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2009 DIGILAW 2990 (ALL)

TAMIZAN BANO v. SRI AHMAD HUSSAIN

2009-08-31

A.P.SAHI

body2009
JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.P. Sahi J.—This petition arises out of the orders dated 22.4.2002 and 21.7.2005 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Moradabad praying for quashing of the same, which is in effect is to restore the order of the trial Court dated 7.7.2001. By the said order the trial Court had rejected the application moved by the defendant-respondent seeking amendment in the counter-claim, which has been set up in the written statement and that was ultimately reversed by the revisional Court, which is under challenge by the plaintiff-petitioner. 2. The facts in short are that a suit was filed by the petitioner being Original Suit No. 435 of 1994 praying for a declaration that she is the absolute owner of the property in dispute and that the defendant-respondent has absolutely no claim for share in the same, on the allegation that the plaintiff has been residing in the said house, which was owned by her mother. She continues to hold on the property for which she relies on an oral gift in her favour said to have been made on dated 10th January, 1983 and accordingly, she claims to be continuing in possession even after her death. 3. The defendant-respondent set up his defence that the property in question was transferred to the defendant-respondent by a registered sale-deed dated 5th January, 1989 and that the plaintiff had moved temporarily for some period in the premises with the permission of the late owner Smt. Banno on the first floor of the house. The defendant further asserted that he had demanded rent from the plaintiff and she paid rent up to 4th July, 1992. Thereafter she defaulted and with a malafide intention instituted the suit on an absolutely frivolous claim of an oral gift. 4. In the suit the defendant set up a counter-claim disclosing the cause of action dated 12th November, 1994, which was alleged to be the date of last refusal by the plaintiff to vacate and deliver peaceful vacant possession of the first floor of the house. A further relief of damage was also claimed @ Rs. 300/- per month and prayer for eviction was made together with decree for damages. 5. A further relief of damage was also claimed @ Rs. 300/- per month and prayer for eviction was made together with decree for damages. 5. The written statement, a copy whereof is annexure 2 to the writ petition, records the aforesaid facts and in paragraph 21 of the written statement, it has been alleged that the plaintiff has been occupying the first floor portion of the disputed house as a tenant and, therefore, the plaintiff had no right to seek declaration as prayed for. 6. The suit proceeded and an application was moved being application No. 95 (Ka), wherein it was alleged that the plaintiff has now forcibly occupied the ground floor as well. Therefore, a relief was prayed for amendment in the counter-claim as set up through the written statement. The trial Court held that the possession of both the first floor and the ground floor was indicated in the written statement itself and that there was no clarity in the application moved as to when this forcible dispossession took place, therefore, the application was rejected. 7. A revision was preferred by the respondent-defendant and the revisional Court held that by merely allowing such an amendment the same will not amount to an admission of any claim and it will be dependant on the evidence which is to be led by the parties. The revisional Court further held that such an order should be taking a liberal view of the matter, and taking a wholesome view of the matter, the counter-claim set up is to the effect that the defendant is the owner of the entire property which would neither change the nature of the counter-claim nor is it a cause of action which is totally disconnected with the counter-claim. Accordingly, the trial Court’s order was set aside on 22.4.2002 and the matter was remitted back to the trial Court. A review was filed against the said order dated 22.4.2002 by the petitioner which has also been dismissed on 21st July, 2005 reiterating the view taken by the predecessor holding that there was no ground to review the earlier order as there was nothing which can be taken as an error apparent on record so as to entertain the same under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’). 8. 8. Shri K.K. Arora, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner advancing his submissions has urged that the provisions of Order VIII Rule 6-A of the Code clearly apply on the facts of this case and such an amendment was absolutely barred and not entertainable, for which Shri Arora heavily relied on the decision of learned Single Judge in this case in the case of Sudhir Kumar Wadhwa v. IVth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Shahjahanpur and others, 1996 ALR 209 and on the decision of learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ganu v.Manik, 2003 (3) CCC 133. 9. For ready reference Order VIII Rule 6-A of the Code is quoted herein below : “6A. Counter-claim by defendant.—(1) A defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under Rule 6, set up, by way of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not : Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. (2) Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim. (3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the Court. (4) The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints.” 10. Shri Pankaj Naqvi, appearing on behalf of the respondent urged that it has been clearly stated in the application of amendment that the plaintiff had “recently” crept into the ground floor of the house in dispute as is evident, a copy of the same is appended as annexure 5 to the writ petition, and thereafter the amendments sought for in the counter-claim were prayed for. Shri Naqvi contends that the counter-claim is in the nature of a suit and an amendment can be brought in the counter-claim on the principles of Order VI Rule 17. It has further been submitted that the nature of the counter-claim does not bring about any change nor does it in any way delay proceedings, as on the same set of evidence the defendant will either fail or succeed in his counter-claim. The amendment prayed for does not bring about any contingency which may delay the trial of the suit. He further contends that there is no bar as is sought to be raised on behalf of the petitioner and that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not at all attracted in the matter. He contends that the amendment has been rightly construed liberally without violation to the provisions of Order VIII Rule 6-A of the Code. 11. In rejoinder Shri Arora contends that as a matter of fact, the amendment sought was clearly barred by time, inasmuch as, the cause of action arose after the filing of the defence and Shri Arora for that proposition relied on the judgment namely Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and others, AIR 1957 SC 363 . 