JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal has been preferred by the 4th respondent in Special Civil Application no. 5253 of 2008 challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge restraining her from further alienating or transferring the property in question, in any manner whatsoever, till the writ petition is disposed of. 2. THE dispute centers round the immovable property situated in village mangrol of Junagadh District. Property was sold to the appellant by respondents nos. 2, 3 and 4 herein vide a registered sale deed dated 23.12.2004. Special Civil suit No. 6 of 2005 was instituted by respondent No. 1 herein before the Court of civil Judge (S. D.) against the appellant and other respondents, seeking cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 23. 12. 2004. In the Suit, respondent No. 1 had preferred an application for injunction, restraining the appellant from transferring or alienating the immovable property in question. Injunction application was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.), Junagadh, on 18.12.2006. Aggrieved by the said order, 1st respondent filed Civil Miscellaneous appeal No. 43 of 2007 before the 7th Fast track Court at Junagadh, and the same was dismissed vide order dated 26.02.2008, against which 1st respondent filed Special Civil Application No. 5253 of 2008 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the orders dated 18.12.2006 and 26.02.2008 passed by the trial Court and the appellate Court respectively. Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant, submitted that the learned Single Judge was not justified in upsetting a well-reasoned order passed by the trial Court, which was confirmed by the appellate Court. Learned counsel submitted that no reasons have been stated by the learned Single Judge for upsetting the orders passed by the trial Court and the appellate Court. Elaborate reasons have been given by the trial Court and the appellate Court in refusing the prayer for injunction, in the event of which, unless and until the orders passed by the trial court and the appellate Court are perverse and not in conformity with the provisions contained under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2, learned Single Judge was not justified in upsetting those orders. 3. 3. LEARNED Counsel submitted that it is well settled that while passing any order or injunction under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2, the Court is required to consider the three basic principles, viz., prima facie case, balance of convenience and inconvenience, and irreparable loss or injury. All these facts were taken into consideration by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court in refusing the injunction prayed for by the respondent No. 1. Under these circumstances, without stating any reasons whatsoever, the learned Single Judge was not justified in upsetting those orders, especially under the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. IN support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court State of U. P. and others v. Modern Transport Co., Ludhiana and another (2002) 9 SCC 514 and Special director and another V. Mohd. Ghulam ghouse and another (2004) 3 SCC 440 . Learned counsel also placed reliance on an unreported judgment of the Apex Court in civil Appeal Nos. 2186-2187 of 2009 and made a specific reference to paragraphs nos. 21 and 22 of the judgment. Mr. T. S. Nanavati, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1, submitted that there is no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Learned counsel submitted that the learned single Judge has only restrained 4th respondent from alienating or transferring the property in question, and not disposed of the writ petition. Learned counsel submitted that the 4th respondent can urge all her contentions before the learned Single judge, and there is no justification to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 5. WE may point out that the learned single Judge was exercising powers under article 226 of the Constitution of India in upsetting the order passed by the trial Court, which was confirmed by the appellate Court, in exercise of powers conferred under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the C. P. C. It is well settled that in issuing a temporary injunction, the tests to be applied are - (1) whether the plaintiff has prima facie case, (2) whether balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff and (3) whether the plaintiff would suffer any irreparable loss or injury, if prayer for temporary injunction is allowed. 6. 6. IN a suit for permanent injunction, while the Court is considering an interlocutory application, the Court is not called upon to decide the real disputes between the parties. The Court is called upon to see whether the party approaching the Court has a plausible case and whether there is a possibility of such case succeeding at the trial. If that test is satisfied then it is the duty of the Court to see whether the damages that the plaintiff is likely to suffer for the action of the defendants complained of can be compensated in money, and if so, whether there is a standard for ascertaining such compensation. If such compensation can be ascertained, then the interlocutory order of injunction should normally be refused. However, if the Court is of the view that such compensation cannot be ascertained, then it is the duty of the Court to see the balance of convenience and inconvenience of the parties. The trial Court after examining the rival contentions, held as follows (translation):- "4. . . . it appears that the father of the defendants No. 1 to 3 have become owner of the disputed property by virtue of Will and at the relevant time, the father of the defendant was minor and hence, condition was imposed in the Will that until he attend (sic) majority, he can not transfer or assign the disputed property to anybody and