DHAMPUR SUGAR MILLS (L) DHAMPUR, BIJNOR v. UNION OF INDIA
2009-08-27
R.K.AGRAWAL, SHASHI KANT GUPTA
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shashi Kant Gupta, J.—This writ petition has been filed inter alia for the following reliefs : (a) A writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to take any coercive action on the basis of show cause notice dated 5.6.1992 (Annexure 13 to this writ petition). (b) A writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned show cause notice dated 5.6.1992 (Annexure 13 to this writ petition). (c) A writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to launch the prosecution proceedings on the basis of the impugned show cause notice dated 5.6.1992 (Annexure 13 to this writ petition) (d) A writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to withdraw the attachment order dated 6.7.1992 for the recovery which was issued in consequence to the show cause notice dated 5.6.1992 for the recovery of the amount mentioned in the show cause notice. 2. The background facts essentially in a nutshell are as follows : The petitioner is a limited company engaged in manufacture and sale of sugar. From time to time, the Central Government granted incentive rebate with regard to the central excise duties on the excess sugar provided by the sugar factory during the lean periods of low recovery as well as low supply of the cane. The aforesaid incentives had been granted for maximizing the consumption of sugar cane for production of sugar and also for facilitating the payment of remunerative price to the sugar cane growers and also to make it available to the consumer at reasonable price. The aforesaid incentive has also got the purpose of compensating the sugar factories of the country for wear and tear of their plant and machinery on account of excess production as also for the losses incurred on account of low recovery. 3. The amount claimed as rebate relate to the years 1977-78, 1980-81, 1982-83 and 1987-88. 4. The controversy involved in the matter is whether the petitioner was entitled to take credit of its own of Rs. 90,40,574.50 as basic excise duty on 24.7.1991, Rs. 71,81,624.64 as additional excise duty on 27.7.1991 and Rs.
3. The amount claimed as rebate relate to the years 1977-78, 1980-81, 1982-83 and 1987-88. 4. The controversy involved in the matter is whether the petitioner was entitled to take credit of its own of Rs. 90,40,574.50 as basic excise duty on 24.7.1991, Rs. 71,81,624.64 as additional excise duty on 27.7.1991 and Rs. 8,44,493.64 as additional excise duty on 25.10.1991 in its Personal Ledger Account (in short “PLA”) and whether the duty of excise can be recovered in terms of Section 11-A of the Act and further penalty can be imposed under Rule 9 (2) and 173-Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. 5. The aforesaid amount was credited by the petitioner on the pretext that the matter stood finalised by the Supreme Court. When the authorities came to know about the aforesaid alleged act of the petitioner, they issued a show cause notice under Section 11-A of the Act dated 5.6.92 (Annexure 13 to the writ petition) for contravening the provisions of Rule 9 and 173-G (1) of Central Excise Rules, 1944 (in short ‘the Rules’) as to why the credit which was taken by the petitioner in PLA be not recovered and penalty for the contravention of the aforesaid Rules be not imposed against the petitioner. The petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid show cause notice dated 5.6.92 issued by the respondent No. 2, has preferred this writ petition. 6. This matter was earlier dismissed by this Court by order dated 30.7.99 on the ground of alternative remedy. The Apex Court by order dated 25th September, 2000 set-aside the order dated 30.7.99 passed by this Court and remanded the matter to this Court to be heard and dispose of on merits. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made inter alia the following submissions : (i) Impugned show cause notice has been issued beyond the period of six months as contemplated under Section 11- A and hence the show cause notice is time barred and illegal. (ii) The charges levelled against the petitioner in the show cause notice is unfounded and the same has already been adjudicated upon and decided by the Supreme Court and this Court. The credit has been taken in the PLA in accordance with Rule 56-A of the Rules, 1944.
