Judgment :- R. MALA, J. In this Habeas Corpus Petition, the Petitioner/detenu challenges the order passed by the 2nd Respondent, whereby the Detenu was detained branding him as a "Goonda" as contemplated under Section 2(f) of the Tamil Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Book-leggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (in short "Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982). 2. Based on the recommendations made by the Sponsoring Authority that the Detenu was involved in three adverse cases, as detailed below, TABLE The ground case in crime No.292/2008 under Section 392 IPC on the file of Kallakudi P.S. was registered on the complaint given by one Kumar @ Muthukumar S/O.Kalidoss, alleging that on 11.08.2008, at about 20.00 hours, at the time of returning to his house, while he was passing near a transformer at Raja Theater, one identified person whose name was learnt that later known to be Selvam, suddenty intercepted him and placing an aruval on his neck, threatened him to hand over the money from his shirt pocket and when he refused to pay the money, the accused enraged over this, threatened him by brandishing the aruval by uttering the words "Tamil" and since the complainant was shocked and stood still, the accused put his hand in his shirt pocker and took Rs.250/- and threatened him not to report the matter to police and ran away. On being satisfied that the Detenu has acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order committing crime of threatening the public on the point of deadly weapon and branding him as a “Goonda” as contemplated under Section 2(f) of the Tamil Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Book-leggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (in short "Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982). 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the petitioner/Detenu has involved in five adverse cases and one ground case. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the petitioner/Detenu has involved in five adverse cases and one ground case. The first adverse case in crime No.206/2007 under Section 379 IPC on the file of Tiruchirappalli Contonment Police Station and the date of occurrence is alleged to be on 24.02.2007, the second adverse case in crime No.207/2007 under Section 379 IPC on the file of Tiruchirappalli Contonment Police Station, the date of occurrence is alleged to be on 23.02.2007 and the third adverse case in crime No.205/2007 under Section 379 IPC on the file of Tiruchirappalli Contonment Police Station, the date of occurrence is alleged to be on 26.02.2007 and the fourth adverse case in crime No.287/2008 under Sections 457, 380 IPC on the file of Lalkudi Police Station, the date of occurrence is alleged to be on 05.08.2008 and the last and fifth adverse case in crime No.290/2008 under Section 457, 380 IPC on the file of Kallakudi Police Station, the date of occurrence is alleged to be on 07.08.2008. All the five adverse cases are only against the individuals. 4. The ground case is Kallakudi P.S. Crime No.292/2008 has been registered under Section 392 IPC and the occurrence alleged to have been taken place on 11.08.2008 at 20.00 hours. The learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that no bail petition has been filed in fourth and fifth adverse cases and ground case and in all the cases, the petitioner/detenu was acquitted during the pendency of the Habeas Corpus Petition. Since all the cases are only against the individuals, there is no public tranquility of public order, breach of law likely to cause disturbs of public order. To substantiate his contention, he relied upon the decisions reported in 2008 STPL(LE)40249 SC (Bhupendra Vs. State of Maharashtra and another) and 2005 M.L.J. (Crl.) 612 (Kausalya Vs. The District Collector and District Magistrate, Kancheepuram and another) and (2003) 2 Supreme Court Cases 313 (Darpan Kumar Sharma Alias Dharban Kumar Sharma) and argued that the detaining authority has not applied his mind and passed the detention order and hence, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed to quash the detention order. 5. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that the Detenu was involved in five adverses cases and one ground case. 5. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that the Detenu was involved in five adverses cases and one ground case. The first three adverse cases have been registered under Section 379 I.P.C, alleged that the petitioner/detenu committed theft of two wheelers which were parked in front of the Hotel Saravana Bhavan, L.I.C. Office, Trichirappalli and Vasan Medical Shop, Central Bus stand, Trichirappalli respectively and in the fourth and fifth adverse cases, registered under Section 457, 380 IPC alleging that the petitioner had committed theft of 3 sovereign and 3-1/2 sovereign gold ornaments respectively by house breaking and in the ground case, the petitioner/detenu had committed robbery near Raja Theater and case has been registered under Section 392 IPC and hence the detaining authority has considered all the materials and came to the conclusion and there is no infirmity in the order passed by the detaining authority and thus he prayed for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition. 6. While considering the arguments of both the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, it is true that the petitioner/detenu was acquitted in all five adverse cases and one ground case during the pendency of this petition. But the above said ground alone is not sufficient to set aside the detention order passed by the second respondent. Because, at the time of passing of the detention order, all the five adverse cases and one ground case are pending against the detenue. So, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner does not merit acceptance. 7. While considering the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is true that the first three adverse cases are theft of two wheelers and the same were alleged to be taken consecutive three days. In the above three matters, the petitioner/detenu has been arrested on 02.03.2007 and he was remanded to judicial custody and subsequently released on bail. In the above three matters, the petitioner/detenu has been arrested on 02.03.2007 and he was remanded to judicial custody and subsequently released on bail. In fourth adverse case, the occurrence had been taken place on 05.08.2008 alleging that when one Valarmathi and her family members were sleeping in front of her house at Rajiv Gandhi Nagar, Pullambadi, at about 1.30 A.M., she heard the noise of opening the bureau kept in the kitchen and she went to the kitchen, where she found an unidentified person, who pushed her and ran away from the place and a case has been registered in crime No.287/2008 under Section 457, 380 IPC on the file of Kallakudi P.S. On 07.08.2008, another occurrence had been taken place at Thirumazhapadi Road, Pullambadi, which was a house breaking and theft of gold ornaments and the case has been registered in Crime No.290/2008 under Section 457, 380 IPC on the file of Kallakudi P.S. and it is clear that there is no disturbances in public law and order problem, it will not create any insecurity in the minds of the people. 