JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—This writ petition has been filed by the Committee of Management Janata Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidhyalaya, Kushi Nagar through its Manager Shri Ram Awadh Singh, aggrieved by the order dated 8.6.2007 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘DIOS’) disapproving suspension of Shri Bhartambar Pandey, respondent No. 3 who is the Principal of the College. 2. The principle ground taken by the petitioner is that the impugned order has been passed by the DIOS ex-parte and in utter violation of the order of this Court passed on 23.4.2007 in writ petition No. 19622 of 2007. The relevant facts in brief are as follows:- 3. The Janata Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidhyalaya, Kushi Nagar (hereinafter referred to as the ‘College’) is a recognized High School by the Board of High School and Intermediate Colleges, Allahabad and is governed by the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1921 Act’). The institution also being in grant-in-aid payment of salary to its teachers and non-teaching staffs is regulated by Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payments of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1971 Act’). 4. One Shri Harish Chandra Singh who was holding post of Principal of the college on substantive basis attained the age of superannuation and retired on 30.7.2000 causing substantive vacancy on the post of Principal. The petitioner was allowed to officiate as Principal by handing over charge of the said post till regular appointment through U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Board’) is made. 5. On certain allegations constituting misconduct, the Committee of Management resolved to conduct a regular disciplinary proceedings against the respondent No. 3 and also resolved to suspend him during enquiry by order dated 8.12.2006. The respondent No. 3 was placed under suspension and simultaneously an Enquiry Committee was constituted to hold disciplinary enquiry against him. A charge-sheet containing several charges was also issued to him on 8.1.2007. In the meantime, the suspension order pertaining to respondent No. 3 sent to DIOS vide Manager’s letter dated 13.12.2006 seeking his approval. After receiving no response, reminders dated 26.12.2006 and 17.1.2007 also sent by the petitioner. A charge-sheet containing several charges was also issued to him on 8.1.2007. In the meantime, the suspension order pertaining to respondent No. 3 sent to DIOS vide Manager’s letter dated 13.12.2006 seeking his approval. After receiving no response, reminders dated 26.12.2006 and 17.1.2007 also sent by the petitioner. It is said that the DIOS vide letter dated 26.2.2007, reacting for the first time, fixed 5.3.2007 as the date for hearing on the matter of approval for suspension. He being absent on the said date, no hearing could take place. Again by letter dated 14.3.2007, the DIOS fixed 20.3.2007 for hearing and required the parties to place their defence by appearing in person and also in writing. No hearing took place on 20.3.2007 also and again vide letter dated 21.3.2007, the DIOS fixed 24.3.2007 for hearing, on which date the Manager of the Committee of Management could not appear due to his sickness hence vide letter dated 24.3.2007 he sought adjournment. 6. In the meantime, the respondent No. 3 also neither submitted any reply to the charge-sheet nor conveyed whether he wants an oral enquiry, though reminder letter issued to him on 2.1.2007. Taking the advantage of inaction on the part of DIOS, the respondent No. 3 vide his letter (undated) (a copy whereof is filed as Annexure 11 to the writ petition) claimed that since his suspension has not been approved within 60 days, the same ceased to operate by operation of law and therefore, his entire salary should be paid since continuance of payment of subsistence allowance after expiry of 60 days is illegal. His claim to the above effect was also supported by the U.P. Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh vide its letter dated 21.3.2007. The respondent No. 3 also threatened to go on strike unto death by publishing an appeal in media, (a photo copy thereof has been placed on record as Annexure 12 to the writ petition). The DIOS accordingly sent letter dated 26.3.2007 directing the petitioner to submit full salary bill of the respondent No. 3 within three days and disapproved suspension by an ex-parte order. 7. The Enquiry Committee, on the other hand, due to non-participation of the respondent No. 3, also proceeded ex-parte and submitted its report dated 1.3.2007 holding the charges levelled against respondent No. 3 proved and recommended his dismissal from service as well as recovery of Rs. 1,31,186.25/-. 7. The Enquiry Committee, on the other hand, due to non-participation of the respondent No. 3, also proceeded ex-parte and submitted its report dated 1.3.2007 holding the charges levelled against respondent No. 3 proved and recommended his dismissal from service as well as recovery of Rs. 1,31,186.25/-. The Committee of Management in its meeting resolved to dismiss the respondent No. 3 from his service and the said resolution was made available to DIOS vide letter dated 9.4.2007. The above matter was referred to Board by DIOS for its consideration for approval vide DIOS’s letter dated 24.4.2007. 