(ii) The charges levelled against the petitioner in the show cause notice is unfounded and the same has already been adjudicated upon and decided by the Supreme Court and this Court. The credit has been taken in the PLA in accordance with Rule 56-A of the Rules, 1944. (iii) The department had full knowledge of the credit taken by the petitioner, there was no fraud or collusion or suppression of statement of fact, or contravention of the Act or Rules by the petitioner and the Proviso to Section 11-A (1) will not (extended period of limitation of 5 years) be applicable in the case of the petitioner. 8. On the other hand learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has contended as follows : (i) The petitioner company has no statutory power to take credit in the PLA on its own, without any specific executive order by the competent authority. Even when the Court orders in favour of the petitioner, specific executive order is required and the amount to be credited in PLA is to be quantified by the competent authority and petitioner cannot make unauthorized entries in the PLA on its own. (ii) The petitioner has failed to specify the order by which they were authorized to take the credit and no scheme and rules authorized the petitioner to take the credit of an amount in PLA on its own. (iii) The petitioner’s contention that the incentive rebate scheme is analogous to Rule 56-A and 56-AA of the Rules, 1944 is misleading as these are altogether different schemes. (iv) Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court or any authority has quantified the amount of rebate admissible to the petitioner and the petitioner has claimed rebate on the basis of its own interpretation of the orders passed by the Courts. The show cause notice has been issued in accordance with law and the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act has been rightly invoked and the notice cannot be said to be time barred since it has been issued within five years from the relevant date as provided under Section 11-A of the Act. 9. Heard Sri A.K. Gupta and N.C. Gupta for the petitioner, Sri Shambhoo Chopra for the respondents and perused the record as well as the show cause notice dated 5.6.1992. 10.
9. Heard Sri A.K. Gupta and N.C. Gupta for the petitioner, Sri Shambhoo Chopra for the respondents and perused the record as well as the show cause notice dated 5.6.1992. 10. Before adjudicating the matter on merits it will be useful to refer to the extract of paragraph (2-a) & (2-b) of the show cause notice dated 5.6.92 wherein the details of the credit taken by the petitioner in PLA has been narrated, which read as under : “During the course of check, as a sequal to the information of their taking a credit in their PLA of Rs. 61,65,679.78 in respect of interest on the alleged amounts of rebate on excess production of sugar under various Notification issued by the Govt. of India in the past years as beyond the provisions of the statute (the matter being separately dealt in an appeal filed before the Collector (Appeals) Central Excise, Ghaziabad by the Department) and under directions of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Moradabad, the then Superintendent of Central Excise Dhampur examined the entries made by the said M/s. Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. Dhampur in their PLA and observed that the party, vide entries as 1875 to 1879 in the PLA as maintained by them with the Collector of Central Excise Meerut had taken credit of the following amounts on 24.7.1991 towards Basic Duty of Excise as entered in Col. 3 (1) thereof giving remarks in Col. 2 thereof reading as noted against each : (The balance of Rs. 1,25,555/- shown against PLA entry No. 1874 raised to Rs. 99,66,129.55 showing against entry No. 1879)” (2) (b) They also appeared to have readjusted the credit in respect of Basic Excise Duty and by debiting the amount of Rs. 77,81,624.61 in basic excise duty and taking simultaneously the credit of the same amount in additional excise duty vide entry No. 1894 dated 27.7.1991 as noted below : 11. Thus from the aforesaid facts narrated in paragraph 2-a & 2-b of the impugned show cause notice dated 5.6.92, it is clear that the petitioner has taken credit on its own of Rs. 90,40,574.50 as basic excise duty on 24.7.91, Rs. 77,81,624.61 on 27.7.91 as additional excise duty and of Rs. 8,45,493.64 as additional excise duty on 25.10.91 in the PLA on the pretext that the above said amount is admissible to it on account of incentive rebate. 12.
