JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—The above revision has been filed under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by the tenant against the judgment and decree dated April 10, 1991 passed by the Xth Additional District Judge, Aligarh in SCC Suit No. 42 of 1986. Smt. Hansmukhi Devi who has died during the pendency of the present revision instituted the aforestated SCC Suit No. 42 of 1986 against the present applicant for his ejectment from the house No. 2/142, Niranjanpuri, Aligarh on the allegations that she is owner and landlady of the said house. It was let out to the defendant namely the applicant herein, on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/-. He is in arrears of rent and has not paid the water taxes. He has without permission of the landlady has raised substantial constructions and disfigured it in the month of January, 1986. The tenancy was terminated by means of the notice dated 4th of September, 1986 served on 27th of September, 1986. 2. The suit was contested on the pleas inter alia that the defendant is the tenant of the entire Kothi. Initially, only part of Kothi was let out and the rent was Rs. 700/- per month. Paucity of accommodation was felt by him and he was permitted to raise one room by the husband of the landlady. The landlady gave a map signed by her for raising the room with the stipulation that the rent would be enhanced w.e.f. 1st of April, 1983 by Rs. 100/- to Rs. 800/- per month. Thereafter, the rent was enhanced to Rs. 1000/- per month. The benefit under Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was also claimed. The defendant tenant stated that he has deposited the entire amount as required under Section 20(4) of the said Act on the first date of hearing amounting to Rs. 15,000/- and as such he may be relieved from eviction decree. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed as many as six issues, detailed in the judgment. 3. Under issue No. 1 relating to default in payment of rent by the defendant, it was found that the defendant failed to make the payment after the receipt of the notice and as such he is defaulter. However, the decree for eviction on the basis of the default was not granted. 3. Under issue No. 1 relating to default in payment of rent by the defendant, it was found that the defendant failed to make the payment after the receipt of the notice and as such he is defaulter. However, the decree for eviction on the basis of the default was not granted. Benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act was extended. Under Issue No. 2 it was found that the defendant tenant has disfigured the building in question by raising construction which has diminished its value and utility and is, thus, liable for eviction. Notice under issue No. 3 was found valid. It was found under issue No. 4 that the suit is not barred by the principle of estoppel or acquiescence. Consequently, decree for ejectment, recovery of arrears of rent etc. was passed by the Court below. 4. The learned counsel for the applicant in support of the present revision has submitted the following two points for consideration : (1) The finding recorded by the Court below under the issue No. 2 holding that the tenant has disfigured the building by raising construction or the construction has diminished its value or utility, is legally incorrect. (2) The finding recorded by the Court below holding that the notice is valid, is incorrect. 5. Taking the first point first, the learned counsel for the applicant submits that the constructions were raised not in the tenanted area but on the vacant piece of land. He went to the extent in submitting that the vacant piece of land was not part of the tenancy and the tenant may be trespasser to the said vacant piece of land. Elaborating the argument, he submits that since the construction has been raised not in the tenanted portion, the tenant is not liable for eviction. He further submits that, as a matter of fact, the offended constructions were not raised by the tenant but by the landlady herself. The further submission is that these constructions may be demolished at any time without affecting the tenanted accommodation and therefore, the decree for eviction cannot be passed under clause (c) of Section 20(2) of the Act. He further submits that, as a matter of fact, the offended constructions were not raised by the tenant but by the landlady herself. The further submission is that these constructions may be demolished at any time without affecting the tenanted accommodation and therefore, the decree for eviction cannot be passed under clause (c) of Section 20(2) of the Act. The learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party, on the other hand, submits that it has been found as a fact that the defendant tenant has raised two rooms, one garage, one latrine and one bathroom on the open piece of land lying in the Kothi which according to him amounts disfigurement of the tenanted structure and is likely to diminish its value or utility. 6. The aforesaid constructions were raised by the tenant without the permission of the landlady. 7. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. At the very outset it may be pointed out that the extent of the tenanted accommodation was not subject matter of the dispute between the parties before the trial Court. In the revision the same is being disputed by the learned counsel for the applicant who submits that, as a matter of fact, only the roofed structure i.e. the Kothi was let out and not the land adjoining the building. 