Judgment K.M. Thaker, J.—The petitioner has challenged award dated 23.03.1999 passed by the Labour Court at Bhavnagar in Reference (L.C.B) Case No. 778 of 1987. 2. The respondent herein raised industrial dispute claiming that she was employed by the petitioner company since 01.06.1985 as a Clerk on salary of Rs. 595.40 ps. per month. She also claimed that she was also required to work as telephone operator and with effect from 30.07.1986, she was terminated without following procedure prescribed by law. With the grievance against her termination, she raised an industrial dispute which culminated into reference (L.C.B) No. 778 of 1987. In January, 1988 she filed her statement of claim and prayed for reinstatement with consequential benefits. After the evidence was recorded and arguments were concluded the trial Court passed impugned award directing the petitioner company to pay full wages from 31.07.1986 to 31.03.1996 and to also extend the benefit of V.R.S to the respondent. Aggrieved by the said award the petitioner is before this Court. 3. Mr. Joshi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that there is no evidence to support the claim of the respondent that she was engaged as and/or required to work as Telephone Operator. He asserted that respondent’s employment was “tenure employment”, hence, covered under Section 2(oo)(bb)) and thus finding about breach of Section 25(f) is unjust and incorrect. The Labour Court has erred in accepting the said claim of the respondent. 3.1 Mr. Raval and Ms. P.C. Fernandez have appeared for respondent and submitted that the respondent had worked continuously from 01.06.1985 to 29.07.1986 and accordingly, she had completed tenure of more than one year. It is also claimed that work put in by respondent is of 346 days between 01.06.1985 and 29.07.1986. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that before or at the time of termination, neither any charge was levelled against respondent nor any compensation was paid and, therefore, her termination is contrary to law. The learned counsel for respondent also summited that considering the fact that the petitioner undertaking is closed, the Labour Court has moulded the relief and there is no reason for interfering with the same. 4. The learned counsel for respondent also summited that considering the fact that the petitioner undertaking is closed, the Labour Court has moulded the relief and there is no reason for interfering with the same. 4. It emerges from the record that in her evidence the respondent maintained that she was employed with effect from 01.06.1985 and she was continued till July, 1986 and then without any reason or without following any procedure prescribed by law, she was terminated w.e.f. 30.07.1986. She also claimed that she was also made to work as Clerk as well as Telephone Operator. She alleged that action of the petitioner company was in the nature of victimization and unfair labour practice besides, being illegal and in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 4.1 The petitioner also examined one Mr. Hasmukhbhai Govindbhai as its witness. The petitioner through its witness asserted that the respondent was engaged on “fixed-term” basis from time to time and every time appointment letters prescribing period of employment were issued. The petitioner claimed that respondent’s service was, thus, covered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. Certain documents, particularly appointment letters of the respondent were produced on record. As per the petitioner’s claim, the petitioner is an undertaking which has been closed down since 31.03.1996.The respondent has not disputed the said assertion. 5. After considering the documentary and oral evidence on record, the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that order of reinstatement would be justified, however, since the undertaking was closed, the Labour Court has directed the petitioner-company to pay wages for the interregnum period to the respondent to also extend the benefit of Voluntary Retirement Scheme. 6. There is no dispute between the parties about the fact that the petitioner company’s undertaking, is closed down since 31.03.1996. The petitioner-company claims that the respondent was engaged for fixed tenure and when the prescribed tenure came to an end, she was relieved and the subsequent engagement was always afresh. 6. There is no dispute between the parties about the fact that the petitioner company’s undertaking, is closed down since 31.03.1996. The petitioner-company claims that the respondent was engaged for fixed tenure and when the prescribed tenure came to an end, she was relieved and the subsequent engagement was always afresh. It is the case of the petitioner company that on fixed tenure basis the respondent was engaged from time to time between 01.06.1985 to 29.07.1986 and when the last tenure came to an end on 29.07.1986, she was relieved w.e.f 29.07.1986 and, therefore, the action of the petitioner company would not fall within the purview of retrenchment as defined under Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, but would be covered under the exception under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. 7. The petitioner company, to support its submissions, relied on the copies of appointment letters of the respondent. All the appointment letters give out that respondent was engaged as Clerk and there is no appointment letter which would show that she was appointed as Telephone Operator. 8. There is no dispute on the count that the respondent was engaged with the petitioner company between 01.06.1985 and 30.07.1986. The dispute or difference, however, is on the point that the petitioner claims that she was engaged from time to time during the said period whereas,the respondent claims that she was continuously engaged during the said period. The another main difference or dispute between the parties is that the petitioner claims that the respondent was engaged as a Clerk during the said period while the respondent claims that she was engaged as a Clerk and also as Telephone Operator. 9. The Labour Court has accepted the say of the respondent despite the fact that the respondent could not produce any appointment letter on record to substantiate her say that she was engaged and required to work as Telephone Operator. 10. The respondent has relied upon the oral evidence of petitioner’s witness and has claimed that even the petitioner’s witness has admitted before the trial Court that the respondent had worked as Telephone Operator. 10. The respondent has relied upon the oral evidence of petitioner’s witness and has claimed that even the petitioner’s witness has admitted before the trial Court that the respondent had worked as Telephone Operator. The said claim of the respondent brings about a situation wherein one has to assume that either the total tenure of the respondent with the petitioner company was divided in two phases i.e. first phase when she worked as (i.e. in capacity of) Clerk, and second phase when she worked as Telephone Operator or that there was frequent overlapping in assignment and discharge of duties. 