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and keeping in view the provisions of Order VIII Rule 6-A of the Code, as quoted above, a counter-claim is a plaint and has the same effect as a cross suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit. The nature of a counter-claim has been well explained in the Case of William Brothers v. Ed. T. Agius Ltd., 1914 Appeal Cases 510 and is an independent action as held in Meyowan and another v. Middleton, 1883 Queens Bench Division page 464. 13. The counter-claim set up in the instant case was in respect of the title to the entire property, which was purchased to the extent as indicated in the sale-deed dated 5th January, 1989. The cause of action had arisen according to the defendant, and the pleadings had been made before the defendant had delivered his defence. 13. The counter-claim set up in the instant case was in respect of the title to the entire property, which was purchased to the extent as indicated in the sale-deed dated 5th January, 1989. The cause of action had arisen according to the defendant, and the pleadings had been made before the defendant had delivered his defence. The allegation in the amendment application is that “recently” the plaintiff has forcibly occupied the ground floor and as such the amendment sought for should be allowed and which has been allowed by the revisional Court. 14. Shri Arora on the strength of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ganu v. Manik (supra) has urged that the amendment was highly belated, time barred and much after the defendant had already delivered his defence. The time for the same had already expired. 15. The Bombay High Court in the aforesaid decision came to the conclusion that amending the counter-claim on the basis of a subsequent cause of action cannot be related back to the date of written statement or the counter-claim first filed. The Court held in that case that the additional claims were sought to be added, the cause of action for which had arisen much after the filing of the written statement. This in the opinion of the learned Judge amounted to filing of a fresh counter-claim after the time limit provided under Order VIII Rule 6-A of the Code had expired. 16. The question as to whether the possession was recently taken, or that the defendant was not in possession at all, was clearly dependant upon the cause of action which had arisen at the time of the filing of the written statement. The case set up in the counter claim is for a declaration on the strength of a sale-deed. The said sale-deed had already been set up in the counter-claim and a plea for declaration together with possession had already been pleaded. There was a claim of possession in the counter-claim in respect of the property which was indicated in the order of the trial Court itself. If that is so then if during the pendency of the counter-claim the defendant had been forcibly dispossessed, the same would be a totally different situation from that which existed on facts before the Bombay High Court in the case of Ganu v. Manik (supra). If that is so then if during the pendency of the counter-claim the defendant had been forcibly dispossessed, the same would be a totally different situation from that which existed on facts before the Bombay High Court in the case of Ganu v. Manik (supra). Whether the defendant had been dispossessed recently or not would be in the nature of the claim of restitution, which will have to be proved through evidence and which would in the opinion of the Court not be barred by the provisions of Order VIII Rule 6-A of the Code. The said amendment in no way would either prejudice the cause of the plaintiff as the plaintiff has to stand on her own legs by proving her oral gift with regard to the entire property. By allowing the amendment it cannot be said that the claim set up was either time barred and if there is some debate about the word “recently” used in the amendment application then the same is always subject to the evidence which will have to be allowed to be led before it can be said that the claim is time barred. By merely allowing the amendment the claim set up through the amendement cannot be treated to have been accepted. The contention of Shri Arora that such a plea cannot be allowed to be raised and evidence is not required for the same would be a premature assessment of the amendment set up in the counter claim. In essence the suit will be allowed to proceed and not delayed on this ground alone. 17. Needless to say that the present petition has survived for 4 years before this Court at the instance of the plaintiff which must have resulted in an impediment of the trial of the proceedings before the trial Court. 18. It is note worthy that time and again right from the decision of the Privy Council till date our Courts have continuously favoured a liberal approach towards amendments. The amendment sought does not fall within the exception to the Rule. A counter-claim would even otherwise survive if the plaintiff chooses to withdraw her claim in such a situation read with the amended provisions which have been brought about in the Code. The amendment sought does not fall within the exception to the Rule. A counter-claim would even otherwise survive if the plaintiff chooses to withdraw her claim in such a situation read with the amended provisions which have been brought about in the Code. The nature of the amendment as sought for in the present case cannot be said to be barred by the provisions of Order VIII Rule 6-A of the Code. 19. In the present case the nature of the amendment does not amount to a fresh counter-claim so as to attract the bar of Order VIII Rule 6-A of the Code. The nature of the claim is more in the nature of an amendment as emphasized under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code or the bringing of pleadings on record, which is otherwise permissible in Order VIII, Rule 9 of the Code. The nature and claim of the counter-claim in essence remains the same and therefore, the decision as relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not apply on the facts of the present case. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. ————