PRAKASH KRISHNA, J. The present writ petition is directed against the order dated April 20, 1976 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, respondent No. 1 herein. The dispute relates to Khata Khatauni Nos. 46, 47 and 79 situate in village Chakhaniya, Pergana Narwan, District-Varanasi. Khata Nos. 46 and 47 were recorded in the basic year as Bhumidhar of Shyam Behari, respondent No. 5 (contesting respondent ). While Shyam Behari was recorded as Sirdar with respect to Khata No. 79. The petitioner preferred an objection before the Consolidation Authorities during the consolidation operation for recording her name in the Revenue records as co-tenure holder along with Shyam Behari. The objections were filed on the pleas inter alia that Namwar Singh, Raja Singh and Nawab Singh, three brothers, sons of Shiv Saran Singh, were tenure holders of the land in dispute. Namwar Singh died about 60 years ago and his share was inherited in absence of any other heir by his remaining brothers Raja Singh and Nawab Singh. Subsequently, Raja Singh also died and thus, Nawab Singh succeeded to the entire property. The petitioner claimed that she is daughter of Nawab Singh and thus, inherited the property in question in the year 1963 when Nawab Singh expired and thus, she claimed that her name may be recorded as co-tenure holder along with the contesting respondent, Shyam Behari. 2. At the initial stage, the contesting respondent preferred not to file any reply to the objection of the petitioner. The Consolidation Officer framed issues on the basis of petitioners objection. The petitioner in support of her case filed a copy of her birth register dated 15. 8. 1908 showing herself daughter of Nawab Singh. She besides aforestated documentary evidence got examined herself and her witnesses. Thereafter, an objection by the contesting respondent was filed, after the close of the petitioners evidence wherein he did not dispute the fact that the property in dispute is ancestral property. He came out with the case that the petitioner is not daughter of Nawab Singh but is daughter of Namwar Singh (brother of Nawab Singh ). He also produced evidence in support of his case. The Consolidation Officer by the order dated February 6, 1974 rejected the objections filed by the petitioner and ordered continuance of the basic year entries in the records. He also produced evidence in support of his case. The Consolidation Officer by the order dated February 6, 1974 rejected the objections filed by the petitioner and ordered continuance of the basic year entries in the records. The said order was challenged by the petitioner in appeal No. 182 successfully before the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation, Varanasi, who recorded a finding after taking into consideration the material on record that on the basis of the birth register of the year 1908, it is established that the petitioner is the daughter of Nawab Singh and not of Namwar Singh. The said judgment and order is dated 6th of January, 1975. Thereafter, both the parties preferred revisions being revision No. 7065 preferred by Shyam Behari (contesting respondent) and revision No. 7066 preferred by the petitioner. The petitioner preferred the revision as her share was not specified by the Settlement Officer Consolidation in the order under revision. She claimed that her share in the land in dispute is 3/4th. Both these revisions were heard together and have been disposed off by common order impugned in the present writ petition. The Deputy Director of Consolidation while exercising the revisional jurisdiction conferred on it under Section 48 of the U. P. C. H. Act allowed the revision of contesting respondent and restored the order of Consolidation Officer. It consequently dismissed the revision preferred by the petitioner. 3. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order of Deputy Director of Consolidation. The main thrust of the argument of Shri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner is, that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has exceeded in its jurisdiction in interfering with the findings of fact as recorded by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. He submits that in view of plain language of Section 48 of U. P. C. H. Act as it existed then, it was impermissible for the Deputy Director of Consolidation to reverse the findings of fact as recorded by the authority below to it unless the said finding is perverse or is not based on material on record. It was also submitted that the entry made in the birth register should have been taken as correct and could not be disputed at this distance of time. It was also submitted that the entry made in the birth register should have been taken as correct and could not be disputed at this distance of time. The contesting respondent threatened the Deputy Director of Consolidation by filing successive transfer applications against him on unfounded allegations, which all were dismissed in due course of time, submits learned counsel for the petitioner. However, the filing of transfer applications one after the other, prejudiced the mind of Deputy Director of Consolidation against the petitioner and the impugned order is outcome of the said prejudice. 