8. In paragraph 1 of the plaint it is pleaded that the plaintiff is owner and landlady of the property bearing municipal No. 2/142, Niranjanpuri, Aligarh as described at the foot of the plaint. 9. The boundaries of the said property have been described in the following manner : East : Passage of the Kothi and afterwards house of Mahesh, Deera Rani Shukla and Udai Pratap. West : Kothi of Surendra Singh Rawat. North : Quarter of Plaintiff Smt. Hansmukhi in tenancy of Smt. Kuber Singh, Workshop of Alok Gupta in his tenancy, owned by Surendra Kumar Mittal and private passage. South : Municipal Lane. 10. In reply, the applicant tenant in written statement has stated that he is the tenant of the entire Kothi. The emphasis is that Kothi as a whole was under his tenancy. South : Municipal Lane. 10. In reply, the applicant tenant in written statement has stated that he is the tenant of the entire Kothi. The emphasis is that Kothi as a whole was under his tenancy. Shri M.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the plaintiff landlady rightly points out that the use of word ‘Kul’ (which means entire) is indicative of the fact that the applicant tenant has admitted that he was the tenant of the entire Kothi meaning thereby the adjoining land also. In this factual background, the plea of the tenant that the constructions were raised not in a tenanted accommodation but on a portion which was not let out to him is to be examined. 11. In my considered view the said plea of the defendant tenant is liable to be rejected for the reasons more than one. 12. The defendant tenant cannot be permitted to raise a new factual controversy which was not raised before the trial Court. The defendant tenant is bound by his averments made in the written statement. No such dispute having been raised before the trial Court, it does not lie in the mouth of the defendant tenant to urge here that the vacant piece of land was not part of his tenancy. This being so the plea that the defendant tenant is a trespasser on the open piece of land cannot be accepted. The plea of trespasser qua the open piece of land having not been set out in the written statement, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time here in the present revision. The parties are bound by their pleadings and they cannot travel beyond it before a higher Court. 13. It was then contended that the said construction was not raised by the defendant tenant but by the landlady herself. The husband of the landlady was examined on her behalf. The landlady has not come in the witness box. The case of the defendant tenant is that the proposed construction was raised as per the map got prepared by the plaintiff. The plaintiff after getting the signature of the defendant, took it back. According to the own case of the defendant tenant, the said map was in respect of one room accommodation. However, two rooms, one garage, one bathroom and one latrine have been found to be got constructed instead. The plaintiff after getting the signature of the defendant, took it back. According to the own case of the defendant tenant, the said map was in respect of one room accommodation. However, two rooms, one garage, one bathroom and one latrine have been found to be got constructed instead. Even assuming for a moment though there is no cogent material on record in support of the above plea, how the two rooms, one garage, one bathroom and one latrine came into existence remains unexplained. Even it was not pleaded that the said map, the existence of which is in dispute, is referable to the offended constructions namely two rooms, one garage, one bathroom and latrine. 14. Section 20 of the Act deals with the bar of the suit for eviction of a tenant except on specified grounds. Clause (c) which is relevant for our purposes is reproduced below : "(c) The tenant has without the permission in writing of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction or structural alteration in the building as is likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it.” 15. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, a tenant is not permitted to raise any construction without the permission in writing of the landlord. To put it differently, a permission by the landlord in writing is necessarily required. The said permission in writing has to be produced by such tenant in order to justify the constructions raised by him. Admittedly, on the record there is no such permission in writing of the landlady. If the law envisages a permission in writing then no amount of evidence that permission was granted otherwise than in writing by a landlord, can be relied upon by a tenant. Thus, out of twine requirements, the first requirement of Section 20(2)(c) is not fulfilled. 16. The theory of map of one room has got no substance. In absence of any material to show that it is the landlady who got the constructions made, this Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act cannot hold that the constructions were raised by the landlady. There is no cogent evidence to show that the offended constructions were raised by the landlady and not by the tenant. 17. There is no cogent evidence to show that the offended constructions were raised by the landlady and not by the tenant. 