JUDGMENT By the Court.—This special appeal under Rule 5 Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, arises out of an order of a learned Judge passed in Writ Petition No. 63944 of 2008, whereby a direction has been issued to the Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Allahabad to examine the grievance of respondents 4 to 7-petitioners, and pass a speaking and reasoned order within a prescribed time. 2. Challenge to the order is on the ground that even though the impugned order appears to be innocuous, yet it has seriously prejudiced the appellant in his cause, and further the said order has been passed without putting the appellant to notice or giving him any opportunity of hearing. 3. In short, the grievance of the appellant is that the direction issued clothes the Registrar with a power to examine a frivolous claim, which is impermissible on the grounds taken in the appeal, and additionally, the impugned order is in violation of principles of natural justice. 4. We have heard Mr. B.B. Paul assisted by Shri H.K. Mishra for the appellant, Shri Ram Autar Verma, who has put in appearance on behalf of respondents 4 to 7 and the learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 to 3. 5. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is being disposed off finally at this stage. 6. The dispute relates to the constitution and functioning of a Committee of Management of a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the Act 1860), which runs and manages a Junior High School by the name Adarsh Krishak Junior High School, Bodipur Dharauta, Post Office-Chhata (Via Mau Aima), Block Mau Aima, Tehsil Soraon, District Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the ‘institution’). The rival claims relate to the control of management of the institution of which the appellant-Ram Sajeevan Patel claims to be the validly elected Manager and respondents 6 and 7 claim themselves to be the rival Secretary and Manager of the Society and institution respectively. 7. The dispute has a chequered history, which dates back to the election of the Committee of Management, which was held in the year 1995. Brij Lal Patel-respondent No. 7 raised a dispute with regard to the elections of 1995 by filing a writ petition before this Court being Writ Petition No. 31368 of 1996. 7. The dispute has a chequered history, which dates back to the election of the Committee of Management, which was held in the year 1995. Brij Lal Patel-respondent No. 7 raised a dispute with regard to the elections of 1995 by filing a writ petition before this Court being Writ Petition No. 31368 of 1996. This Court directed the dispute of the elections to be decided by the Prescribed Authority under Section 25 of the Act 1860. The Prescribed Authority, who is the Sub Divisional Officer of the Sub Division concerned, decided the dispute on 13th of August, 1999 declaring the elections of the appellant Ram Sajeevan Patel to be valid. Against the said order, the respondent No. 7-Brij Lal Patel filed Writ Petition No. 46297 of 1999, in which initially there was a time bound interim order and the petition was ultimately dismissed as infructuous on 16.2.2004 on the ground that the term of the Committee of Management, which was five years, had already expired. Against the order dated 16.2.2004, respondent No. 7 preferred Special Appeal No. 308 of 2004, which was also dismissed on 25th of March, 2004. While dismissing the special appeal, it was observed that in any view of the matter, the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority under Section 25 of the Act 1860 are always subject to the decision in a regular suit. 8. The renewal of the Society was due, and taking advantage of this situation, respondent No. 7 moved an application on 25.6.2004 requesting the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Allahabad to grant renewal of registration of the Society indicating himself as the Manager of the institution. The appellant Ram Sajeevan Patel moved an application before the Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Lucknow requesting that the matter be transferred to some other Assistant Registrar as he does not hope for any justice from the Assistant Registrar at Allahabad. On this application, the Registrar examined the matter himself and found that the application moved by respondent No. 7-Brij Lal Patel was not maintainable as the renewal had already been granted till 10th of October, 2005. 9. Against the aforesaid order, respondent No. 6-Chhotey Lal Patel claiming himself to be the Secretary of the Society filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 42056 of 2005 before this Court. 9. Against the aforesaid order, respondent No. 6-Chhotey Lal Patel claiming himself to be the Secretary of the Society filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 42056 of 2005 before this Court. This Court vide judgment and order dated 10th June, 2005 dismissed the writ petition holding that the order of the Registrar simply acknowledges the renewal of the registration of the Society and it does not decide any claim with regard to the office bearers and, therefore, it is open to the petitioner therein to seek such remedy as is available to him either under the Act 1860 or by filing a civil suit. 10. Respondent No. 6-Chhotey Lal appears to have moved an application before the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits. The Assistant Registrar, taking notice of the aforesaid facts, came to the conclusion that the appellant was the Manager of the outgoing Committee of Management and, therefore, any future elections could be held only by the recognized and accepted office bearers. Accordingly, the Assistant Registrar rejected the application of Chhotey Lal Patel and held that fresh elections, which were held on 9th October, 2005, have been acknowledged and the registration of the Society has again been renewed with effect from 10.10.2005 for a period of five years. 