hence, his interest was sealed. Further, it appears from record that after death of Bhavajibhai, present defendants No. 1 to 3 have become owner of the disputed property as a legal heirs and their names were entered into the revenue records and property card and now they have sold out the disputed property to defendant No. 4 after getting consideration and the present plaintiff has never raised any dispute while the defendants have entered their names as an owners in the revenue records. It appears from the record itself that the defendant No. 4 has become bonafide purchaser and he cannot be restrain (sic) by virtue of this application, passing injunction against the defendant no. 4 as he is sole owner of the disputed property and now any of the dispute remains in between present plaintiff and defendants nos. It appears from the record itself that the defendant No. 4 has become bonafide purchaser and he cannot be restrain (sic) by virtue of this application, passing injunction against the defendant no. 4 as he is sole owner of the disputed property and now any of the dispute remains in between present plaintiff and defendants nos. 1 to 3 and that dispute can be determined after recording full-fledge evidence and if the plaintiff will succeed in the suit, he can get all the benefits in terms of money. If the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 are restrained then the defendant No. 4 who is bonafide purchaser of the disputed property will suffer irreparable loss as he has already paid consideration of disputed property and now he is owner of the suit property. It also appears from record that the defendant No. 4 is a bonafide purchaser and to determine the dispute, it is required to be recorded evidence from both sides. It appears from record that the balance of convenience is in favour of defendant No. 4 and if injunction as prayed for be granted, the defendant no. 4 will suffer great inconvenience and irreparable loss. It appears from record that the so called property was entrusted to benkunverben and then after, gradually after execution of several Wills, the father of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 have become owner of the suit property. All these facts and disputes in question can only be determined after recording evidence and till then the defendants cannot be restrained from utilizing the suit property. But simultaneously, if the plaintiff will succeed in the suit, he can get compensation in terms of money and no question arise to suffer any irreparable loss to the plaintiff. At this stage, the defendant No. 4 has proved his prima-facie case and the balance of convenience is also in his favour and if injunction granted as prayed for, he will suffer great loss and hence, I come to the conclusion that the present application deserves to be dismissed and passed (sic)the following order:-ORDER this application is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. " 7. WHEN the plaintiff, i.e., the 1st respondent herein, preferred appeal before the appellate Court, the appellate Court after examining the rival contentions held as follows:- "13. . . . As observed by the Principal Sr. There shall be no order as to costs. " 7. WHEN the plaintiff, i.e., the 1st respondent herein, preferred appeal before the appellate Court, the appellate Court after examining the rival contentions held as follows:- "13. . . . As observed by the Principal Sr. Civil Judge, Junagadh, the defendant's father has obtained disputed properties only for the purpose of use and occupation and thenafter, on 27-11-1974, Bhavanjibhai father of the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 has died and thus all the defendants, become occupants of disputed properties, but in fact, as per the stipulation made in the will, they are not become the owner of the property even though, they have sol out the disputed property and now he is constructing the building and thereafter, he is succeeded in entrusting the said property to third party as a tenant or otherwise. Therefore, the plaintiff has filed the present suit with a view to restrain the defendants to transfer, alienate or dispose of in any way the suit property in favour of anybody else. The view taken by the Principal Sr. Civil Judge, Junagadh is to the effect that the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 who are the legal heirs of deceased Bhagavanji has every right to sell out the property. After the death of his father, they become the owner of the suit property. The sale-deed effected between the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and 4 is produced vide mark 5/2, as such by virtue of sale-deed, defendant No. 4 becomes owner and she had title in the property in dispute. On going through the order passed below exh. (6), it appears that the Principal sr. Civil Judge, Junagadh has prima facie established that defendant No. 4 becomes the owner by virtue of sale-deed. On going through the order passed by the learned principal Sr. Civil Judge, Junagadh, it appears that at the interim stage, it is established that defendant No. 4 becomes owner of the disputed property and then she cannot be restrained to utilize the suit property. It is to be noted at this stage, that while deciding the ad-interim injunction application, the merits of suit cannot be examined or trial Court should be slow in examining the merits of the case. However, particularly in this case, when the transaction is made between the parties by virtue of sale-deed, then it is held by learned Principal Sr. It is to be noted at this stage, that while deciding the ad-interim injunction application, the merits of suit cannot be examined or trial Court should be slow in examining the merits of the case. However, particularly in this case, when the transaction is made between the parties by virtue of sale-deed, then it is held by learned Principal Sr. Civil Judge, Junagadh that defendant No. 4 has acquired every right