JUDGMENT Hon’ble D.P. Singh, J.—Heard counsel for the parties. 2. This petition by the landlord is directed against a judgment and order dated 22.10.2005 whereby the Additional District Judge, Bijnor has allowed the revision of the respondent-tenant setting aside the order of eviction passed by the trial Court. 3. Originally late Ram Niwas, father of petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 was a tenant of the disputed premises situated in Tehsil Dhampur in district Bijnore at a monthly rent of Rs.12.50, on his demise, they became tenants of the disputed premises. The petitioner-landlord vide notice dated 4.3.2002 terminated the tenancy of the tenants on the ground of default, sub-letting to respondent No. 5, material alteration etc. which was registered as SCC Case No. 60 of 2002. The respondents filed their written statement denying the plaint allegations and the trial Court framed at least five issues including on the point of sub-letting and whether the tenants were entitled for protection under Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (here-in-after referred to as the Act). After the parties had led their evidence, it decreed the suit holding that the respondent No. 5 was not a member of the family of the tenants and thus, was a sub-tenant and since the deposits under Section 30 (1) of the Act were illegal and further that the tenants had at least two houses within the same municipal limits, were not entitled to the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act. 4. Aggrieved, the respondents-tenant preferred a revision No. 21 of 2004 which has been allowed holding that since the respondent No. 5 was son of the daughter of Late Ram Niwas and was looking after mentally challenged respondent Nos. 3 and 4, he would not be deemed to be a sub-tenant but only a guardian. The Revisional Court went on to hold that once an order under Section 30 (1) had been passed in favour of the tenants who had deposited the rent, the trial Court had erred in holding that the tenants have failed to prove legal deposit and thus, it set aside the eviction decree and allowed the revision. 5. The Revisional Court went on to hold that once an order under Section 30 (1) had been passed in favour of the tenants who had deposited the rent, the trial Court had erred in holding that the tenants have failed to prove legal deposit and thus, it set aside the eviction decree and allowed the revision. 5. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that once it was admitted and proved that the tenants had at least two residential premises within the same municipal limits, they were not entitled to the protection of Section 20 (4) of the Act. It is also contended that respondent No. 5 was neither a member of the family of the tenant or his heir, and at best his occupation would be of a sub-tenant. It is then urged that the revisional Court has ignored the requirement of Rule 21 (5) of the Rules framed under the Act and therefore there was no legal deposit under Section 30 (1). Lastly, it is urged that the revisional Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciating the facts. 6. It would be appropriate to take note of relevant part of Section 20 (2) and sub-section (4), which is to the following effect : “20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds—(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner : (2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the termination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds, namely : (a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand; (b) .................................... (c) .................................... (d) .................................... (e) .................................... (f) .................................... (g) .................................... (c) .................................... (d) .................................... (e) .................................... (f) .................................... (g) .................................... Sub-section (4) reads as under : (4) In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or [tenders to the landlord or deposits in Court] the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord’s costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-section (1) of Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. (a) the expression ‘first hearing’ means the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendant; (b) the expression ‘cost of the suit’ includes one-half of the amount of counsel’s fee taxable for a contested suit.” 7. Under Section 20 (2) of the Act a suit for eviction of a tenant from a building after determination of tenancy may be instituted on the ground of arrears of rent of not less than four months which the tenant has failed to pay despite service of notice to that effect. However, Section 20 (4) of the Act empowers the Court to relieve the tenant against his liability of eviction on the ground of default if at the first hearing of the suit he unconditionally pays and tenders the entire amount of rent, damages etc. together with interest after deducting any amount deposited under Section 30 (1). But the aforesaid protection of sub-clause (4) is hedged with the condition as envisaged in the proviso that the tenant or any member of his family does not have a residential accommodation in the same city or municipality or notified area or town area. 8. together with interest after deducting any amount deposited under Section 30 (1). But the aforesaid protection of sub-clause (4) is hedged with the condition as envisaged in the proviso that the tenant or any member of his family does not have a residential accommodation in the same city or municipality or notified area or town area. 8. In the present case, the landlord had raised specific ground that the tenants had at least two residential buildings within same municipal limit/town area and therefore, they were not entitled to the protection of Section 20 (4). The trial Court considered the issue in detail and found that the tenants were in possession of one building adjacent to the disputed building and further another one in Chhatri Nagar in Tehsil Dhampur. This factual issue is not denied even before this Court. The revisional Court has not at all adverted itself to this issue which has been dealt with extensively by the trial Court. The contention that only respondent Nos. 3 (deceased) and 4 resided in the disputed premises along with respondent No. 5 cannot enure to the benefit of the tenants. It is not denied that Ram Niwas was the original tenant and after his death the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 all became joint tenants and once the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had occupied residential building within the same municipal limits, they would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 20 (4) in view of proviso thereof. 