90,40,574.50 as basic excise duty on 24.7.91, Rs. 77,81,624.61 on 27.7.91 as additional excise duty and of Rs. 8,45,493.64 as additional excise duty on 25.10.91 in the PLA on the pretext that the above said amount is admissible to it on account of incentive rebate. 12. It is the contention of the petitioner that the said credit has been taken by it under the provisions of Rule 56-A, as a scheme of rebate is said to be analogous to Rule 56-A. In this connection, reference to notification No. 200/63 dated 20.11.1963 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) as amended by notification No. 209/63 dated 14.12.1963 is relevant, where in paragraph-3 it has been stated as follows : “the detailed procedure for granting incentive rebate as excess production of sugar in 1963-64 season through “proforma credit” in the Personal Ledger Account of sugar factories appended.” 13. However, the petitioner for the reasons best known to it has not appended the said detailed procedure for granting incentive rebate as provided in the aforesaid paragraph-3 of the said notification. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to lay the procedure before this Court as appended in the said notification and deprived us from scrutinizing it. 14. The petitioner has placed much emphasis upon the aforesaid notification, therefore, at this juncture, reference to paragraph-4 of the said notification is quite relevant, which reads as under : “It is likely that before receipt of this procedure by the collectrates clearance as concessional rights would have been allowed for excess production for certain parties, in same cases. All that is necessary in such cases is to determine the entitlements and by deciding the quantities and the amounts to the extent of concessions conferred, by the balance, if any, may be created the present ledger account.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. Thus, the aforesaid notification itself provides that the entitlement claimed by the petitioner should be determined by deciding the quantities and the amounts to the extent of concessions conferred, and only then the amount can be credited to the PLA. 16. The bare perusal of paragraph 2-a and 2-b of the impugned notice dated 5.6.1992 goes to show that the order of the Supreme Court has been made the basis for crediting the impugned amount in the PLA. The petitioner has filed the order of the Supreme Court dated 7th May, 1991, 8th January, 1991 and 9th January, 1991.
16. The bare perusal of paragraph 2-a and 2-b of the impugned notice dated 5.6.1992 goes to show that the order of the Supreme Court has been made the basis for crediting the impugned amount in the PLA. The petitioner has filed the order of the Supreme Court dated 7th May, 1991, 8th January, 1991 and 9th January, 1991. A perusal of the aforesaid orders clearly indicate that the Supreme Court has not determined the quantum of the basic excise duty/additional excise duty to be granted to the petitioner. The controversy raised before the Apex Court related to the entitlement of additional excise duty, and secondly, whether the orders passed by the excise authorities were provisional or final in nature. Apex Court had no occasion to advert and adjudicate upon the actual quantum of the excise duty. As such, the contention of the petitioner that the rebate claimed by them is on the basis of the order of the Supreme Court is mis-leading, inasmuch as the amount to be credited was neither determined nor quantified by the said orders of the Supreme Court as referred to hereinabove. That apart, even the Appellate Court had not quantified the amount, although issues were settled on some counts. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the credit was taken in the PLA was on the basis of the order of the Supreme Court and other Courts has no foundation. 17. In support of his contention, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has referred to the order dated 21.5.91 passed by this Court in writ petition No. Nil of 1991(M/s. Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and others) involving the issue of grant of rebate to the petitioner. This Court inter alia had observed as follows : “The proper direction that may be made in the circumstances is to the Superintendent (T) Central Excise, Moradabad, to determine the benefit to which the petitioner is entitled according to the orders of the Supreme Court and the Collector (Appeals), as the case may be, with respect to the said three sugar years and communicate his orders to the petitioner. The orders to this effect may be passed within two months from the date a copy of this order is produced before him by the petitioner.” (Emphasis supplied) 18.
