JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajiv Sharma, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The present writ petition has been filed against the judgment and order dated 14th January, 1976 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, Varanasi inter-alia on the ground that the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed an error in extending the benefit of provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, and in not considering the fact that Vendors Raj Bahadur and others were left with no right to enter into a compromise on 11th May, 1971. 3. At the outset, it is relevant to point out that during the pendency of the writ petition, Ram Karan son of Shitla Prasad died and as such his sons were arrayed as respondent Nos. 3/1 to 3/6. Similarly in place of Raj Bahadur Singh, Prem Bahadur Singh was substituted as respondent No. 4/1. Respondent No. 5 -Gumraj Singh also died during the pendency of the writ petition and as such his legal heirs were impleaded/substituted as respondents Nos. 5/1 to 5/4. 4. The dispute in the present case relates to plot No. 363/1 and 363/2 having a total area of 1 Bigha 2 Biswas and 2 Dhurs. In the basic year, the plots stood recorded in the names of Raj Bahadur, Gumraj and Gaya Singh, who were shown as its bhumidhars. Ram Karan, however, was shown as Asami of Class 7 Gha. 5. Raj Bahadur Gumraj and Gaya Singh executed two sale-deeds in favour of petitioner on 29.8.1964 of plot No. 363/2 and of plot No. 363/1 on 28.12.1986. On 9th January, 1967 the vendees Vishwanath and others applied before the Assistant Consolidation Officer for the mutation of their names in place of the vendors. This application was allowed on 28th February, 1967 and the vendors admitted the claim of the vendees-petitioner. 6. Ram Karan-respondent No. 3 filed objection on 29.5.1965 against the basic year entry claiming himself to be bhumidhar of the land in dispute on the ground that he was mortgagee for the past more than 60 years and as the limitation for redeeming the mortgage had expired, therefore he had become bhumidhar of the same and the right, title and interest of the recorded tenure holders, who were descendants of original mortgagor got extinguished. Raj Bahadur, Gumraj and Gaya Singh contested the objections asserting that the plot in dispute had throughout been in their possession. Raj Bahadur, Gumraj and Gaya Singh contested the objections asserting that the plot in dispute had throughout been in their possession. The Consolidation Officer vide order dated 18.10.1967 rejected the claim of Ram Karan so far as it relate to declaration of bhumidhari rights but held him to be Asami and ordered for the continuance of his name in column 7. Against the aforesaid order, Raj Bahadur and others as well as Ram Karan filed separate appeals and the Assistant Settlement Officer ( Consolidation) allowed the appeal of Raj Bahadur and others and dismissed the appeal of Ram Karan. However, his entry in column No. 7 in respect of plot No. 363/1 was allowed to continue but entry in column 7 in respect of plot No. 363/2 was found fictitious hence it was directed to be expunged. 7. Ram Karan preferred two revisions against the aforesaid order of Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 12.8.1968. In these Revisions a compromise was filed by Ram Karan on one hand and Raj Bahadur, Gumraj and Gaya Singh on the other hand on 11.5.1971, which was verified by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. As per the said compromise Ram Karan became Bhumidhar of plot No. 363/1 and Raj Bahadur, Gumraj and Gaya Singh became bhumidhars of plot No. 363/2. It is in this background that Ram Karan filed an appeal before Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation assailing the order dated 28.2.1967 of Consolidation Officer whereby the names of the petitioners were allowed to be recorded. The said appeal was contested by the petitioner inter-alia on the grounds that appeal was not maintainable at the instance of Ram Karan, as he was not a party before the Consolidation Officer and secondly it was highly belated. Further, the petitioners were not parties to the said compromise which was verified by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 8. The Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation vide judgment and order dated 20.9.1975 allowed the appeal of Ram Karan holding that the sale-deed dated 28.12.1966 was hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Properties Act and secondly that sale-deeds were executed only to defeat the right of Ram Karan. The order dated 20.9.1975 was assailed in Revision No. 573 of 13034 but the same was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 14.1.1976, hence the instant writ petition. 9. The order dated 20.9.1975 was assailed in Revision No. 573 of 13034 but the same was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 14.1.1976, hence the instant writ petition. 