JUDGMENT R.Basant, J. 1. Petitioner faces indictment in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The signature in the cheque is admitted. The contention raised is that the cheque was handed over long earlier as a blank signed cheque. Notice of demand was received. Admittedly after receipt of the notice of demand, there was no response whatsoever. 2. In the course of trial, the accused took up a stand that the cheque was handed over as a blank signed cheque and was misused. On the contrary the case of the complainant was that the cheque was issued in partial discharge of a decree obliging the accused along with 2 others to jointly and severally discharge the liability of about Rs.10 lakhs. 3. At the defence stage, the petitioner wanted the cheque to be sent to the expert. The purported purpose was to compare the age of the writings in the cheque viz-a-viz the signature in the cheque. It was contended that the expert opinion on the question would help the accused to substantiate his contention that it was a case of a blank signed cheque issued long earlier being misused, at a much belated stage to stake a non existing claim on the basis of the cheque. 4. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order took the view that the petitioner is not entitled to have the cheque forwarded to the expert. In coming to this conclusion two reasons appear to have weighed with the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate took the view that the silence of the petitioner on receipt of the notice of demand suggests that there is no bona fides in the present prayer to forward the cheque to the expert. The Court further took note of the fact that in the earlier written statement filed, which is marked as Ext. D1, this theory that blank signed cheque was handed over had not been taken up at all. 5. I must alertly remind myself of the nature, quality and contours of the jurisdiction of this Court when called upon to invoke and exercise the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction during the pendency of a proceedings. Law frowns upon attempts to raise a challenge against an interlocutory order during the pendency of the proceedings. This policy of law is clearly reflected in Section 379(2) CrPC. Law frowns upon attempts to raise a challenge against an interlocutory order during the pendency of the proceedings. This policy of law is clearly reflected in Section 379(2) CrPC. It enacts an embargo against revisional challenges against interlocutor orders when the main proceedings are pending. Ordinarily and normally a person aggrieved by an interlocutory order will certainly have to wait for the proceedings to culminate and must challenge such interlocutory orders which are not challengable in revision during the pendency of the proceedings at the final stage after judgment is rendered in the prosecution. 6. Petitioner's right to challenge the impugned order after final judgment is passed in the prosecution shall of course remain. I am not persuaded to agree that there are any compelling reasons that should persuade this Court to invoke the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to interfere with the impugned order. I am not too convinced about the reasons given on the basis of Ext. D1 written statement filed. But I do note that the Court below has considered the absence of a response in the wake of a specific notice of demand which said that the payment was made by cheque in partial of the decree debt. I shall not encumber the records with any further expression of opinion. I am not satisfied that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the powers under Section 482 CrPC need be issued. 7. Reliance has been placed on the decision in Nagappa v. Muralidharan, 2008 (3) KLT158 (SC)1. Relying on the observations in Nagappa v. Muralidharan, the Court below has observed that the said decision is not authority for the proposition that any and every application to send the cheque to the expert shall have to be allowed. It is for the Court to alertly consider whether the purpose sought to be achieved is protraction of proceedings or not. 8. This Crl. MC is, in these circumstances, dismissed, but making it clear that the dismissal of this Crl. MC will not in any way fetter the rights of the petitioner to challenge the impugned order if he be obliged to challenge the final order in ST No. 3357 of 2008 at a later stage.