11. From a perusal of the records of the writ petition, which has given rise to the present special appeal, the aforesaid facts appear to have been stated in detail, but nowhere in the writ petition has it been stated as to why the respondents-petitioners upon the order dated 14.8.2006 having been issued long back did not choose to challenge the same. The writ petition was filed in the month of November 2008. Further, the prayer clause of the writ petition nowhere prays for any relief against the said order dated 14.8.2006, even though the said order has been criticised in paragraph 41 of the writ petition as a simple letter without there being a decision on the claim of the respondents-petitioners. 12. Further, the prayer clause of the writ petition nowhere prays for any relief against the said order dated 14.8.2006, even though the said order has been criticised in paragraph 41 of the writ petition as a simple letter without there being a decision on the claim of the respondents-petitioners. 12. The respondents-petitioners instituted the writ petition praying for the following reliefs : “(a) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies & Chits, Allahabad/respondent No. 3 to refer the election dispute between the petitioners and the respondents No. 5 to 7 regarding their elections held on 9.10.2005 and 9.10.2005 respectively to the Prescribed Authority under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860.” 13. The aforesaid writ petition has been disposed off by the impugned order without putting the appellant to notice and, as such, aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been preferred. 14. The grievance of the appellant as canvassed by Shri Paul is that the writ petition was filed without questioning the correctness or validity of the order dated 14.8.2006 and without praying for quashing of the same, that too, even after almost two years of passing of the said order. He further contends that the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits or the Registrar, while exercising powers in respect of filing of list of office bearers under Section 4-A of the Act 1860 or granting renewal of a Society does not act as a mere post office and he is not bound to refer any and every dispute to the Prescribed Authority under Section 25 of the Act 1860. He contends that it is only a bona fide and genuine dispute which can be subject matter of reference under Section 25 of the Act 1860 and not otherwise and for the aforesaid proposition, Shri Paul has relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Committee of Management, Kisan Shiksha Sadan, Banksahi, District Basti and another v. Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Gorakhpur Region, Gorakhpur and another, (1995) 2 UPLBEC 1242. 15. 15. On the other hand, Shri Ram Autar Verma, appearing on behalf of respondents 4 to 7, has urged that the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits was bound to refer the dispute in respect of fresh elections dated 9th October, 2005 and that the respondents-petitioners could not have been non-suited by the Assistant Registrar under a mere letter dated 14.8.2006. He contends that once the Assistant Registrar was faced with two rival Committees, elections of which are alleged to have been held on the same date, then in view of the provisions of Section 25 of the Act 1860, a reference was bound to follow to the Prescribed Authority as has been done on the earlier occasion in respect of elections of 1995. He was further supported in his submission by the learned Standing Counsel who contends that the order passed by the learned Judge is innocuous and it is open to the appellant to raise his objection before the Assistant Registrar or the Registrar, as the case may be in this regard. 16. We have considered the rival submissions of the parties and perused the record. 17. It is evident from the facts narrated in the background that the dispute was being raised time and again by the contesting respondents-petitioners but their claim has not found favour by any authority till date. The dispute, which is sought to be raised, has its genesis in the elections of 1995, which were found to be valid in which the appellant Ram Sajeevan Patel was elected as the Manager. The order of the Prescribed Authority dated 13.8.1999 in spite of challenge before this Court, remained intact. Even thereafter, with regard to subsequent elections in the year 2000, the respondents-petitioners could not succeed in getting the said elections set aside. On both occasions, when the respondents-petitioners approached this Court, observations were made that in case they were aggrieved, it was always open to them to take recourse to the remedy of filing a suit. It is evident that no suit has been preferred by the respondents-petitioners in respect of earlier elections nor any such declaration has been returned in their favour. 