8. The petitioner challenged the DIOS’s order dated 24.3.2007 declining to approve suspension of respondent No.3 in writ petition No. 19622 of 2007. This writ petition was allowed by the Hon’ble Single Judge vide judgment dated 23.4.2007 and the operative part of the judgment is as under : “Accordingly this writ petition stands allowed. The order dated 24.3.2007 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar, respondent No. 2 is quashed. The matter is remanded back to the District Inspector of Schools to take fresh decisions in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. Learned counsel for the petitioner as well as respondent No. 3 have both agreed that the parties would appear before the District Inspector of Schools on 1st May, 2007 at 10:00 a.m. For hearing of the case. The District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar respondent No. 2 shall either hear the matter on that date itself or any other date which may be fixed within the next few days and decide the matter after hearing the parties in accordance with law within ten days. No costs.” 9. Pursuant to above judgement, the DIOS vide letter dated 1.5.2007 fixed 10.5.2007 for hearing. It is alleged by the petitioner that thereafter on 10.5.2007, the DIOS was absent and thereafter he fixed 19.5.2007, and 28.5.2007 but throughout on both the said dates, the DIOS was absent and no hearing could take place. On 5.6.2007, the Manager of the Committee of Management was present in the office of DIOS. He submitted a letter on the same date stating that though he is present in the office but DIOS himself is absent, the petitioner’s Manager feeling sick is leaving and further date may be given after 25.6.2007. However, on 8.6.2007 the DIOS passed the impugned order ex-parte. 10. He submitted a letter on the same date stating that though he is present in the office but DIOS himself is absent, the petitioner’s Manager feeling sick is leaving and further date may be given after 25.6.2007. However, on 8.6.2007 the DIOS passed the impugned order ex-parte. 10. It is contended by Shri Rajesh Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner that the DIOS has passed the impugned order again ex-parte. Since the DIOS was also impleaded by the petitioner in personal capacity making serious allegations against him, considering the above facts, this Court directed the respondent No. 2 to appear before the Court in person with the relevant record by order dated 17.7.2007. The said order remained un-complied with. By order dated 31.7.2007, this Court fixed 9.8.2007 again for compliance. The respondent No. 2 on 9.8.2007 appeared in person and also filed his reply explaining as to why he could not pass order within 10 days as directed by the Court vide judgment dated 23.4.2007. 11. Replying the facts and the circumstances as to why DIOS (respondent No. 2) passed ex-parte order dated 24.3.2007, in paras 8, 9 and 10 of the personal affidavit filed by the respondent No. 2, he has said that on every date fixed i.e. 5.3.2007, 20.3.2007 and 24.3.2007 the Manager of the College was absent and on the last date i.e. 24.3.2007, he sought adjournment on the ground of illness, as a result whereof the respondent No. 2 decided the matter on 243.2007 without adjourning the same. In response to the impugned order and the circumstances in which he passed late order dated 8.6.2007, it is not disputed by him that on 10.5.2007, the Manager, Committee of Management was present in the office of DIOS at 10 : 00 a.m. However, earlier to that the respondent No. 2 had gone elsewhere to attend some official duties and informed in his office that he will return by 4 : 30 p.m. The Manager left the office at 3:00 p.m. submitting application that despite of his presence since DIOS was absent therefore, he is going back. It is averred that the respondent No. 2 returned at 4:30 p.m. when the Principal of the College i.e. respondent No. 3 was present but the Manager had gone back. 12. It is averred that the respondent No. 2 returned at 4:30 p.m. when the Principal of the College i.e. respondent No. 3 was present but the Manager had gone back. 12. Regarding 19.5.2007, the respondent No. 2 says in para 16 of the personal affidavit that Manager did not appear and sought adjournment vide letter dated 19.5.2007. He has also filed a copy of Manager’s letter dated 19.5.2007 as Annexure 6 to the personal affidavit. The respondent No. 2 has further said that he changed the venue of hearing and informed both the parties but the Manager did not appear at the changed venue i.e. Buddha Inter College, Kushinagar on 19.5.2007. Consequently, hearing was adjourned till 28.5.2007 and next hearing was to be held at 12 O’clock at Tulsidas Inter College, Padrauna. The Manager did not appear before respondent No. 2 on 28.5.2007 also at Tulsidas Inter College, Padrauna stating that he has apprehension of lack of security of his person and documents, therefore, he is present in the office of the DIOS at 12 noon on 28.5.2007 and the hearing may either be held in the said office or in the premises of the college itself. The respondent No. 2 thereafter fixed 5.6.2007 on which date the Principal was present but the Manager was absent, and, instead sent a letter to adjourn hearing till 25.6.2007. He further states that on 7.6.2007 in order to verify sickness of the Manager, he inspected the college and found him present there. Consequently, he heard the matter on 7.6.2007 itself and passed the impugned order on 8.6.2007. 