JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.S. Chauhan, J.—The present petition has been filed challenging the order dated 6.3.2006 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda. 2. The facts in brief to the present dispute are that Khata No. 143 situated in Village Manihari, Pargana Gwarich, Tehsil Karnailganj, District Gonda was recorded in the name of Raj Kishore Singh, father of opposite parties No. 2 and 3 in 1362 Fasli as sirdar. Under the Correction of Land Records Drive Scheme (hereinafter referred as to as the ‘CLRD Scheme’ for short), name of Balbhaddar Singh, real uncle of the petitioner was recorded as co-tenant vide order dated 11.6.1955 passed by the Additional Tehsildar and the said entry continued upto the basic year and after the death of Balbhaddar Singh name of the petitioner came to be recorded on the basis of succession. After the commencement of the consolidation operation in the village in the year 1974 objections were filed by the father of the opposite parties No. 2 and 3 under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referered to as the ‘Act’) on the ground that name of the petitioner has been fictitiously recorded without any order of the competent authority. The petitioner was neither in possession nor had any share, hence his name may be expunged from the khata. The objections were contested by the petitioner and it was stated that name of Balbhaddar Singh was recorded under the CLRD Scheme and after his death he came into possession over the land in dispute. The long standing entries cannot be corrected and it was pleaded that the petitioner has perfected right by acquiescence and estoppel and the objections filed after 19 years by Raj Kishore Singh were liable to be rejected. The parties adduced evidence in support of their claim. The Consolidation Officer on a consideration of the entire evidence rejected the objections by Raj Kishore Singh vide order dated 27.8.1977. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 27.8.1977 Raj Kishore Singh filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation on 19.11.1977 and the Settlement Officer Consolidation dismissed the appeal vide judgment dated 3.12.1984. Against the aforesaid order, Raj Kishore Singh preferred a revision under Section 48 of the Act before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, which was allowed by the Director of Consolidation vide order dated 6.3.2006. Hence this petition. 3. Against the aforesaid order, Raj Kishore Singh preferred a revision under Section 48 of the Act before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, which was allowed by the Director of Consolidation vide order dated 6.3.2006. Hence this petition. 3. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is in continuous possession and, therefore, he perfected his title by way of adverse possession and Raj Kishore Singh took no steps to eject Balbhaddar Singh for a period of about 19 years and the entry continued as such. He further submits that the revision was filed without the copy of the order of the Consolidation Officer and, therefore, the revision was itself not maintainable. It is also submitted that no evidence has been discussed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation while allowing the revision and so also he has erred in exercising power under Section 48 of the Act. It is further submitted that when the objection was rejected on technical ground, then it ought to have been taken at the initial stage as the same has not been raised, it cannot be raised here. The first objection having been rejected vide order dated 27.11.1974, the second objection was not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in Section 11-A of the Act. It is also submitted that subsequent objection filed was barred by the principles of res judicata and also by the principles enunciated in Section 11-A of the Act. The second objection, therefore, could not have been entertained by the Consolidation Officer. 4. Learned counsel for the opposite parties No. 2 and 3, on the other hand, has submitted that objection was rejected on technical ground and there was no decision on merit, therefore, the principles of res judicata will not apply unless and until there was any decision on merit. It is also submitted that bar of Section 11-A of the Act will not apply in the present case as there was no decision on merit. It is further submitted that name of Balbhaddar Singh could not have been recorded in the CLRD Scheme as it was only the Sub-Divisional Officer, who was empowered as provided under Para 155-A of the U.P. Land Records Manual to make any correction in the Khatauni. The co-tenancy could not have been allowed under the CLRD Scheme. It is further submitted that name of Balbhaddar Singh could not have been recorded in the CLRD Scheme as it was only the Sub-Divisional Officer, who was empowered as provided under Para 155-A of the U.P. Land Records Manual to make any correction in the Khatauni. The co-tenancy could not have been allowed under the CLRD Scheme. The CLRD Scheme was only for the purposes that if any person was in possession and his name has not been recorded, then the name of the person who was in possession may be recorded. It is also submitted that prior to the date of abolition of the zamindari name of the father of Raj Kishore Singh was entered in the khatauni in 1345 Fasli. Raj Kishore Singh also filed receipts of the revenue rent, which also proved that he was in possession and he continued to pay the rent as well. He has further submitted that another dispute in respect of khata has been decided, but not the present one. It is further contended that the order passed under the CLRD Scheme does not contain the signature of any officer to prove the authenticity of the order. 