8. In regard to the ground case, it is stated in paragraph No.3 of the ground of detention as follows: “........ On 11.08.2008, at about 20.00 hours, he was returning to his houe by a bi-cycle. While passing near a transformer at Raja Theatre one unidentified person whose name was learnt that later known to be Selvam S/o. Suriyan suddenly intercepted him and placing an aruval on his neck, threatened him to hand over the money from his shirt pocket. Thiru. Kumar alias Muthukumar threatened him to handover the money from his shirt pocket. Thiru. Kumar alias Muthukumar refused to pay the money. Enraged over this, the accused Selvam threatened him by brandishing the aruval by saying "Tamil". Thiru.Kumar alias Muthukumar was shocked and stood still. Availing the opportunity, the accused Selvam willfully put his hand in his shirt pocker and took Rs.250/-. On seeing his atrocious activities, the general public, who were there tried to apprehend him and rescue kumar alias Muthukumar. Knowing the arrival closure to him, the accused Selvam, brandished the same aruval and shouted by saying "Tamil". Due to fear, the general public ran away. The accused Selvam also demanded mamool amount from the shop vendors. They refused to pay the amount. Enraged over this, the accused Selvam twisted the aruval by saying. Knowing the arrival closure to him, the accused Selvam, brandished the same aruval and shouted by saying "Tamil". Due to fear, the general public ran away. The accused Selvam also demanded mamool amount from the shop vendors. They refused to pay the amount. Enraged over this, the accused Selvam twisted the aruval by saying. "Tamil" On seeing his activities, the shop vendors also shut down their shops and ran away in all directions. The vehicular traffic was also paralyzed for some time. Later Selvam threatened Kumar alias Muthukumar not to report the matter to police, else he would do away with him and then ran towards the western side of the road." In that circumstances, the Detaining authority arrived at the satisfaction, the above said action affects the public, law and order and the Detenus have created alarm and a feeling of the insecurity in the minds of the people of the area, in which the occurrence took place. 9. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision reported in 2005 M.L.J. (Crl.) 612 (Kausalya Vs. The District Collector and District Magistrate, Kancheepuram and another), where it was clearly stated what are the activities would amount only to breach of law and order or likely to cause disturbance of public order would be decided on the following principles: 1) The maintenance of law and order relates to the crimes committed by private individuals. The maintenance of public order relates to the disturbance to the even tempo of life and public tranquility and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality; 2) Every assault in a public place resulting in the death of a victim may cause panic to those who are spectators but that does not mean that the said incident would cause disturbance or dislocation of the community life of the locality, in the absence of material that the act is committed in a public place to cause terror to the people in the locality so that they would be prevented from following their usual avocations; 3) The impact on "public order" and "law and order" depends upon the nature of the act, the place where it is committed and the motive force behind it. If the act is confined to an individual without affecting the tempo of the life of the community, it is a matter of law and order only and it may not fall within the orbit of public order; 4) In order to bring the activity so as to show that it would affect the maintenance of public order, there must be material to show that there has been a feeling of insecurity among the general public; 5) The mere words in the ground of detention would not be sufficient to inject the requisite degree of quality and potentiality to show that the incident was so grave as to disturb the normal life of the community in the locality in the absence of such materials. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner would also rely upon the decision reported in 2008 STPL (LE)40249 SC (Bhupendra Vs. State of Maharashtra and another) and argued that the Apex Court has laid down the guidelines how the activities of detenu to be breach of law to the public order to be decided. In that, the Apex Court has held as follows: “7. The crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the expression 'law and order' is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order. `Public order' has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of `law and order' and 'public order' is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting 'public order' from that concerning `law and order'. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting 'public order' from that concerning `law and order'. The question to ask is: "Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?" This question has to be faced in every case on its facts. 8. "Public order" is what the French call 'order publique' and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, is:Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed? (See Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1972 SC 1656 ). 9. "Public order" is synonymous with public safety and tranquility: "it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war, affecting the security of the State". Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum, which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. (See Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Ors. ( 1966 (1) SCR 709 ). 10. 'Public Order', 'law and order' and the 'security of the State' fictionally draw three concentric circles, the largest representing law and order, the next representing public order and the smallest representing security of the State. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. 10. 'Public Order', 'law and order' and the 'security of the State' fictionally draw three concentric circles, the largest representing law and order, the next representing public order and the smallest representing security of the State. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. Likewise, an act may affect public order, but not necessarily the security of the State. The true test is not the kind, but the potentiality of the act in question. One act may affect only individuals while the other, though of a similar kind, may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life of the community. This does not mean that there can be no overlapping, in the sense that an act cannot fall under two concepts at the same time. An act, for instance, affecting public order may have an impact that it would affect both public order and the security of the State. [See Kishori Mohan Bera v. The State of West Bengal ( 1972 (3) SCC 845 ); Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal ( 1969 (2) SCR 635 ); Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal ( 1970 (3) SCR 288 ); Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal ( 1972 (1) SCC 498 ). 