JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—The petitioner who is plaintiff of suit No. 5 of 2008 has approached this Court for quashing of the order dated 13-1-2009 passed by the appellate Court, allowing the appeal and setting aside the order granting ad interim injunction order granted in his favour. 2. Facts of the case are not much in dispute. Admittedly, the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) took ‘Ice Producing Unit’, situate in premises No. 80/80, Cooperganj, Kanpur, which is owned by the respondent No. 2 herein (referred to hereinafter as defendant) on licence for running the said Ice Producing Unit. Initially, the father of the plaintiff was lincencee who took the said unit on licence and started running the Ice Manufacturing Unit in the year 1989 and paid the licence fee till 1996. Thereafter, an agreement was entered into between father of the plaintiff and the defendant for a period of five years w.e.f. 1-4-1997. After the death of his father, the plaintiff entered into fresh agreements from time to time. Lastly, indisputably on 25-3-2002, the plaintiff took the said unit as licencee for a period of five years ending on 31-3-2007 on payment of Rs. 2,50,000/- per year w.e.f. 1-4-2003. Earlier the licence fee was Rs. 2,25,000/- per annum. The defendant, on the request of the plaintiff, permitted to use certain open area of the factory and consequently, the licence fee was enhanced from Rs. 2,25,000/- to Rs. 2,50,000/-. It is also not in dispute that the licence period has expired and there is no fresh licence deed in any manner in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff in-spite of expiry of the licence period has not handed over the said unit to the defendant and filed suit No. 5 of 2008, wherein an application for grant of temporary injunction during the pendency of the suit, giving rise to the present writ petition, was filed, on the allegations that the defendant is trying to evict the plaintiff otherwise than due course of law. 3. The said application for grant of temporary injunction was hotly opposed and contested by the defendant and it was pleaded that since the licence period has expired, the plaintiff has no right to use the said Ice Manufacturing Unit. 3. The said application for grant of temporary injunction was hotly opposed and contested by the defendant and it was pleaded that since the licence period has expired, the plaintiff has no right to use the said Ice Manufacturing Unit. The trial Court, after hearing the parties, granted temporary injunction order on 29-1-2008 and injuncted the defendant not to evict the plaintiff without taking recourse to judicial process and not to interfere in the manufacturing work of the plaintiff in any manner. It has been further provided that the plaintiff would be liable to pay licence fee for the period he remains in occupation of the unit and will not remove the plants and machineries from the disputed unit as was given to him on licence. The said order was challenged in appeal No. 52 of 2008 successfully. The Court below, by the impugned order, has held that on the admitted facts, the licence period having expired, the plaintiff was under legal obligation to hand over the unit in good working condition to the defendant which he failed. The licence agreement has come to an end on 31-3-2007 which has not been renewed subsequently and the electric connection was also disconnected with the consent of the plaintiff and it was not in existence at the time of institution of the suit, but the plaintiff in a clandestine manner got the electric connection in his name. The plaintiff having failed to prove his possession, is not entitled for any interim relief. 4. Heard Sri S.M.A. Kazmi, learned Senior Counsel along with Ms. Tahira Kazmi for the petitioner and Sri V.C. Misra, learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondent/defendant. 5. The main thrust of the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that the plaintiff is in ‘settled possession’ of the disputed property since the very beginning of the licence period, therefore, he cannot be dispossessed without taking recourse to due process of law. Elaborating the arguments, he submits that the possession of the plaintiff over the ice manufacturing unit is ‘settled’ possession and as held by the Apex Court in Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2097 and Rame Gowda (D) by LRs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (D) by LRs. Elaborating the arguments, he submits that the possession of the plaintiff over the ice manufacturing unit is ‘settled’ possession and as held by the Apex Court in Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2097 and Rame Gowda (D) by LRs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (D) by LRs. and another, AIR 2004 SC 4609 , the plaintiff is entitled to retain his possession and he cannot be evicted by force even by a true owner. 