The orders to this effect may be passed within two months from the date a copy of this order is produced before him by the petitioner.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. As such, even this Court in the aforesaid writ petition had directed the concerned authorities to determine the benefit to which the petitioner was entitled on the basis of the orders of Supreme Court and Collector (Appeals), but the petitioner who was in utmost haste did not even wait for the determination of the amount. Thus Court in the aforementioned writ petition was quite conscious of fact that the amount to be credited in PLA by the petitioner was first as to be quantified and determined. 19. The petitioner has failed to refer to any of the specific order of the Supreme Court, Tribunal or the Ministry of Finance Government authorizing it to take credit of the amount, as aforesaid in respect of its claims. Thus the amount of the alleged claims were credited in PLA without any authorization of the Competent Authority as provided under the Act, as such the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder were contravened by the petitioner. 20. Much emphasis has been given by the petitioner, that the scheme of rebate is analogous to the provisions of Rule 56-A of the Excise Rules, 1944. We are not all impressed by the submissions of the petitioner. The notification dated 20.11.1963/14.12.1963 does not help the petitioner in any way for the following reasons : (a) firstly, as already we have noticed hereinearlier that the petitioner has not appended the detailed procedure as provided in paragraph 3 of the said notification dated 20.11.1963 for granting incentive rebate as excess production of sugar through proforma credit in the PLA. (b) Secondly, paragraph 4 of the said notification itself provides that the entitlement has to be determined. (c) Thirdly, the Rule 56-A does not permit the petitioner to take credit in PLA on its own. Rule 56-A prescribes procedure for movement of duty paid materials or components for use in the manufacture of finished excisable goods or for more convenient distribution of such goods. It provides for proforma credit of duty already paid on materials/components brought for use in the manufacture of specified finished excisable goods. 21.
Rule 56-A prescribes procedure for movement of duty paid materials or components for use in the manufacture of finished excisable goods or for more convenient distribution of such goods. It provides for proforma credit of duty already paid on materials/components brought for use in the manufacture of specified finished excisable goods. 21. In this regard, paragraph-4 of the show cause notice dated 5.6.92 is very relevant and is reproduced as under : “The said M/s Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd., Dhampur, thus appeared to have taken the credit unauthorizedly in their said PLA of the amount as aforesaid so as to inflate the balance at the credit of their said PLA with intent to evade payment of duty on the excisable goods removed subsequent to fabrication of the account as aforesaid showing the same to have been removed on payment of duty as per chart enclosed inasmuch as : (a) Rule 56 (2A) as referred to by the factory vide statement dated 2.12.91 of its Sales Manager, does not exist on the statute. However, as per the statement of Sri J.S. Sharma, recorded on 18.12.1991, he stated that credit was taken under Rule 56-A as the scheme of rebate is analogous to Rule 56-A. But it appears that this Rule does not permit an assessee to take credit in PLA of their own. Rule 56-A prescribes procedure for movement of duty paid materials on components for use in the manufacture of finished excisable goods or for more convenient distribution of such goods. It provides from proforma credit of duty already paid on materials/components brought for use in the manufacture of specified finished excisable goods. The analogy of this Rule could be referred only to the extent of making available the exemption from Central Excise Duty, allowed as a measure of incentive of higher production, in advance, by way of credit in PLA of actual removal of the excisable goods and to no other provisions of this Rule including Rule 56 (2A) having altogether different purpose, provisions and procedure than Section 11-B governing the refund including rebate on excess production.
(b) No scheme of Rules authorise for taking the crdit of an amount in PLA by the assessees of their own except on deposit of a sum on TR-6 and on the authority of an executive order passed by the Competent Authority of Central Excise allowing the assessee to take credit of a specified amount. (c) On the admission of the factory as per remarks shown by them in Col. 2 (i) of the PLA as well as in their letter dated 2.12.91 (as referred to above) the amount taken credit of by them on 24.7.1991 as aforesaid related to their claims as revised and submitted in consequences of certain issues decided by the Supreme Court in favour of the appellant including parties other than the factory (viz. M/s Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd., Dhampur, as referred to in their letter dated 2.12.1991). The party however did not refer to any specific order of the Court/authorising them to assume the powers of the Statutory Authority and to outright take the credit of the amounts representing their revised claim as stated to have been submitted to the proper officer of Central Excise for necessary sanction in accordance with the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. They also failed to refer to such a specific order or authority in their letter dated 2.12.1991 addressed to the Superintendent Range while referring to the issues decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in identical cases (without citing specifically the relevant orders) and not in any case relating to the specific amount allegedly claimed as revised and taken credit of by them in their PLA as aforesaid. The authorized representative of the aforesaid factory, during the course of enquiries by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise Moradabad on 18.12.1991 (copy of his statement dated 18.12.1991 already supplied to him) also failed to refer to any specific order relating to the amounts taken credit of showing as alleged to be revised benefits accruing to them on the interpretation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in their favour. He however, admitted to have not received any executive directions for taking such credits and also to have not referred to any specific order or authority in the PLA while taking credit therein as aforesaid.
