Judgment : N. KIRUBAKARAN, J. This civil miscellaneous appeal has been preferred by the claimants against the award of Rs. 20,000/- as against the claim of Rs. 1,50,000/-, for the death of one A. Nazir Jinnah. 2. The case of the claimants is that, when the deceased Nazir Jinnah was riding his tricycle from Kappalur to Thirumangalam on 17. 2000 from North to South, a Ambassador car bearing registration No. TMV-2179 driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner hit against the tricycle and due to that impact, the deceased sustained fracture and multiple injuries, especially in the head. Initially, he was taken to Government Hospital, Thirumangalam and after giving first-aid, he was admitted in Government Rajaji Hospital, Kadurai and took treatment till 8. 2000. After that, he was readmitted in Vadipatti Government Hospital and subsequently, he succumbed to the injuries. Though the claim petition was filed by the victim on 18. 2000, the victim died on 111. 2000. Thereafter, amendment petition was filed by the parents of the deceased contending that the victim died because of the injuries sustained by him in the accident. The claim petition was contested by the insurance company by filing counter statement. 3. No counter affidavit was filed by the insurance company opposing the amendment and as result the amendment petition was allowed on 23. 2002. No additional counter statement was filed by the second respondent insurance company after amendment. The claim of the parents was that the deceased was working in a bakery and was earning about Rs. 3,000/- per month. Though they valued their loss at Rs. 2,86,000/-, they restricted their claim to Rs. 1,50,000/-. 4. Before the Tribunal the father of the deceased examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.Ws.2 to P.W.4. and marked the following documents: 1. Exhibit P-1 – First Information Report 2. Exhibit P-2 – O.P. Note book of the Government Rajaji Hospital 3. Exhibit P-3 – O.P. Record of Vadipatti Government Hospital 4. Exhibit P-4 – O.P. Record of Vadipatti Government Hospital 5. Exhibit P-5 - Death Certificate 6. Exhibit P-6 – Medical Records for having taken treatment from 8. 2000 to 9. 2000 7. Exhibit P-7 – Medical Records for having taken treatment from 9. 2000 to 19. 2000 8. Exhibit P-8 –Discharge Summary On the side of the respondents, no witness was examined nor any document was marked. 5. Exhibit P-5 - Death Certificate 6. Exhibit P-6 – Medical Records for having taken treatment from 8. 2000 to 9. 2000 7. Exhibit P-7 – Medical Records for having taken treatment from 9. 2000 to 19. 2000 8. Exhibit P-8 –Discharge Summary On the side of the respondents, no witness was examined nor any document was marked. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the evidence of P.W.3, who attended and gave treatment to the deceased in Government Rajaji Hospital and he specifically relied upon the following portion of P.W.3’s evidence: TAMIL Relying on the said piece of evidence of P.W.3, the counsel for the appellants submitted that the victim sustained injuries in the brain and there was blood clot through out the brain. When blood clot spread throughout the brain, as stated by P.W.3, it was the cause for the death of the victim. 6. Learned counsel also relied upon various authorities to drive home the points as if any injury is caused in the brain, that will create harm to the person and death could even long interval. In this connection, he relied upon. “MODI’S TEXT – BOOK OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND TOXICOLOGY” 19th Edition in Chapter XII- Regional Injuries Head, it is stated as follows: “Wounds of the scalp usually heal rapidly though rare cases fatal results may follow from the supervention of infection, or suppuration may set in, and spread into the brain through the blood vessels or through necrosis of bone resulting from infection,, or through an unnoticed fissured fracture. Thus, cases have occurred in which scalp wounds have apparently healed, and yet death has occurred from septic meningitis or brain abscess after a few days or weeks.” By relying upon the said paragraph, the counsel convincingly argued that the wound which would appear to be healed, still would cause harm to any human being. In this case, all the parts of the brain were affected as stated by P.W.3, whose testimony was not impeached either in the cross examination or by rebuttal evidence by bringing a competent neurologist by the respondents. 