4. Shri R. N. Singh, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri A. K. Rai and Shri Vishnu Kumar Singh, advocates, on the other hand, submits that the Consolidation Officer and the Deputy Director of Consolidation as well have recorded categorical finding of fact that the petitioner has failed to prove that she is daughter of Nawab Singh. The said finding is essentially a finding of fact. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has placed reliance upon the documentary evidence as well and has rightly accepted the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the contesting respondent, as trustworthy while dismissing the revision filed by the petitioner. Appreciation of evidence on a question which is purely one of the fact, cannot be done by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, submits the learned senior counsel. 5. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The basic question which falls for consideration in the present writ petition is whether the petitioner who died during the pendency of the writ petition, was the daughter of Nawab Singh as pleaded by her or was of Namwar Singh as pleaded by the contesting respondent (Shyam Behari) and also scope of interference in revision by the Deputy Director of Consolidation while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 48 of the U. P. C. H. Act. 6. The following pedigree has been given by the petitioner: Bishan Dayal Shiv saran Dwarika = Smt. Mahesha Nepal = Smt. Morochhi Shishu Singh Namwar Raja Nawab (Daughter) Smt. Mahraji (Petitioner) w/o Laxman Singh Dal Ganja Sarju Shyam Behari R. No. 5 Ram Roop 7. Except whether Mahraji (petitioner) was daughter of Nawab Singh or of Namwar Singh, there is no dispute between the parties regarding the above pedigree. 8. Except whether Mahraji (petitioner) was daughter of Nawab Singh or of Namwar Singh, there is no dispute between the parties regarding the above pedigree. 8. There also appears to be no dispute that Namwar, Raja and Nawab sons of Shiv Saran were the three brothers. Namwar expired earliest about 60 years before. Thereafter, Raja expired. He was married to one Wachi but there was no issue from this wedlock. There also appears to be no dispute that in this chain Nawab survived and died in the year 1963. The petitioner further states that her son Satya Narain was murdered 6-7 years before the filing of objection and she was mentally perturbed on account of murder of her son. When she recovered, raised the dispute by filing objection. She claimed that she was Pardanasheen lady and was under a belief that in normal course her name would be recorded in place of Nawab Singh but the contesting respondent got his name recorded exclusively over the disputed Khatas. In evidence, the petitioner examined herself, Sarju and Markandey Singh. Her evidence was closed on 22. 8. 1973. Thereafter, the objection by the contesting respondent that she is daughter of Namwar, was filed. 9. The Deputy Director of Consolidation found that the petitioner has failed to prove her case and consequently, it rejected the objection filed by her. While doing so, he had also taken into consideration that the petitioner has not filed any document to show that she has paid any Revenue. She has not filed irrigation slips etc. to show that she ever irrigated the land in dispute. Further, an adverse inference was drawn against her as an application was filed by the contesting respondent (Shyam Behari) for summoning the birth register of the year 1908. The said prayer was contested but the application was ultimately allowed. The failure on the part of the petitioner to get the said document summoned was taken as adverse by the Consolidation Officer. He found that voter lists have not been proved. The said order was set aside in appeal by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation. 10. The Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation called for the said birth register and found that therein it is recorded that a daughter was born to Nawab Singh on 15. 8. 1908 at village Diggi Chakhaniya. In the said register the other births are also recorded. The said order was set aside in appeal by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation. 10. The Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation called for the said birth register and found that therein it is recorded that a daughter was born to Nawab Singh on 15. 8. 1908 at village Diggi Chakhaniya. In the said register the other births are also recorded. On weighing the birth register dated 23. 11. 1903 and 15. 8. 1908, the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation found that there is no reason why the birth of the petitioner may not be taken as 15th August, 1908, as claimed by her. He also took into consideration that the petitioner closed her evidence oral and documentary on 22. 8. 1973 and a reply was filed by the contesting respondent on the said date after the close of evidence. The contesting respondent in para 16 of his reply stated that the first daughter of Namwar was Prabhawati who was married to Leelapur, District Ghazipur and that the birth entry in the birth register dated 15th August, 1908 is fabricated one. On making an analysis of the oral evidence of the parties, the said authority came to the conclusion that the entry regarding the birth of daughter to Nawab Singh in the year 1908 is correct and it is the petitioner who was born on 1908. A daughter might have born to Namwar Singh in the year 1903 but being not in issue, it need no consideration. 