. Zameel) had purchased land from Raja Syed Mohd. Saadat Ali Khan of Nanpara on 6.2.1970 and had constructed a building on the east west side of the land which was purchased by him. 14. However respondent Nos. 5 and 6 who have no concern whatsoever with the help of the local police had tried to demolish the constructions standing thereon. Having no other alternative, the father of the petitioner No. 2 had filed a suit for permanent injunction on 11.11.1991 which was numbered as Regular Suit No. 1058 of 1991 in the Court of Munsif Bahraich and an injunction was granted on 11.11.1991 thereby directing the parties to maintain status quo. 15. Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 had not filed their written statement in the said suit, as such the Court proceeded against them ex-parte under Order 8 Rule 10, CPC and ultimately the same was decreed by a judgment and decree dated 30.7.1993 restraining the defendants of the said suit permanently from interfering with the peaceful possession of Sri Abdul Khaliq, the father of the petitioner No. 2 and demolishing the constructions standing thereon. 16. The respondent Nos. 5 and 6 aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 30.7.1993 filed an appeal which was allowed and they were directed to file written statement in the suit No. 1058 of 1991 but the injunction order which was granted in regular suit No. 1058 of 1991 is still operative. 17. During the pendency of the said suit, Abdul Khaliq, father of the petitioner No. 2 died on 17.11.2005 as such the petitioner No. 2 moved an application for substitution which is pending disposal in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bahraich as the Court is vacant. 18. In view of the above said factual matrix, the learned senior counsel had argued that an application made by the petitioner No. 1 under Order 39 Rule 2-A, CPC for wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order of the injunction dated 29.4.1991 and the application under Section 151, CPC as directed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 10.7.2006 which are still pending and the matter is subjudice before the competent Court but the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 have forcibly dispossessed the petitioner from the property in dispute and thus the action of the respondent concerned is not only illegal, arbitrary but also untenable. 19. In spite of the injunction order granted in regular suit No. 1058 of 1991 the respondents by taking law in their own hands had deliberately violated the said order. 20. And further it was submitted that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 who are the protector/custodian of the law and have to abide by the orders passed by the competent Court of law, yet the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 with the help of the local police despite the injunction orders passed by competent Courts, took forcible possession of the property in dispute, therefore, the action of the respondent is not sustainable in law and they are liable to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. 21. On the strength of the said argument it has been submitted by learned counsel for petitioner that this Court may take action against the said respondents and direct the respondents to restore back the possession of the property in dispute to the petitioner which has been illegally taken over by the respondent No. 6 by putting a lock as well as by constructing boundary wall within the time frame fixed and further they may be restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of the petitioners till the final adjudication is made by the competent Court of law i.e. the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bahraich in Regular Suit No. 286 of 1991 filed by petitioner No. 1 and in the regular suit No. 1058 of 1991 filed by petitioner No. 2 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bahraich. 22. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents argued that in the event if the petitioner has some alleged grievance of disobedience of any action on the part of the concerned respondents which is in contravention to the injunction order dated 11.11.1991 passed in Regular Suit No. 1058 of 1991 in that event they had got adequate remedy under the law itself and for the said purpose writ petition filed by the petitioners is not maintainable on the ground of availability of statutory alternative remedy. 23. 23. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the record of the case we are of the opinion that the petitioner No. 1 has already moved an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A, CPC for wilful, deliberate disobedience of the order of injunction dated 29.4.1991 passed in Regular Suit No. 286 of 1991 and thereafter filed an application under Section151, CPC as directed by this Court and the same are still pending and the matter is subjudice. 24. So, if the petitioner No.1 has any grievance in respect to disobedience of the injunction order passed in the matter in question, for which they have already moved application under Order 39 Rule 2-A, CPC along with an application under Section 151, CPC, they may press the same and adequate relief will be granted by the Court concerned taking into consideration the facts of the case. 25. So far as the violation of the injunction order passed in regular Suit No. 286 of 1991 is concerned, it is not disputed that the petitioner No. 1 has also moved an application under Section 151, CPC as directed by this Court and the same is pending. 26. Moreover, if the petitioner No. 2 has any grievance in respect to the disobedience of the violation of the injunction order dated 11.11.1991, passed in regular suit No. 1058 of 1991 then he has adequate remedy for redressal of his grievance under Section 151, CPC. 27. Section 151, CPC provides as under : "151. Saving of inherent powers of the Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court." 