7. Mr. K.K. Ramakrishnan, learned counsel for the appellants has taken pain to refer a. number of books in medical literature and Immediate Cause At the time of terminal event, e.g.b rochopneumonia, peritonitis, trauma etc. 7. Mr. K.K. Ramakrishnan, learned counsel for the appellants has taken pain to refer a. number of books in medical literature and Immediate Cause At the time of terminal event, e.g.b rochopneumonia, peritonitis, trauma etc. Basic Cause Pathological process responsible for the death at the time of the terminal event or prior to or leading to the event e.g. gunshot wound of abdomen complicated by generalized peritionitis Contributory Cause Pathological process involved in or complicating, but not causing the terminal even. In some cases, the basic and the immediate cause may be identical. 8. Healso referred “THE BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY” to define what is meant by cause: “Cause caqusans – An immediate or effective cause. Se immediate cause under Cause. Cause sine qua non – A necessary cause; the cause without which the thing cannot be or the event could not be or the event could not have incurred. So but-for cause under Cause. Cause, n. 1. Something that produces an effect or result < the cause of accident > But-for cause. The cause without which the event could not have, occurred – Also termed actual cause; cause in fact; factual cause. Proximate cause. 1. Cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability. 2. A cause that directly produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred –Also termed direct cause; direct and proximate cause; efficient proximate cause; efficient cause; efficient adequate cause; lequoted important portions which are essential for arriving a conclusion in this matter. He relied upon the book “THE ESSENTIALS OF FORENSIC MEDICINE AND TOXICOLOGY” by DR.K.S. NARAYAN REDDY, Chapter 6: Death and its cause, wherein it is stated as follows: “Cause of death: The cause of death is the disease or injury responsible for starting the sequence of events, which are brief or prolonged and which produce death. It may be divided into: gal cause; procuring cause; producing cause; primary cause; jural cause.” 9. The counsel also relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in Klaus Mittelbachert v. East India Hotels Ltd. AIR 1997 Delhi 201, wherein it is stated as follows: “128. It may be divided into: gal cause; procuring cause; producing cause; primary cause; jural cause.” 9. The counsel also relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in Klaus Mittelbachert v. East India Hotels Ltd. AIR 1997 Delhi 201, wherein it is stated as follows: “128. In Words & Phrases, Permanent Edn Vol.21 at page 448, ‘injury causing death’ has been defined as under: “If an employee but for an injury would not have died at the time at which and in the way in which he did die the accident though it merely hastened a deep-seated disorder is regarded a resulting in an “injury causing death” within the Workmen’s Compensation Act.” 129. ‘Death resulting from injury’ has been defined in Vol. XI page 46-47 (CAPP) ibid as follows: “Death resulting from injury…. covers cases in which an injury aggravates or accelerates an existing condition so that death ensues earlier than it would in the ordinary course, even though the existing condition would have ultimately resulted fatally.” 130. In Pigney v. Pointers Transport Services Ltd. 1952 (2) All England Law Reports 307 relying on Re: Polemis & Furnace, 1921 (3) KB 560, 577 LORD PILCHER has said: “if death is directly traceable to the injury in the accident for which the defendants are responsible., the chain of causation is not broken.” 131. In plain words, if an injury hastens or accelerates the death, directly and not remotely, then in law the injury is one causing or resulting’ in death.” By relying upon those paragraphs, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that any injury which forms the nucleus resulting in a death, has to be taken as cause for the death. 10. He also relied upon “RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL’S THE LAW OF TORTS” to speck about the connection between the act and the death. From the Chapter “1.Damages”, he relied on the following paragraph: 1(B) Causation “If the damage alleged was not caused by the defendant’s wrongful act the question of its remoteness will not arise. In deciding the question whether the damage was caused by the wrongful act, the generally accepted test is known as ‘but for’ test. This means that if the damage would not have resulted but for the defendant’s wrongful act, it would be taken to have been caused by the wrongful act. In deciding the question whether the damage was caused by the wrongful act, the generally accepted test is known as ‘but for’ test. This means that if the damage would not have resulted but for the defendant’s wrongful act, it would be taken to have been caused by the wrongful act. Conversely it means that the defendant’s wrongful act is not a cause of the damage if the same would have happened just the same, wrongful act or no wrongful act. Thus when a doctor is negligent in failing to see and examine a patient and give him the proper treatment, the claim will still fail if it is shown on evidence that the patient would have died of poisoning even if he had been treated with all due care. That doctor’s negligence in such cases is not the cause of the patient’s death.” .11. He quoted another judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Ramathal v. Managing Director, Cheran Transport Corporation AIR 2004 SC 3445 : (2003) 10 SCC 53 . In that case, the deceased was originally injured on 11. 