9. During the pendency of the writ petition, two applications for amendment were filed. By one application the order dated 20.9.1975 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation was assailed and by the second application the compromise verified by Deputy Director of Consolidation vide its order dated 11.5.1971 was also assailed. 10. Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that after coming into force of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 in July, 1950 all the rights of mortgagee were ceased and even the Act itself provides that in case mortgages are in possession, they had to return back the same. The Bhumidhari rights are statutory rights and can be conferred by the Act, 1950 alone and the said right can neither be conferred by any act of parties or by admission or by compromise. Therefore, by compromise dated 11.5.1971 said Raj Bahadur, Gumraj and Gaya Singh cannot confer any right upon Ram Karan and the entire compromise was a nullity in the eyes of law but this material fact was overlooked by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 11. Elaborating his arguments, learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that on the date of alleged compromise i.e.11.5.1971 Raj Bahadur, Gumraj and Gaya Singh had no right and title over plot No. 363/1 vested in them as they had already sold the said plot to the petitioner vide sale-deed dated 28.12.1966. Further, the petitioners were not parties to the said compromise nor they were aware about the proceeding pending before the consolidation authorities. 12. As regard the entertainment of appeal by the Assistant Settlement Officer, it has been submitted that while admitting/allowing the appeal, the delay was not condoned. Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act clearly bars the jurisdiction of any Court. The Court can exercise its jurisdiction only in the event when delay is condoned under the provisions of Section 5 of the Act. In support of his contentions reliance has been placed on Ragho Singh v. Mohan Singh and others, 2000(41) ALR 786. Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act clearly bars the jurisdiction of any Court. The Court can exercise its jurisdiction only in the event when delay is condoned under the provisions of Section 5 of the Act. In support of his contentions reliance has been placed on Ragho Singh v. Mohan Singh and others, 2000(41) ALR 786. The appeal at the instance of Ram Karan was not maintainable before the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation inasmuch as he was not a party before the Consolidation Officer in proceeding initiated at the instance of the petitioners. Section 11 read with Section 47 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act clearly provides that any party to proceedings under Section 9-A can file an appeal. Since Ram Karan was not a party to the proceedings, the appeal at his instance was not at all maintainable. To substantiate his assertions, reliance has been placed on Goan Sabha and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2003(1) AWC 269 and Smt. Sukhjinder Jeet Kaur v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Rampur, 2003(94) RD 79. 13. Concluding his arguments he submitted that the Courts below were unnecessarily swayed away by compromise entered into between Ram Karan and Raj Bahadur, Gumraj and Gaya Singh. The Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation wrongly recorded a finding that only to defeat right of Ram Karan, sale-deeds dated 29.8.1964 and 28.12.1966 were executed overlooking the fact that sale-deeds were executed much earlier to the compromise. He further submitted that the objection of the respondents that the sale-deed is hit by Section 5(1)(c) (ii) of the UPCH Act is wholly misconceived inasmuch as there were two plots i.e. plot No. 363/1 and 363/2 and part of plot i.e. plot No. 363/2 was sold vide sale-deed dated 29.8.1964 i.e. before the initiation of consolidation proceedings and the remaining portion of the said plot was sold vide sale-deed dated 28.12.1966 and as such there was no fragmentation affected by means of second sale-deed whereby remaining land was also sold. In this context, the petitioner has invited attention of this Court towards paragraph 6 of the Full Bench decision in Smt. Ram Rati and others v. Gram Samaj Jhawa, AIR 1974 and paragraph 5 of Ram Kali v. Hira Lal and others, 1986 RD 147. 14. In this context, the petitioner has invited attention of this Court towards paragraph 6 of the Full Bench decision in Smt. Ram Rati and others v. Gram Samaj Jhawa, AIR 1974 and paragraph 5 of Ram Kali v. Hira Lal and others, 1986 RD 147. 14. On behalf of the contesting respondent, it has been argued that the respondent No. 3 was not made party in the mutation proceedings and as such he had no knowledge of the said mutation order. On coming to know about the said fact, he filed an appeal against the mutation order which was well within limitation from the date of knowledge and the appeal was rightly allowed by Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation. It is incorrect to say that appeal at the instance of the respondent No. 3 was not maintainable as he was affected person due to mutation order which was passed behind his back. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has rightly applied the doctrine of lis pendens as envisaged in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act as the sale-deed in question was executed during the pendency of the Consolidation Proceeding and was void ab initio. It is wrong to allege that Deputy Director of Consolidation failed to consider the after having transferred the plot on 28.12.1966; Raj Bahadur and others could not have any right to enter into compromise in respect of those plots on 11.5.1971. As a matter of fact, the Deputy Director considered the said facts and recorded a categorical findings that the sale-deed in question was void ab initio and there was no error in compromise. Therefore, there is no illegality in the impugned orders and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 15. It has also been argued on behalf of the contesting respondent that there is no ban on the sale of entire holding or chak without the necessary permission but in the present case sale-deed dated 28.12.1966 for plot No. 363/1 was void and did not confer any title upon the petitioners as the same was executed during the pendency of the consolidation operations without taking permission of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation and as such it is barred by Section 5(1)(C) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 16. On July 1,1952, U.P. Z.A. And L.R. Act, No. 1 of 1951 came into force. 16. On July 1,1952, U.P. Z.A. And L.R. Act, No. 1 of 1951 came into force. As a consequence of this enactment, all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries in every estate vested in the State of U.P. free from all encumbrances. Various rights were created by the State in favour of various class of persons, all private wells, trees in Abadi, building alongwith area appurtenant thereto were deemed to be settled with a person in actual possession under Section 9 of the Act. The State has created Bhumidhari rights in favour of class of persons, who were holding rights under the U.P. Tenancy Act like Sir Khudkast, Grove holders or other kind of tenants as provided in Section 18 of the Act. Similarly, under Section 19 of the Act, sirdari rights were conferred on number of persons having different types of tenancies under the U.P. Tenancy Act mentioned in the said section. Asami rights were created under Section 21 of the Act. The persons who were in actual possession and were also recorded occupants under Section 20 of the Act were conferred ‘adhivasi’ rights and after following certain procedures, prescribed under the Act, they were also conferred ‘sirdari’ rights. After amendment, two kinds of Bhumidhari rights were created i.e. Bhumidhari with non transferable rights and Bhumidhari with transferable rights. In Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank, 1961 RD 326 the Apex Court held that sir and khudkasht land and grove land have been acquired under the Act and have vested in the State; therefore, the mortgage is relegated to enforce his right against the mortgagor in the manner provided in Section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act and in no other way. 17. Bhumidhari or Asami or any other kind of rights created under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act are creation of statutes and unless the conditions/ingredients of statute are satisfied, any person claiming right under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act whether Bhumidhari with transferable rights or Bhumidhari with non-transferable rights cannot be conferred any Bhumidhari right or any right under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the right could be created of acquired, confirmed, extinguished, or denied, only on the basis of statutory rights flowing from statute and not otherwise. Admittedly, Ram Karan filed an application before the Consolidation Officer to the effect that he was mortgagee for the past more than 60 years and on the expiry of the limitation for redeeming the mortgage, he had become bhumidhar of the land in question and as such he be recorded as tenure holder. The declaration sought by Ram Karan was rightly rejected by the Consolidation Officer. Therefore, by way of compromise no rights can be conferred upon Ram Karan and that too when Raj Bahadur, Gumraj and Gaya Singh had no right and title over plot No. 363/1 vested in them as they had already sold the said plot to the petitioner by execution of a sale-deed. 18. The assertions of the petitioners that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act will not be attracted in the present case as the compromise was the result of collusion between Raj Bahadur, Gum Raj and Gaya Singh with Ram Karan. Earlier both the parties were hotly contesting the matter, but later on, they colluded just to defeat the rights of the petitioner. The assertion of the petitioners appears to have some force. 