13. The respondent No. 3 has also filed a counter-affidavit in the matter of hearing also. He has supported and taken the same stand as is taken by the DIOS i.e. respondent No. 2 and has pleaded that the Manager himself was not availing the opportunity of hearing and seeking adjournment repeatedly, hence the impugned order passed by DIOS is in strict compliance of the directions of the Court. 14. He has supported and taken the same stand as is taken by the DIOS i.e. respondent No. 2 and has pleaded that the Manager himself was not availing the opportunity of hearing and seeking adjournment repeatedly, hence the impugned order passed by DIOS is in strict compliance of the directions of the Court. 14. So far as the validity of the impugned order dated 8.6.2007 is concerned, the limited issue which this Court has to consider is whether the order is ex-parte or has been passed after hearing the petitioner or that the petitioner himself is to be blamed for not availing the opportunity of hearing, and can be said to be an order in compliance of this Court’s directions contained in judgment dated 23.4.2007 in words in spirit or that there is disobedience deliberate reflecting on the conduct of the respondent Nos. 2 and 4. 15. Before adverting to this aspect of this matter I will notice one more fact which is not disputed among parties that the matter of approval regarding disciplinary proceeding and the Management’s resolution for dismissal of his service is still pending for consideration before the Board and no order till date has been passed by the Board thereon. It is also admitted before the Court by the learned counsel for the parties that the respondent No. 3 has attained the age of superannuation on 31.7.2009 (his date of birth being 1.8.1947), would retire at the end of the session i.e. on 30.6.2010 and therefore the matter of approval pending before the Court also needs an expeditious disposal. 16. Now coming to the merits of this matter i.e. whether the impugned order is ex-parte or due to deliberate inaction etc on the part of the respondent No. 2, I find that the matter can be examined in the light of the explanation submitted by the respondent No. 2 containing his personal affidavit and the counter-affidavit qua the pleadings in writ petition. In paras 8 and 9 of personal affidavit, the DIOS has said that on 5.3.2007 and 20.3.2007 the Principal of the College was present but the Committee of Management through its Manager remained absent. Both the paragraphs are sworn on the basis of the personal knowledge. But his (DIOS) letters which have been filed by the petitioner along with the writ petition tells otherwise. 17. Both the paragraphs are sworn on the basis of the personal knowledge. But his (DIOS) letters which have been filed by the petitioner along with the writ petition tells otherwise. 17. The Management’s order dated 8.12.2006 placing respondent No. 3 under suspension is said to have been received in the office of DIOS on the same date. However, the DIOS chose not to take any action thereon for quite some time. The petitioner sent reminders on 26.12.2006, 21.7.2007 and 13.1.2007 as stated in para 9 of the writ petition which has been replied in para 29 of the counter-affidavit by the respondent No. 2 as under : “That the contents of para 9 of the writ petition is not admitted and denied. Full and complete facts stated above.” 18. However, in the earlier part of the counter-affidavit, nothing has been said as to why for months together no action was taken by DIOS in the matter of approval of suspension of respondent No. 3 though he knew that under Section 16 G(7) of 1921 Act if a suspension is not approved within 60 days it would cease to operate by operation of law. The first date of hearing fixed by the respondent No. 2 is 5.3.2007 i.e. after expiry of 60 days. 19. Now manner in which the hearing got adjourned on 5.3.2007 and 20.3.2007 can be seen from the letters dated 14.3.2007 and 21.3.2007 issued by the respondent No. 2(copy whereof is annexure 8 to the writ petition). It would be appropriate to reproduce the same as under : Letter dated 14.3.2007 : ^^Jh HkkjrEcj ik.Ms; fuyfEcr iz/kkukpk;Z] turk m0ek0fo0 fot;iqj ds fuyacu ds laca/k esa fnukad 5-3-2007 dks lquokbZ gsrq frfFk dk fu/kkZj.k fd;k x;k FkkA fdUrq ml frfFk dks lquokbZ ugha gks ldhA vr% fnukad 20-03-2007 dks fnu ckjg cts lquokbZ dh tkuh gSA Ñi;k mDr frfFk dks mifLFkr gksdj viuk fyf[kr dFku izLrqr djsaA** Letter dated 21.3.2007 : ^^Jh HkkjrEcj ik.Ms; fuyfEcr iz/kkukpk;Z turk m0ek0fo0 fot;iqj ds fuyacu ds laca/k eas fnukad 20-3-2007 dks lquokbZ dh frfFk fu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k Fkk] ijUrq vifjgk;Z dkj.kksa ls lquokbZ ugha gks ldhA iqu% lquokbZ gsrq fnukad 24-3-2007 dks fuèkkZfjr dh tkrh gSA vr% fnukad 24-3-07 dks ckjg cts fnu esa lquokbZ dh tkuh gSA di;k mDr frfFk dks mifLFkr gksdj viuk fyf[kr vfHkdFku izLrqr djsaA** 20. A bare perusal of both the letters shows that the respondent No. 2 has mentioned the reason of adjournment in his letter dated 21.3.2007 an “unavoidable reasons” and no reason in his letter dated 14.3.2007. There is no whisper about the absence of the Manager on account whereof hearing could not take place. This Court failed to understand as to why the same was not mentioned in both these letters if it was in fact a reason for adjournment. I have no reason to disbelieve the petitioner that hearing could not take place on the above dates due to the reasons directly attributable to the respondent No. 2 and it is he alone who is responsible for not conducting any proceedings on the said dates and ultimately fixing 24.3.2007 at 12 O’clock since there is no material otherwise on record. 