JUDGMENT By the Court.—These two appeals arise out of a common judgment in two writ petitions delivered on 20.8.1997, whereby the learned single Judge dismissed both the writ petitions, and upheld the order of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission, disapproving the recommendation of the Committee of Management proposing dismissal of Raja Ram Shukla, appellant in Special Appeal No. 835 of 1997 from the post of Principal of an Intermediate College, and substituting the punishment of reversion, whereby the said appellant stood reverted as a Lecturer in the institution. The judgment under Appeal stands reported in 1997 (3) ESC 1850, Raja Ram Shukla v. U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission and others. 2. The issue raised in this appeal is primarily on the question as to whether the appellant-Raja Ram Shukla was a direct recruit on the post of Principal or not on the date when the punishment was awarded and as to whether the punishment of reversion awarded by the Commission was permissible in law keeping in view the provisions of Section 21 of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 (Act No. 5 of 1982) read with Regulation 8 of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission (Procedure for Approval of Punishment) Regulations, 1985. 3. The undisputed facts are that Raja Ram Shukla, the petitioner-appellant in Special Appeal No. 835 of 1997, was promoted and was appointed as a Lecturer in the year 1973 in the institution in question namely Vinoba Inter College, Kamasin, District Banda. The appointment on the post of Teachers and Principals in an Inter College are governed by the provisions of U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 as amended from time to time. 4. A vacancy, on the post of Principal, occurred in the said institution which was advertised under the provisions of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 and the Rules framed thereunder. This vacancy on the post of Principal occurred when the earlier incumbent retired on 30.6.1987. According to the Rules applicable, and as admitted in the pleadings of both the parties, Raja Ram Shukla, being one of the senior most Lecturers of the institution, was nominated under the Rules, and his documents were forwarded for being considered to be selected as Principal of the Institution. According to the Rules applicable, and as admitted in the pleadings of both the parties, Raja Ram Shukla, being one of the senior most Lecturers of the institution, was nominated under the Rules, and his documents were forwarded for being considered to be selected as Principal of the Institution. The Commission, after having screened out all the candidates, finally selected Raja Ram Shukla, who came to be appointed as Principal in the year 1989 itself. 5. The Committee of Management of the Institution alleged certain financial irregularities and acts of misconduct against the said Raja Ram Shukla and instituted disciplinary proceedings against him. The delinquent was charge-sheeted and according to the Committee of Management an inquiry was held providing full opportunity to him whereafter the Committee of Management resolved to dismiss Raja Ram Shukla from his service as Principal vide resolution dated 13.3.1994. The said resolution was required to be approved under the 1982 Act by the Commission and, as such, the same was forwarded by the Committee of Management to the Commission. The Commission by order dated 4.11.1995, impugned in the writ petitions, even though found Raja Ram Shukla to be guilty, refused to approve the punishment of dismissal and substituted the same by passing an order of reversion. Accordingly, Raja Ram Shukla stood reverted as a Lecturer in the Institution. 6. The said order of the Commission was assailed by Raja Ram Shukla as well as by the Committee of Management inasmuch as Raja Ram Shukla was aggrieved by the award of punishment by way of reversion whereas the Committee of Management was aggrieved as according to it, the punishment of reversion could not have been substituted as against the punishment of dismissal proposed by it. 7. The learned single Judge held that Raja Ram Shukla had been promoted to the post of Principal and, therefore, he could have been reverted to the post of Lecturer, and further found that in view of the relevant provisions as discussed in the judgment, the Commission had the power to alter or modify the punishment awarded by the Committee of Management. 8. 8. We have heard Sri Shobhit Dubey holding brief of Sri Ashok Khare, learned counsel for Raja Ram Shukla, appellant in Special Appeal No. 835 of 1997 and Respondent No. 2 in Special Appeal No. (490) of 1997, Sri Man Mohan Singh holding brief of Sri P.S. Baghel, learned counsel for the Committee of Management, appellant in Special Appeal No. (490) of 1997 and Respondent No. 3 in Special Appeal No. 835 of 1997, Sri A.K. Yadav, Advocate, for respondent-U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission in both the appeals and Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Chief Standing Counsel and Sri M.S. Pipersenia, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of the State. 9. Assailing the findings recorded by the learned single Judge, Sri Dubey contends that the learned single Judge has found in law that a direct recruit to a post cannot, as a measure of punishment, be reverted to a lower post inasmuch as a person, who is directly appointed to a post, cannot be reverted to a post which he never held. Sri Dubey has invited the attention of the Court to paragraph 7 of the reported decision of the present case, which is the judgment under Appeal. He further contends that the learned single Judge erred by construing the appointment of Raja Ram Shukla as Principal to be an appointment by way of promotion from the post of Lecturer. It has been submitted that this assumption of the learned single Judge is absolutely erroneous both in law as well as in fact. With the help of the provisions contained in U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 and the 1985 Regulations (supra), Sri Dubey urged that the Commission had no power to revert or reduce in rank the appellant-Raja Ram Shukla as a Lecturer inasmuch as he was directly recruited and was never promoted from the post of Lecturer. He has further invited the attention of the Court to the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 to contend that the post of Head of the Institution has to be filled up by direct recruitment as the law then existed. The only rule for promotion was in a case where an Institution was upgraded from a Junior High School to a High School, which is not the contingency involved for consideration in the present case. 10. The only rule for promotion was in a case where an Institution was upgraded from a Junior High School to a High School, which is not the contingency involved for consideration in the present case. 10. Replying to the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the Commission Sri A.K. Yadav contends that in view of Regulation 8 of 1985 Regulations, the Commission had the power to revert the appellant and, therefore, the conclusion drawn by the learned single Judge cannot be faulted with. He, however, could not dispute the factual position that Raja Ram Shukla was appointed by way of direct recruitment and not by way of promotion from the post of Lecturer. 11. Learned counsel for the Committee of Management contended that the Commission had no power to substitute the decision taken by the Committee of Management which had, after a full scale inquiry, found Raja Ram Shukla to be guilty of the charges and, therefore, the only punishment which the delinquent deserved was that of dismissal. He further submitted that the Commission, on erroneous considerations of law and fact, has without authority substituted the said decision in spite of the fact that the delinquent has been found guilty of the charges. It is urged that the finding of the learned single Judge appears to be that the punishment awarded by the Commission deserved affirmance, taking a humanitarian view, which is erroneous inasmuch as law does not allow any considerations of sympathy, and any decision against law would be a nullity. 