He however, admitted to have not received any executive directions for taking such credits and also to have not referred to any specific order or authority in the PLA while taking credit therein as aforesaid. (d) The claims as revised appear to have been countersigned by the Superintendent, Central Excise, Dhampur on 31.7.1991 and received in the office of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise Moradabad on 2.8.1991 whereas the entire amount so claimed, as revised on the basis of revised date, got credited in the PLA on 24.7.1991 and 25.10.1991 in complete disregard to the provisions of the statute relating to the refund of the amounts stated to have been claimed by them and maintained the statutory record in form PLA (as maintained by them with the Collector of Central Excise Rules, 1944) in an arbitrary manner. The alleged revised claims have since been dealt with in accordance with the law and rejected by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Moradabad as conveyed to them under his orders C.No. V (17) (18) 155-Rebate/91/2057-60 dated 31.3.1991 C.No. V (17) (18) 152-Rebate/91/2237-42 dated 3.4.1992 C.No. V (17) (18) 151-Rebate/91/dated 4.3.1992 and C.No. V (10) (18) 153-Rebate/91/1618-22 dated 9.3.1992 inviting amount of Rs. 3,34,572.32.” 22. The reasoning and the grounds enumerated in the aforesaid para by respondent No. 2 while issuing the show cause notice does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. In the show cause notice, Respondent No. 2 has assigned cogent and convincing reasons that petitioner was not entitled to take credit in PLA in accordance with Rule 56-A, without any authorization. The petitioner’s claim that the incentives rebate claim is analogous to Rule 56-A is misleading, the credit under the proforma scheme under Rule 56-A is taken in RG 23 while the credit under incentive rebate scheme is taken in PLA after the determination of the amount and in the present case petitioner has taken credit on his own in the PLA and unnecessarily trying to take shelter behind the Rule 56-A and 56-AA of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 just to counter the charge of unauthorized credit. The higher Appellate Court had only upheld the claim of the petitioner qua basic and additional excise duty and it had no occasion to quantify the amount of rebate admissible to them.
The higher Appellate Court had only upheld the claim of the petitioner qua basic and additional excise duty and it had no occasion to quantify the amount of rebate admissible to them. The petitioner has no statutory power to take credit on its own without any specific executive order by the Competent Authority/Appropriate Authority even in case any benefit had accrued to the petitioner as a consequence of any order of any of the Court, specific executive order is required for taking such benefits under the provisions of law. 23. The next contention of the petitioner is that the claim with regard to the rebate was countersigned by the Superintendent as such he was authorized to take credit in the PLA. This argument of the petitioner is totally misconceived as Superintendent is not the Competent Authority to finalize the rebate/refund claim. It is admitted to the petitioner that the claims of the petitioner were countersigned by the Superintendent on 31st July, 1991 and received in the office of Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Moradabad on 2.8.1991 whereas, the petitioner had taken the credit in the PLA much prior to that i.e. 24th July, 1991 and 27th July, 1991 in complete disregard to the provisions of statute. Therefore, the petitioner cannot take any advantage on this count. This apart, claims were forwarded to the Collector of Central Excise, Moradabad on 1.8.91 who was Competent Authority to sanction the rebate. Petitioner had taken credit unauthorizedly without the approval of the Competent Authority as the credit was taken prior to 1.8.91. It has come on record that the alleged revised claims was rejected by the Asst. Collector of Excise Commissioner, Moradabad. However, according to the petitioner, the said order was set aside on the ground of violation of natural justice and the matter is still pending for adjudication. 24. Lastly, it is submitted by the petitioner that the notice issued under Section 11-A is time barred, neither any recovery can be made from the petitioner nor any penalty can be imposed. Even though, the petitioner has not pleaded in the writ petition as to how the impugned show cause notice is time barred under Section 11-A of the Act, during the course of argument much emphasis has, however, been laid on the question of limitation. Therefore, in the interest of justice, we proceed to adjudicate upon this issue. 25.