6. Sri V.C. Misra, learned Senior Counsel for the defendant, on the other hand, submits that on the admitted facts, the plaintiff has no right to remain in occupation of the disputed unit and, therefore, is not entitled to get any interim protection from the Court. He has not come to the Court with clean hands. So far as the allegation that the licence is irrecovable or recovable on account of the fact that permanent construction has been raised by the plaintiff, he submits that under the licence agreement, the plaintiff was not permitted to raise any sort of construction of permanent nature nor he was ever permitted to do so. The plaintiff was permitted to use open piece of land for putting additional ice canes only. Measurement of the said open space is 25’ x 30 which was earlier in use of the plaintiff partly for storing ice canes and partly was lying open. He submits that there being no equity in favour of the plaintiff, this Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of such person who has failed to fulfill his obligations. 7. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. Copies of the licence agreements are on record. It is useful to refer the last licence agreement made on 25-3-2002 between the plaintiff and the defendant. A copy of the said agreement has been annexed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. It provides that the licensors have been carrying on the business inter-alia manufacturing ice at Kanpur and for that purpose the licensors have set up an Ice Plant in their premises known as J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd., Oil Division, situate at 80/80, Cooperganj, Kanpur. The said unit was renovated from time to time. It provides that the licensors have been carrying on the business inter-alia manufacturing ice at Kanpur and for that purpose the licensors have set up an Ice Plant in their premises known as J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd., Oil Division, situate at 80/80, Cooperganj, Kanpur. The said unit was renovated from time to time. Keeping the said unit in running condition, it was given on licence for a period of three years from 1-4-1999 to 31-3-2002 to Mohd. Sami (plaintiff) and since the said agreement is expiring on 31-3-2002, a fresh licence in his favour for five years from 1-4-2002 is being executed. Besides providing terms of payment of the licence fee per annum and the expenses which would be borne by the licensee for running the unit, it is provided that the licence hereby granted is personal to the licencee and accordingly the licencee shall not be entitled to assign the benefit of the license to any other party for the use of the said Ice Plant or any plant and machinery and equipment or any other part thereof. The licencee has been prohibited from making any addition or alteration to the existing building without prior written permission of the licensors, vide para-8. Under condition No. 9, to consider the extension of the licence period has been given to the licensor i.e. the defendant on the request of the licencee i.e. the plaintiff. Condition No. 10, which is relevant for the present purposes, is reproduced below : “10. The licencee shall on the expiration of this agreement or sooner determination thereof quietly and peacefully hand back and deliver to the licensors possession of the said Ice Plant including the plant, machinery and equipment in proper working order, a list of the present installed machinery, motors and other equipment is attached herewith.” 9. Alongwith the agreement of licence, a list of machinery etc. running in two pages has been enclosed. There is absolutely no dispute between the parties that the licence period has expired. Also, there is no dispute regarding payment/balance of any licence fee for the licence period. The suit has been filed stating that the plaintiff has spent huge amount of money about Rs. running in two pages has been enclosed. There is absolutely no dispute between the parties that the licence period has expired. Also, there is no dispute regarding payment/balance of any licence fee for the licence period. The suit has been filed stating that the plaintiff has spent huge amount of money about Rs. 3.25 lacs in making permanent construction/structure etc., the intention of the officers and employees of the defendant has become dishonest and they are threatening to cause obstructions and interference in the peaceful possession and occupation of the plaintiff of the said premises and to go ahead with fully installing of the new unit in pursuance of the permission granted on 12-4-2003. In para-23 of the plaint it has been stated that in view of the permission granted on 12-4-2003, a fresh licence has come into existence under law and the same is irrevocable and it cannot be revoked nor the plaintiff can be dispossessed from the said possession. Cause of action arose on 12-4-2003 when the defendant granted to the plaintiff to make permanent constructions and structures in the said premises and also to install another ice producing unit and plant and thereafter on various dates as mentioned in para-28 of the plaint. The licence agreement and the pleadings have been noticed in some detail to given an idea about the case of the plaintiff, as set out in the Court below. 