18. It is in the aforesaid background that the Assistant Registrar has rightly recorded in the order dated 14.8.2006 that the appellant at least had the right to hold elections as it was the outgoing Committee of Management. 18. It is in the aforesaid background that the Assistant Registrar has rightly recorded in the order dated 14.8.2006 that the appellant at least had the right to hold elections as it was the outgoing Committee of Management. The Assistant Registrar has not gone to the extent of making a declaration on the validity of elections, and has acknowledged the appellant as a genuine office bearer entitled to seek renewal of the registration of the Society, which stands renewed for a period of five years till 2010. The respondents-petitioners have now come up questioning the elections dated 9th October, 2005 by filing a writ petition almost three years thereafter. The learned Judge, in our opinion, without taking notice of the aforesaid facts, has issued a mandamus to the Registrar to pass an order in respect of the dispute of elections dated 9.10.2005. In our opinion, there is no plausible explanation on behalf of the respondents-petitioners as to why they filed the writ petition almost after two years of the passing of the order and three years after the holding of the elections, and further as to why they did not challenge the order dated 14.8.2006. 19. The aforesaid facts having not been noticed by the learned Judge, in our opinion, renders the impugned judgment unsustainable. Further such a direction, in our opinion, could not have been issued without putting the appellant to notice. The Assistant Registrar, as pointed out in the case of Kisan Shiksha Sadan, Banksahi, (supra), is not a post office for referring any and every dispute. The respondents-petitioners with the aid of 1/5th members of the general body of the Society could have moved for a reference as provided for under Section 25 of the Act 1860 or they could have filed a civil suit. There was absolutely no occasion for a writ petition to have been entertained at such a belated stage and further after more than three years of holding of the elections. 20. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 21. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 23.7.2009 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 63944 of 2008 is set aside and the writ petition filed by respondents 4 to 7 stands dismissed. ——— 187. 21. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 23.7.2009 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 63944 of 2008 is set aside and the writ petition filed by respondents 4 to 7 stands dismissed. ——— 187. Coming to the aspect whether penalties of death should be sustained in the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel called to advert to the guidelines laid down in stream of decisions commencing from Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 (2) SCC 684 and thereafter reiterated in subsequent decisions namely Machchi Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 (3) SCC 470 and Devender Pal Singh v. State of N.C.T. of Delhi, 2002 (5) SCC 234 . The guidelines laid down in Bachan Singh’s case (supra) may be culled out as under : (i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability. (ii) Before opting for the death penalty, the circumstances of the offender also require to be taken into consideration alongwith the circumstances of the crime. (iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words, death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances. (iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so, the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised.” 188. In Machchi Singh and others v. State of Punjab, (1983), the Supreme Court expanded the “rarest of rare” formulation beyond the aggravating factors listed in Bachan Singh to cases where the “collective conscience” of a community may be shocked. But the Bench in this case underlined that full weightage must be accorded to the mitigating circumstances in a case and a just balance had to be struck between aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 189. In Devender Pal Singh’s case (supra), the Apex Court regard being had to both the cases supra, expanded the formulation for imposing extreme penalty. But the Bench in this case underlined that full weightage must be accorded to the mitigating circumstances in a case and a just balance had to be struck between aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 189. In Devender Pal Singh’s case (supra), the Apex Court regard being had to both the cases supra, expanded the formulation for imposing extreme penalty. The guidelines may be abstracted below as under : (1) When the murder is committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community. (2) When the murder is committed for a motive which evinces total depravity and meanness e.g. Murder by hired assassin for money or reward, or cold blooded murder for gains of a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a dominating position or in a position of trust; or murder is committed in the course for betrayal of the motherland. (3) When murder of a member of a Scheduled Caste or minority community etc. is committed not for personal reasons but in circumstances which arouse social wrath; or in cases of bride burning or dowry deaths or when murder is committed in order to re-marry for the sake of extracting dowry once again or to marry another woman on account of infatuation. (4) When the crime is enormous in proportion. For instance when multiple murders, say of all or almost all the members of a family or a large number of persons or a particular caste, community, or locality are committed. (5) When the victim of murder is an innocent child or a helpless woman or old or infirm person or a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a dominating position, or a public figure generally loved and respected by the community.” 