28. The power of Section 151, CPC to pass order of injunction in the form of restoration of possession of the Code is not res integra now. 29. The inherent powers of the Court under Section 151, CPC are wide and are not subject to any limitations. Where in violation of a stay order or injunction against a party, something has been done in disobedience, it will be the duty of the Court as a policy to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong done. 30. Where in violation of a stay order or injunction against a party, something has been done in disobedience, it will be the duty of the Court as a policy to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong done. 30. The inherent power will not only be available in such a case, but it is bound to be exercised in that manner in the interests of justice. 31. Even apart from Section 151, CPC, we observe that as a matter of judicial policy, the Court should guard against itself being stultified in circumstances like this by holding that it is not powerless to undo a wrong done in disobedience of the Court’s order. But in this case it is not necessary to go to that extent as we hold that the power is available under Section 151, CPC. 32. In the case of Meera Chauhan v. Harsh Bishnoi and another, JT 2007 (1) SC 458 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : "15. On a bare perusal of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot be said to be in dispute that Section 151 confers wide powers on the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. 17. In Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, while dealing with the power of the Court to pass orders for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary order of injunction in the circumstances which are not covered under the provisions of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. At the same time, it is also well settled that when parties violate order of injunction or stay order or act in violation of the said order the Court can, by exercising its inherent power, put back the parties in the same position as they stood prior to issuance of the injunction order or give appropriate direction to the police authority to render aid to the aggrieved parties for the due and proper implementation of the orders passed in the suit and also order police protection for implementation of such order. 19. 19. It is also well settled that when in the event of utter violation of the injunction order, the party forcibly dispossesses the other, the Court can order restoration of possession to the party wronged.” 33. Further in the case of Manohar v. Hira Lal, AIR 1962 SC 527 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held, “While dealing with the power of the Court to pass orders in the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the Court, the Court has got inherent powers to pass an order under Section151, CPC which confers wide power on the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.” 34. Further in the case of Ram Chand & Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Kanhaiyalal Bhargava, (2004) 11 SCC 177 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held, “The inherent power of a Court is in addition to and complementary to the power expressly conferred under the Code. But that power will not be exercised if its exercise is inconsistent with, or comes into conflict with, any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the other provisions of the Code. If there are express provisions exhaustively covering a particular topic, they give rise to a necessary implication that no power shall be exercised in respect of the said topic otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the said provisions. Whatever limitations are imposed by constructions on the provisions of Section 151 of the Code, they do not control the undoubted power of the Court conferred under Section 151 of the Code to make a suitable order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.” 35. As discussed above, the Court has inherent power under Section 151, CPC to prevent the abuse of process of the Court by any of the parties. As discussed above, the Court has inherent power under Section 151, CPC to prevent the abuse of process of the Court by any of the parties. In these circumstances, once the petitioner No.1 had already filed an application under Section 151, CPC as directed by this Court and the same is still pending and the matter is subjudice, therefore, we are not inclined to interfere in the matter and the same position is also existing in respect of the grievance of the petitioner No. 2 who has raised grievance in respect to the disobedience or violation of injunction order granted on 11.11.1991 in Regular Suit No. 10548 of 1991 for which the petitioner No. 2 too has remedy under Section 151, CPC for redressal of his grievance. 36. At this stage, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has submitted that as the Courts in which the Regular Suit No. 286 of 1991 and Regular Suit No. 1058 of 1991 are pending, are lying vacant, as such some directions may be issued to the District Judge to transfer the said suits to some other Courts. In this regard, we observe that if the petitioners are so advised they can move an application for transfer of the said suits on the ground that the Court where they are pending are lying vacant, in that event the District Judge may consider the same in accordance with law. 37. In view of what has been discussed above, the writ petition lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. 38. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. ————