ORDER : S.S. Chauhan, J. This writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 18.04.2009 passed by opposite party No. 1 whereby the order dated 23.01.2007 passed by opposite party No. 2 has been upheld. 2. The facts giving rise to the present petition are that a suit for permanent injunction was filed by opposite party No. 3 against the petitioner and opposite parties No. 4 to 6 regarding plot No. 218 situate at Village - Bhilawan, Alambagh, District - Lucknow. The suit proceeded ex-parte on 08.03.1990 and an application was moved for recalling the said order and the order dated 08.03.1990 was recalled. Thereafter the suit proceeded and again an ex-parte order was passed on 05.04.1994. The application was moved for recalling the aforesaid order and on 17.08.1994 the said order was recalled but the petitioner did not take any interest in the matter and so again an order for proceeding ex-parte against the petitioner was passed on 14.02.1995. It is thereafter that the petitioner disappeared and the suit came to be decided by means of judgment and decree dated 15.01.2001. Thereafter execution was moved for implementation of the decree on 05.10.2001. The execution proceedings went on and the petitioner on 23.03.2002 moved an application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the ex-parte decree alongwith an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. An objection was filed to the aforesaid application on 30.05.2003. Thereafter, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 5615 (M/S) of 2006, which was disposed of with a direction to opposite party No. 2 to dispose of the application moved by the petitioner under Order 9 Rule 13 within six weeks from 01.12.2006. Writ Petition No. 4365 (M/S) of 2006 was also filed by opposite party No. 3 in which a direction was given by this Court to decide the Execution Case No. 10 of 2001 expeditiously, say within a period of four months. The application of the petitioner moved under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code was rejected vide order dated 23.01.2007. The said order was challenged by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 699 (M/S) of 2007, which was dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal against the order dated 23.01.2007 rejecting his application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code. The said order was challenged by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 699 (M/S) of 2007, which was dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal against the order dated 23.01.2007 rejecting his application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code. The appellate court after examining the pleadings of the parties and evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the order passed by the trial court was proper, valid and justified in the circumstances of the case and rejected the appeal of the petitioner vide order dated 18.04.2009. The petitioner thereafter feeling aggrieved with the order of the appellate court dated 18.04.2009 has filed this writ petition. 3. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that a liberal view ought to have been taken in condoning the delay in moving the application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code and the court below committed gross illegality in not following the verdict of the apex court. It is also submitted that the petitioner has throughout pursued his case genuinely and with all earnest efforts but on account of the fact that his counsel did not inform him the correct position, as such, he could not attend the court. It is also submitted that the ex-parte decree could not have been passed against the petitioner as the petitioner was always ready and pursued the court proceedings. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the cases of (Smt.) Saroj Singh and Another v. Board of Revenue, Lucknow and Others, 2008 (26) LCD 1610, Ram Chandar v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh & Ors, 2003 (2) JCLR 51 (All), U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. District Judge, Saharanpur, 2004 (1) JCLR 659 : 2004 AII LJ 3333 (All), Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 SC 1353 , Srinagar Development Authority v. M.H. Leharwal & Ors., 2001 (1) JCLR 75 (SC), Jagdish Sawhney v. Harbans Singh & Ors., 2001 (1) JCLR 76 (SC) : AIR 2000 SC 3143 , Smt. Sudesh and others v. Additional District Judge, Court No. 8, Kanpur Dehat and others, 2006 (24) LCD 230 : 2006 (2) ALJ 182 and Smt. Kaushalya Devi and others v. Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Saharanpur, 2007 (25) LCD 4. 4. 4. In reply to the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner, opposite party No. 3, who has appeared in person has submitted that the petitioner has not been taking any interest in the disposal of the case and he had been trying to linger on the case again and again by adopting dilatory tactics and that is why after the first ex-parte order passed on 08.03.1990 was recalled, then the second order dated 05.04.1994 was recalled and thereafter from 14.02.1995 the petitioner withdrew from the proceedings deliberately and knowingly. It is also submitted that the petitioner appeared in Criminal Case No. 844 of 2007 as PW-1 in the court of Judicial Magistrate-III, Lucknow on 04.01.2000 and he was cross-examined on 29.01.2000 and the suit was decreed ex-parte on 15.01.2001. So, it cannot be said that the petitioner was having no knowledge about the progress of the case. Once he was present in the premises of the court, he could have easily confirmed the progress of the case from his counsel or from the office concerned where the case was pending. He did not make any efforts and took the things for granted and did not appear after 14.02.1995 which shows his conduct in not pursuing the proceedings deliberately and intentionally. It is also submitted that such negligent and irresponsible litigant should not be given any sympathy of this Court and the orders of the courts below be maintained. Learned counsel for the opposite parties, in support of their contentions have placed reliance upon the cases of Salil Dutta v. T.M. and M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185 : 1993 AIR SCW 1178, Jagannath Prasad v. Sant Hardasram Sevashram and others, 1978 All. L. J. 261, Om Prakash Singh v. Smt. Satya Devi and another, 1989 All. L.J. 482, Ram Pal v. Birmo (Smt.), 2008 (3) ARC 302 : 2008 (4) ALJ 81 : 2008 (6) ALJ (DOC) 12 (ALL), Roop Chand Jain v. Pushpa Devi (Smt.) and another, 2008 (3) ARC 125 : 2008 (6) ALJ (DOC) 12 (ALL), D. Gopinathan Pillai v. State of Kerala and another, (2007) 2 SCC 322 : AIR 2007 SC 2624 , P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another, AIR 1998 SC 2276 , State of U.P. and another v. Smt. Asha Srivastava, 2008 (2) ARC 379. