JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Poonam Srivastava, J.—Heard Sri M.A. Qadeer, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Shamim Ahmad, counsel for tenant/petitioner and Sri K. Ajit, counsel for contesting landlord/respondent. 2. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged. The counsels for respective parties agree that the instant petition may be decided finally at the stage of admission itself. 3. The dispute relates to a shop measuring 8 x 10 situated at Taxi Stand Road, Civil Lines, Rampur. Petitioner is a tenant of the said shop at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month. Plaintiff/respondent gave a notice for demanding arrears of rent on the ground of default in payment of rent as well as material alteration in the shop in dispute on 20.7.2002. After expiry of period of notice, S.C.C. Suit No. 12 of 2002 was instituted for recovery of arrears of rent and damages. 4. The Judge Small Causes Court decreed suit on 24.3.2007 in favour of plaintiff, which was challenged in S.C.C. Revision No. 21 of 2007. The judgment and decree of the Judge Small Causes Court was confirmed in S.C.C. Revision, same was dismissed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 2, Rampur, vide judgment and order dated 4.11.2008. Both the judgment and orders are challenged in the instant writ petition. 5. Sri M.A. Qadeer, has challenged the impugned judgments on three counts. First challenge is on the ground of notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. Contention of the counsel for petitioner is that notice was not served and finding of the Courts below that it was refused by tenant/petitioner, is not substantiated by evidence. Besides, notice was invalid. 6. Next challenge is on the ground that the Court illegally failed to grant benefit of Section 20 (4) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and also findings were recorded on material alteration under Section 20 (2) (c) of the Act. 7. The counsel for petitioner has placed paragraph 4 of plaint as well as statement of PW-1 Anil Kumar Verma to substantiate his argument that date of notice mentioned is 30.7.2002 and plaintiff claims that service was also effected on the same day. Suit was instituted immediately after 30 days i.e. 3.9.2002. Thus, requisite period of 30 days did not expire. Admittedly, it is mentioned in the plaint that notice is dated 30.7.2002. Suit was instituted immediately after 30 days i.e. 3.9.2002. Thus, requisite period of 30 days did not expire. Admittedly, it is mentioned in the plaint that notice is dated 30.7.2002. It is stated that notice was refused by refusal on the same day and suit was instituted thereafter. Therefore, period mentioned in notice had not elapsed. Besides, it is also submitted that tenancy was not determined and, therefore, tenant could not be evicted on the basis of said notice. 8. Sri K. Ajit, has objected this argument of Sri M.A. Qadeer. He has placed photostat copy of notice, which is annexed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition where date of notice mentioned is 20.7.2002 and on the back of notice an endorsement of post man regarding refusal by tenant is 30.7.2002. Stamp of post office is also dated 20.7.2002, therefore, the Courts have rightly come to a conclusion that notice is in fact dated 20.7.2002 and not 30.7.2002 as mentioned in the plaint. This error has been explained by PW-1 in his statement where he has unequivocally admitted that date of notice mentioned in the plaint as 30.7.2002 is due to inadvertence and this fact has clearly been discussed in the judgments of the Courts below. Therefore, findings arrived at by Courts below after analyzing evidence, which is the notice, cannot be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. Besides, Sri K. Ajit, has placed extract of judgment of the Courts below where finding has been recorded on the basis of explanation given by PW-1 regarding mistake in the plaint. The Court recorded finding that notice is dated 20.7.2002 and it was refused on 30.7.2002. List of evidence mentioned as 5-C to 6-C are copies of notice dated 20.7.2002, paper No. 7-C is postal receipt, 8-C is original notice dated 20.7.2002 brought on record. PW-2 has also stated that refusal by tenant was visible from distance of 10-15 paces where he could see that post man had gone to his house. 10. After hearing arguments of counsels for respective parties on the question of notice, I am of the considered view that two Courts have held the notice to be valid. On perusal of notice it transpires that tenancy stood terminated in the event of non-deposit of rent demanded in the notice. Admittedly, this having not been done. 10. After hearing arguments of counsels for respective parties on the question of notice, I am of the considered view that two Courts have held the notice to be valid. On perusal of notice it transpires that tenancy stood terminated in the event of non-deposit of rent demanded in the notice. Admittedly, this having not been done. The submission of Sri M.A. Qadeer, Senior Advocate, merely a wrong mention of date of notice in the plaint and the error having been substantially explained, the two Courts arrived at a definite finding that the demand notice was dated 20.7.2002 and refusal was on 30.7.2002. It is evident by a typing error and the finding of fact by the J.S.C.C. and confirmed in revision cannot be interfered at this stage. 