11. The distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been pointed out succinctly in Arun Ghosh's case (supra). According to that decision the true distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and `public order' is "one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society". The Court pointed out that "the act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different". (See Babul Mitra alias Anil Mitra v. State of West Bengal and Ors. ( 1973 (1) SCC 393 , Milan Banik v. State of West Bengal ( 1974 (4) SCC 504 ). 12. The true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. 12. The true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and therefore touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be very different. 13. The two concepts have well defined contours, it being well established that stray and unorganized crimes of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder. Law and order represents the largest scale within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents the security of State. "Law and order" comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order" just as "public order" comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State". [See Kuso Sah v. The State of Bihar and Ors. ( 1974 (1) SCC 185 , Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra ( 1992 (2) SCC 177 , T.K. Gopal v. State of Karnataka ( 2000 (6) SCC 168 , State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub ( 1980 (2) SCR 1158 )] and Commissioner of Police v. C. Anita ( 2004(7) SCC 467 ).” While considering the above said citation, there is a distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but it is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act question upon society. In one case, it may affect the specific individual only and therefore it reaches problem of law and order only. While in another, it may affect public order. But, here the ground case has not affected the public order. Hence, it will not cause panic and insecurity in the minds of public. In one case, it may affect the specific individual only and therefore it reaches problem of law and order only. While in another, it may affect public order. But, here the ground case has not affected the public order. Hence, it will not cause panic and insecurity in the minds of public. So, we are of the considered view that there is no cogent material before detaining authority to come to the conclusion that the act of the Detenu has created panic in the minds of people of particular locality or public in general. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would also rely upon the decision reported in (2003) 2 Supreme Court Cases 313 (Darpan Kumar Sharma Alias Dharban Kumar Sharma) and the relevant portion is extracted hereunder: “Though in the grounds of detention the detaining authority had stated that by committing this offence in public the detenu created a sense of alarm, scare and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the public of the area and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which affected the even tempo of life of the community, but citation of these words in the order of detention is more in the nature of a ritual rather than with any significance to the content of the matter. Thus, a solitary instance of robbery as mentioned in the grounds of detention is not relevant for sustaining the order of detention for the purpose of preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In the above said case, the detenu has involved in three adverse cases under Section 379 IPC. The ground case is that he had committed robbery of Rs.1000/- in point of knife and disturbing even tempo of life of public since the occurrence taken place at Tambaram Railway Station. In that, the Apex Court has held that the detaining authority had stated that by committing this offence in public the detenu created a sense of alarm, scare and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the public of the area and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which affected the even tempo of life of the community. 12. 12. Even though the detaining authority while passing order in paragraph No.4 of the grounds of detention order, he has stated that he was satisfied that Selvam, the petitioner/detenu has acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order committing crimes by threatening the public with deadly weapons and as such he is a "Goonda" as contemplated under Section 2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 and by committing the above-described grave crime in the public place, he has created alarm and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the people of that area and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 13. On perusal of entire documents, there is no evidence to show that the occurrence has taken place in the public place at public view and on seeing the occurrence, public in the locality were scared and felt insecurity. Moreover, there is no iota of evidence before the detaining authority that by committing the above said crime in the nearby residential area and traffic area, they have created alarm and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the general public, where the occurrence took place and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 14. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the considered view that there was no cogent material before the detaining authority to come to the conclusion that the Detenu has created a scene of scare and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the community in the locality in which the occurrence had taken place and thereby acting in the manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. 15. As per the decision reported in 2008 STPL(LE)40249 SC (Bhupendra Vs. State of Maharashtra and another), the detenu has not created law and order problem and the ground of detention is not sufficient for sustaining the order of detention, for the purpose of preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. This ground is enough to quash the orders of detention made by the respondents. 16. Accordingly, the Habeas Corpus Petition is allowed and the impugned order of detention in Cr.M/.P.No.36/2008 dated 29.08.2008, is quashed. This ground is enough to quash the orders of detention made by the respondents. 16. Accordingly, the Habeas Corpus Petition is allowed and the impugned order of detention in Cr.M/.P.No.36/2008 dated 29.08.2008, is quashed. The Detenu is directed to be released forthwith, unless his presence is required, in accordance with law, in connection with any other case.