17. Then, it was urged that since the constructions were raised on a open piece of land and such constructions can be removed, it would not be a ground for eviction of the defendant tenant within the meaning of Section 20(2)(c) of the Act. Reliance has been placed upon a judgment of this Court in Jai Bhagwan v. Padam Sen, 1964 ALJ 991. In this case the Court was called upon to interpret the phrase “material alteration” occurring in Section 3 (1)(C) of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 and not under the Act. It has been held that the words “material alteration” must be interpreted within the common sense and reason and not so as to make a reasonable enjoyment impossible for the tenant. The question whether a particular alteration in the accommodation is material or not must be answered according to the circumstances of that case. In this case the tenant covered half of the open space in front of his living room which was considered by the landlord as material altered the accommodation. In this scenario the Court was of the view that by constructing the roof over a portion of terrace, tenant has not materially altered the accommodation. The terrace will still remain a terrace and the rest of the accommodation what it was. It was found that the roof can be removed without damaging the rest of the building as it rests on the walls already constructed by the landlord. 18. The learned counsel for the applicant heavily placed reliance on the said part of the judgment which deals with that the roof can be removed without damaging the rest of the building. 19. Reliance was also placed by him on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Dr. Jai Gopal Gupta v. Bodh Mal, 1969 ALJ 477. This case was also under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. In this case, the tenant on a portion of the courtyard erected a kitchen and bathroom without obtaining permission from the landlord. The suit for eviction on the ground that the tenant has made material alterations in the house without the permission of the landlord was instituted. In this case, the tenant on a portion of the courtyard erected a kitchen and bathroom without obtaining permission from the landlord. The suit for eviction on the ground that the tenant has made material alterations in the house without the permission of the landlord was instituted. It was held that since the bathroom and the new kitchen are separate from the structure of the house and they cover only 1/3rd portion of the courtyard and having no foundation, will not amount to “material alteration”. The accommodation as was let out had no separate bathroom. It was found that it has a separate kitchen but it could not be conveniently used. On these facts, taking into consideration, the dictionary meaning of ‘alteration’, the Court took the view that expression “material alteration” should be held to be changed in the character or position of the accommodation which is essential or important. 20. Submission is that the offended constructions can be demolished without damaging the tenanted roof structure as the said constructions are independent. It is difficult to agree with him. The above case does not lay down as a general proposition that the structures which can be removed will not amount to material alternations. It will depend on the facts of each case. 21. What would amount to “material alteration” is not presently germane. The relevant portion of Section 20 (2)(c) has already been reproduced above, under which the suit was filed. The said clause does not contain any such expression as “material alteration”. The phrase “material alterations” was used in U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 which was the preceding legislation and has been replaced by the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. This being so, it is not necessary to dwell upon as to what amounts material alteration any further. Under the relevant Statute focus is on “construction or structural alteration in the building” as is likely to diminish its value or utility or disfigured it. No attempt was made by the learned counsel for the applicant to place any material before this Court to show that offended constructions is beyond the scope and purview of the aforesaid clause. In other words, no attempt was made to show that such constructions would not amount to disfigurement or diminish the value of the tenanted building or utility. 22. In other words, no attempt was made to show that such constructions would not amount to disfigurement or diminish the value of the tenanted building or utility. 22. Disfigurement has not been defined in the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. If the existing shape and beauty of the building is adversely affected consequent upon the raising of a disputed construction either in or upon the building, it may amount to disfigurement. No principle of universal application as to what amount to disfigurement can be laid down, it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Each case must, therefore, be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances for determining whether the offending construction does cause any disfigurement or not. The matter has been considered by this Court in Smt. Rajrani Kapoor v. Bhupindera Singh, 1986 (2) ARC 457. The relevant paragraph 15 is reproduced below : “15. ‘Disfigurement’ has not been defined in the Act. However according to the ordinary dictionary meaning, ‘disfigurement’ means “to spoil the figure, to deform; spoil the beauty; to change to a worse form or to make it ugly.” Thus if the existing shape and the beauty of the building is adversely affected consequent