12. Learned counsel for the State also attempted to support the decision of the learned single Judge and urged that keeping an over all view of the matter, there is no ground made out for interfering with the judgment of the learned single Judge. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to reflect on the scheme of the relevant provisions applicable in the matter of recruitment and appointment of Heads of institutions of Intermediate Colleges within the State. The legislature in order to govern the functioning of the aided and non-aided Institutions privately managed by educational Societies came up with a legislation entitled the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 which has been amended from time to time. The said enactment also makes provision for the service conditions of the teachers and employees of such institutions. The legislature in order to govern the functioning of the aided and non-aided Institutions privately managed by educational Societies came up with a legislation entitled the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 which has been amended from time to time. The said enactment also makes provision for the service conditions of the teachers and employees of such institutions. It is undisputed that the institution with which the present matter is concerned, is an Intermediate College duly recognized and governed by the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the Regulations framed thereunder. The post of Head of the institution under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act has to be filled up by direct recruitment as provided under Section 16-E (2) of the Act with an exception, which is quoted below : “16-E (2) Every post of Head of Institution or teacher of an institution shall, except to the extent prescribed for being filled by promotion, be filled by direct recruitment after intimation of the vacancy to the Inspector and advertisement of the vacancy containing such particulars as may be prescribed, in at least two newspapers having adequate circulation in the State.” 14. The exception for appointment by way of direct recruitment to the post of Head of the institution was provided for in Regulation 2 of Chapter II of the said Act which has been framed under the provisions of the Act itself. The said exception indicates that where a High School is upgraded as an Intermediate College, then the headmaster of the High School shall be promoted as the Principal of the Intermediate College provided he possesses the qualifications. A further provision was made in respect of the promotion of the Headmaster of a Junior High School in the event such a Junior High School was upgraded as a High School. The aforesaid provisions continued to be in operation till the State Government found that in the matter of recruitment of teachers and Heads of the Institutions, a Selection Board deserves to be set up and the law deserves to be modified. Accordingly, the State legislature enacted U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 known as U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 which came into force on 14.7.1981. The said Act empowers the Board to make selection of Head of the Institutions and Teachers. Accordingly, the State legislature enacted U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 known as U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 which came into force on 14.7.1981. The said Act empowers the Board to make selection of Head of the Institutions and Teachers. It was made imperative that the appointment has to be made only on the recommendation of the Board and for that it would be appropriate to quote Section 16 of the said Act hereunder : “16. Appointment to be made only on the recommendations of the Board.—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 or the regulations made thereunder, but subject to the provisions of Sections 12, 18, 21-B, 21-C, 21-D, 33, 33-A, 33-B, 33-C, 33-D and 33-F, every appointment of a teacher shall, on or after the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board (Amendment) Act, 2001 be made by the management only on the recommendation of the Board : Provided that in respect of retrenched employees, the provisions of Section 16-EE of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 shall mutatis mutandis apply : Provided further that the appointment of a teacher by transfer from one institution to another may be made in accordance with regulations made under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 : Provided also that the dependant of a teacher or other employee of an institution dying in harness who possesses the qualifications prescribed under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, may be appointed as teacher in Trained Graduates’ Grade in accordance with the regulations made under sub-section (4) of Section 9 of the said Act. (2) Any appointment made in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be void.” 15. A perusal of the said provisions clearly indicates that the Act of 1982 was given an over riding effect subject to certain provisions. However, any appointment made in contravention of the provisions was declared to be void. 16. The procedure for selection by direct recruitment was provided in Section 10, which is quoted herein below : “10. A perusal of the said provisions clearly indicates that the Act of 1982 was given an over riding effect subject to certain provisions. However, any appointment made in contravention of the provisions was declared to be void. 16. The procedure for selection by direct recruitment was provided in Section 10, which is quoted herein below : “10. Procedure of selection by direct recruitment.—(1) For the purpose of making appointment of a teacher, by direct recruitment, the management shall determine the number of vacancies existing or likely to fall vacant during the year of recruitment and in the case of a post other than the post of Head of the Institution, also the number of vacancies to be reserved for the candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes of citizens in accordance with the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes) Act, 1994 and notify the vacancies to the Board in such manner and through such officer or authority as may be prescribed. (2) The procedure of selection of candidates for direct recruitment to the post of teachers shall be such as may be prescribed: Provided that the Board shall, with a view to inviting talented persons, give wide publicity in the State to the vacancies notified under sub-section (1).” 17. A perusal of the said provisions clearly indicates that the procedure for selection by direct recruitment of candidates shall be such as may be prescribed. 18. Similarly the procedure of selection by promotion was also prescribed under Section 12, which is quoted below : “12. Procedure of selection by promotion.—(1) For each region, there shall be a Selection Committee, for making selection of candidates for promotion to the post of a teacher, comprising : (i) Regional Joint Director of Education - Chairman (ii) Senior most Principal of Government Inter College in the region - Member (iii) Concerned District Inspector of Schools - Member/Secretary (2) The procedure of selection of candidates for promotion to the post of a teacher shall be such as may be prescribed.” 