21. It is not disputed by the petitioner’s counsel that on 24.3.2007 due to his sickness, the Manager could not appear and sought adjournment. However, the respondent No. 2 did not accept his request though admits that the said letter of adjournment was received by him as is evident from para 10 of his personal affidavit. But this time he proceeded to pass the order on 24.3.2007 though ex-parte. This Court is refraining to make any comment further on this aspect since the validity of the order dated 24.3.2007 was already considered by this Court in writ petition No. 19622 of 2007 where the Court has also recorded its finding that there is nothing to show that the petitioner was responsible for delay in any manner, as is evident from the following : “It is not understood that when the District Inspector of Schools himself had been adjourning the hearing on the past few dates when the petitioner as well as respondent No. 3 were both present, then why such urgency had been there to decide the matter on such particular date when the petitioner could not appear because of illness. The very fact that the notice had been given to the petitioner on each date would go to show that the opportunity of hearing was necessarily to be given to the parties. The proceedings do not show that the petitioner was in any way responsible for delaying the decision in the matter as except for one adjournment, he had not sought adjournment on any earlier dates. The proceedings do not show that the petitioner was in any way responsible for delaying the decision in the matter as except for one adjournment, he had not sought adjournment on any earlier dates. It is well established principle of law that an order affecting a party has to be passed after following the principles of natural justice. In the present case, such opportunity of hearing has been denied to the petitioner.” In these circumstances this Court quashed the order dated 24.3.2007. 22. Thereafter again the manner in which respondent No. 2 has dealt with the matter is really shocking as is evident from the following discussion. 23. The Court itself fixed 1.5.2007 directing both the parties to appear before DIOS and he was directed to hear the matter on that date itself or any other date which may be fixed within next few days and decide the matter after hearing the parties within 10 days. 24. The respondent No. 2 therefore was under an obligation that either to hear the matter when both the parties are present on 1.5.2007 or any other date but not a date which would enable him not to decide the matter within 10 days. The outer limit as per the judgment of this Court was 11.5.2007 on which date the DIOS i.e. respondent No. 2 was under an obligation to pass the order and that too after hearing both the parties. 25. Now the manner in which respondent No. 2 proceeded is interesting to notice. On 1.5.2007, both the parties were present. It is not the case of the respondent No. 2 that he had to fix another date due to absence of either of parties. However on 1.5.2007, he fixed 10.5.2007 and the contents of his letter are as under : "vius i=kad@16@2007 fnukad 28&4&2007 }kjk ek0 mPP U;k;ky; bykgkckn esa ;ksftr ;kfpdk la0 19622@07 esa ikfjr vkns’k fnukad 23&4&2007 dh izfr izkfIr djk;h x;h gSA mDr vkns’k ds vuqikyu esa fnukad 10&5&2007 dks lquokbZ dh frfFk fu/kkZfjr dh tkrh gSA mDr frfFk dks viuk fyf[kr vfHkdFku lk{kh lfgr mifLFkr gksdj izLrqr djasA" 26. In para 20 of the writ petition, the petitioner has averred as under : “The Manager appeared before him on 1.5.2007 with all documents and evidences, but as wont the respondent No. 2 did not hold the hearing on date and fixed 10.5.2007 without any rhyme or reason.” 27. In para 20 of the writ petition, the petitioner has averred as under : “The Manager appeared before him on 1.5.2007 with all documents and evidences, but as wont the respondent No. 2 did not hold the hearing on date and fixed 10.5.2007 without any rhyme or reason.” 27. In counter-affidavit the entire paragraph 20 of the writ petition has been admitted as is evident from para 35 of the counter-affidavit which has also been sworn by the respondent No. 2. “That the contents of para 20 of the writ petition need no reply. It is stated that the Manager was played the tactic of delay for hearing then has sent an application before District Inspector of Schools and made allegations against the respondent No. 2.” 28. On 10.5.2007, it is not disputed by the respondent No. 2 that the petitioner i.e. Manager was present in the office at 10:00 a.m. as is evident from para 14 of his personal affidavit, the relevant extract whereof is reproduced as under : “The Committee of Management as Manager was present at 10 A.M. before the office of D.I.O.S., Kushinagar. Attention is drawn to the facts the District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar was Prabandh Sanchalak of Buddha Inter College, Kushinagar. Suddenly he was received the information by college authority that the dispute of teachers shall come in aforesaid college. The District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar was went to college at 9:30. the distance of the college is 20 kms from Kushinagar. The District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar took cared the dispute of the college and taken time in the college, therefore the District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar was informed by telephone in the office that I will reach about 4:30 p.m.. the aforesaid information also given both parties but the Committee of Management ignored the aforesaid information.” 