1991 and was hospitalised for one week and subsequently, he was discharged from the hospital. Thereafter, after one year he died on 22. 1992. Originally, the victim filed the claim for compensation. Since, he subsequently died, the defendants filed amendment application and sought for a sum of Rs. 5,33,000/- as compensation. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 3,59,508/-. On appeal, this Court reduced the compensation to Rs. 76,000/-. The claimants therein preferred appeal before the Honourable Supreme Court and the Supreme Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 2,00,000/-. While reversing the judgment of the High Court, the Honourable Supreme Court in paragraph 15 of the judgment stated as follows: .“15. Unfortunately, the High Court did not discuss the materials on record in detail. It is not in dispute that the deceased was an indoor patient from 11. 1991 to 21. 1991. fie thereafter was being treated in the Government Hospital, Palladam. He died there. The medical certificate shows that the cause of the death was due to primary disease hypoxic encephalopathy and the immediate cause of death was due to cardiorespiratory arrest. The doctor examined on behalf of the claimants categorically stated that the accident might have been the cause of death of the deceased. He died there. The medical certificate shows that the cause of the death was due to primary disease hypoxic encephalopathy and the immediate cause of death was due to cardiorespiratory arrest. The doctor examined on behalf of the claimants categorically stated that the accident might have been the cause of death of the deceased. The respondent did not bring any material on record to show that there was no link between the accident and the death. The finding of the High Court that there was no proper medical treatment and, therefore, cause of death is not attributable to the accident does not appear to be based on any material on record. In any event, it cannot be said to be the correct approach adopted by the High Court particularly when the Tribunal on the basis of the materials brought on record by the parties came to a contrary finding. No strong and cogent reason has been assigned by the High Court in support of its judgment reversing the findings of the Tribunal. It accepted the submission made on behalf of the respondent herein without analysing the materials and without arriving at a clear finding of fact.” 12. By relying upon that decision, Mr. K.K. Ramakrishnan, submitted that even for the death, which occurred after one year, the Honourable Supreme Court granted compensation. Whereas, in this case, the accident occurred on 17. 2000 and he died on 111. 2000, immediately within four months. Taking into consideration of nature of injuries the deceased sustained in the brain and within short span of time he died after the accident, the death should have been due to the injuries sustained by the victim in the accident. .13. On the other hand. Mr. 2000 and he died on 111. 2000, immediately within four months. Taking into consideration of nature of injuries the deceased sustained in the brain and within short span of time he died after the accident, the death should have been due to the injuries sustained by the victim in the accident. .13. On the other hand. Mr. S. Vellaichamy, learned counsel appearing for the second ‘respondent submitted that (i) the Tribunal correctly disbelieved the version of the claimants and rightly found that the death was not due to the injuries caused in the accident; (ii) there was no post-mortem conducted to prove the cause of the death and in the absence of the post-mortem report, it cannot be stated that the victim died because of the injuries sustained by him in the accident; (iii) the death did not occur immediately after the accident and it occurred after four months, hence, it could not be stated that the death was due to the injuries sustained by him in the accident and (iv) the injured was not properly treated or continued to be treated and because of the negligence only the death occurred. 14. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the second respondent. 15. Admittedly, the accident had occurred on 17. 2000 and he was hospitalised in Government Hospital, Thirumangalam immediately after the accident. After initial treatment, he was referred to Government Rajaji Hospital, where he took treatment from 17. 