19. The word teacher as used in both the sections referred to herein above, was assigned the meaning as contained in the definition clause of the Act, which is Section 2 (k); quoted herein below : “2.(k) ‘Teacher’ means a person employed for imparting instruction in an institution and includes a Principal or a Headmaster;" 20. The Act further contemplates that the provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 shall continue to apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Section 32 of the Act is quoted herein below : “32. Applicability of U.P. Act 11 of 1921.—The provision of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the Regulations made thereunder in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or the Rules or regulations made thereunder shall continue to be in force for the purposes of selection, appointment, promotion, dismissal, removal, termination or reduction in rank of a teacher.” 21. There are certain other provisions for appointment by way of regularisation but the same are not being referred to as they do not concern the present controversy. 22. In order to give effect to the said provisions of the Act, Rules were framed known as Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission Rules, 1983. The said Rules are being referred to as the same are applicable in respect of the controversy involved in the present case inasmuch as the selection of Raja Ram Shukla was admittedly held in the year 1989 when the said Rules were in force. Rule 4 (1)(ii) is quoted below in respect of the procedure to be followed where the Head of the Institution has to be appointed : “4 (1)(ii) In regard to the post of head of an institution, the management shall also forward, mutatis mutandis in the manner hereinafter specified, the names of two senior most teachers, copies of their service records (including character rolls) and such other record or particulars as the Commission may require from time to time.” 23. Rule 4 (1)(iii) made a provision for appointment by way of promotion but the said provision is not applicable in this case as in the instant matter it is not a case of the upgradation of a Junior High School to High School or of a High School to Inter College. Rule 4 (1)(iii) made a provision for appointment by way of promotion but the said provision is not applicable in this case as in the instant matter it is not a case of the upgradation of a Junior High School to High School or of a High School to Inter College. The claim is not of a headmaster of a High School to be promoted as Principal of an Inter College. 24. Rule 6 of the said Rules along with first proviso further throws light on the procedure of recruitment which is quoted below : “....Provided that, in respect of the post of the head of an institution, the Commission shall also call for interview two senior most teachers of the institution, whose names are forwarded by the management under sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 :" 25. The Rules of promotion are contained in Rule 9 of the said Rules, which is quoted below : “9. Procedure for appointment by promotion.—(1) Where any vacancy is to be filled by promotion, all teachers working in L.T. or C.T. grade, who possess the minimum qualifications and have put in at least 5 years continuous service as teacher on the date of occurrence of vacancy shall be considered for promotion to the Lecturer or L.T. grade, as the case may be, without their having applied for the same. Note.—For the purpose of this sub-rule, service rendered in any other recognised institution shall count for eligibility, unless interrupted by removal, dismissal or reduction to a lower post. (2) The criterion for promotion shall be seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit. (3) The management shall prepare a list of teachers, referred to in sub-rule (1), and forward it to the Commission through the Inspector with a copy of seniority list, service records (including the character rolls) and a statement in the proforma given in Appendix ‘A’. (4) Within three weeks of the receipt of the list from the management under sub-rule (3), the Inspector shall verify the facts and forward the list to the Commission. (5) The Commission shall, after calling for such additional information as it may consider necessary, intimate the name of selected candidate or candidates to the Inspector with a copy to the Manager of the Institution. (5) The Commission shall, after calling for such additional information as it may consider necessary, intimate the name of selected candidate or candidates to the Inspector with a copy to the Manager of the Institution. (6) Within 10 days of the receipt of the intimation from the Commission under sub-rule (5), the Inspector shall send the name of the selected candidate(s) to the Manager of the concerned institution and the provisions of sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 8 shall mutatis mutandis apply.” 26. A perusal of the said rule would indicate that these promotional Rules were applicable only in respect of LT or CT grade teachers and it nowhere reflects the post of head of the Institution to be filled up by way of promotion. As pointed out herein above, the post of Head of the Institution by way of promotion was to be filled up only in 2 contingencies as the Rules then existed and contained in Rule 4 (1)(iii). 27. The subsequent amendments in the Rules in respect of selection and promotion are not being referred to as the same would not be applicable in the controversy presently involved. However, it would be worth noting that while further amending the Rules in the year 1998, which are known as the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Rules, 1995. Rule 10 clearly specifies that the post of Principal of an Intermediate College or Headmaster of a High School shall be filled up only by direct recruitment and not otherwise. The said Rules 1995 have clearly done away with any contingency of appointment by way of promotion. 28. So far as the present dispute is concerned, a perusal of the provisions referred to herein above and keeping in view the applicability of the 1921 Act as saved under Section 32 of the 1982 Act, it is evident that the post of Head of the Institution was to be filled up by way of direct recruitment. This is evident from a bare reading of Section 16-E (2) read with 1983 Rules referred to herein above. 29. The exception was only in favour of such appointments which had to be filled up by promotion of a Headmaster of a High School or a Junior High School which is not the contingency on facts in the present case. 30. 29. The exception was only in favour of such appointments which had to be filled up by promotion of a Headmaster of a High School or a Junior High School which is not the contingency on facts in the present case. 30. It is the admitted case of the parties that the post was advertised by the Commission to be filled up by selection and the same was done by way of direct recruitment. It is nobody’s case that Raja Ram Shukla had ever applied for being promoted or was claiming promotion on the post of Principal. It is not the case of the Commission either that the post against which the selections were held was a promotional post. 31. Coming to the finding of the learned single Judge on this issue, the following portion of the judgment deserves to be quoted hereunder : “...........In the background of the above law, now let us consider the case of the present petitioner, namely, Sri Raja Ram Shukla. To say that he was direct recruit, is nothing, but a misnomer, twisting the facts and hair splitting the matter. Admittedly, Sri Raja Ram Shukla had risen to the post of principal by promotion. He was initially appointed as Assistant Teacher in the College in 1967. In due course, he was promoted to the post of Lecturer in the year 1973. When the vacancy to the