11. Reliance has been placed by counsel for petitioner on a decision of this Court; R.S. Negi v. Vishnu Sahai Verma and another, 2006 (2) ARC 566, wherein notice was held to be invalid in a civil revision since tenancy was not terminated. I have gone through that judgment. In the instant case, this is a concurrent finding of fact and it is discussed in detail that notice was dated 20.7.2002, which was refused by tenant on 30.7.2002 as well as the fact that despite notice arrears was not paid, therefore, this itself was sufficient for a decree of eviction. Question of validity of notice having discussed and confirmed by the two Courts is not open for reappraisal. 12. Next argument is regarding benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. Question regarding benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act, finding of the Court below is that entire rent claimed to be deposited by tenant was held as it was not deposited on the first date of hearing but after lapse of one year i.e. in the year 2003, therefore, the tenant was not entitled to avail this benefit. Arrears of rent as claimed in suit was w.e.f. 1.7.2001 to 30.6.2002. The tenant has to necessarily establish that the entire arrears of rent along with 9% interest plus cost of suit should be deposited unconditionally on the first date of hearing. Sri Qadeer has not demonstrated from the record that all the prerequisites of Section 20 (4) of the Act stands fulfilled. Thus, I am of the view that Courts have not committed any error while not granting this benefit. 13. Sri Qadeer has not demonstrated from the record that all the prerequisites of Section 20 (4) of the Act stands fulfilled. Thus, I am of the view that Courts have not committed any error while not granting this benefit. 13. The counsel for tenant objected to this contention and claimed that rent was refused by landlord. The revisional Court has come to a conclusion that refusal alleged on the part of tenant was liable to be established by cogent evidence, which has not been done. Only bald statement in the witness box is not sufficient to establish refusal by landlord. It has not been said that rent was tendered by money order or was deposited in the Court after refusal. Besides, there is also concurrent finding on the question of material alteration, which has diminished the value of the building. 14. Sri K. Ajit, has placed reliance on two decisions of the Apex Court. It was held by the Apex Court that once two Courts after evaluation of evidence come to a conclusion that there is material alteration, which has reduced utility of building as they have materially effected outlook, which could be said to have effaced the structure and value, is not open for consideration under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Two decisions cited by counsel for respondent is; Vipin Kumar v. Roshan Lal Anand and others, JT 1993 (3) SC 171 and British Motor Car Co. v. Madan Lal Saggi (Dead) and another, AIR 2005 SC 240 . Paragraph 7 and 8 of decision of British Motor (supra) is quoted below : "7. The appellate authority under the Act, after careful re-appreciation of the evidence on record completely affirmed the findings recorded on all issues by the Rent Controller. The appellate authority also took the view that the sheds constructed by the tenant are of permanent nature which could not be removed without doing damage to the building in question as they were embedded in the floor and also in the side wall; that by constructing the three sheds on almost whole of the courtyard, the petitioner had not only obstructed ventilation to the courtyard, but had also reduced the area of the courtyard considerably. According to the appellate authority, this certainly amounts to “materially impairing the value of the premises”. The appeal therefore failed. 8. According to the appellate authority, this certainly amounts to “materially impairing the value of the premises”. The appeal therefore failed. 8. Although the High Court was merely deciding a civil revision petition by the unsuccessful tenant the High Court has also re-appreciated the evidence threadbare and affirmed the findings of the two Courts below. The High Court has rightly rejected the contention that merely because in the previous litigation the petitioner-tenant had succeeded, that could not debar the respondent-landlord from moving a petition for eviction based on subsequent events affording him a fresh cause of action. The High Court has affirmed the findings of the two Courts below that the value and utility of the courtyard had been totally impaired as further construction had been made thereupon by the petitioner without the written consent of the landlord." 15. Sri K. Ajit, has placed reliance on next two decisions of this Court as well; Rajesh Mikhija v. Smt. Mukti Sen, 2006 (9) ADJ 431 (All) and Naresh Chandra Gupta v. Rajendra Mohan Mishra, 2008 (2) AWC 1973 . 16. Thus the challenge and arguments advanced by the counsel for the petitioner on all these grounds are not sustainable. The tenant is not entitled to the benefit under Section 20 (4) of the Act. He also failed to accede to the demand notice dated 20.7.2002 and tender rent on the first date of hearing. Besides, he has also made material alteration without the permission of the landlord. This has resulted in effacing the front view of the shop. The notice is held to be duly served and, therefore, the two judgments do not call for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17. In view of what has been discussed above, the writ petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. ————