to utilize the suit property as she had purchased the suit property by virtue of sale deed. I have gone through the order passed by Learned Principal Sr. Civil Judge, junagadh and every points involved in this matter are examined by him and the documents are also kept in view, while deciding the prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience. I have gone through the ratio of the citation cited on behalf of the appellant and respondents. The ratio laid down in AIR 2003 Gujarat P-294 (Supra)is that when there is registered document and if it is presented before the sub-Registrar, not sufficient to draw adverse inference for holding that sale deeds are ante-dated. If the citation cited on behalf of Mr. Nanavati is to be seen when the ratio laid down in the citation cannot be made applicable in the case on hand. Here, in this case, it is to be true that the trial court has given reasons that by virtue of sale-deed, she becomes the owner of the suit property. If the citation cited on behalf of Mr. J. C. Doshi and the ratio laid down in the citation is to be seen, then it appears that by virtue of registered sale deed, the person acquired absolute right over the property. Therefore, when defendant No. 4 has acquired absolute right over the disputed property by virtue of sale-deed then she cannot be restrained and that is why the learned Principal Sr. Civil Judge, Junagadh has rejected the ad-interim injunction application, taking the view that if injunction will be granted then the irreparable loss to be caused to defendant no. 4 as she has acquired title over the suit property by virtue of sale-deed. It is true that when the right of parties is to be decided as regarding the immovable properties, then ordinarily status-quo is required to be maintained to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. 4 as she has acquired title over the suit property by virtue of sale-deed. It is true that when the right of parties is to be decided as regarding the immovable properties, then ordinarily status-quo is required to be maintained to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Here, in this case, as I have observed earlier, when the trial Judge has taken the view that defendant No. 4 i. e. respondent No. 4 acquires right over the suit property, in which there is no illegality or perversity and no interference is required in the order passed by the Principal Sr. Civil Judge junagadh, therefore, I answer point No. 1 in the negative. 14. POINT NO. 2:-In view of my above discussion, I pass the following order in the interest of justice:- :-ORDER-: this Civil Misc. Appeal is hereby dismissed. The Order passed by the Learned principal Senior Civil Judge, Junagadh below application Exh. 6 in Special Civil suit No. 6/2005 on dated 18-11-2006 is hereby confirmed. Parties to bear their own costs. Memo of costs be drawn accordingly. " 8. WE find from the above mentioned orders that the trial Court as well as the appellate Court have elaborately considered the rival contentions, and prima facie came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not made out a case for injunction. Learned single Judge has nullified both the orders in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the constitution of India stating as follows:- "by way of interim relief, the respondents more particularly respondent no. 4 is restrained from further alienating, transferring the property in question in any manner whatsoever." We are of the view that the learned single Judge is not justified in upsetting the well-considered order of the trial Court as well as the appellate Court, without stating any reasons. 9. GRANTING of injunction is a matter of discretion. Balance of convenience and irreparable injury are triable issues and are required to be examined and positively found. It is settled law that while hearing appeal against discretionary exercise of powers by the trial Judge, while deciding the application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of C. P. C. the appellate Court is not expected to interfere with the discretion, unless it is shown that power has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or in perversity and against the settled principles of law. Appellate Court is not expected to reassess the material and to reach a conclusion different than the one reached by the Court below. If the one reached by the Court was reasonably a plausible view, appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the order. But, if the exercise of discretion in appeal is only on the ground that the matter has not received consideration at trial Court stage, then it would have come to a different conclusion and the appellate Court can interfere with the exercise of discretion of trial Court provided it is satisfied about prima facie strong case, balance of convenience and extreme urgency. 10. LEARNED Single Judge, in our view, has in a casual manner and without examining the reasons stated by the trial court and the appellate Court, interfered with the orders of the trial Court and appellate Court and granted injunction, which was refused by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court. Therefore, in our view, learned Single Judge was not justified in doing so, especially, while exercising powers under Article 226 of the constitution of India. Under the circumstances, we allow this appeal and quash and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Needless to say that if the appellant parts with the property, the same would also be hit by principles of lis pendense, if ultimately the suit is decreed. We make it clear that the views expressed by us are only tentative and will have no bearing when finally Special Civil Application and the Suit are disposed off. The appellant, if advised, may approach the learned Single judge for early hearing of the petition. 11. ACCORDINGLY, Letters Patent Appeal and Civil Application are allowed. Appeal allowed.