29. The respondent No. 2 however has given his explanation that he being the authorised controller of another college i.e. Budhha Inter College, Kushinagar had gone to attend some duty thereat. The said college is about 20 kms from Kushinagar. the aforesaid information also given both parties but the Committee of Management ignored the aforesaid information.” 29. The respondent No. 2 however has given his explanation that he being the authorised controller of another college i.e. Budhha Inter College, Kushinagar had gone to attend some duty thereat. The said college is about 20 kms from Kushinagar. He informed on telephone in his office that he shall reach office at 4:30 p.m. It is stated in para 14 of the personal affidavit of respondent No. 2 that the aforesaid information that he (the respondent No. 2) shall reach the office by 4:30 p.m. was given to both the parties, but the Manager ignored the said information and left office at 3:00 P.M. It is interesting to note that entire paragraph No. 14 of personal affidavit has been sworn by respondent No. 2 on the basis of record and he has placed nothing on record to show that office informed the Manager about late arrival of respondent No. 2 in the office and directed the Manager to wait until 4:30 p.m. Name of the person who conveyed this information to petitioner is also not given. The said statement obviously thus cannot be accepted or believed. I find myself fortified in recording the above finding from a perusal of the subsequent letter dated 10.5.2007 of DIOS wherein he admitting his absence on 10.5.2007 and presence of Manager till 3:00 p.m. in his office has said that despite of information that the respondent No. 2 shall return by 4:30 p.m. he left the office. There also it is not mentioned that the information was given to the petitioner by the office of the respondent No. 2. In facts given in para 14 of the personal affidavit and in letter dated 20.5.2007 are totally different. In para 14, respondent No. 2 has stated that the information about his return by 4:30 p.m. was given by him in the office and thereafter he contents that the aforesaid information was also given to both the parties. The relevant extract of para 14 of his personal affidavit is reproduced as under : “ The District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar was informed by telephone in the office that I will reach about 4:30 p.m. the aforesaid information also given both parties but the Committee of Management ignored the aforesaid information.” 30. The relevant extract of para 14 of his personal affidavit is reproduced as under : “ The District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar was informed by telephone in the office that I will reach about 4:30 p.m. the aforesaid information also given both parties but the Committee of Management ignored the aforesaid information.” 30. However, in the letter dated 10.5.2007 the respondent No. 2 states that the information was given to the Manager on telephone by him. The contents of the letter dated 10.5.2007 are reproduced as under :— “ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;] bykgkckn esa ;ksftr ;kfpdk la[;k 19622@2007 esa ikfjr vkns’k fnukad 23&04&2007 ds vuqikyu gsrq fnukad 10&05&2007 dks lquokbZ dh frfFk v/kksgLrk{kjh }kjk fu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k FkkA ijUrq vki }kjk vius i=kad@ 20@2007&2008 fnukad 10&5&2007 }kjk ;g voxr djk;k x;k gS fd lk;a 3&00 cts rd mifLFkr jgs ijUrq lquokbZ ugha gks ldh] mDr ds lEcU/k esa vkidks nwjHkk"k ij voxr djk;k tk pqdk fd eSa fo|ky; tkWp esa O;Lr gqW vr% vki lHkh 4&30 cts rd dk;kZy; esa vius fyf[kr vfHkdFku ds lkFk mifLFkr jgsA ijUrq vki 3&00 cts gh pys x;s] Li"V gS fd vki }kjk izdj.k ds lquokbZ esa tku cw> dj vojks/k mRiUu fd;k tk jgk gSA iz/kkukpk;Z }kjk viuk fyf[kr i{k izLrqr fd;k x;kA vr% izdj.k dh lquokbZ iqu% 19&5&2007 dks le; 12 cts fu/kkZfjr fd;k tkrk gS ;g lquokbZ vfUre lquokbZ gksxhA mDr vof/k dks vki le; ls mifLFkr gks dj vius fyf[kr vfHkdFku ds lkFk lquokbZ esa O;fDrxr :i ls mifLFkr gksus dk d"V djsa ftlls fd ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds vkns’k dk vuqikyu gksa ldsA” 31. This Court therefore is constrained to disbelieve the stand taken by the respondent No. 2 that was being Manager of the Committee of the Management responsible for non holding of proceedings on 10.5.2007 and shows the conduct of non-co-operation. 