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. From the pleadings of the parties, it is evident that a Regular Suit No. 146 of 1989 was filed on 09.06.1989. The petitioner was appearing in the aforesaid suit and thereafter he withdrew himself from participating in the proceedings of the suit and so the suit proceeded ex-parte on 08.03.1990. Thereafter an application for recall/restoration was moved and the ex-parte order was recalled and again the suit proceeded but the petitioner after participating in the proceedings for certain time, withdrew himself from the proceedings and so the court again passed an order for proceeding ex-parte against the petitioner on 05.04.1994. The petitioner moved an application for recalling the ex-parte order and the ex-parte order was recalled on 17.08.1994. The petitioner again participated in the proceedings for certain time and then absented himself and so ultimately on 14.02.1995 an order was passed to proceed ex-parte against the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter did not take any care about the proceedings pending against him although he was in specific knowledge about the proceedings since 08.03.1990 when the ex- parte order was passed. It is not the end of the things that the petitioner did not know the proceedings pending against him but knowingly he abstained from participating in the court proceedings after 14.02.1995. The petitioner was a witness in Criminal Case No. 844 of 2007 as PW-1 and he appeared in the court of Judicial Magistrate-III, Lucknow in the aforesaid case as witness on 04.01.2000. The petitioner was cross-examined on 29.01.2000 but in spite of that he did not care to contact his counsel and to enquire about the status of the case although he was present in the court. The explanation submitted by the petitioner that he remained in Lucknow up till 1994 in irrigation department and he pursued his case up till then is also not correct on account of the fact that the suit was directed to proceed ex-parte on 08.03.1990 and it was got restored. The explanation submitted by the petitioner that he remained in Lucknow up till 1994 in irrigation department and he pursued his case up till then is also not correct on account of the fact that the suit was directed to proceed ex-parte on 08.03.1990 and it was got restored. It is not that the petitioner was never coming to Lucknow but in fact he has been visiting Lucknow off and on and even if the statement of the petitioner is believed that he did not come to Lucknow at any point of time, then the court record proves his presence in Lucknow on 29.01.2000 when he appeared in criminal case as PW-1 and was cross-examined. The defence set up by the petitioner, therefore, appears to be a concocted defence having been created for the purpose of the present case to get the ex-parte decree set aside. 7. The discretion of the Court has to be exercised on the given facts of the particular case in favour of hearing and a liberal view has to be given where it is found that a party with all his sincerity has been pursuing his proceedings and with all genuineness he appeared in the court or that he was precluded to appear in the court on account of certain unavoidable contingency. Here in the present case, right from 08.03.1990 the suit has proceeded ex-parte, then restored, then again proceeded ex-parte on 05.04.1994 and was restored on 17.08.1994 and again proceeded ex-parte on 14.02.1995 which shows the conduct of the petitioner that he deliberately, intentionally and knowingly did not pursue the court proceedings. It is not that an ex-parte decree has been passed without any service upon the petitioner but in fact the petitioner having after appeared in the court has abstained himself with full knowledge that the case can be decided against him ex-parte. The explanation and the defence of the petitioner that his counsel did not inform him cannot be believed as his elder son was residing at Lucknow and he could have also done pairvi in the case. Information could have been provided to the petitioner through his son. It cannot be believed that he was misled by his advocate. It was his duty to have come to the court and should have enquired from his counsel and should have also looked into the record. Information could have been provided to the petitioner through his son. It cannot be believed that he was misled by his advocate. It was his duty to have come to the court and should have enquired from his counsel and should have also looked into the record. An irresponsible and lethargic litigant is not entitled for the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act when the court finds that he has deliberately avoided to attend the court. The question of gaining knowledge cannot be denied by the petitioner as he has been continuously appearing in the case time and again up till 14.02.1995. The litigants should not take the case for granted. They should also be alert and they must understand that leniency of the court can be availed to a certain extent but not to the extent of misusing the court process. In the present case, the petitioner has only tried to misuse the process of the court by time and again moving recall/restoration applications. The explanation submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, does not appeal to reason and cannot be accepted. 8. Reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgments rendered in the cases of (Smt.) Saroj Singh and Another (Supra), Ram Chandar (Supra), U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. (Supra), Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another (Supra), Srinagar Development Authority (Supra), Jagdish Sawhney (Supra), Smt. Sudesh and others (Supra) and Smt. Kaushalya Devi and others (Supra), are not applicable as in all these cases the Court has found that the explanation submitted by the party concerned was found to be satisfactory, convincing and it was not found that there was deliberate default by the defaulting party. It was also ruled that liberal view has to be adopted in deciding the question of limitation. The said case laws are not applicable in the case of the petitioner on account of the fact that the sufficient cause shown by him has not been found to be satisfactory by the courts below as well as by this Court. He has continuously defaulted in participating in the proceedings and from the record it is evident that there was deliberate default on his part with a view to linger on the proceedings. He has