10. However, before this Court, Sri S.M.A. Kazmi, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has confined, as stated hereinabove, his argument on a limited point that the plaintiff being in ‘settled’ possession, is entitled for protection of his possession over the premises in question in view of the two pronouncements of the Apex Court, referred to above. It was not disputed by him before this Court that the period of licence has come to an end nor it was urged by him that any new licence or period of earlier licence has been extended. Plea of irrevocability of licence was also not urged, though the learned Senior Counsel for the defendant tried to demonstrate before this Court that the said plea is bogus one. But in rejoinder, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has confined his argument to the question of ‘settled’ possession only. 11. Plea of irrevocability of licence was also not urged, though the learned Senior Counsel for the defendant tried to demonstrate before this Court that the said plea is bogus one. But in rejoinder, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has confined his argument to the question of ‘settled’ possession only. 11. In Gujrat Bottling Company v. Cococola C., AIR 1995 SC 2372, the Apex Court has laid down the test for exercise of discretion in granting temporary injunction in the following words : (1) Whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case, (2) Whether balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff, and (3) Whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. 12. To grant or not grant temporary injunction is in the discretion of the Court. It has been repeatedly held that temporary injunction order should not be issued in a routine manner. To sustain validity of a claim for temporary injunction, it is not only that the plaintiff has to establish his prima facie case as to his right, but he has to also establish further the balance of convenience lay in his favour and that he would suffer irreparable injury if the temporary injunction prayed for was not granted. In an application for interlocutory injunction, the applicant must establish a probability of or strong prima facie case that he is entitled to the right of whose violation he complains, subject to this the governing consideration is the maintenance of statusquo pending the trial. 13. Coming to the facts of the case, it cannot be denied that the licence agreement between the parties was of a commercial nature. Before adverting further under clause 10 of the licence agreement, reproduced above, it cannot be lost sight of the fact that thereby and thereunder the plaintiff had agreed that on determination of the licence agreement, he will quietly and peacefully hand over and deliver back to the licensors possession of the ice plant including the plant, machinery etc. in proper working order. 14. When the attention of the learned Senior Counsel was invited by the Court towards the said clause, he could not give any satisfactory reply, except that the plaintiff is in ‘settled’ possession. in proper working order. 14. When the attention of the learned Senior Counsel was invited by the Court towards the said clause, he could not give any satisfactory reply, except that the plaintiff is in ‘settled’ possession. In this connection the following passage from the judgment of Krishna Ram Mahale (supra), relied upon by him, is reproduced below:- “8....................It is well settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. If any authority were needed for that proposition, we could refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 203 at pp 208-210 : AIR 1968 SC 620 at pp 622- 623. This Court in that judgment cited with approval the well know passage from the leading Privy Council case of Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, 51 Ind App. 293 at p. 299 : AIR 1924 PC 144, wherein it has been observed (p. 208) (of SCR) : at p. 622 of AIR : “In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court.” 15. There cannot be any dispute to the above proposition of law, but its applicability to the facts of the present case is another thing. The aforesaid observations were made by the Apex Court entirely in a different factual scenario and also in a different context. Analysis of the facts of the above case would show that a licence was granted by the defendant therein, in favour of the plaintiff to run a business of restaurant known as ‘Meenakshi Bhuvan’ which later came to be known as ‘Central Cafe Udipi’. The licence period was extended till April 30, 1965 (vide para-5). However, before expiry of the said period, the owner of the said restaurant in collusion, got the licencee evicted and took the possession on 15-2-1959 in high handed manner as found by the trial Court. This finding of the trial Court was confirmed in appeal by the High Court and was not challenged before the Apex Court. However, before expiry of the said period, the owner of the said restaurant in collusion, got the licencee evicted and took the possession on 15-2-1959 in high handed manner as found by the trial Court. This finding of the trial Court was confirmed in appeal by the High Court and was not challenged before the Apex Court. The Apex Court took a strong exception with regard to the conduct of the defendant therein who took law in his own hand and compelled the licencee to file a suit for possession. The Apex Court in that context made the aforesaid observation. A meaningful reading of the judgment would show that the Apex Court did not approve, rather condemned the conduct of the owner/lincesor for illegally dispossessing the licencee (plaintiff). In this factual background, the plea that the licence period has expired was rejected with the observation that it would amount to nothing sort of travesty of justice. Moreover, the Apex Court, as is apparent from para-10 of the report, expressed its dis-pleasure for wrong statement made by the counsel for the defendant before it. The said judgment was rendered in a suit for possession filed by the licencee against the licensor who was evicted during the currency of licence period, which is not so here. In the case on hand, the factual scenario is totally different. The licence period has indisputably expired and the conduct of the defendant licensor is not at all blameworty, rather it is the conduct of the plaintiff which is blameworthy who has failed to honour his commitment as contained in para-10 of the licence agreement. 