2000 to 8. 2000. Exhibits P-2 and P-8, medical records would show that X-rays and Scan were taken and it was proved that the injuries were inflicted in the brain, which was also confirmed by the categorical deposition of P.W.3, the doctor, who treated the victim in the hospital. The portion of the evidence of P.W.3 relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants would detail the injuries caused in the brain. Any injury in the body is a damage to the body. But, the injury caused/inflicted in the brain cannot be equalled with the injury caused to the other parts of the body as the brain is the nerve centre of the whole body. Any disturbance or any injury in the brain would affect the very mechanism of the body. A very good example is paralysis. Because of the injury, the brain paralytic stroke occur. The paralytic patient may loose speech, movement of hands or legs or both. Any disturbance or any injury in the brain would affect the very mechanism of the body. A very good example is paralysis. Because of the injury, the brain paralytic stroke occur. The paralytic patient may loose speech, movement of hands or legs or both. It would make a person abnormal. 16. P.W.3 gave details about the blood clots caused in the brain. Any blood clot would affect the function of the brain. It may appear as if there is no injury to the person, who actually sustained injury and the authority viz, MODI’S TEXT BOOK OF MEDICAL, JURISPRUDENCE AND TOXICOLOGY supports the aforesaid finding. 17. The findings given by the Tribunal are very strange. The Tribunal found fault with the claimants for not marking the X-Rays and C.T. Scan, which were duly reflected in Exhibits P-2 and P-8. If the 2nd respondent challenged the veracity of Exhibits P-2 and P-8, then alone the question of marking X-Rays and C.T. Scan would arise. As long as Exhibits P-2 and P-8 are not challenged, marking of X-Rays and C.T. Scan is not essential. The Court is not an expert to go into the details of the medical records. Moreover, the non marking of X-Rays and C.T. Scan would not affect the issue involved in the case. What has to seen by the Tribunal is as to (i) whether the victim sustained injuries? and (2) whether the injuries were due to the accident? When the accident was admitted/proved and the injury was also proved to be due to the accident, then there is no question of going into other aspects, of marking of documents as per Law of evidence. The proceedings before the Tribunal are summary in nature, where elaborate evidence is not required to be adduced as per law of evidence strictly. In any event, the claimants proved that the victim sustained injuries in the accident and the injuries were so grave in nature as proved by Exhibits P-2 and P-8 and by oral testimony of P.W.3, the doctor, who treated the victim. .18. In the absence of the any rebuttal evidence by a competent neurologist, the evidence of P.W.3 has to be believed by the Tribunal. The categorical assertion of P.W.3 was that the victim died because of the injuries sustained by him in the accident. However, the Tribunal, by irrelevant consideration rejected the plea of the claimant. .18. In the absence of the any rebuttal evidence by a competent neurologist, the evidence of P.W.3 has to be believed by the Tribunal. The categorical assertion of P.W.3 was that the victim died because of the injuries sustained by him in the accident. However, the Tribunal, by irrelevant consideration rejected the plea of the claimant. One peculiar aspect was dealt with by the Tribunal by finding fault with the way in which treatment was given. The duty of the Tribunal is only to see whether there was accident and the victim sustained injury in the accident and whether the death was caused due to the injuries. But, the Tribunal found fault with the way in which the treatment was given to the victim. Merely because there was lapse in continuation of treatment, it cannot be a ground in denying the compensation to the claimant. The Tribunal found fault with the claimant that the victim was taken to Vadipatti Government Hospital from Government Rajaji Hospital, Madurai where more sophisticated instruments and machines are available. In this connection it has to be seen, P.W.1, the father of the victim was a Government servant, working in Vadipatti Government Hospital. So, for the sake of convenience and also for continuation of proper treatment as there are known Government doctors there, he shifted his son to Vadipatti Government Hospital. As far as the facility available in the Government Rajaji Hospital is concerned, that facilities were already made use by the victim for diagnosis and suitable treatment and only for continuation of treatment, the victim was shifted to the Vadipatti Government hospital, so, the finding of the Tribunal in this regard are per-se and unwarranted. 