post of Principal occurred, the name of two senior most teachers including that of Sri Raja Ram Shukla were sent under Rule 9 of the U.P. Secondary Education Commission and Selection Board Rules, framed under the provisions of the Act. The appointment of Sri Raja Ram Shukla as Principal came to be made by virtue of the fact that he was the senior most Lecturer in the institution. It is not a case where Sri Raja Ram Shukla has been brought by direct recruitment from some other institution to the institution in which he was serving as Principal. By no stretch of imagination, Sri Raja Ram Shukla can be termed to be a direct recruit. He was holding the post of Lecturer in the College just before his promotion to the post of Principal. By no stretch of imagination, Sri Raja Ram Shukla can be termed to be a direct recruit. He was holding the post of Lecturer in the College just before his promotion to the post of Principal. Since he had gone on promotion from the post of Lecturer, which belonged to the feeder cadre, on the establishment of various charges against him, as a result of the disciplinary enquiry, there is nothing wrong or illegal to revert him to the post of lecturer, which he admittedly held earlier.” 32. A perusal of the said finding recorded by the learned single Judge on a closure scrutiny would reveal that the learned single Judge assumed a fact which was not a case pleaded or proved by either of the parties. The finding of the learned single Judge that Raja Ram Shukla was functioning as a Lecturer and, therefore, in view of his name having been sent for consideration as one of the senior most Lecturer’s of the institution, amounted to promotion, is a fiction created by interpretation which, in our opinion, is absolutely erroneous. The mere sending of the names, for consideration of 2 senior most Teachers to the Commission, would, by no stretch of imagination, amount to recommend a promotion on the post of the Head of the Institution. At the best, it is a provision made in favour of 2 senior most teachers for the compulsory consideration of their candidature. The same in no way compels the commission to select them in case they are not suitable or eligible. They are only candidates to be considered at the time of the selection by the Commission and nothing beyond that. 33. The Rules applicable and as quoted herein above do not indicate the post of Head of the Institution of an Intermediate College to be filled up by promotion except in the case where the Headmaster of a High School had to be promoted on upgradation. The appellant-Raja Ram Shukla was neither the Headmaster of a High School nor was the institution upgraded as an Intermediate College which required a promotion of the Head of the Institution. The learned single Judge, therefore, took an erroneous view by misconstruing the facts and by rendering an interpretation which travels beyond the true sense of the legislation. The appellant-Raja Ram Shukla was neither the Headmaster of a High School nor was the institution upgraded as an Intermediate College which required a promotion of the Head of the Institution. The learned single Judge, therefore, took an erroneous view by misconstruing the facts and by rendering an interpretation which travels beyond the true sense of the legislation. The learned single Judge, in our opinion, has changed the very basis of the facts, which were contrary to the records and the admitted position between the parties, and thereafter has proceeded to apply a law by reading into the provisions a rule of promotion which otherwise does not exist. A second look at the provisions again would establish that the post of head of the Institution in the present case had to be filled by direct recruitment and was actually filled up by way of direct recruitment and not by way of promotion. The Rules of promotion also do not indicate the promotion of a Lecturer on the post of head of the institution. In such circumstances and in view of the conclusions drawn herein above, we have no option but to over rule the opinion of the learned single Judge and hold that Raja Ram Shukla had been appointed to the post of Principal by way of direct recruitment and not by way of promotion. 34. Having held so, the task relating to the proposition of law as to whether the delinquent could have been reverted or not becomes easier. For that, one will have to refer to the Rules namely the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Procedure for Approval of Punishment) Regulations, 1985. These Rules have been framed in exercise of powers vested in the Government under Section 7 read with Section 34 of the U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982. However, before referring to the said Rules, it would be appropriate to refer to the charging Section namely Section 21 of the U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982, which is quoted herein below : “21. Restriction on dismissal etc. However, before referring to the said Rules, it would be appropriate to refer to the charging Section namely Section 21 of the U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982, which is quoted herein below : “21. Restriction on dismissal etc. of teachers.—The management shall not, except with the prior approval of the Board, dismiss any teacher or remove him from service, or serve on him any notice of removal from service, or reduce him in rank or reduce his emoluments or withhold his increment for any period (whether temporarily or permanently) and any such thing done without such prior approval shall be void.” 35. The aforesaid section, therefore, prohibits the dismissal or removal of a teacher except with the prior approval by the Board. The Commission, while exercising the aforesaid power under Section 21, has to conform to the above mentioned Regulations and Regulation 8, which is subject matter of consideration herein is quoted below : “8. Disposal by Commission.—The Commission shall after due consideration approve or disapprove the punishment proposed or may issue any other directions deemed fit in the case.” 36. The question as to whether the Commission has the power to alter or modify, rescind or issue any direction in relation to the proposal of punishment has been subject matter of consideration in a large number of decisions of this Court. The scope and ambit of the said provision is explained in detail in the case of Pradumna Kumar Jain v. U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission and others, 1997 (2) ESC 847. The learned single Judge, after discussing the law and the relevant provision on the issue, came to the following conclusion : “6. Mr. Shandilya, relying on the order contained in Annexure ‘I’, contends that the text of the order is in the nature of an order. By no stretch of imagination, according to him, the same could be termed as a direction. The phrase ‘direction’ does not postulate any scope for passing another order. It can only issue direction, nothing more nothing less. The contention of Mr. Shandilya cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the power to approve or disapprove includes the power to modify, which power is implicit in it and is an established principle by now. The phrase ‘direction’ does not postulate any scope for passing another order. It can only issue direction, nothing more nothing less. The contention of Mr. Shandilya cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the power to approve or disapprove includes the power to modify, which power is implicit in it and is an established principle by now. It is an established principle that when an order is open to a superior authority to decide on the merits of it for the purpose of either affirming or reversing the same, the same is also akin into approving or disapproving. Inasmuch as though two different terms have been