19. It is not disputed that Raj Bahadur, Gum Raj and Gaya Singh had sold the property in favour of the petitioner vide two sale-deeds dated 29.8.1964 and 28.12.1966. Thus, the rights, title and interest stood transferred to the petitioners. Therefore, Raj Bahadur, Gum Raj and Gaya Singh were not competent to enter into the compromise dated 11.5.1971 in respect of the property which they had already sold. 20. Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act does not come into the picture where the proceeding is collusive and any order is passed by the Court due to the collusion of the parties in Shyam Narain v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur [1994 RD 462] while considering the provisions of Section 52 of the Act, the Court observed as under : “Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act contemplates any suit or proceeding is collusive and any order is passed by the Court, such order may not be binding upon a transferee. A person, who is a party in the property in dispute, cannot collusively defeat the rights of the person to whom he has transferred the property. A person, who is a party in the property in dispute, cannot collusively defeat the rights of the person to whom he has transferred the property. He has left no interest in the property after he had executed the sale-deed in favour of his transferee except to defend his rights in the suit and in doing so in some circumstances he may enter into a compromise but a person to whom he has sold the property is also entitled to be impleaded in the suit or proceedings which may be pending affecting his rights. The moment he is impleaded, he has a right to a fair trial. Seshgiri Aiyar J. in Policherla Veeraghava Reddi v. Cherla Subba Reddi and others considered the origin of doctrine of lis pendens enunciated under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. There are twin principles—one that the party should not suffer by any private action of a party to the suit affecting his rights but the other principle is that the right of a person to whom the property has been sold should not be affected by a collusive decree who is not before the Court, and his right should not be affected by any adjustment or compromise to which he is not a party. He can intervene in the proceedings and in his absence his rights should not be affected by any adjustment or agreement between the parties to the suit.” 21. In the instant case, it may be pointed out that the petitioners were not party to the compromise and they were also not party to the proceedings which ultimately ended into a collusive compromise just to defeat the rights of the bona fide purchasers/petitioners. In Annamal v. Chellakutti [AIR 1963 Madras 300] it was held that unless the termination of the suit is honestly brought in one of usual modes the doctrine of lis pendens will have no application. 22. This Court in the case of Gaon Sabha and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Basti, (2003)1 AWC 269 and Smt. Sukhjinder Jeet Kaur v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2003 (94) RD 79, on which reliance has been placed by the petitioner, held that an appeal shall be filed only by the parties to the proceedings. It is well settled that right of appeal, revison or review are statutory rights. It is well settled that right of appeal, revison or review are statutory rights. They are conferred by the statute and unless conferred, they cannot be availed off by any person and no authority can entertain the appeal, revision or review unless the said authority is authorized by the statute to entertain the same. Therefore, the appeal at the instance of Ram Karan was not maintainable before the consolidation authority as he was not party before the Consolidation Officer in proceeding initiated at the instance of petitioners. Section 11 read with 45 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act clearly provides that any party to proceeding under Section 9-A can file an appeal. As Ram Karan was not a party to the proceeding, the appeal at his instance was not maintainable. Furthermore, the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) committeed an error in entertaining the appeal, which, admittedly, beyond time and even the delay was not condoned. The appeal, in fact, was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. 23. In view of the above discussion, the impugned judgment suffers serious legal infirmities and are liable to be set aside. Several other arguments were also raised to show the illegalities in the order, but I am not entering into other pleas as I am satisfied that on the aforesaid grounds alone the order passed by the Consolidation Authorities cannot be sustained. 24. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned judgment 14.1.1976 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the order of the Assistant Settlement Consolidation dated 20.11.1975 are hereby set aside. ————