11. A bare perusal of the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation would show that it has proceeded to decide the revision as if he was exercising the power of a trial Court without adverting to any of the reasoning as was given by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation. He has addressed the issue as if he was exercising the original jurisdiction whether the petitioner was born in the year 1908 and was daughter of Nawab Singh or she was born in the year 1903 and was daughter of Namwar Singh. On the said issue the evidence led by the parties is contradictory, in the nature of oath against oath. On the said issue the evidence led by the parties is contradictory, in the nature of oath against oath. The Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation as noticed in his order had taken the pains to summon the original birth register and after taking into consideration the other evidences on record, negated the plea of the contesting respondent that the entry of birth of the year 1908 is fabricated or Farzi. This aspect of the matter has not been at all addressed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in the impugned order. The Deputy Director of Consolidation neither summoned the birth register in original nor has given any reason for his disagreement, if any, to the said approach of the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation. The finding returned by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is, thus, vitiated. 12. Entries in birth register are made by official concerned in discharge of his official duty, as observed by the Apex Court in Har Pal Singh and another v. State of H. P. , AIR 1981 SC 361 , therefore, it follows that the burden to establish that the said entry is fabricated one lay upon the person so alleges. 13. Besides the above, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has also ignored one important circumstance of the case which was taken into consideration by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. The said aspect is that the contesting respondent filed his reply to the objections after the closure of the evidence filed by the petitioner. He, thus, had the full knowledge of the evidences which were produced by the petitioner. The possibility of moulding his defence in the light of the evidence already produced by the petitioner, cannot be ruled out. The contesting respondent, being in advantageous position, pleaded that the petitioner was not the daughter of Nawab Singh but was of Namwar Singh. 14. It is interesting to note that the Consolidation Officer and the Deputy Director of Consolidation as well, while determining the date of birth of the petitioner wrongly took into consideration that the petitioner in her deposition has stated her age as 60 years and reached to the conclusion that she was born in the year 1913. A true copy of the petitioners deposition has been filed asannexure-10 wherein she has disclosed her age as 65 years. This being so they were not justified in drawing any adverse inference against the petitioner. A true copy of the petitioners deposition has been filed asannexure-10 wherein she has disclosed her age as 65 years. This being so they were not justified in drawing any adverse inference against the petitioner. The statement of the petitioner corroborates her date of birth as 15th August, 1908. In para 19 of the writ petition pleading of misreading of age of petitioner from her statement has been set out as 60 years instead of 65 years. Its reply has been given in para 14 of the counter affidavit by the contesting respondent wherein the contents of para under reply, have not been disputed specifically. Only this much has been stated that "the argument in nutshell is that appreciation of evidence on a question which is purely one of fact cannot be done by this Honble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. " 15. Having noticed some vital aspects from the orders of three authorities below, at this stage it is desirable to consider the scope of interference in a revision by the authority concerned under Section 48 of the U. P. C. H. Act. The impugned order was passed in the year 1976 and therefore, the relevant section as then stood, is to be considered, before amendment. Section 48 of the U. P. C. H. Act reads as follows : "48. Revision and reference,- (1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than interlocutory order passed by such authority in the case of proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case of proceedings as he thinks fit. (2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub-section (3 ). (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1 ). Explanation.- (1) For the purposes of this section, Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. Explanation.- (1) For the purposes of this section, Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. Explanation.