19. The Tribunal in paragraph 7 referred P.W.3 doctor’s evidence. It doubted the fact as to whether there was any blood clot in the brain, because there was no remarks by another duty doctor, who attended the victim, while he was in the Government Rajaji Hospital, P.W.3 deposed as follows: TAMIL Based on the aforesaid evidence, the Tribunal doubted the blood, clot in the brain. The approach adopted by the Tribunal in appreciating the evidence is unknown to law. It is not the duty of every duty doctor or visiting doctor to make remarks each and every time about the injuries. The approach adopted by the Tribunal in appreciating the evidence is unknown to law. It is not the duty of every duty doctor or visiting doctor to make remarks each and every time about the injuries. The doctor who saw the victim first time alone could make the diagnosis and the other doctors will remark only the condition at the time of their respective visit. There is no necessity for the doctors to remark about the diagnosis every time again and again. Hence, the finding of the Tribunal doubting the blood clot in the brain has to be rejected as contrary to the evidence available on record. 20. The conjoint reading of evidence of P.W.3 and the medical records would undoubtedly would reveal that the victim sustained injuries in the accident and the injuries were inflicted/caused in the brain as deposed by P.W.3 and proved by Exhibits P-2 and P-8 and the death was caused due to the injuries caused in the brain. Hence, the death was only due to the accident and the claimants are entitled for compensation and the finding of the Tribunal that the claimants did not prove the death of the victim was due to the accident is set aside for the reasons stated above. .21. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that in the absence of post-mortem certificate it cannot be stated that the death was due to the accident. For that, he relied upon the judgment of the Patna High Court in Vijay Laxmi Devi v. Ram Naresk (2003) ACJ 1140. In that case, the deceased sustained injury by falling from the bus. In that case, neither post-mortem report of the deceased was produced nor certificate from the doctor who examined the deceased and declared him dead was produced to prove that he died due to the injuries he sustained in the accident. Apart from that, the doctor, who treated and examined the victim was not examined. In those circumstances, the learned single Judge of Patna High Court held that the death was not proved by producing post-mortem report and examining the doctor. In this case, the doctor P.W.3, who treated the victim was examined and the required documents were marked. Hence, the judgment relied on by the counsel for the respondent is not applicable to the facts of the case. .22. In this case, the doctor P.W.3, who treated the victim was examined and the required documents were marked. Hence, the judgment relied on by the counsel for the respondent is not applicable to the facts of the case. .22. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in Khairullah v. Anita (1994) ACJ 1017, which case also arise under the Motor Vehicles Act. The injured died after 25 days of the accident. The owner and driver contended relying upon the discharge summary that the deceased died due to cardio-respiratory failure and not on account of the injury received in the accident. In that case no post-mortem was done. Finding fault with the fact that no post-mortem was done, it was argued that the cause of death was not due to the accident and hence, they were not liable. While answering the question as to whether the failure to conduct post-mortem could be taken a circumstances against the claimant, the Honourable High Court held that .“It is not a case under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, wherein the conducting of postmortem examination to know the cause of death may be necessary. In this case, the cause of death is known from the documentary evidence, especially Exhibit A-10 and also from the evidence of P.W.2. The evidence of P.W.2 is convincing. In the light of both oral and documentary evidence available in this case, the failure to conduct post-mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased cannot be taken as a circumstance against the claimants, who are claiming compensation for the death of the deceased.” 