used, they mean the identical situation. To approve or to disapprove has the same meaning for all practical purposes to affirm or reverse. In respect of the appellate jurisdiction, it is the consistent view of the High Courts and the Apex Court that the power to affirm or reverse includes the power to modify. Unless such power or jurisdiction is barred by express provision, the same is always explicit in it. But in the present case the inclusion of the phrase “or may issue any other directions deemed fit in the case”, indicates the very existence of the power to modify. Such expression cannot be interpreted to narrow down the meaning so as to make the provision ineffective. An interpretation which further the aims and objects of the statute is preferable to be accepted, against an interpretation which frustrates the same or narrows down the scope. The intention of the legislature, if not explicit or express or cannot be covered even by implication, in that event, a narrow meaning cannot be imputed for interpreting a Statute. In the present case, it does not appear that the legislature had ever intended to narrow down the meaning so as to confine the power or jurisdiction only on power to approve or disapprove. The inclusion of the expression in the phrase referred to above clearly indicates that the legislature had intended some more powers beyond the narrow lane of approval or disapproval. Therefore, the order modifying the punishment to a lesser extent cannot be said to be without jurisdiction, though argued with great vehemence and intelligently, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Shandilya with regard to this point. 7. Therefore, the order modifying the punishment to a lesser extent cannot be said to be without jurisdiction, though argued with great vehemence and intelligently, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Shandilya with regard to this point. 7. Then again unless an act is expressly prohibited by law, the Court is not supposed to presume as a matter of general principle that certain act is prohibited beyond what has been expressly conferred to the extent it is acceptable on the principle as enunciated in the foregoing para, namely, to the extent that the power to approve or disapprove a particular order includes the power is modify such order as well particularly when the structure of the Statute conceives of a liberal interpretation furthering the object and purpose for which the same is incorporated. The purpose and object of incorporation of the approval and disapproval has been ensured to safeguard the interest of the delinquent from the arbitrary and high handed actions on the part of the Committee of Management. The checks and balance on the high handedness of the Committee of Management, as has been sought to be introduced by reason of incorporation of the power to approve or disapprove surely will further the object and purpose if the construction as is being made herein, is accepted in the light of the observations made above. In the case of Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey, (I.L.R. 5 All. 163), it was laid down : “Courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly forbidden by the Code but on the perverse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law, as a matter of general principle prohibitions cannot be permitted.” Following the said decision in the case of Narsingh Das (supra), is the case of Smt. Rukmani Devi v. District Judge, Gorakhpur, (1983) 9 ALR 95, it was held : “The Tribunal in absence of express prohibition can be deemed to have possessed a power which was necessary to do the right and undo wrong in course of determination of justice.” 37. The issue was again raised in the case of Managing Committee of Gochar Krishi Inter College, Rampur Maniharan, Saharanpur and another v. U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board, Allahabad and others, 2002 (1) ESC 355, and the learned single Judge took a different opinion holding that the Commission did not have the power to award a punishment other than proposed by the Management or reduce or enhance the punishment in view of the provisions of Section 21 of the Act. Paragraph 11 and 12 of the said decision are quoted below : “11. Section 21 of the Act provides restriction on dismissal of a teacher except with the prior approval of the Board. The power to approve also includes disapproval but the question in the present case is about the extent of powers of the Selection Board while approving or disapproving the proposal. Although, the regulations cannot curtail the powers under the Act, under which they are made, these can only enumerate the scope of powers. Regulation 7 authorises the Commission to call for any documents, considered relevant in the case from the Management or the Inspector. This power is in aid of making an enquiry into the matter. Regulation 8, however, enumerates the scope of power of approval and provides that the Commission, after due consideration, shall approve or disapprove the punishment proposed or may issue any other directions deemed fit in the case. It is to be noticed that Section 16-G (3)(b) of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 provides that the Inspector may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management provided that in the cases of punishment, before passing orders, Inspector shall give an opportunity to the Principal, the Headmaster or the teacher to show cause within a fortnight of the receipt of notice why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted. After the enactment of U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982, the powers of the Inspector under Section 16-G(3)(b) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, in the case of Institutions, which are not minority institution, have been vested in the Selection Board, with significant absence of the power to reduce or enhance the punishment. After the enactment of U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982, the powers of the Inspector under Section 16-G(3)(b) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, in the case of Institutions, which are not minority institution, have been vested in the Selection Board, with significant absence of the power to reduce or enhance the punishment. The authority, specifically given to the Inspector, is conspicuously missing in Section 21 of Act, 1982 read with regulations of 1985 and consequently the power to give opportunity to the Principal, the Headmaster or the teacher to show cause why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted, is also not provided in Section 21 of the Act, 1982 or the regulations made thereunder. The Selection Board, therefore, has not been given the powers to either reduce or enhance the punishment. 