Judgment :- Heard Mr. Sathia Chandran, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A. Arumugam learned Special Govt. Pleader for respondents. 2. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, it is stated by the petitioner that he is an agricultural labourer and he is associated with Vivasayigal Viduthalai Munnani, an association formed for expousing the cause and rights of the farmers. The petitioner is also functioning as District Organizer of the said movement. It is stated that most of the people residing in Karappattu Village depending on agricultural work, majority of them are agricultural coolies. According to the petitioner, the agricultural coolies are paid below the minimum wages by their employer and landlords. Therefore the above said organization has taken steps to organize them under one banner and this gave rise to ill feeling among the cadres of the Communist party of India (Marxist). 3. On 20.06.2008 one Ezhumalai, President of the said movement was murderously attacked. Fortunately, he escaped from the attempt on his life. In that attempt, one Mr. Rajendran, member of a political party, who intervened to save the said person, was murdered. In such circumstance, the members of the public came forward to collect some amount and pay the same to the family members of Mr. Rajendran. 4. In that regard, the petitioner submitted an application dated 11.08.2008 to the respondents to grant permission to conduct a public meeting on 18.08.2008 from 6. P.m. to 11 p.m. and to hand over the donation amount collected by the public to the family of the deceased. However, the second respondent, by his memo dated 13.08.2008 refused permission citing Law and Order problem. Once again, the petitioner has submitted an application dated 13.08.2008, which was also rejected on 011. 2008 citing the same reason. Therefore, challenging the said order dated 011. 2008 of the second respondent, the present Writ petition has been filed. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the decision of this Court reported in (Adhirai M.M. Ibrahim vs. The Commissioner of police, Chennai City, Chennai – 600 008) 2005 (3) CTC 260 and submitted that rejecting the request of the petitioner would amount to denying the right of the petitioner enshrined under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India. In the said order, Para:17 and 18 are relevant, which are extracted hereunder:- “Para:17. In the said order, Para:17 and 18 are relevant, which are extracted hereunder:- “Para:17. As regards law and order, the fact that there are two rival groups can never be a reason for rejection of permission to any citizen for airing his views in public. In democracy, rival opinions are common. The very idea of protest meeting visualizes rival group or groups. It is impossible and unimaginable to spell out any issue over which there would be consensus between all citizens and different sections of the Society. There cannot be any consensus ad item between all political parties or social groups. Dissent is one of the essential features of democracy and the fact that there is dissent or a rival group holding the opposite view and likely to cause any problem, cannot at all be a reason for denying the right of a citizen under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. Right of freedom of expression has been recognized as one of the essential ingredients of democracy. 18. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Prof. Manubhai D. Shah, 1992 (3) SCC 637, the Supreme Court has expressed very categorically the need to give utmost importance to freedom of speech and expression, as follows: “8. The words “freedom of speech and expression” must, therefore, be broadly construed to include the freedom to circulate one’s views by words of mouth or in writing or through audio-visual instrumentalities. It, therefore, includes the right to propagate one’s views through the print media or through any other communication channel e.g. the radio and the television. Every citizen of this free country, therefore, has the right to air his or her views through the printing and / or the electronic media subject of course to permissible restrictions imposed under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. The print media, the radio and the tiny screen play the role of public educators, so vital to the growth of a healthy democracy. Freedom to air one’s views is the lifeline of any democratic institution and any attempt to stifle, suffocate or gag this right would sound a death-knell to democracy and would help usher in autocracy or dictatorship. It cannot be gainsaid that modern communication mediums advance public interest by informing the public of the events and developments that have taken place and thereby educating the voters, a role considered significant for the vibrant functioning of a democracy. It cannot be gainsaid that modern communication mediums advance public interest by informing the public of the events and developments that have taken place and thereby educating the voters, a role considered significant for the vibrant functioning of a democracy. Therefore, in any set-up, more so in a democratic set-up like ours, dissemination of news and views for popular consumption is a must and any attempt to deny the same must be frowned upon unless it falls within the mischief of Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. It follows that a citizen for propagation of his or her ideas has a right to publish for circulation his views in periodicals, magazines and journals or through the electronic media since it is well known that these communication channels are great purveyors of news and views and make considerable impact on the minds of the readers and viewers and are known to mould public opinion on vital issues of national importance. Once it is conceded, and it cannot indeed be disputed, that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of circulation and propagation of ideas, there can be no doubt that the right extends to the citizen being permitted to use the media to answer the criticism leveled against the view propagated by him. Every free citizen has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, except to the extent permitted by Article 19(2), would be an inroad on this freedom. This freedom must, however, be exercised with circumspection and care must be taken not to trench on the rights of other citizens or to jeopardize public interest. It is manifest from Article 19(2) that the right conferred by Article 19 (1) (a) is subject to imposition of reasonable restrictions in the interest of, amongst others, public order, decency or morality or in relation to defamation or incitement to an offence. It is, therefore, obvious that subject to reasonable restrictions placed under Article 19(2) a citizen has a right to publish, circulate and disseminate his views and any attempt to thwart or deny the same wound offend Article 19 (1) (a).” 6. The petitioner seeks permission to conduct public meeting to handover the donation amount collected from the public to the family of the deceased, which was rejected by the second respondent citing Law and Order problem. The petitioner seeks permission to conduct public meeting to handover the donation amount collected from the public to the family of the deceased, which was rejected by the second respondent citing Law and Order problem. Considering the above facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of ratio laid down in the above cited judgment, this court is of the view that it is not open to the second respondent to reject the request of the petitioner citing Law and Order problem and without assigning any other valid reasons. Therefore, the impugned order dated, 011. 2008 passed the second respondent is liable to be quashed and accordingly it is quashed. The writ petition is allowed and the order dated, 011. 2008 of the second respondent is quashed and the petitioner is directed to resubmit the application for permission to hold the public meeting, to the second respondent within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. On receipt of the same, the second respondent is directed to pass orders on merits and in accordance with law within a period of two weeks thereafter. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order to costs.