23. As rightly held by the Honourbale Andhra Pradesh High Court, this is also not a case under Section 302 I.P.C. and here also P.W.3, doctor deposed and Exhibits P-2 and P-8 were marked to prove the cause of death viz. the injuries caused in the accident. Hence, the non doing of postmortem on the body of the deceased would not be a ground to deny the compensation to the claimants. Apart from that, there is no contra or rebuttal evidence adduced on the side of the respondent against the evidence already adduced by the claimants. Hence, this Court finds that non doing of post-mortem is not a ground to deny the benefits to the claimants. Apart from that, there is no contra or rebuttal evidence adduced on the side of the respondent against the evidence already adduced by the claimants. Hence, this Court finds that non doing of post-mortem is not a ground to deny the benefits to the claimants. Hence, this Court holds that the death of the deceased occurred only due to the injuries caused to the deceased, in the accident. 24. As far as the negligence is concerned, the Tribunal in paragraph 5 of the award rightly concluded that the accident was due to the negligence of the first respondent’s driver. To arrive at the aforesaid conclusion it relied upon P.W.1’s evidence and the evidence of P.W.2, who was the eye-witness. There is no appeal by the insurance company challenging the finding in this regard. Even in the absence of appeal, this Court opined that only based on the available evidence, the Tribunal rightly concluded that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the 1st respondent’s driver. .25. As far as the quantum is concerned, the claimants claimed that the deceased was earning a sum of Rs. 3,000/- per month working in a bakery owned by P.W.4.P.W.1. spoke about the employment of the victim, which was supported by P.W.4. In paragraph 12 of the award, the Tribunal rejected P.W.4’s evidence, relying upon a contradiction in the evidence. Reliance of an isolated piece of evidence cannot be a ground to reject the whole evidence. The evidence of any witness has to be appreciated in to. P.W.4 merely stated that he was the owner of Bakery. In Exhibit P-1, First Information Report, P.W.4 was quoted to be saying that his father Marimuthu was running Anandhi Bakery, in which the injured was working. It is usual practice of a person, in the family owning the bakery saying that he is running the bakery. Merely because P.W.4 deposed in his evidence that his father was the owner of the bakery, it can be a contradiction and the alleged contradiction cannot be a ground for rejecting the whole evidence of P.W.4, eye witness. It is usual practice of a person, in the family owning the bakery saying that he is running the bakery. Merely because P.W.4 deposed in his evidence that his father was the owner of the bakery, it can be a contradiction and the alleged contradiction cannot be a ground for rejecting the whole evidence of P.W.4, eye witness. In the absence of any definite evidence to ascertain the actual income of the deceased, the Honourable Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd., v. Kalpana (Smt.) and Others (2007) 3 SCC 538 : (2007) 2 MLJ 1173, fixed the monthly contribution of the deceased to the family after deducting 1/3rd income towards personal expenses at Rs. 3,000/- per month. Relying upon the said judgment, it can be safely presumed that even in the absence of any material to prove the income of the deceased, this Court arrive at the monthly income of the deceased at Rs.3,000/- per month. 26. As far as the multiplier to be adopted in years at the time of accident and the mother was aged about 46 years, when they made the claim petition. As per the second schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles Act, the proper multiplier to be adopted is 13. If multiplier 13 is adopted the loss of income comes to Rs. 3,000/- x 12 x 13 – Rs. 4,68,000/- (Rupees four lakhs and sixty eight thousand). As far as the transportation expenses and funeral expenses are concerned awarding a sum of Rs. 2,500/- (Rupees Two thousand and five hundred only) each is reasonable and the same is accordingly confined. For loss of love and affection, the claimants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only). For treatment, there is no necessity to award any sum as the victim took treatment only in the Government Hospital. Accordingly, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is enhanced as follows: i) For loss of income Rs. 4,68,000.00 ii) For loss of love and affection Rs. 20,000.00 iii) For funeral expenses Rs. 2,500.00 iv) For Transport expenses Rs. 2,500.00 Total Rs. 4,93,000.00 The accident occurred on 17. 2000. The rate of interest prevailed on the date of accident was 9% p.a. Accordingly, the claimants are entitled to 9% p.a. from the date of petition. 27. 4,68,000.00 ii) For loss of love and affection Rs. 20,000.00 iii) For funeral expenses Rs. 2,500.00 iv) For Transport expenses Rs. 2,500.00 Total Rs. 4,93,000.00 The accident occurred on 17. 2000. The rate of interest prevailed on the date of accident was 9% p.a. Accordingly, the claimants are entitled to 9% p.a. from the date of petition. 