Even though, the petitioner has not pleaded in the writ petition as to how the impugned show cause notice is time barred under Section 11-A of the Act, during the course of argument much emphasis has, however, been laid on the question of limitation. Therefore, in the interest of justice, we proceed to adjudicate upon this issue. 25. At this juncture, we feel that it would be quite appropriate, in this context, to reproduce the provisions of Section 11-A (as it stood at the relevant time) which reads as under : “11-A. Recovery of duties not levied or not paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded : (1) When any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded, a Central Excise Officer may, within six months from the relevant date, serve notice on the person chargeable with the duty which has not been levied or paid or which has been short-levied or short-paid or to whom the refund as erroneously been made, requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice : Provided that where any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded by reason of fraud, collusion or any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts, or contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of the rules made thereunder with intent to evade payment of duty, by such person or his agent, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect. [as if for the words “Central Excise Officer” the words “Collector of Central Excise”, and for the words “six months” the words “five years” were substituted]. Explanation.—Where the service of the notice is stayed by an order of a Court, the period of such stay shall be excluded in computing the aforesaid period of six months or five years, as the case may be.” 26. It is the contention of the petitioner that the show cause notice is time barred since the period of six months is to be calculated as per the first part of the provisions of Section 11-A (1) of the Act, since the credit was taken in July, 1991 but the notice was issued to the petitioner on 5.6.1992, which was after the expiry of six months. 27.
27. The contention of the petitioner is totally misconceived. Bare perusal of Section 11-A (1) of the Act goes to show that it is only when there is no fraud, collusion or any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts etc. The limitation for issuing show cause notice is six months, however, when the excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded by reason of fraud, collusion or any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts or contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of the Rules made thereunder with intent to evade payment of duty by such person or agent, in that event notice can be issued within 5 years from the relevant date. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner does not come within the ambit of proviso to Section 11-A (1), therefore, the limitation of 5 years will not be applicable as such the notice is illegal and time barred. 29. We are not at all convinced by such submissions. A bare perusal of the show cause notice and material available on record clearly reveals that the respondent No. 2 has rightly invoked the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11-A while issuing the show cause notice, which provides 5 years of period of limitation. 30. The petitioner has contravened the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder by taking the unauthorized credit by making wilful mis-statement that credit has been taken as per the order of the Supreme Court/appellate Court. But the petitioner failed to refer to any of the specific order of the Supreme Court or any authority. 31. Supreme Court never quantified or determined the credit taken by the petitioner in PLA. This aspect has already been dealt at length by us in earlier part of this judgment. In this regard, it is useful and appropriate to reproduce para 6 and 7 of the show cause notice, which read as under : “6.