5. I have heard Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Mohd. Adil Khan and Sri A.R. Khan, learned counsel for the opposite parties No. 2 and 3 and gone through the record. 6. The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that once the earlier objection was rejected vide order dated 27.11.1974 by the Consolidation Officer, then the subsequent objection by Raj Kishore Singh would not be maintainable in view of the provisions contained in Section 11-A of the Act. 7. In order to resolve the controversy as to whether there was any decision dated 27.11.1974, the record was summoned by the Court and after summoning the record, it was found that in “To” Register Case No. 7363 under Section 9-A(2) of the Act has been entered into between Shiv Shankar Singh v. Raj Kishore Singh. Against this entry in column No. 5 two dates have been given i.e. 27.11.1974 and 27.8.1977. Against this entry in column No. 5 two dates have been given i.e. 27.11.1974 and 27.8.1977. Why these two dates have been mentioned and what is the procedure prevailing in the consolidation Courts, the Court summoned the local Consolidation Officer to explain and the Consolidation Officer explained that when a decision is not taken on merit, then such entries are made. For example, when a recall application is filed or any other situation has risen on account of which the decision on merit has not been taken place, then a new number is given and when a new number is given, then the case is decided on merit. The record of the Case No. 4120, Raj Kishore Singh v. Shiv Shankar Singh, which was decided vide order dated 27.11.1974 has been weeded out on 3.7.2003. The order dated 27.8.1977 contained in the file of the Settlement Officer Consolidation goes to indicate that Case No. 7363 has been added after the old Case No. 4120, which itself goes to establish that in the earlier Case No. 4120 the present objection was filed and a new case number was entered as 7363 and thereafter the case was decided. So from the evidence and the practice prevailing in the consolidation Courts, it cannot be said that the decision dated 27.11.1974 was anywhere on merit. The weeding of the record on 3.7.2003 when the record was summoned by the Court of Deputy Director of Consolidation also throws volumes of doubt upon the conduct of the party, which was to be benefitted on account of the weeding of the record. Father of opposite parties No. 2 and 3 when moved an application for summoning the record, the record was not sent and when the Deputy Director of Consolidation asked for, it was reported that the file has been weeded out on 3.7.2003. From the aforesaid state of affairs and the evidence on the record, it cannot be said that there was any decision on merit and that is why the second objection was entertained in continuation of the earlier order dated 27.11.1974. Thus, the argument of counsel for the petitioner that the bar of Section 11-A of the Act will operate in respect of the present objection is devoid of merit and is rejected. 8. Thus, the argument of counsel for the petitioner that the bar of Section 11-A of the Act will operate in respect of the present objection is devoid of merit and is rejected. 8. The question as to the maintainability of the second objection was neither raised before the Consolidation Officer nor before the Settlement Officer Consolidation on account of the fact that by that time the order dated 27.11.1974 was in existence. The order of the Consolidation Officer is dated 27.8.1977 and the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation is dated 3.12.1984 and the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is dated 6.3.2006 no such plea was taken even before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It is for the first time in this Court the plea has been taken in regard to bar of Section 11-A of the Act. Had it been so and there was decision on merit, then the objection would have been raised at the stage of Consolidation Officer. The argument has come forward only after it was reported to the Court of Deputy Director of Consolidation that the file has been weeded out on 3.7.2003, but the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation does not indicate that any such plea was raised, therefore, the plea being raised for the first time in this Court cannot be allowed to be raised and is liable to be rejected. 9. To give support to the above proposition, learned counsel for the opposite parties No. 2 and 3 has placed reliance upon the judgment reported in the case of Harihar Prasad Pandey, son of Ram Achraj Pandey and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Basti and another, 1980 RD 62, wherein this Court has held that if the objection was taken for the first time before the Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision regarding maintainability of the objection received by the Consolidation Officer, then such objection cannot be taken into consideration, as the same has not been raised at the very initial stage and it would be deemed to have waived the objection. This view finds support from the case of Tungal Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1969 RD 54, wherein it has been held that where an objection as to the procedure and jurisdiction of the Consolidation Court is not taken, it gives rise to an estoppel. This view finds support from the case of Tungal Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1969 RD 54, wherein it has been held that where an objection as to the procedure and jurisdiction of the Consolidation Court is not taken, it gives rise to an estoppel. The same view has been reiterated in the case of State of U.P. and others v. Phool Singh, 1974 Unreported Revenue cases 502, wherein it has been held that the initial lack of jurisdiction in the entertainment of the objection by the Consolidation Officer vanished when the matter was decided by the Settlement Officer Consolidation on appeal. 