JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned Additional Government Advocate. 2. This criminal contempt petition has been filed for initiating proceedings for contempt against the opposite parties for having flouted the order of this Court dated 7.1 .2009 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 35526 of 2008, Bhup Ram and others v. State of U.P. and others. 3. In our view a criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 lies when a person by word or sign or otherwise does any act, which tend to scandalise or lowers, or tends to lower the authority of any Court, or prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings, or interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. 4. We think that simply for flouting an order, if at all, where material is led to show that the matter has been duly communicated prior to the action taken by the alleged contemnor, a civil contempt may lie, but a criminal contempt would not lie. 5. Further learned AGA has drawn our attention towards two decisions of the Apex Court in State of Kerala v. M.S. Mani and others, JT 2001 (7) SC 577 and Bal Thackrey v. Harish Pimpal Khute and others, JT 2004 (10) SC 244, for the proposition that normally in view of Section 15(1)(b) of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 criminal contempt should not be initiated without the consent in writing of the Advocate General. Admittedly, this has not been done in the present case. 6. However, learned counsel for the applicant contended that there is always a reserve powers with the Court to initiate proceedings of contempt suo moto. The authority of the Apex Court indicates that it is in the most rare case that the Court will choose to exercise such power. 7. In our opinion, in view of the aforesaid circumstances where simply an order issuing notice to the other side inviting objections under Section 145(1), Cr.P.C. by order dated 22.4.2008 and attaching the property under Section 146(1) had been stayed on the ground that on the same day, both the orders were passed, we cannot say that any of the species of criminal contempt, as stated under Section 2(c) are disclosed. 8. 8. We, therefore, find no ground to initiate criminal proceedings against the opposite parties. 9. The application has no force. It is accordingly dismissed.