upon raising of the disputed construction either in or upon the building, it may amount to disfigurement. However, it is neither proper nor possible to lay down any hard and fast rule in this respect. Each case must depend upon its own facts. Each case must, therefore, be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances for determining whether the offending construction does cause any disfigurement or not. In some cases, even as so called work of improvement may result in disfigurement of the building. Where, for example, a building is of old style having ornamental work on its front elevation but it is partly changed according to modern concept of architecture with plain plastered surface after the old worn out ornamental plaster has peeled of, it may in some cases result in disfigurement. Where, for example, a building is of old style having ornamental work on its front elevation but it is partly changed according to modern concept of architecture with plain plastered surface after the old worn out ornamental plaster has peeled of, it may in some cases result in disfigurement. Similarly, if, a tenant puts up a cow-shed on the lawns of a bungalow or in the open land in front of the main building or in the area left as set back in the front side some walls are raised to form an enclosure or a part of it is converted into an open air toilet, these may certainly amount to disfigurement of the building. Thus, disfigurement has nothing to do with improvement or otherwise but must be seen in the lights of the effect the offending construction has on the mind of an average person on seeing it. Disfigurement does not depend upon any single factor but is the cumulative effect of a variety of circumstances such as the pace, nature, magnitude and its effect on the look of the existing construction and on the over all appearance of the building.” 23. In Mool Narain Mehrotra v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1987(2) ARC 411 the constructions were raised on a vacant land and was covered by pucca construction at the instance of the tenant without there being the permission of the landlord in this respect. It has been laid down that the constructions had to be from the point of view of the landlord and not at the convenience of the tenant alone. The vacant land has its own utility in the premises, independent of a situation etc. It was held that the construction of eight rooms on the vacant land definitely disfigured the building let out to the tenant. 24. In Mooli v. Vth Additional District Judge, Mathura, 1989 (2) ARC 152, the Court has interpreted the expressions ‘likely’ and ‘disfigure’ used in Section 20(2)(c) of the Act. Relevant portion from the report is extracted below : “In Webster Dictionary (Latest edition), the word ‘likely’ has been defined to mean probable, quite possible, plausible or appearing to be capable. 24. In Mooli v. Vth Additional District Judge, Mathura, 1989 (2) ARC 152, the Court has interpreted the expressions ‘likely’ and ‘disfigure’ used in Section 20(2)(c) of the Act. Relevant portion from the report is extracted below : “In Webster Dictionary (Latest edition), the word ‘likely’ has been defined to mean probable, quite possible, plausible or appearing to be capable. According to words and phrases, the word means “of such nature or so circumstanced as to render some thing probable but is not equivalent to saying reasonably certain.” When used as an adverb, it means “in all probability or probably or worthy of belief or reasonably expected”. According to the said book, there is but a shade of difference between ‘reasonably expected’ and ‘reasonably certain’. It is more akin to probability but more than a mere possibility but less than probable. Therefore, what can be said to be likely cannot be very much away from actually. It is, therefore, necessary that the Court should on the basis of evidence before it find that the construction or structural alteration complained of can be reasonably expected to result in any thing like diminishing the value of the building or its utility or cause its disfigurement. Sub-section (c) of Section 20(2) is most inartistically drafted and the legislature should have used a more specific or appropriate expression to convey what it intended to provide. According to Webster, latest edition “to disfigure means to spoil the appearance of”. In words and phrases it is defined as ‘to deface’. However, in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 27, it is stated that the word has no technical meaning but in its plain and ordinary sense it has been defined as meaning to mar the figure; to render less perfect or beautiful in appearance; to deface or deform; to do some external injury which may detract from the personal appearance. The word is also used in the sense of blot, blemish, sincere mutilation, that which impairs or injures the beauty, symmetry, appearance of a person or thing, that which renders un-sightly, mis-shapen or imperfect or deform in any manner; a change of external form to, or for the worse. The word is also used in the sense of blot, blemish, sincere mutilation, that which impairs or injures the beauty, symmetry, appearance of a person or thing, that which renders un-sightly, mis-shapen or imperfect or deform in any manner; a change of external form to, or for the worse. From the various meaning assigned to the word ‘disfigure’ it will be apparent that disfigurement in the most commonly used sense means a change in the outer shape and figure in such a manner that its appearance becomes worse than before. The appearance, therefore, must result in some thing which is less beautiful or less pleasing than it was earlier.” Further, it would be appropriate to have a glance on the dictionary meaning of the word ‘disfigure’ which means as follows : Disfigure: 1. To mar the appearance or beauty of; deform; deface: our old town are increasingly disfigured by tasteless new buildings. 