27. Though the claimants prayed for Rs.1,50,000/- in the claim petition, this Court is inclined to grant a sum of Rs.4,93,000/- on appreciation of evidence available on record. This Court has got jurisdiction and power under Order 41 Rule 33 read with Section 151 C.P.C., Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act and under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to award more compensation, it the facts of the case warrant. A three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh AIR 2003 SC 674 : (2003) 2 SCC 274 held that the Court can award more compensation than the amount claimed. The same view is reiterated in National Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Saroj and Others (2009) 1 TNMAC 619 (SC), Clara v. T.Harendranath (2007) 1 MLJ 600 . 28. The appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a statutory appeal and the contention raised by the appellant should be considered and findings should be arrived at by this Court based on the evidence. This view is supported by the judgment of the Apex Court in Jaising v. Satinder (2001) 1 ACC 6444 (SC) and in Eastern Goal Filed v. Mayadevi (2001) 2 ACC 1064 (SC). When the facts and evidence satisfy this Court to award more amount than prayed for, this Court is not power less to award higher compensation. The proceedings before the Special Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act are summary in nature governed by Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the same has been held in Mantoo Sartar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. And Another (2009) 4 MLJ 674: (2009) 1 TNMAC 68 (SC) It has been held by the Supreme Court in Ningamma and Another v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2009) ACJ 2020 as follows: “25. Ltd. And Another (2009) 4 MLJ 674: (2009) 1 TNMAC 68 (SC) It has been held by the Supreme Court in Ningamma and Another v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2009) ACJ 2020 as follows: “25. Undoubtedly, Section 166 of the MVA deals with ‘just compensation’ and even if in the pleadings no specific claim was made under Section 166 of the MVA in our considered opinion a party should not be deprived from getting just compensation’ in case the claimant is able to make out a case under any provision of law. Needless to say, the MVA is beneficial and welfare legislation. In fact, the Court is duty-bound and entitled to award ‘just compensation’ irrespective of the fact whether any plea in that behalf was raised by the claimant or not. However, whether or not the claimants would be governed with the terms and conditions of the insurance policy and whether or not the provisions of Section 147 of the MVA would be applicable in the present case and also whether or not there was rash and negligent driving on the part of the deceased, are essentially a matter of fact which was required to be considered and answered atleast by the High Court.” In another judgment in Rajrani v. United Insurance Company Limited (2009) ACJ 2003, the Apex Court held that it is not necessary in proceedings under Motor Vehicles Act to go by any rules of pleadings or evidence and that Section 166 of the MVA speaks about grant of “just compensation” and that Courts’ duty is to award just compensation and that it would try to arrive at the said findings irrespective of the facts as to whether any plea in that behalf was raised by the claimant or not. Therefore, strict rule of pleadings and evidence is not mandatory before the Tribunal as spelt out in Bimla Devi and Others v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Others (2009) TNMAC 700 (SC). It has been held in Union of India and Another v. Saraswathi Debnath and Others (1995) ACJ 980 that the claim petition has to be decided on the basis of Preponderance of probability and evidence should not be scrutinized as is done in civil and criminal cases. It has been held in Union of India and Another v. Saraswathi Debnath and Others (1995) ACJ 980 that the claim petition has to be decided on the basis of Preponderance of probability and evidence should not be scrutinized as is done in civil and criminal cases. It is also settled principle of law that it is not necessary to appreciate the finer details of evidence to arrive at a conclusion in the claims’ cases before the Tribunal. Hence, this Court is justified in granting more compensation, even if lesser amount is sought for. 29. Apart from that, this Court has to consider the beneficial nature of the legislation. Chapter X to XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 were incorporated by the Parliament for the benefit of innocent motor accidents victims. The beneficial nature of the Act has been declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a number of cause including in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and Others AIR 2004 SC 1531 : (2004) 3 SCC 297 (IIII Judges Bench), in Ningamma and Another v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) and in Sohan Lal Passi v. P. Sesh Reddy AIR 1996 SC 2627 . This Court is duty bound to keep in mind the social welfare and beneficial legislation, while dealing with claims under the act. Technicalities should be divorced when deciding tire matter arising out of Motor Vehicles Act claims and justice should be rendered completely. The compensation awarded should be fair and reasonable and should not be arbitrary or very low. In an endeavour to render justice only, this Court awards compensation more than claimed by the claimants in the petition. 