190. On a comparative study of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge embodied her view on the aspect in the judgment impugned herein. While dwelling on the question of quantum of punishment, she summed up the woeful and eerie feature of the case and gave vent to her view stating that gravity of the crime committed by the accused is indeed shocking to the conscience. She has summed up that the accused person has ravished a poor, hapless girl and thus, he has committed a gruesome cold blooded heinous atrocious and cruel crime which has hardly any parallel in the history. She has summed up that the accused person has ravished a poor, hapless girl and thus, he has committed a gruesome cold blooded heinous atrocious and cruel crime which has hardly any parallel in the history. She further observed that the crime committed by the accused could not have been committed even in the era when there was no civilization. Again, it was observed that a comparative study of the arguments advanced across the bar leads her to observe that on one hand humanity is crying for security and on the other hand bewailing parents of an innocent girl are crying for being shielded from the misdemeanour of the lustful ravishers. She further observed that innocent girl has fallen prey to the hands of beasty ravishers and the incident is indeed shocking, tragic, lachrymose, hair raising, and heart rending. She further observed that an innocent girl of 14 years was subjected to beasty ravishment and subsequently, she was killed in a most brutal and blood curdling manner and not only this, her body was chopped into pieces and after wrapping the parts in polythene the same were thrown. She has also observed that barbarity of the accused did not stop at it; he also cooked some selected parts of the body and used to consume the same with frenzy. 191. The incident and events thereafter as have been unravelled in the case are most distressing and indeed shocking and stir the conscience and disturb the equanimity. 192. We have considered the submissions of counsel for the appellant as to what should be the punishment in the totality of circumstances. That the appellant is father of two children, could hardly constitute a mitigating circumstance in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 193. The crime indulged in by A-2 is not only gruesome, and cold but blooded, blood curdling, heinous, atrocious and cruel and in the totality of circumstances, we would not forbear from expressing that the accused Surendra Koli is a menace to the society. In the facts and circumstances of the case, option of awarding sentence of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed. It brooks no dispute that it is in exceptional case where the crime committed by accused is so gruesome, diabolical and revolting which shocks the collective conscience of the community that the accused be visited with death penalties. In the facts and circumstances of the case, option of awarding sentence of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed. It brooks no dispute that it is in exceptional case where the crime committed by accused is so gruesome, diabolical and revolting which shocks the collective conscience of the community that the accused be visited with death penalties. There cannot be any doubt that the case of accused A-2 falls within the category of the rarest of rare cases. The depraved and brutish acts of Surendra Koli call for only one sentence and that is death sentence. We agree with the reasoning of the Sessions Judge awarding death sentence and affirm the sentence of death awarded by the trial Court to Surendra Koli. 194. It is also clarified that the findings recorded by us are only confined to the murder of Rimpa Haldar and the Court below shall not be import any observation/comments in the body of this judgment for being applied to the decision while hearing other cases relating to Nithari incident. 195. Lastly, we record our hearty appreciation for the able service and assistance rendered by Sri Gopal S.Chaturvedi Senior Advocate Amicus Curiae assisted by Sri Samit Gopal Advocate in the true spirit of friend and officer of the Court. 196. The appeal of Moninder Singh Pandher (A-1) is allowed. His conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court is set aside and he is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. He shall be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in any other case. 197. The appeal of Surendra Koli (A-2) who is incarcerated in jail is dismissed. His conviction and sentences awarded by the trial Court are affirmed. 198. In the above conspectus, the reference in sofar as it relates to Moninder Singh Pandher is not accepted. The reference insofar as Surendra Koli is concerned, is accepted. ———