32. Now coming to next date 19.5.2007, I find that respondent No. 2 fixed hearing in his own office at 12:00 noon. It is admitted in his personal affidavit that the petitioner was present on 19.5.2007 in the office of DIOS i.e. respondent No. 2. However, what he says is that the petitioner was not present for hearing on 19.5.2007 at Buddha Inter College, Kushinagar. It is admitted in his personal affidavit that the petitioner was present on 19.5.2007 in the office of DIOS i.e. respondent No. 2. However, what he says is that the petitioner was not present for hearing on 19.5.2007 at Buddha Inter College, Kushinagar. Regarding the change of venue of hearing in para 16 of the personal affidavit, the respondent No. 2 states that the Manager came along with the crowd in the office of DIOS causing problem in hearing hence the venue of hearing was changed and both the parties were informed. Para 16 of the personal affidavit is reproduced as under : “That on 19.5.2007 the Manager was not presented for hearing at place Buddha Inter College, Kushinagar. The principal was also presented at place of hearing. The manager of the college sent a letter before District Inspector of Schools, Kushiinagar that I am unable to reach at the place of hearing. A photocopy of the letter dated 10.5.2007 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure 6 to the affidavit. Attention is drawn to fact that Manager has come alongwith crowd in the office of the District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar the time of hearing then the District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar was facing very problem. The District Inspector of Schools, Kushi nagar changed venue and informed both parties. The Manager has taken objection for safety purpose therefore, he could not appear at place of Buddha Inter College for hearing. It is not justified action of part of manager with respect of hearing.” 33. Therefore, one thing is clear that date of hearing was 19.5.2007 at 12:00 noon in the office of DIOS where the Manager was present at the prescribed time. The DIOS was not present in the office. He had changed the venue of hearing to Buddha Inter College, Kushinagar which according to him is 20 kms from the office of the DIOS at Kushinagar. He has placed nothing on record to show that any order was passed by him to the same effect i.e. for the change of venue of hearing and it was communicated to both the parties. Para 16 of personal affidavit has been sworn by the respondent No. 2 on the basis of record though earlier paragraphs No. 8 and 9 regarding alleged absence of the Manager are sworn on the basis of personal knowledge. Para 16 of personal affidavit has been sworn by the respondent No. 2 on the basis of record though earlier paragraphs No. 8 and 9 regarding alleged absence of the Manager are sworn on the basis of personal knowledge. The averments in para 16 of personal affidavit therefore, are unsubstantiated and I find it difficult to accept the said version of respondent No. 2. This Court fails to understand as to why respondent No. 2, if was present in his office, and intended to change venue of hearing why he could not pass an order to that effect and conveyed the same to the concerned parties. Moreover, the letter dated 19.5.2007 submitted by the petitioner in the office of DIOS, a photo copy whereof has been filed along with the personal affidavit of respondent No. 2 itself contains petitioner’s version that DIOS was not present in the office on 19.5.2007 and instead pasted a notice on the notice board fixing 23.4.2007 as the next date for hearing at Buddha Inter College, Kushinagar at 4:00 p.m. This has not been controverted by him either in the personal affidavit or by sending any letter subsequently to the Manager. On the contrary, the short letter dated 19.5.2007 said to have been issued by respondent No. 2 fixing 28.5.2007 at 12:00 noon at Goswami Tulsidas Inter College, Padrauna states as under : “;kfpdk la[;k 19622@2007 esa ikfjr vkns’k fnukad 23@4@2007 ds vuqikyu esa fnukad 19@5@2007 dks lquok;h dh frfFk fu/kkZfjr dh x;h Fkh] ijUrq vkids mifLFkr u gksus ds dkj.k lquok;h u gks ldhA mDr ds laca/k esa lquok;h fnukad 28@05@2007 dks 12 cts fnu esa xksLokeh rqylhnkl b.Vj dkyst iM+jkSuk essa fu/kkZfjr dh tkrh gSA vki viuk fyf[kr vfHkdFku ,oa lk{;ksa lfgr le; ls mifLFkr gksosaA” 34. The absence mentioned in this letter is about the venue at Buddha Inter College, Padrauna. Nothing of the sort as claimed to have transpired in his office is mentioned therein. 35. The petitioner has not disputed that he did not appear before DIOS on 28.5.2007 at Goswami Tulsidas Inter College, Padrauna due to his apprehension regarding security of his person and documents and instead presented himself in the office of the DIOS. Nothing of the sort as claimed to have transpired in his office is mentioned therein. 35. The petitioner has not disputed that he did not appear before DIOS on 28.5.2007 at Goswami Tulsidas Inter College, Padrauna due to his apprehension regarding security of his person and documents and instead presented himself in the office of the DIOS. This Court also failed to understand as to why the respondent No. 2 was not able to conduct hearing at his own office where he could have arranged requisite security and could have taken steps to prevent any disturbance by the parties, if any, and why he tried to fix the venue of hearing at some other educational institute and that too at a place other than Kushinagar namely at Padrauna. 36. Then comes the last date of hearing i.e. 5.6.2007 which was convened by the respondent No. 2 vide his letter dated 28.5.2007. In para 23 of the writ petition it is stated that Manager was present in the office of DIOS on 5.6.2007 and waited up to 3:30 p.m. but DIOS was not in the office. The reply to para 23 of the writ petition is contained para 36 of the counter-affidavit sworn by respondent No. 2 and it says as under : “That the contents of para 21 to 24 of the writ petition is not admitted and denied. Full and complete facts stated above.” 37. In para 19 of the personal affidavit, the respondent No. 2 has said that only Principal was present in the office of DIOS but the Manager gave letter and requested adjournment till 25.6.2007. Full and complete facts stated above.” 