30. This Court under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act can re-appreciate the whole evidence to decide the matter. This Court draws support for the aforesaid proposition from the Apex Court judgment in Smt. Thokchom Ongar Sangeetha v. Oriental Insurance Co, in AIR 2008 SC 245 : (2008) 1 MLJ 151. It is settled law that the appeal is the continuation of original proceedings and this Court can decide the matter independently and award “Just compensation.” 31. Under Order 41 Rule 33 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, in order to render justice this Court can award more compensation based on the evidence. It is settled law that the appeal is the continuation of original proceedings and this Court can decide the matter independently and award “Just compensation.” 31. Under Order 41 Rule 33 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, in order to render justice this Court can award more compensation based on the evidence. The power and the discretion are vested with this Court to enhance the amount according to the facts of the case, if the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is not “just.” Even in the absence of any appeal/cross appeal by the claimants, this Court can enhance the compensation in this appeal preferred by the insurer. The aforesaid proposition has been settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1. Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and Others (supra). 2. Mahant Dhangir and Another v. Madan Mohan and Others AIR 1988 SC 54 : (1987) Supp SCC 528. 3. State of Punjab v. Bakshish Singh AIR 1999 SC 2626 : (1998) 8 SCC 222 : 1999-I-LLJ-1208. 4. APSRTCand Another v. Rama Devi and Others (2008) 3 MLJ 276: (2008) 1 TNMAC 234 (SC). 5. M.D. Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Kalavathi (1988) ACJ 151. 6. M.D. Thanthai Periyar Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Sundariammal (1999) 3 MLJ 147 : 1999 (2) CTC 560 . 7. M.D. Annai Sathya Corporation Ltd. v. Janardhanan 2000 (2) CTC 272 . 32. Even otherwise, under Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court has power and jurisdiction to pass such a decision or direction as the inferior Court/Tribunal should have made. The above ratio was laid by Apex Court in Sahil (Smt) v. Manojkumar and Others AIR 2004 SC 3210 : (2004) 4 SCC 785 . In Trimbak Gangadhar v. Ramachandra Ganesh AIR 1977 SC 1222 : (1977) 2 SCC 437 it has been held that where the order passed by the Tribunal results in manifest injustice, this Court can justifiably intervene under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, this Court, can invoke Article 227 “suo motu” and decide the matter, if the Court/Tribunal below has not passed order correctly. This Court are was support for the above said view from the judgment of Supreme Court in Ahmedabad MFG and Calico PTG Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnand and Others, AIR 1972 SC 1598 : (1972) 1 SCC 898 : 1972-II-LLJ-165. 33. This Court are was support for the above said view from the judgment of Supreme Court in Ahmedabad MFG and Calico PTG Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnand and Others, AIR 1972 SC 1598 : (1972) 1 SCC 898 : 1972-II-LLJ-165. 33. For the reasons stated above and the various provisions of the above mentioned laws, this Court awards Rs. 4,93,000/- even though the claimant claimed Rs. 1,50,000/- only in the claim petition. In the result, the civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed by enhancing the total compensation awarded by the Tribunal from Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) to Rs. 4,93,000/- (Rupees four lakhs and ninety three thousand only), which amount shall carry interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from the date of petition till date or realisation. The claimants are entitled to equal shares in the award. The Insurance Company is directed to deposit the said amount within 6 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The Tribunal is directed to pay the amount to the claimants within one week form the date of deposit. The claimants have to pay the required additional Court fee before the Tribunal to get the enhanced compensation. The appeal is allowed and there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.