continuously defaulted in participating in the proceedings and from the record it is evident that there was deliberate default on his part with a view to linger on the proceedings. Opposite party No. 3 has instituted the suit in 1989 and has waited up till 2001 for decision and every time the petitioner was given opportunity to participate in the proceedings by recalling the ex-parte orders passed against him time and again but instead of availing the benefit and opportunity for participating in the proceedings, the petitioner deliberately avoided to participate in the proceedings. Opposite party No. 3 has placed reliance upon the case of Salil Dutta (Supra) wherein it was held as under :- "8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engaged him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex-parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq must be understood in the facts and circumstances of that case and cannot be understood as an absolute proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was an on-going suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a village residing away from the city, where the court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private limited company with its head-office at Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not disposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. Maybe, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. Maybe not. But one thing is clear - they chose to non-cooperate with the court. It is evident that when their applications were not disposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. Maybe, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. Maybe not. But one thing is clear - they chose to non-cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature of significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted." 9. In the case of Jagannath Prasad (Supra) their Lordships view that the conduct of the parties should be inconsonance with due diligence and if the party has failed, then his claim has also to fail for condonation. The Court ruled as under:- "Thus, the appellant has utterly failed to show that he had been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding and that he had acted in good faith. His conduct falls short of the standard of due care and attention attributed to an ordinary and prudent person. Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It is true that Section 14 in terms applies to suits and not to appeals but in substance the same principle may be applied. That is why the application has been made under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Even for successfully invoking the benefit of Section 5, the appellant has to make out sufficient cause and therefore, reckless or grossly negligent conduct of the appellant would be inconsistent with such sufficient cause. In fact, the Division Bench case of this Court in Lala Hanuman Das v. Prithvi Nath, (1956 All LJ 367) (Supra) was a case under Section 5 of the Limitation Act wherein as we would be clear from the excerpts quoted above it was held that cases of negligence or carelessness would not be covered by Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the delay in such cases would not be condoned. Applying those tests to the facts of the present case, we are not satisfied that good cause has been established under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to justify condonation of delay in the instant case." 10. In the case of Om Prakash Singh (Supra) again a Division Bench of Court proceeded to hold that wrong legal advice cannot be a ground for condoning the delay. The Court ruled as under :- "8. Insofar as the proposition that as far as possible the Court's discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing, there is no difference or dispute. However, this discretion has to be exercised judicially and it would not be correct to say that even where sufficient cause has not been shown for non-appearance, the ex-parte decree has to be set aside. In other words, the latitude and so-called indulgence has to be shown only to an extent permissible under the law and, certainly, not without limits. Discretion has to be exercised when the ground for non-appearance has to be shown to be sufficient and the bona fides are also established. True, that in assessing the sufficiency of the ground, the Courts need not be over-strict. That does not, however, mean that the Courts should readily accept whatever is alleged to explain away the default. A litigant who is careless and negligent and who fails to establish his bona fides cannot be held to be entitled to their so called indulgence as otherwise, the system cannot ensure its effective and purposeful functioning. In these matters, each case depends on its own facts. 9. In the present case, the appellant did not file the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree within permissible time, he instead filed the application after about nine months. The delay was sought to be explained on account of the wrong advice given by his counsel for filing an appeal which was, eventually, withdrawn. The appellant failed to satisfy the Court that he acted on the advice of his counsel who rendered the advice after due care and attention. The ground which allegedly prevented the appellant to appear before the court on the date fixed was not considered sufficient on the basis of what appeared to be the true factual position from the material on record. The allegations contained in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent were not controverted by the appellant. The ground which allegedly prevented the appellant to appear before the court on the date fixed was not considered sufficient on the basis of what appeared to be the true factual position from the material on record. The allegations contained in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent were not controverted by the appellant. As has been mentioned above, the two points made out from the counter-affidavit took away the very essence and bona fide underlying the grounds taken in the affidavit filed in support of the application filed to have the ex-parte decree set aside. In this view of the matter, the order of the Family Court under appeal cannot be said to be improper and wrong. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed." 11. In the case of Ram Pal (Supra) again it was a case of wrong advice by the counsel on account of which a time barred appeal was filed. This Court while considering the judgment of the apex court dismissed the appeal and refused to condone the delay in filing the appeal. In Roop Chand Jain (Supra) also, after considering the law laid down by the apex court, Single Judge of this Court held that where a suit was directed to proceed ex-parte, an application being moved by the defendant for recall of that order was allowed and thereafter written statement was not filed and the suit was decreed ex-parte and when the decree was put into execution, objection was filed under Section 47 and an application for appointment of Commissioner; both the applications were rejected against which a writ petition was filed, which too was dismissed. Thereafter an application under Order 9 Rule 13 was moved after more than one year of the said dismissal, it was found that the application was moved after 12 years. The plea of the petitioner in the said writ petition that he was not rendered proper advice by his counsel was not accepted by this Court. Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted hereinbelow :- "18. This is not the position in the present case as the findings which were found to be wanting have been given by the trial Court in the present case. Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted hereinbelow :- "18. This is not the position in the present case as the findings which were found to be wanting have been given by the trial Court in the present case. The court below has noticed that the application under Order 9, Rule 13 was filed on 29th May 2007 after 12 years and that in the Execution Case, objections had been filed and the writ petition that had been filed against the various orders passed in the Execution Case as well as the ex-pare judgment and order dated 10th March, 1995 had been dismissed. It also noticed that the plea taken in the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application that the lawyer had not advised for filing the application under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code was not a formal advice and nor could it be believed particularly when he had engaged such senior and prominent lawyers of the district Court Agra, like Sri Anil Kumar Rajpoot, Sri K.V. Saxena, Sri R.K. Prajapati etc. along with Sri B.D. Badalia. The Court, has, on the other hand drawn a conclusion that the tenant-judgment debtor was deliberately delaying the execution as he had filed objections in the executing Court and then moved a Transfer Application and had not even paid rent for the last 30 years. 19. As seen above, there is no general principle saving the parties from all mistaken of the counsel and if there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the counsel, the application should not be allowed. In the present case, the advice given by the counsel is not a bona fide advice at all. The trial court was justified in rejecting the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Salil Dutta (supra)." 12. In D. Gopinathan Pillai (Supra) no proper explanation was given for condoning the delay of 3320 days and the apex court refused to condone the delay for setting aside the award. Paragraph-5 of the said judgment is quoted below :- "5. We are unable to countenance the finding rendered by the Sub- Judge and also the view taken by the High Court. Paragraph-5 of the said judgment is quoted below :- "5. We are unable to countenance the finding rendered by the Sub- Judge and also the view taken by the High Court. There is no dispute in regard to the delay of 3320 days in filing the petition for setting aside the award. When a mandatory provision is not complied with and when the delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay, only on the sympathetic ground. The orders passed by the learned Sub-Judge and also by the High Court are far from satisfactory. No reason whatsoever has been given to condone the inordinate delay of 3330 days. It is well-considered principle of law that the delay cannot be condoned without assigning any reasonable, satisfactory, sufficient and proper reason. Both the courts have miserably failed to comply and follow the principle laid down by this Court in a catena of cases. We, therefore, have no other option except to set aside the order passed by the Sub-Judge and as affirmed by the High Court. We accordingly set aside both the orders and allow this appeal." 13. In P.K. Ramachandran (Supra) again the apex court did not find it a fit case for condoning the delay. Paragraph-6 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow :- "6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs." 14. In State of U.P. and another (Supra) this Court while considering the question as to whether the delay should be condoned where it has not been properly explained has come to the conclusion that in such case, the delay should not be condoned. This Court has held as under :- "23. No costs." 14. In State of U.P. and another (Supra) this Court while considering the question as to whether the delay should be condoned where it has not been properly explained has come to the conclusion that in such case, the delay should not be condoned. This Court has held as under :- "23. While deciding an application for condoning the delay in filing an appeal, the Court must also keep in mind the observations made by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Amateur Riders Club, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603, wherein the delay of 264 days was not condoned and they are :- "For quite sometime in the past, this Court has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November, 1993. ............... After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the Courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is the Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigate as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interest. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by time." 26. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by time." 26. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay, the order passed by the Appellate Court rejecting the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not suffer from any infirmity." 15. For the reasons indicated above and after considering all the case laws, which have been relied upon by the parties, in the opinion of the Court, the delay has not been properly explained. It is also evident that the petitioner has deliberately avoided to attend the proceedings under his own planning. No sufficient cause has been given for condoning the delay. Such unscrupulous litigants cannot be permitted to exploit or misuse the process of the Court. 16. In the aforesaid circumstances, I do not find any ground to interfere in the matter. The writ petition is devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.