37. In para 19 of the personal affidavit, the respondent No. 2 has said that only Principal was present in the office of DIOS but the Manager gave letter and requested adjournment till 25.6.2007. A copy of the letter said to have been given by the Manager on 5.6.2007 in the office of DIOS is Annexure 9 to the personal affidavit, and its contents are as under : “eS vkidk /;ku vkids i=kad eseks@07 fnukad 28-5-07 dh rjQ vkd`"V djkuk pkgrk gwWA ftles ;kfpdk la[;k 19622@07 ds lquokbZ gsrq vkids dk;kZy; ij frfFk fuf’pr fd;k x;k gSA bl laca/k esa eS vkidks iqu% ;kn fnykrk gwW fd fnukad 10-3-07 o 19-5-07 o 20-5-07 rFkk 5-6-07 dks dk;kZy; esa lquokbZ frfFk fuiVk dj vki vuqifLFkr jgsA fofnr gks fd vkids i=kad eseks@07 fnukad 28-6-07 ds vuqikyu ess vki fnukad 5-6-07 dks 12 cts fnu essa vkids dk;kZy; esa leLr vfHkys[kksa rFkk lk{;ksa ds lkFk mifLFkr gwWA vr% fuosnu gS fd esjs rfc;r [kjkc gksus ds dkj.k eS bykt djkus ds fy, fnukad 7-6-07 ls y[kuÅ tk jgk gwW blfy, de ls de 25-6-07 ls iwoZ lquokbZ gsrq dksbZ frfFk u ns eS vkidk vkHkkjh jgwWxkA” 38. The said letter clearly mentions that respondent No. 2 is absent in the office on 5.6.2007 when the said letter was given and received in the office of respondent No.2. The respondent no. 2 in para 19 of personal affidavit has nowhere said that he was present in the office on 5.6.2007. On the contrary what he says is that he inspected the college on 7.6.2007 where the Manager and Principal were present and he heard both of them there at. This para 19 of the personal affidavit has also been sworn on the basis of the record without placing any material to support the same. Para 19 of the personal affidavit is reproduced as under : “That on 5.6.2007 the Principal was presented in office of District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar but Manager was given letter before the office of the District Inspector of Schools and requested to adjourned the hearing till 25.6.2007 on account that I am going for treatment. A photocopy letter dated 5.6.2007 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. 9. It is stated that the Manager of the College had not gone for treatment before SGPGI, Lucknow. A photocopy letter dated 5.6.2007 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. 9. It is stated that the Manager of the College had not gone for treatment before SGPGI, Lucknow. When the aforesaid information was received by the District Inspector of Schools, Kuishinagar. The District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar inspected in the college on 7.6.2007. The Manager was presented in the college. The Manager and Principal was presented before District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar and heard both parties. They submitted all relevant documents related to hearing. The son of the Manager reached in the office of the District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar and taken the relevant papers of the Manager which was submitted before the District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar in the college at the time of hearing for purpose of Photostat of relevant papers but the son of the petitioner did not come back in the office of the District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar. A photocopy of the supporting evidence dated 7.6.2007 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure 10 to the affidavit.” 39. Besides, in the alleged inspection note which the respondent No. 2 has filed as Annexure 10 to the personal affidavit, there is no mention about the hearing of the petitioner and the respondent No. 3. It says that the son of the petitioner went away along with the documents. The above document does not help the respondent No. 2 in any manner. I further find it difficult to accept as to why the respondent No. 2 could not inform the petitioner in advance that he may be inspecting the college on 7.6.2007 and would hear the matter. Annexure 11 to the personal affidavit said to be the office noting containing signatures of only respondent No. 3 and does not inspire any confidence whatsoever particularly in view of the discussions made above. By the later part the respondent No. 2 has tried to show that the claim of the Manager that he fell sick on 25.6.2007 was incorrect and for the said purposes he made enquiry at different places but the same is wholly irrelevant. 40. Considering the above facts this Court has no manner of doubt that the conduct of the respondent No. 2 is highly objectionable and collusive in one or other way to help the respondent No. 3. 40. Considering the above facts this Court has no manner of doubt that the conduct of the respondent No. 2 is highly objectionable and collusive in one or other way to help the respondent No. 3. He has gone to the extent of flouting the direction of this Court by acting in a manner so as to make it improbable compliance of the judgment dated 23.4.2000 particularly with reference to the time limit. By his conduct the respondent No. 2 has tried to make the suspension of the respondent No. 3 inoperative and ineffective. His sheer arbitrary and illegal action in a calculated manner needs to be censored and disapproved by this Court in strongest words. The order impugned in this writ petition in the above circumstances cannot be sustained. 