12. A question thereafter arises to the extent and scope of the powers of the Board. In all the cases where the appointing authority is vested with discretionary powers, the power of enquiry, evidence, production of documents, the examination of charges and the defence taken by the delinquent is in the hands of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which has to form an opinion whether the charges were established after going through the record and evidence adduced by the department and the delinquent employee. The sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence, demeanour of witnesses and conduct of the delinquent employee is to be judged by the disciplinary authority. The scrutiny by approving authority is to find out; (1) whether the enquiry was conducted by the competent authority; (2) whether the delinquent was informed of the charge; (3) whether he was afforded opportunity to defend himself and that there was no prejudice caused on account of denial of such opportunity; (4) whether the evidence led by department proves the charges, and (5) whether the proposed punishment is commensurate to the charge. The power of approval cannot be extended to include afresh enquiry in the matter. Even if the approving authority comes to the conclusion that the enquiry was not fair or impartial or the principles of natural justice were violated or that the punishment is not commensurate to the charges, if can only send back the matter to the disciplinary authority. The power of approval cannot be extended to include afresh enquiry in the matter. Even if the approving authority comes to the conclusion that the enquiry was not fair or impartial or the principles of natural justice were violated or that the punishment is not commensurate to the charges, if can only send back the matter to the disciplinary authority. The power to inflict punishment or reduce or enhance the punishment has not been given under Section 21 of the Act, and the necessary conclusion is that the Commission does not have authority to re-examine the charges and to come to a different conclusion than arrived at by the Committee of Management." 38. It would be worthwhile to mention here that the aforesaid decision of the learned single Judge does not take notice of the earlier decision in the case of Pradumna Kumar Jain or the decision rendered by the learned single Judge in the present case which was also reported in 1997 (3) ESC 1850 (supra). Learned single Judge in the present case had also discussed in detail the impact of Section 21 and is not being reproduced as it is part of the present record. The conclusion drawn by the learned single Judge is contained in para 9 of the judgment which can be referred to wherein it was held that upon a reading of the various provisions of the Act and the Rules, the Commission is not denuded of the power to alter or modify the proposed punishment as the Commission cannot be relegated to the State of helplessness. It was further held that if such an interpretation is given to Regulation 8 of 1985 Regulations then the existence of the power of approval or disapproval would become a mere formality. 39. The issue again came up before this Court in the case of Committee of Management, Shri Chameli Devi Khandelwal Girls Inter College, Mathura and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2005 (1) ESC 615 , where the learned single Judge after considering all the judgments referred to herein above, came to the conclusion that the Commission or the Board as the case may be, may not have the authority to entertain fresh replies from the delinquent employee against the charges, but it can assess the evidence which was already led before the inquiry Committee and thereafter arrive at findings on its own. Learned single Judge noted some later decisions of the Apex Court and the Division Bench decision of this Court and came to the following conclusion in para 15, which is quoted below : “15. Said Division Bench judgment of Rajendra Lal Srivastava v. Secondary Education Service Commission, 2003 (1) ESC 74, and judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Committee of Management, Bishambhar Saran Vaidic Inter College v. U.P. Secondary Education, 1995 (Supp.) 3 SCC 244, has been followed in the case of Committee of Management, M.M.I.C. v. S.E.S.C., 2004 (1) UPLBEC 20 and it has been reiterated that Commission/Board is to apply its mind independently to the question whether the evidence on record justified the removal or not, and in this regard has to carefully apply its mind to the facts on record and merit of action taken then it can also direct for lesser punishment, if case so justified. These judgments, nowhere subscribe the view that fresh evidence can be entertained, qua the charges levelled.” 40. The said view of the learned single Judge has been followed in the decision of Committee of Management v. State of U.P. and others, 2005 (4) ESC 1 (NOC) and in the case of Prakash Dwivedi v. District Inspector of Schools and others, 2005 (4) ESC 2482 . 41. The learned single Judge in the aforesaid decision on arriving at the same conclusion, adopted the following reasoning in paragraph 18 and 19 of the judgment, which is quoted below : “18. From a combined reading of Section 21 of the Act read with Regulation 8 of the Regulations of 1985, it is clear, without doubt, that the Board has the power to approve or disapprove the proposed punishment or may issue any other directions which impliedly includes the power to modify or alter, i.e., either reduce or enhance the proposed punishment. If the contention of the management that the Board has no jurisdiction to deviate from the recommendation of the management, in that event the Board would be left helpless. A reading of the various provisions of the Act and the Regulations indicate that the Board is a high powered body and has been constituted for regulating the recruitment and appointment of teachers and in matters relating to punishment in respect of teachers. The Board was entrusted to supervise the action taken by the management against the teachers. 19. A reading of the various provisions of the Act and the Regulations indicate that the Board is a high powered body and has been constituted for regulating the recruitment and appointment of teachers and in matters relating to punishment in respect of teachers. The Board was entrusted to supervise the action taken by the management against the teachers. 19. In view of the aforesaid, the Board had the power not only to approve or disapprove the proposed punishment but also had the power to reduce or enhance the punishment. The judgment cited by Managing Committee, namely, the Managing Committee of Gochar (supra) did not take into consideration the Regulations of 1985 and also did not consider the judgment of the Supreme Court.” 42. Having traced the precedents on the issue and having considered the aforesaid aspects, we also endorse the view taken by the learned single Judge in the case of Pradumna Kumar Jain (supra) and as followed and explained in the decisions of the other learned single Judges taking the same view. We would, however, like to clarify that the view taken by the learned single Judge in the case of Managing Committee of Gochar Krishi Inter College (supra) has already been explained and the correct view has been opinionated in the decision of Prakash Dwivedi (supra). 43. In the aforesaid background of the law already settled by this Court, the Commission does have the power to alter or modify the proposal forwarded by the Committee of Management. The submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Committee of Management-appellant to that extent that the Commission did not have the power to alter or modify has to be rejected. 44. Coming to the issue presently involved as to whether the delinquent employee could have been reverted to the post of Lecturer by the Commission or not, we may point out that the learned single Judge in the present case reported in 1997 (3) ESC 1850 (All) itself after discussing the entire law on the subject, came to the following conclusion. Paragraph 6 and 7 is quoted herein below : “6. Paragraph 6 and 7 is quoted herein below : “6. The sheet anchor of the case of the petitioner Sri Raja Ram Shukla is that the order passed by the Commission to revert him to the post of Lecturer is illegal and without jurisdiction for one simple reason that Sri Raja Ram Shukla was directly recruited to the post of Principal and a reason, who is recruited directly to a particular post, cannot be reduced in rank or reverted to a post, which is lower in rank to the post to which he was directly recruited. In support of his submission, learned counsel for Sri Raja Ram Shukla placed reliance on P.V. Srinivasa Sastry and others v. Comptroller and Auditor General and others, AIR 1993 SC 1321 ; State of U.P. and others v. Smt. Jaya Quddusi, AIR 1994 SC 2254 ; Hussain Sasan Saheb Kaladgi v. State of Maharashtra, (1988) 4 SCC 168 ; and Nyadar Singh v. Union of India and others, (1983) 4 SCC 170. 