10. In the case of Sekendar Ali Mridha v. Sadaruddin Bhuniya, AIR 1935 Cal 792, it has been held that it was not to ascertain the grounds on which the appellate Court had upheld the decision of the trial Court in the previous suit and hence the decision could not be taken operating as res judicata. 11. In the case of Mt. Batul Begum v. B. Hem Chandar Mukherji, AIR 1960 All. 519 , the same principle was reiterated that a plea cannot be raised for first time in second appeal especially when no sufficient material was there on record. In this case, a decision reported in AIR 1936 PC 258, Jagadish Chandra Deo v. Gour Hari Mahato was followed. 12. In the case of Udai Pratap Singh and others v. Baiju Kewat and others, 1967 AWR 827, this Court held that the party pleading the question of res judicata has to file judgment, plaint and written statement and mere production of certified copy of the decree without judgment was not found to be sufficient. 13. In the case of Bhagwati Singh v. Board of Revenue, Allahabad and others, AIR 1978 All 323 (FB), this Court reiterated the principle that if a suit is dismissed on a preliminary ground or on the ground that it is premature, its judgment does not operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit. The Full Bench also relied upon the decisions in the case of Abdullah Ashgar Ali Khan v. Ganesh Dass, AIR 1917 PC 201 and Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali Shah, 1964 All LJ 805. 14. Apart from the above decisions, learned counsel for the opposite parties No. 2 and 3 has also placed reliance upon the following decisions : Inacio Martins (Deceased) through LRs. 14. Apart from the above decisions, learned counsel for the opposite parties No. 2 and 3 has also placed reliance upon the following decisions : Inacio Martins (Deceased) through LRs. v. Narayan Hari Naik and others, (1993) 3 SCC 123 ; State of Maharashtra and another v. M/s National Construction Company, Bombay and another, 1996 LCD 555; Mangru v. Kishori and others, (1996) 4 LCD 183; Bhrigu Nath Rao and others v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh and others, 1999 (17) LCD 624; V. Rajeshwari (Smt.) v. T.C. Saravanabava, (2004) 1 SCC 551 . 15. The above cases are also on the same point and emphasize on the principle that plea has to be raised in the pleadings or in issues at the stage of the trial and if it has not been raised in the trial, then it would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of appeal. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, is not acceptable. The reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner on the case of Gafoora and another etc. etc. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Meerut and others, AIR 1975 SC 1716 is besides the point, where an application under Section 12 of the Act was moved without preferring any objection under Section 9(2) of the Act, then in that context it was held that the rejection of the application on the ground of delay was valid. 16. Apart from it, it is to be noted that the CLRD Scheme proceedings are summary in nature and, therefore, the title was never adjudicated upon between the parties and could have been agitated at any point of time as and when occasion arose for deciding the same in accordance with law. It is not that for the first time objection has been raised by way of such plea before the consolidation authorities, but in fact a Suit under Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act was filed by the petitioner against father of opposite parties No. 2 and 3 on 5.5.1966/17.5.1966 and in the partition Suit written statement was filed in which it was specifically stated that the land belongs to father of Raj Kishore Singh i.e. Santosh Singh and he along with his brother was in possession over the land in dispute. After the death of Santosh Singh, Raj Kishore Singh and Badri Prasad Singh came into possession as successors and since then they were continuing in possession over the land in dispute. The petitioner was having no right, title and share in the said land. It was also averred that the said entry in the name of the petitioner was forged and on that basis no right can be claimed. The petitioner moved an application for withdrawal of the Suit and the said Suit was dismissed as withdrawn on 18.8.1966. 17. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that later on the petitioner filed a subsequent Suit, which was decreed vide judgment and order dated 17.6.1972 is neither here nor there and no judgment has been placed on record to prove the said fact. It is not known whether the opposite parties were given any notice and were represented in the said Suit and whether the said Suit was decided on merit or it was an ex-parte decree. 18. The fact remains that title of the petitioner was specifically denied by Raj Kishore Singh, father of opposite parties No. 2 and 3 way back in 1966 and thereafter, so it cannot be said that the petitioner has perfected his right and title by way adverse possession and the long standing entry will not confer any right in his favour. The adverse possession cannot confer any right upon the co-tenant and neither the plea of adverse possession can be raised by a co-tenant. The name of the petitioner came to be recorded under the CLRD Scheme. 