16. Then, reliance was placed on Rame Gowda (D) by LRs v. M. Varadappa Naidu (D) by LRs. and another (supra), para-9 in particular. In the said para, the Supreme Court has observed that it is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against a true owner. The concept of settled possession and right of possessor to protect his possession against true owner has come to be settled by catena of decisions referred therein. The appeal in that case also arose out of a decree passed in a suit for permanent injunction, filed on the basis of title and possession. The concept of settled possession and right of possessor to protect his possession against true owner has come to be settled by catena of decisions referred therein. The appeal in that case also arose out of a decree passed in a suit for permanent injunction, filed on the basis of title and possession. It was found by the trial Court that the plaintiff has failed to prove his title but had succeeded in proving his possession over the said property which he was entitled to protect unless dispossessed therefrom by due process of law. The decree was passed by the trial Court restraining the defendant from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment. Noticeably, the observations made therein were in respect of a suit for permanent injunction which has been disposed of finally. The Apex Court in that case was not called upon to consider the parameters for grant of temporary injunction. In para-12 of the report reference of a Division Bench decision of this Court in Dasnam Naga Sanyasi and another v. Allahabad Development Authority, Allahabad and another, AIR 1995 All 418 relied upon by the appellant therein is made. It was distinguished on the ground that it was a case related to grant of temporary injunction. This being so, the principle, as laid down by the Apex Court, may not be very helpful while considering the question of grant of temporary injunction. 17. In view of the above discussions, the decisions relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff are not of much help to him. The licence period having been expired, it cannot possibly be said that the plaintiff has got any prima facie case to remain in possession/occupation of the ice manufacturing unit. His right, if any, to run the unit has come to an end by efflux of time. 18. Concept of ‘settled’ possession, as propounded in the above cases, is in a different context and it does not deal with the situation where the commercial transaction was there or where the licencee remains in occupation after expiry of the licence period. In the eyes of law, a licencee does not hold any possession and the difference as has been pointed out on numerous occasions in between the licence and the lease is that there is no delivery of possession to a licensee. In the eyes of law, a licencee does not hold any possession and the difference as has been pointed out on numerous occasions in between the licence and the lease is that there is no delivery of possession to a licensee. A licencee is permitted to enjoy the property but the possession remains with that of the licensor. There is no parting of possession by the licensor in the legal sense to a licencee. 19. The term ‘license’ means and is synonymous with “permit”, “permission”, or “authority”. The word, in its general and popular sense, means a right or permission granted in accordance with law by some competent authority to do some act, to do a certain thing, to engage in some transaction which but for such license would be unlawful. A document embodying such permission or evidencing such authority is often times called “license”. 20. According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1996 Edition, Vol. II, at page 1304, the word “license”, inter alia, means : (1) permission to act, (2) a right or permission granted in accordance with law by a competent authority to engage in some business or occupation, to do some act, or to engage in some transaction which but for such license would be unlawful, (3) formal permission from local authorities, and (4) a document embodying such permission or evidencing the license granted. 21. In Words and Phrases, permanent Edition, Vol. 32, at pages 233 and 234, the word “license” is stated to signify the following : “The term ‘license’ in its general and popular sense, as used with reference to occupations and privileges, means a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or to do an act which without such license would be illegal and is the grant of a special privilege not enjoyed by citizens generally and words ‘license’ and ‘permit’ are often used synonymously.....’License’ means and is synonymous with ‘permission’ or ‘authority’....... The law dictionary and lexicographers concur in saying that a ‘license’ is a ‘permit’ to do a certain thing, and it is clear that these words are used synonymously...........Little difference exists in meaning of words ‘license’ and ‘permit’ as used in statute authorising licensing of dealers in malt beverages, and word ‘license’ as used in section authorising municipalities to levy business license taxes is a ‘permit’ as used in section prohibiting manufacture, distribution, and sale malt beverages in municipalities without a permit......... In its general sense a ‘license’ is a permission to do something which without such permission would have been unauthorised or prohibited.” 