9. The revisional Court after having found that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were of unsound mind and were being looked after by respondent No. 5, who was residing in the premises could not be treated as a tenant but would only be called a guardian especially when payment of rent by him has not been proved. 10. It is undisputed that respondent No. 5 was not a member of the family of either Ram Niwas or of any of his sons respondent Nos. 1 to 4. It is also admitted to the tenants that respondent No. 5 was the son of the daughter of Ram Niwas. Thus, his occupation can neither be covered by the definition of ‘tenant’ as provided in Section 3 (a) nor would he be a member of the family as defined in Section 3 (g). 1 to 4. It is also admitted to the tenants that respondent No. 5 was the son of the daughter of Ram Niwas. Thus, his occupation can neither be covered by the definition of ‘tenant’ as provided in Section 3 (a) nor would he be a member of the family as defined in Section 3 (g). The revisional Court carved out a new case for the tenants by holding that the occupation of respondent No. 5 was that of a guardian. However, the tenants have failed to point out any provision in the Act which justifies the occupation of a ‘guardian’ as legal. In fact Section 25 makes a deeming provision for sub-tenants in the following words : “25. Prohibition of sub-letting.—(1) No tenant shall sub-let the whole of the building under his tenancy. (2) The tenant may with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate, sub-let a part of the building. (i) where the tenant ceases, within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 12, to occupy the building or any part thereof he shall be deemed to have sub-let that building or part : (ii) lodging a person in a hotel or a lodging house shall not amount to sub-letting.” Section 12(1) provides as under : “12. Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases.—(1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if— (a) he has substantially removed his effects therefrom, or (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family, or (c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere." 11. A joint reading of the two provisions makes it amply clear that in the case of a residential building where a tenant allows any person, not being a member of his family, to occupy whole or a part of the tenanted building, he would be deemed to have sublet the whole or part of the building. As already held, since the tenant allowed respondent No. 5 to reside in the building, therefore, they would be deemed to have sublet it to respondent No. 5. 12. As already held, since the tenant allowed respondent No. 5 to reside in the building, therefore, they would be deemed to have sublet it to respondent No. 5. 12. It is not denied that the deposit was made under Section 30 (1) of the Act which runs as below. “30. Deposit of rent in Court in certain circumstances.—(1) If any person claiming to be a tenant of a building tenders any amount as rent in respect of the building to its alleged landlord and the alleged landlord refuses to accept the same then the former may deposit such amount in the prescribed manner and continue to deposit any rent which he alleges to be due for any subsequent period in respect of such building until the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willingness to accept it.” 13. The procedure for deposit under Section 30 is provided in Rule 21 of the Rules framed under the Act. Sub-rule (5), though empowers continuance of deposit in consonance with Section 30 (1) it imposes a mandatory condition that on every subsequent deposits, though fresh application is not necessary, but process and notice in the Form ‘F’ shall accompany every subsequent deposit. The trial Court has recorded a finding of fact that it is admitted to the tenants that process fee and notice in the Form ‘F’ with regard to subsequent deposits was not made but the revisional Court, relying upon the order dated 18.10.1997 has held that after passing of the said order it would be deemed that all the provisions have been complied. No doubt, so far as the initial deposit is concerned, it would be presumed that the service was sufficient on the landlord but the said order dealt with the deposit made on or prior to 18.10.1997, years before the notice determining the vacancy was given. Therefore, the legality of subsequent deposits was crucial for relieving the tenants from eviction and thus in view of Rule 21 (5), it was incumbent upon the tenant to have proved that they had deposited fresh process and notice in Form ‘F’ with regard to subsequent deposit made after October, 1997. Therefore, the legality of subsequent deposits was crucial for relieving the tenants from eviction and thus in view of Rule 21 (5), it was incumbent upon the tenant to have proved that they had deposited fresh process and notice in Form ‘F’ with regard to subsequent deposit made after October, 1997. There is no evidence on record to show compliance with the requirement of Rule 21 (5) in regard to subsequent deposit and therefore, the trial Court had rightly held that the tenants would not be entitled to the benefit of subsequent deposit and therefore, the protection of Section 20 (4) of the Act. In fact even the defence of the tenants was liable to be struck off under Order 15 Rule 5, C.P.C. for not depositing the monthly dues within time. Thus, this argument is also bound to be accepted. 14. Since the writ petition is bound to be allowed on the aforesaid points, rest of the arguments need not be considered. 15. For the reasons above, this petition succeeds and is allowed and the revisional order dated 22.10.2005 is hereby quashed and that of the trial Court is restored. 16. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own cost. ————