19. The original register was summoned in order to ascertain as to in what form the entry was made and the entry does not contain the signature of any officer. On perusal of register, it was found that only an endorsement has been made that uncle of the petitioner was recorded as co-tenant under the Scheme. The CLRD Scheme was not meant for granting co-tenancy rights, but in fact the Scheme was meant for the purposes that certain persons, who were in possession and their names have not been recorded, after verification on spot their names be recorded. The petitioner’s name, therefore, could not have been recorded as a co-tenant in the CLRD Scheme. The CLRD Scheme was not meant for granting co-tenancy rights, but in fact the Scheme was meant for the purposes that certain persons, who were in possession and their names have not been recorded, after verification on spot their names be recorded. The petitioner’s name, therefore, could not have been recorded as a co-tenant in the CLRD Scheme. Para A-155 of the U.P. Land Records Manual confers the right upon the Sub-Divisional Officer to make entries regarding new tenure holders without registered leases. 20. In this regard, counsel for the opposite parties No. 2 and 3 has placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Sukhari v. Tribeni Rari, 1965 AWR 55 to press-forth the point that the CLRD proceedings are summary in nature and are not judicial proceedings at all and no weight can be attached to the entries made in such proceedings, and no mistake can be attributed to the lower Court when such an entry was ignored. 21. It is admitted case of the parties that entry in the CLRD Scheme was made by the Additional Tehsildar, who was having no power to make such an entry and, therefore, on the basis of the said entry no right can accrue in favour of the petitioner and neither it can be termed that it was a valid entry made by a competent officer. It was not a vacant land and the entry was being made along with the father of opposite parties No. 2 and 3, so a notice was also necessary to the original tenure holder. In this regard, this Court in the case of Jhinak Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh and another, 1980 RD 265 has categorically held that entry under Para- 155 (a), Class-IX of the U.P. Land Records Manual made by the Tehsildar would not be a correct entry. The said entry can be made only by the Assistant Collector, Ist Class and the entry made by the Tehsildar was held to be an illegal entry. The said case received approval of the apex Court as well. 22. The said entry can be made only by the Assistant Collector, Ist Class and the entry made by the Tehsildar was held to be an illegal entry. The said case received approval of the apex Court as well. 22. So far the argument of the counsel for the petitioner that against the order of the Consolidation Officer revision was not maintainable, does not require any more debate on account of the fact that law in this regard is settled by this Court in the cases of Ram Ajor v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1982 All LJ 1160; Smt. Taluka Devi v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh and another, 1981 RD 120; and Ram Das and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1979 RD 308. 23. So far the question of acquiescence of sirdari rights by co-tenant is concerned, A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Budhlal and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur and others, 1982 RD 324, has held that there is no provision under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, which may permit a person to become co-tenant by estoppel and acquiescence in so far the sirdari rights are concerned. In the aforesaid case, this Court further held as under : “The substantive law governing the rights of parties was that a Sirdar could not transfer even by co-option or create a co-Sirdar under the doctrine of estoppel and acquiescence. The proceedings for mutation even under Section 82 of the Panchayat Raj Act were summary proceedings. They could not declare title of the parties which may be binding in regular title proceedings. The submission is misconceived. Learned counsel then argued that the petitioners had mutated rights by adverse possession. The argument has to be stated to be rejected. The petitioners from the very beginning admitted that Smt. Brij Rani had one-third share. They could not hence claim that they had acquired rights by adverse possession in the holdings. On their own case they had come in possession by consent and permission of Smt. Brij Rani. There is no evidence that at any point of time they declared to the knowledge of Smt. Brij Rani that their possession was adverse. They could not hence turn round and claim title by adverse possession.” 24. On their own case they had come in possession by consent and permission of Smt. Brij Rani. There is no evidence that at any point of time they declared to the knowledge of Smt. Brij Rani that their possession was adverse. They could not hence turn round and claim title by adverse possession.” 24. The claim of the petitioner, therefore, on the face of it, does not appear to be based on the legal and cogent evidence. The entry claimed is based on the basis of an entry made in 1362 Fasli, which was also disputed time and again between the parties and the title of the petitioner was specifically denied by the father of opposite parties No. 2 and 3. The entry in 1345 Falsi also goes to indicate that it was in the name of father of Raj Kishore Singh. The Deputy Director of Consolidation while considering the case of the parties has came to the conclusion that the entry has not been made in accordance with law and hence no right can be conferred on the basis of such entry, which has not been made in accordance with law. Co-tenancy was not permissible under the CLRD Scheme, hence the Deputy Director of Consolidation was right in determining that the petitioner was having no right and title over the land in dispute. On a consideration of the above reasoning, I am of the opinion that petition is devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed. ————