22. Recently in Madali Ranganna and others v. T. Ramachandra and others, AIR 2008 SC 2291 , it has been held that while considering the application for grant of temporary injunction, the Court will not only take into consideration the basic elements in relation thereto, viz., existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties. Grant of injunction is an equitable relief. Grant or refusal of injunction has serious consequence depending upon the nature thereof. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Sri Sriman Narayan and another, AIR 2002 SC 2598 , it has been held that grant of temporary injunction, in commercial context between the parties for sale of the products manufactured by the defendant when the agreement has been revoked by the Corporation, is not proper. 23. Applying the principle of law delineated in the aforestated Apex Court’s judgments, it would be evident that the conduct of the plaintiff does not deserve any sympathy or equitable relief. Licence agreement which was a commercial transaction between the parties has admittedly come to an end. There is absolutely no justification even for a moment, for the plaintiff not to remove his effects from the Ice Manufacturing Unit immediately after the expiry of the licence period and if the conduct of the plaintiff is given approval by the Court, it would create chaotic situation in the society. It will not be possible to carry out day to day commercial transactions. For example, a cinema viewer may insist to remain in occupation of a seat even after exhibition of cinema is over. Can he insist that he should be evicted only through process of law and not by force. It will not be possible to carry out day to day commercial transactions. For example, a cinema viewer may insist to remain in occupation of a seat even after exhibition of cinema is over. Can he insist that he should be evicted only through process of law and not by force. If he cannot, then how the plaintiff can say so. 24. Concept of ‘lease’ and ‘license’ are different and distinct to each other. Distinction between them is fine but substantial. 25. It has been held in Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vid v. Phundan Singh and others, AIR 1999 SC 2322 that relief by way of temporary injunction cannot be granted by way of social justice or equitable ground. 26. Sri V.C. Misra, learned Senior Counsel for the defendant strongly submits that the electric connection was got disconnected with the consent of the plaintiff after expiry of the licence period and there was no electric connection at the time of filing of the suit. The plaintiff in high handed manner with the connivance of the officers of U.P. Power Corporation got a new electric connection in his name during pendency of the suit, in a high handed manner. This conduct of the plaintiff is also dis-entitles him to get any relief from the Court. In para 12 of the writ petition it has been stated that the petitioner applied for extension of load of electric connection which was extended on 9-5-2009. The electric connection was provided on that date, i.e. subsequent to the order dated 29-1-2008, passed by the trial Court. 27. Learned senior counsel for the defendant supports the impugned judgment holding that the plea of irrevocability of licence as set out by the plaintiff in para-13 of the plaint is wholly untenable in law. In the said para, the plaintiff has pleaded that in view of the permission granted by the defendant vide its letter dated 12-4-2003 and acting on the licence granted, the licence of the plaintiff has become irrevocable as he has raised permanent constructions comprising walls built up of pucca red well burnt bricks and cement concrete mortar etc. A copy of the said permission has been annexed by the plaintiff which is at page 46 of the paper book. For the sake of convenience, the same is reproduced below : 12-4-2003 “Mohd. Sami, son of Mohd. Safi, R/o 76/391, Coolie Bazar, Kanpur. A copy of the said permission has been annexed by the plaintiff which is at page 46 of the paper book. For the sake of convenience, the same is reproduced below : 12-4-2003 “Mohd. Sami, son of Mohd. Safi, R/o 76/391, Coolie Bazar, Kanpur. Sir, Subject : Agreement dated 25-3-2002 in respect of Ice Plant situated in the premises of 80/80 Cooperganj, Kanpur for the period 1-4-2002 to 31-3-2007. This has reference to your request and also visit of the undersigned regarding your proposal to use open space measuring 25 ft x 30 ft hither to used partly for storing water of the ice factory and partly lying open, now desired for putting additional ice canes over it for which you are agreeable to increase the existing annual licence fee of the Ice Factory as per agreement referred to above from Rs. 2,25,000/- to Rs. 2,50,000/- per year. The increase will be effective from 1-4-2003. You are allowed to use the aforesaid space for the same and