7. I have thoroughly studied the aforesaid rulings and after having scanned them it is found that the gamut of all these ruling is that a person who is directly recruited to a particular post, cannot be reverted or reduced in rank to a post which he never held. A direct recruit, therefore, cannot be reverted to the post which he never held. A distinction was also sought to be created in the said rulings in the two expressions—reversion’ and ‘reduction in rank’. The expression reversion connotes and means that an employee is to return to the original post which he had earlier held. This expression, therefore, envisages that the lower post to which the employee is reverted should necessarily be amongst those earlier held by him and from which he had come on promotion..........” 45. A perusal of the said finding recorded by the learned single Judge, therefore, leaves no room for doubt that the learned single Judge was also of the opinion that a person, who has been directly recruited, cannot be reverted by way of punishment to a lower post and for that the learned single Judge has rightly relied on the Apex Court decisions referred to therein. We, therefore, hold that the learned single Judge was right in drawing a conclusion on the aforesaid proposition of law which is in line with the settled law of the land. We, therefore, hold that the learned single Judge was right in drawing a conclusion on the aforesaid proposition of law which is in line with the settled law of the land. 46. We may, however, clarify another fact keeping in view the aforesaid finding recorded by the learned single Judge. It is no doubt true that delinquent Raja Ram Shukla was a permanent Lecturer in the institution and by virtue of his being one of the senior most Lecturer in the institution, had been recommended by the Committee for consideration. In fact, he was holding the post of Lecturer but the question here is as to whether he was selected as Principal by way of promotion or by way of direct recruitment. As concluded herein above, Raja Ram Shukla had been appointed by way of direct recruitment and not by way of promotion and, as such, merely because he was holding the post of Lecturer prior to his appointment as Principal, would not enable the Commission to award reduction in rank or reversion as a measure of punishment. The concept of reversion and reduction in rank arises only in the matters where an employee has been promoted to a higher post. As explained herein above, the post of the Principal of an Intermediate College has to be filled up by way of direct recruitment. 47. Learned single Judge after having noted the Apex Court decisions cited before him sought to draw a distinction between “reversion and reduction in rank”, and held as follows : “The expression ‘reduction in rank’ has no such limitation Reduction-in-rank can take place even to a rank which the delinquent employee never held. A reading of the aforesaid rulings makes it clear the reversion of an employee is possible and permissible to the post which he had held earlier and from which post he was promoted, meaning thereby, the post to which the employee is reverted is in line of promotion and is a ‘feeder service’. None of the above mentioned cases is an authority on the point that a person cannot be reverted to a post which he had earlier held........” 48. The aforesaid conclusion of the learned single Judge with all respect appears to be founded on an incorrect interpretation of the ratio of the Apex Court decisions referred to therein. A reference to the same would, therefore, be apt at this juncture. The aforesaid conclusion of the learned single Judge with all respect appears to be founded on an incorrect interpretation of the ratio of the Apex Court decisions referred to therein. A reference to the same would, therefore, be apt at this juncture. The case of Hussain Sasan Saheb Kaladgi v. State of Maharashtra, (1988) 4 SCC 168 , was a matter of reversion where it was held as follows : “2. ........ he was not a departmental promotee who had been promoted from the post of primary teacher to the post of ADEL..........A direct recruit to a post, it cannot be gainsaid, cannot be reverted to a lower post. It is only a promotee who can be reverted from the promotion post to the lower post from which he was promoted. These propositions are so elementary that the same are incapable of being disputed and have not been disputed........... The State had passed an order which clearly was unsustainable in view of the fact that the appellant was a direct recruit and there was no question of reverting him to any lower post...........” 49. A more elaborate discussion on the terms “reversion” and “reduction in rank” came to be interpreted in the case of Nyadar Singh v. Union of India and others, (1988) 4 SCC 170 , where the penalty imposed was of reduction in rank to a post lower than the one on which the delinquents had been initially recruited. The Supreme Court noticing the divergent views of various High Courts assessed, three contingencies in paragraph 3 to 5 as follows : “3. There is a divergence of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts on the point: The Division Benches of the Orissa and Karnataka High Courts have held that such a reduction in rank is not possible at all. [See: Babaji Charan Rout v. State of Orissa; Shivalingaswamy v. State of Karnataka]. 4. However, the Madras, Andhra Pradesh and Allahabad High Courts have held that there is no limitation on the power to impose such a penalty. [See: R. Gopal Rao v. C.l.T., Mahendra Kumar v. Union of India, S.N. Dey v. Union of India]. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras, in C.S. Balakumar v. lnspecting Asstt. C.I.T. has also subscribed to this view. 5. [See: R. Gopal Rao v. C.l.T., Mahendra Kumar v. Union of India, S.N. Dey v. Union of India]. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras, in C.S. Balakumar v. lnspecting Asstt. C.I.T. has also subscribed to this view. 5. There is yet a third view, as typified in P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller & Auditor General of India and the one taken by the Central Administrative Tribunal in the case from which the Special Leave Petition arises, that such a reduction in rank is permissible provided that promotion from the post to which the Government servant is reduced to the post from which he was so reduced is permissible, or, as it has been put, the post to which the Government servant is reduced is “in the line of promotion” and is a “feeder-service”. 50. Then the Apex Court deliberated on the meaning of the phrase “reduction in rank” as contained in Article 311 (2) as follows : “311. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges." 51. After noticing the various shades of the submissions raised in paras 14 to 20, the Court arrived at the following conclusion in paras 21 and 24 thereof : “21. The contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General that when a legislative-authority uses the expression “reduction in rank” without imposing any limitations there is no justification to fetter or otherwise limit the plenitude of the idea of ‘reduction’, looks, at the first blush, seemingly plausible and even somewhat attractive. The view has commended itself for acceptance to some of the High Courts and Tribunals. 