- (2) For the purposes of this section the expression interlocutory order in relation to a case or proceeding, means such order deciding any manner arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect originally disposing of such case or proceeding. Explanation.- (3) The power under this section to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order includes the power to examine any finding, whether of fact or law, recorded by any subordinate authority, and also includes the power to reappreciate any oral or documentary evidence. " [the Explanation (3) Ins. By U. P. Act No. 3 of 2002 (w. e. f. 21. 6. 2002) Published in U. P. Gazette Extra. Part I Section (Ka) dated 4th September, 2002] 16. The said section was amended from time to time and the Explanation III thereto was added subsequent to the period under consideration. Therefore, the said Explanation was not on the Statute Book on the relevant point of time. 17. Scope of Section 48 of U. P. C. H. Act after its amendment in 1968 came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Ram Dular v. D. D. C. , Jaunpurand others, JT 1994 (3) SC 341. Then, it was examined in Sheo Nand and others v. DDC, Allahabad, JT 2000 (2) SC 332. The relevant para 20 and 21 thereof are reproduced below: "20. The Section gives very wide powers to the Deputy Director. It enables him either suo motu on his own motion or on the application of any person to consider the propriety, legality, regularity and correctness of all the proceedings held under the Act and to pass appropriate orders. These powers have been conferred on the Deputy Director in the widest terms so that the claims of the parties under the Act may be effectively adjudicated upon and determined so as to confer finality to the rights of the parties and the Revenue Records may be prepared accordingly. 21. These powers have been conferred on the Deputy Director in the widest terms so that the claims of the parties under the Act may be effectively adjudicated upon and determined so as to confer finality to the rights of the parties and the Revenue Records may be prepared accordingly. 21. Normally, the Deputy Director, in exercise of his powers, is not expected to disturb the findings of fact recorded concurrently by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), but where the findings are perverse, in the sense that they are not supported by the evidence brought on record by the parties or that they are against the weight of evidence. It would be the duty of the Deputy Director to scrutinise the whole case again so as to determine the correctness, legality or propriety of the orders passed by the authorities subordinate to him. . . . . . . . . . . . " 18. Taking note of the aforestated pronouncements, the Apex Court in Gaya Din (D) through Lrs. and others v. Hanuman Prasad (D) through Lrs. and others, JT 2000 (Suppl. 3) SC 199 has held in para 14 as follows: "thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the fact that Section 48 has been couched in wide terms, it only permits interference where the findings of the subordinate authority are perverse in the sense that they are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or where they suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. " 19. The authoritative judicial pronouncements as noticed above, support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Deputy Director of Consolidation can interfere with the findings of the Subordinate Authority only when they are perverse or against the material on record. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has not found that the findings recorded by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation were perverse. As already noticed above, he proceeded to decide the Us as if he was exercising the original jurisdiction. While doing so, he has preferred to believe the oral testimony of the contesting respondents witnesses in comparison to the oral testimony of the witnesses produced by the petitioner, which he could not do as pointed out by the Apex Court in the case of Gaya Din (supra ). While doing so, he has preferred to believe the oral testimony of the contesting respondents witnesses in comparison to the oral testimony of the witnesses produced by the petitioner, which he could not do as pointed out by the Apex Court in the case of Gaya Din (supra ). The respondent No. 1 has exceeded in its jurisdiction to reverse the findings of fact and as such the impugned orders cannot be sustained. The revision preferred by the contesting respondent was wrongly allowed and the same, therefore, stands rejected. The order of the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation to this extent is restored. The grievance regarding the determination of the petitioners share still survives and it is desirable that it should be adjudicated upon by the respondent No. 1. For this limited purpose, the matter is restored back to the file of the Deputy Director of Consolidation by setting aside the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation passed in the revision filed by the petitioner. The said revision is restored to its original number which shall be heard and decided afresh. 20. Viewed as above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. No order as to costs. .