for other similar purposes like manufacturing and preparing of ice candy etc. In no case, any part of the Ice factory shall be used for preparation or freezing of nonvegetarian products. This letter is issued in duplicate, please sign a copy of the same signifying your acceptance to the above. Yours faithfully For J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd.” 28. A perusal of the said letter alongwith the terms of the licence would show that at no stage the defendant permitted the plaintiff to raise any construction of permanent nature. The plaintiff, on the contrary, was prohibited under the terms of the licence, to raise any construction. The said term has not been in any manner diluted or modified by the letter dated 12- 4-2003. At the most, through the said letter, the plaintiff has been permitted for putting additional ice canes over lying open space. Not more than that. The learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff petitioner preferred not to give any reply to the said plea of the defendant. 29. On the question of balance of convenience and irreparable injury, the plaintiff could not show as to how he will suffer irreparable loss by nongrant of temporary injunction or balance of convenience lies in his favour for granting relief claimed by him. 30. 29. On the question of balance of convenience and irreparable injury, the plaintiff could not show as to how he will suffer irreparable loss by nongrant of temporary injunction or balance of convenience lies in his favour for granting relief claimed by him. 30. Even otherwise also, it is not in the interest of justice to issue any writ or direction for quashing the impugned order which is otherwise just and equitable. It is not a fit case to exercise discretion in favour of the plaintiff. The Apex Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and others, AIR 1994 SC 853 has held that a person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court. The Courts are not meant for wrong doer, tax evaders etc. Relevant extract from the aforesaid judgment is reproduced below:- “...............The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loandodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is base on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.” 31. During the course of the arguments, a query was put by the Court as to whether the plaintiff petitioner has paid any amount for the period subsequent to 31-3-2007. The learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff could not give any reply in the absence of any instruction in this regard. 32. The trial Court while granting temporary injunction had directed the plaintiff to pay the amount equal to licence fee. The trial Court while fixing the amount payable by the plaintiff to the defendant, equal to licence fee lost sight of the fact that it was an agreed amount for the anterior period. The defendant is not willing to licence out the plant any more to the plaintiff but the plaintiff who has lost all his rights under the licence is thrusting himself on the defendant, through Court. Even otherwise also, globalisation has changed the economic scenario of the country. Prices have sky rocketed. The defendant is not willing to licence out the plant any more to the plaintiff but the plaintiff who has lost all his rights under the licence is thrusting himself on the defendant, through Court. Even otherwise also, globalisation has changed the economic scenario of the country. Prices have sky rocketed. There was thus no justification of fixation of the same amount, by the trial Court, by way of damages. The suit was filed in the year 2008 while the licence had come to an end on 31-3-2007. There is no averment atleast in the writ petition that in pursuance of the aforesaid direction of the trial Court, the plaintiff has deposited any amount so far. In order to do complete justice and to also protect the interest of the defendant and to balance the equities, it is provided that the plaintiff shall pay/deposit the amount for depriving the defendant to use the Ice Producing Unit for the period from 1-4-2007 to 31-3-2009 (for two years at the rate of Rs. five lacs per annum) i.e. Rs. 10 lacs. The plaintiff shall also be liable to deposit a sum of Rs. seven lacs in advance for the period 1-4-2009 to 31-3-2010. In similar manner, subject to periodical upward enhancement in this regard by the Court, the plaintiff shall continue to deposit the amount for subsequent years during the pendency of the suit and the proceedings arising out of it by the month of April of each year till he removes his effects and hand over the unit to the defendant as per terms of license agreement, in good condition. One month’s time is granted to the plaintiff petitioner to deposit the aforestated Rs. 17 lacs after adjusting the amount if any already deposited in the trial Court by way of bank draft drawn in favour of the defendant which shall be paid to the defendant. If the plaintiff fails to fulfill the conditions, stipulated above, further proceedings in the suit shall remain stayed. In case of default, it is further provided that the said amount shall be recoverable from the plaintiff by way of execution. 33. No other point was pressed. 34. In view of the above discussions, I find no merit in the writ petition. 35. The writ petition is dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. Ten thousand). ————