2. To mar the effect or excellence ......................... Disfigurement: From the various meanings assigned to the word ‘disfigure’ it will be apparent that disfigurement in the most commonly used sense means a change in the outer share and figure in such a manner that its appearance becomes worse than before. The appearance, therefore, must result in something which is less beautiful or less pleasing than it was earlier." 25. A Kothi by its name suggests that it is for residential purpose. If a godown is added to it, the addition by way of new construction has marred the appearance and the beauty of the Kothi. The offended construction has been in the nature of a godown. It has defaced and deformed the Kothi. 26. Coming to the facts of the present case, the Kothi with land adjoining to it was let out to the defendant tenant. No attempt was made by the tenant that there is any symmetry in the offended constructions with the Kothi. It is not the case of the tenant that by raising the offending constructions, the utility of the accommodation has been increased. The raising of the offended construction though on a vacant piece of land would on the facts of the present case amount to disfigurement of the Kothi unless it is shown that there was a symmetry. The nature and design of the offended constructions are such as it would amount to a patch work. The raising of the offended construction though on a vacant piece of land would on the facts of the present case amount to disfigurement of the Kothi unless it is shown that there was a symmetry. The nature and design of the offended constructions are such as it would amount to a patch work. The Commissioner appointed by the Court has found, as noticed in the judgment, the pucca construction by bricks 31 x 9" in length and 13’x 8" in breadth. Cement was used for joining the bricks. The constructions were found new constructions. A new constructed garage covered with tin shed was also found there. The finding of disfigurement recorded by the revisional Court in the factual background is perfectly justified and calls for no interference. 27. To me, it appears that no tenant is permitted to do any structural change in a tenanted accommodation by making addition, alteration or demolition so as to adversely affect the beauty of the tenanted accommodation is more precious. 28. Now, I take up the second point. It has been found that initially the building in question was let out for residential purposes. Subsequently, the tenant has started using it for commercial purposes. The contention of the learned counsel for the tenant is that six months notice was required to determine the tenancy as provided by Section 106 of the T.P. Act. In the present case, thirty days notice was given which has been found to be valid. Section 106 of the T.P. Act deals with the determination of notice. In the present case, the tenancy was month to month tenancy and premises were not let out under any registered instrument, the notice in question is valid, even if the premises is being used presently for commercial activities. The finding of the trial Court on this point is perfectly justified and calls for no interference. 29. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the opposite party that initially the accommodation in question was given on lease for residential purposes and not for manufacturing purposes. This being so, six months notice for determination of lease is not required. 30. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the revision. Besides the aforestated two points, no other point was pressed by the learned counsel for the applicant in the revision for consideration of this Court. The revision is, therefore, dismissed. This being so, six months notice for determination of lease is not required. 30. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the revision. Besides the aforestated two points, no other point was pressed by the learned counsel for the applicant in the revision for consideration of this Court. The revision is, therefore, dismissed. 31. Time to vacate the disputed accommodation up to 31st of December, 2009 is granted provided the applicant files an undertaking on affidavit before the trial Court within a period of one month from today that he will vacate the disputed accommodation on or before 31st of December, 2009 and will hand over peaceful vacant possession to the heirs of the deceased landlady. Within the aforesaid period the applicant is also required to deposit the entire decretal amount at the decreed rate for the period up to August, 2009. Within the same period he shall be liable to pay the damages for the subsequent period at the rate of Rs. 5,000 per month and is required to deposit for the months of September, 2009 to December, 2009 at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per month, in advance. 32. In case of default, of any of the conditions, as stipulated above, it shall be open to the heirs of the landlady to put the decree in execution. 33. The revision is dismissed with costs throughout. ————