24. As to whether a person initially recruited to a higher time-scale, grade or service or post can be reduced by way of punishment, to a post in a lower time-scale, grade, service or post which he never held before, the statutory-language authorising the imposition of penalty does not, it is true, by itself impose any limitations. The question is whether the interpretative-factors, relevant to the provision, impart any such limitation. On a consideration of the relevant factors to which we will presently refer we must hold that they do.” 52. The question is whether the interpretative-factors, relevant to the provision, impart any such limitation. On a consideration of the relevant factors to which we will presently refer we must hold that they do.” 52. Having arrived at the aforesaid conclusion, the Court further held as follows in paras 25 to 28 : “25. Though the idea of reduction may not be fully equivalent with ‘reversion’, there are certain assumptions basic to service law which bring in the limitations of the latter on the former. The penalty of reduction in rank of a Government servant initially recruited to a higher time-scale, grade, service or post to a lower time-scale, grade, service or post virtually amounts to his removal from the higher post and the substitution of his recruitment to lower post, affecting the policy of recruitment itself. 26. In Worthington v. Robinson, where a supervisor of Inland Revenue was reduced in rank by statutory authority, referring to the effect of reduction in rank, though in a different context, brought about by the order of the statutory authority, the Court of appeals understood the process as a dismissal from the higher post and reappointment to the lower post. Rigby, L.J observed : I treat what has happened as a dismissal, because, though in effect he has been reduced to a lower position, his new appointment is in fact a re-appointment. If we could see any point in this action upon which there might be a possibility of his succeeding, we should be most anxious to give him the opportunity. 27. But action was dismissed because the civil servant was holding the office at the pleasure of the Commissioners under the Inland Revenue Regulation Act governing the situation. 28. There are, therefore, certain considerations of policy that might militate against such a wide meaning to be given to the power. In conceivable cases, the Government servant may not have the qualifications requisite for the post which may require and involve different, though not necessarily higher, skills and attainments. Here enter considerations of the recruitment-policy. The rule must be read in consonance with the general principles and so construed the expression ‘reduction’ in it would not admit of a wider connotation. The power should, of course, be available to reduce a civil servant to any lower time-scale, grade, service or post from which he had subsequently earned his promotion.” 53. The rule must be read in consonance with the general principles and so construed the expression ‘reduction’ in it would not admit of a wider connotation. The power should, of course, be available to reduce a civil servant to any lower time-scale, grade, service or post from which he had subsequently earned his promotion.” 53. Finally the Apex Court, overruling the decisions of the High Courts held that “reduction in rank” permits imposition of a penalty to reduction to a lower post, ruled as follows in paragraph 30 : “30. The argument that the rule enables a reduction in rank to a post lower than the one to which the civil servant was initially recruited for a specified-period and also enables restoration of the Government servant to the original post, with the restoration of seniority as well, and that, therefore, there is nothing anomalous about the matter, does not, in our opinion, wholly answer the problem. It is at best one of the criteria supporting a plausible view of the matter. The rule also enables an order without the stipulation of such restoration. The other implications of the effect of the reduction as a fresh induction into a lower grade, service or post not at any time earlier held by the Government servant remain unanswered. Then-again, there is an inherent anomaly of a person recruited to the higher grade or class of post being asked to work in a lower grade which in certain conceivable cases might require different qualifications. It might be contended that these anomalies could well be avoided by a judicious-choice of the penalty in a given fact-situation and that these considerations are more matters to be taken into account in tailoring-out the penalty than those limiting the scope of the punitive power itself. But, an over-all view of the balance of the relevant-criteria indicates that it is reasonable, to assume that the rule-making-authority did not intend to clothe the disciplinary-authority with the power which would produce such anomalous and unreasonable situations. The contrary view taken by the High Courts in the several decisions referred to earlier cannot be taken to laid down the principle correctly.” 54. The contrary view taken by the High Courts in the several decisions referred to earlier cannot be taken to laid down the principle correctly.” 54. The decision in the case of P.V. Srinivasa Sastry and others v. Comptroller and Auditor General of the Karnataka High Court and others (supra), itself was subjected to an appeal before the Apex Court and the Apex Court followed and approved the view taken in Nyadar Singh’s case once again which is reported in AIR 1993 SC 1321 . The said view has been reiterated in the case of State of U.P. v. Smt. Jaya Quddusi, reported in AIR 1994 SC 2254 . 55. Thus, the law as explained by the Apex Court in Nyadar Singh’s case and as quoted above, clearly holds that in a matter of reduction of rank, the imposition of penalty is not free from limitations as clearly expressed therein. The conclusion of the learned single Judge is, therefore, contrary to the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Nyadar Singh’s case (supra). 56. The appellant-Raja Ram Shukla, therefore, having not been promoted, could not have been reverted or reduced in rank by the Commission to the post of Lecturer. He lost his lien on the post held by him earlier altogether and there was a complete change in his status of service after selection as Principal. The then Rules of 1983 applicable to the present controversy do not envisage any feeder cadre for promotion on the post of Principal subject to the exceptions as explained herein above. 57. The appellant-Raja Ram Shukla, who was reported to be about 52 years of age at the time of filing of these appeals by now, must have attained the age of superannuation. However, his continuance as Principal or otherwise would make a difference in payment of emoluments or post retiral pecuniary benefits in the event the Commission arrives at a conclusion which may either go in favour or against the either of the appellants. The order impugned in the writ petition and the conclusions drawn by the learned single Judge upholding the same are clearly unsustainable in view of the findings recorded by us herein above. The contention on behalf of the Committee of Management that the Commission has no power to alter or modify the punishment is, too widely stated, only to be rejected for the reasons aforesaid. 58. The contention on behalf of the Committee of Management that the Commission has no power to alter or modify the punishment is, too widely stated, only to be rejected for the reasons aforesaid. 58. Accordingly, in view of the fact that on account of long passage of time, the matter may require an early disposal, while setting aside the judgment of the learned single Judge as well as the impugned order of the Commission dated 16.10.1995, we direct the respondent-Commission to decide the matter afresh within a period of 3 months from the date of production of a certified copy of the judgment before it after giving an opportunity of hearing to the contesting parties. 59. The appeals are, therefore, allowed to the aforesaid extent with no cost on parties. ————