31. Supreme Court never quantified or determined the credit taken by the petitioner in PLA. This aspect has already been dealt at length by us in earlier part of this judgment. In this regard, it is useful and appropriate to reproduce para 6 and 7 of the show cause notice, which read as under : “6. The said M/s Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd., Dhampur, thus appears to have been showing scant regard to the provisions of law and not maintaining any sanctity of the statutory record and accounts and mis-using the concession granted under the scheme of SRI as applicable to them by resorting to mis-statement and suppression of facts while dealing in a manner prejudicial to revenue and also in contravention of the provisions of Rule 9 read with Rule 173-G (i) of Central Excise Rules, 1944. The said M/s Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd., Dhampur thus appears to have contravened the provisions of Rule 9 and 173-G (i) of Central Excise Rules, 1944, by misstating the facts with intent to evade payment of Central Excise duty on the excisable goods cleared by them showing payment of duty leviable thereon by debiting the same against the amount of unauthorized credit so taken by them in their PLA which is recoverable from them, apart from rendering themselves liable to a penalty under Rule 9 (2) and 173-Q of Central Excise Rules, 1944, as extended period as provided under the said Rule read with Section 11-A of Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 for the recovery of the amounts as aforesaid shall apply in this case. 7. The said M/s Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd., Dhampur, are therefore, hereby required to show cause to the Collector of Central Excise, Meerut, as to why a penalty may not be imposed upon them under Rule 9 (2) and 173-Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and also why the amount of basic/additional excise duty un-unauthorizedly taken credit of in their PLA and debited towards payment of duty on excisable goods removed thereafter, may not be recovered from them under Rule 9 (2) of Central Excise Rules, 1944.” 32. Thus the petitioner without any basis after resorting to misstatement and suppression of facts has taken the credit in PLA and as such contravened the provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder with intent to evade payment of duty. 33.
Thus the petitioner without any basis after resorting to misstatement and suppression of facts has taken the credit in PLA and as such contravened the provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder with intent to evade payment of duty. 33. The petitioner has also placed reliance upon the following decisions of the Apex Court in support of his contention; Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Mumbai v. M/s Bell Granito Ceramic Ltd., 2006 AIR SCW 281; Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh v. M/s Punjab Laminates (P) Ltd., 2006 AIR SCW 4848; Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad v. M/s Chemphar Drugs and Liniments, Hyderabad, (1989) 2 SCC 127 ; M/s Continental Foundation Joint Venture Sholding Nathpa, Himachal Pradesh v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh, 2007 AIR SCW 6012. 34. In the case of Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Mumbai v. M/s Bell Granito Ceramic Ltd. (supra), the Tribunal had held that there was no suppression of facts hence the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act will not apply. That being the finding of fact, therefore, the apex Court did not interfere in the matter. However, in the present case the petitioner instead of filing his reply to the show cause notice or to contest the proceedings before the authorities as provided under the Act, has filed the present petition and we have already held after scrutinizing the entire material on record that the petitioner with intent to evade the payment of duty has made wilful mis-statement and contravened the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder. Therefore, the aforesaid case cited by the petitioner is not at all applicable in the present matter. 35. In the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh v. M/s Punjab Laminates (P) Ltd. (supra), the matter reached the apex Court after the decision of the Tribunal, wherein the Tribunal while allowing the appeal, opined that the entire payment pertaining to the period from 8.1.93 to 31.2.93 was hit by the time limit specified under Section 11-A of the Act.
In this background, the Apex Court observed that the proviso appended to Section 11-A of the Act extending the period of limitation is required to be applied if the conditions precedent therefor are satisfied, and consequently keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, the apex Court did not interfere in the matter and upheld the order of Tribunal. Therefore, the aforesaid case was also confined to its own fact and it does not help the petitioner in any way. 36. In the case of Collector Central Excise, Hyderabad v. M/s Chemphar Drugs and Liniments, Hyderabad (supra) the matter reached the apex Court after decision of the Tribunal wherein the Tribunal had concluded that the facts of the case do not warrant any inference of fraud and found that explanation given by the manufacturer was plausible. In the circumstances, the apex Court upheld the findings of the Tribunal. Therefore, the aforesaid case was confined to its own facts and it also does not help the petitioner in any way. 37. The case of M/s Continental Foundation Joint Venture Sholding Nathpa, Himachal Pradesh v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh (supra) is also confined to its own facts and in our opinion it is distinguishable and has no bearing on the case in hand. 38. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we do not find any illegality or any infirmity in the show cause notice issued by the Respondent No. 2. 39. This writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. ————