10.1 There is nothing on record to bring out or differentiate the period for which the respondent worked as Clerk and the period during which she worked as Telephone Operator. It is pertinent that it is not the case and/or evidence of the respondent that she was simultaneously working as Clerk as well as Telephone Operator. In her evidence the respondent claimed that at the time when she was discontinued the work of Telephone Operator was available. The said assertion would mean that her employment-tenure in the petitioner company was, in effect, divided in two parts/phases and that she was working as Telephone Operator when terminated i.e. during the latter part/phase of her tenure. How long was that span? That does not become clear from her deposition. The possibility of overlapping of the two duties during the same span/period can be safely ruled out in view of the respondent’s evidence noticed above coupled with absence of any claim that she was performing the two duties parallely or simultaneously. 10.2 When the Labour Court accepted the say of the respondent that she worked with the petitioner company as a Clerk and also as Telephone Operator then the Labour Court also ought to have taken into consideration as to whether the respondent’s service with the petitioner company in two different categories could have been clubbed together for determining as to whether she had put-in work for 240 days or not. 10.3 However, this aspect has not been addressed by the Labour Court. The respondent has not given evidence on the point of time when she was engaged as Telephone Operator. 10.3 However, this aspect has not been addressed by the Labour Court. The respondent has not given evidence on the point of time when she was engaged as Telephone Operator. 10.4 All the appointment letters on record show that the respondent was engaged as Clerk and, therefore, it is not possible to ascertain in this proceeding, the time when the respondent was engaged as Clerk and the time during which she was engaged as Telephone Operator. 11. It is pertinent that though all the appointment letters show that the respondent was engaged as Clerk, she has insisted that she was engaged as Clerk and also as Telephone Operator. The respondent, however, did not elaborate and/or did not clarify the said assertion and absence of any clarification gives birth to several options or theories or possibilities e.g. initially she was engaged as Clerk and then as Telephone Operator or that she was required to perform both duties/functions simultaneously/parallely or that in one block (period covered under an appointment letter) she worked as a Clerk and the said block was being followed by another block when she was made to work as a Telephone Operator. At the same time, one of the fall-outs of her claim and evidence could be that when the petitioner engaged the respondent as Telephone Operator the petitioner’s requirement of engaging her as Clerk would have come to an end. But all these are merely possibilities and in absence of evidence cannot be made the premise for conclusion. 12. As per respondent’s evidence she was engaged in two different categories during the total tenure of 12-13 months (i.e. from 01.06.1985 to 24.07.1986). Service rendered in two different categories at different times which require discharging different duties or functions, ordinarily cannot be clubbed together for calculating working of 240 days or for determining whether the employee had put in work of 240 days in preceding 12 months or not. 13. All these aspects are not brought out or clarified in the evidence and/or are not discussed by the the Labour Court in the award. 14. On the other hand is the evidence and case of the petitioner. The petitioner’s case before the Labour Court was that the respondent was engaged only as Clerk. The petitioner has not disputed respondent’s claim regarding the tenure of her service and/or her claim that she had put in work for 346 days. 14. On the other hand is the evidence and case of the petitioner. The petitioner’s case before the Labour Court was that the respondent was engaged only as Clerk. The petitioner has not disputed respondent’s claim regarding the tenure of her service and/or her claim that she had put in work for 346 days. Thus the fact remains that the respondent worked between 01.06.1985 and 29.07.1986 and though there may be small gaps or hiatus in between the dates on which the respondent was engaged by the petitioner from time to time, the total work of the respondent comes to about 346 days, provided the entire tenure comprising service in two different categories, is put together. 15. The foregoing discussion and examination of award shows that several vital and relevant aspects have not been addressed and decided by the labour Court and the final directions have been issued without considering the material points and issues. Such lapse or failure renders the award unsustainable and calls for interference of this Court. On the overall assessment and examination, the award deserves to be set aside and absence of appropriate evidence would also mandate that the case may be remanded to the trial Court. However, in facts of present case the said option does not seem proper, or feasible or practicable, more particularly as the proceedings are almost 21 years’ old and since March 1996 the undertaking is closed. Thus it appears a situation based necessity that the issue may be settled at this stage. 16. Considering the fact that the total length of the service of respondent with the petitioner company is only about one year and that since almost 12 years the undertaking of the petitioner company has been closed down, the relief of reinstatement and/or the direction to pay salary for the entire interregnum of eleven years from 01.06.1985 to 31.03.1996 does not appear justified, and it deserves to be set aside. 17. Likewise the direction to extend the benefit of V.R.S which was granted by the company to its regular and permanent employees; and that too, to those who were in employment till the time of closure, is also unsustainable. There is no justification for granting such relief. The case of petitioner is not comparable with the persons who were granted V.R.S benefit by the company at the relevant time. 18. There is no justification for granting such relief. The case of petitioner is not comparable with the persons who were granted V.R.S benefit by the company at the relevant time. 18. Earlier by order dated 01.11.1999 petitioner company was directed to pay lump sum Rs. 22,000/- to the respondent. Mr. Joshi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of petitioner company submitted that the said amount has already been paid to the respondent and acknowledgment receipt has been executed by the respondent. Thus, the respondent has already been paid Rs. 22,000/- in the year 1999. Thereafter, this Court also directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 30,000/- in the Labour Court. The respondent was permitted to withdraw the said amount after furnishing security. Neither the petitioner’s advocate nor the respondent’s advocate make it clear as to whether the respondent has withdrawn the said amount or not. If the workman has not withdrawn the said amount then out of said Rs. 30,000/-, a sum of Rs. 5000/- is to be paid to the respondent and the balance amount should be returned to the petitioner. Thus, the total amount paid to the respondent would come to Rs. 27,000/- which would be more than the amount of compensation, gratuity etc. If the amount has been withdrawn, then the respondent shall refund Rs. 25,000 (Rs. 30,000-Rs.5,000) to the petitioner. 19. With the aforesaid clarification and direction, the present petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.