41. However, considering the legal consequences of non granting approval as contemplated under section 16-G(7) of 1921 Act, I find that cessation of order of suspension is operation of law if it is not approved within 60 days. Even if I quash this impugned order, in my opinion that would not result in revival of order of suspension which has outlived its term prescribed in the statute and cannot continue in the absence of the observance of the condition precedent provided in the statute for its continuance. 42. The result would be that respondent No. 3 despite the fact that the impugned order dated 8.6.2007 Annexure 1 to the writ petition cannot sustain cannot be kept under continuous suspension. This Court would not substitute its judgment as an executive order which ought to have been passed by the statutory authority contemplated under the statute. But simultaneously I find it a fit case where respondent No. 2 must be saddled with some exemplary cost for showing defiance of law as well as mandamus issued by this Court with such integrity otherwise the Executive Authorities having the mentality akin to respondent No. 3 would feel it safe and get encouraged to act in a similar fashion. It would ultimately cause travesty of justice. 43. It would be useful at this stage to reproduce observation of Lord Hailsham in Casell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome, 1972 AC 1027 observed : “An ordinary citizen or a common man is hardly equipped to match the might of the State or its instrumentalities. It would ultimately cause travesty of justice. 43. It would be useful at this stage to reproduce observation of Lord Hailsham in Casell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome, 1972 AC 1027 observed : “An ordinary citizen or a common man is hardly equipped to match the might of the State or its instrumentalities. That is provided by the rule of law.....public functionary if he acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then it is not an exercise of power but its abuse. No law provides protection against it. He who is responsible for it must suffer it ............harassment of a common man by public authorities is socially abhorring and legally impressible. It may harm him personally but the injury to society is far more grievous.” 44. In the case of Registered Society v. Union of India and others, (1996) 6 SCC 530 the Apex Court has follows as under : “No public servant can say “you may set aside an order on the ground of mala fide but you can not hold me personally liable. No public servant can arrogate in himself the power to act in a manner which is arbitrary.” 45. In the case of Shiv Sagar Tiwari v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 558 the Apex Court has held as follow: “An arbitrary system indeed must always be a corrupt one. There never was a man who thought he had no law but his own will who did not soon find that he had no end but his own profit.” 46. In the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction and another, AIR 1996 SC 715 the Apex Court held as follows : “A democratic Government does not means a lax government. The rules of procedure and/or principles of natural justice are not mean to enable the guilty to delay and defeat the just retribution. The wheel of justice may appear to grind slowly but it is duty of all of us to ensure that they do grind steadily and grind well and truly. The justice system cannot be allowed to become soft, supine and spineless.” 47. In the result the writ petition is allowed with the following directions : (i) The order dated 8.6.2007 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed. The justice system cannot be allowed to become soft, supine and spineless.” 47. In the result the writ petition is allowed with the following directions : (i) The order dated 8.6.2007 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed. However, the respondent No. 3 though may not be treated to be under suspension but it would be open to the petitioner, Committee of Management of the College to take work from him or not but he shall be paid salary as and when it falls due. (ii) The respondent No. 5 i.e. U.P. Secondary Service Board, U.P. Allahabad is directed to take a final decision in the matter of approval of Management’s proposal regarding termination of service of respondent No. 3 conveyed to the respondent No. 5 vide DIOS, Kushinagar’s letter dated 24.4.2007 (Annexure 15 to the writ petition) within a period of two months from the date of production of certified copy of this order after hearing concerned parties. It is made clear that in case either of the parties i.e. petitioner and the respondent No. 3 fails to co-operate in availing opportunity of hearing before respondent No. 5, it would be open to it to proceed ex-parte. (iii) The respondent No. 1 Secretary, Education U.P. Lucknow would look into the matter i.e manner and the circumstances in which the respondent no. 2 has functioned and after holding disciplinary enquiry in the matter shall take such appropriate action as permissible in law in the light of the findings received in the said proceedings. (iv) The petitioner shall be entitled to costs which is quantified to Rs. 50,000 against the respondent No. 2 who shall deposit the same with the Registrar General of this Court within two months failing which the said amount may be realised from his as arrears of land revenue. After realisation of the said costs, Rs. 25,000 may be paid to the petitioner and Rs. 25,000 shall be sent to the Mediation Centre of this Court. ————