JUDGMENT Ranjan Gogoi, J. 1. This writ appeal is directed against an order dated 22.12.2004 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in a proceeding registered and numbered as W.P.(C) No. 114 of 2001. By the aforesaid order, the learned single Judge, on the grounds and reasons assigned, has negated the challenge made by the appellant as the writ petitioner in respect of an acquisition proceeding under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter referred to as "the Act". 2. The brief facts that will be required to be noticed for the purpose of consideration of the instant appeal are set out herein below. 3. The appellant as a Co-operative Society registered under the Assam Cooperative Societies Act. According to the appellant, a plot of land measuring 4 Bighas 11 Lechas covered by Dag Nos. 19 and 20 of K.P. Patta and No. 62 situated at Village-Dispur, under Beltola Monza was owned and possessed by it at the relevant point of time. By a resolution of the Society dated 19.10.1985, the aforesaid plot of land was allotted to the respondent Nos. 8 and 11 and the said resolution of the Society was approved by the jurisdiction Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies. According to the Society, one Shri Prabhu Dayal Deorah who had run and managed the aforesaid Society since its inception till the year 1989 had made the aforesaid allotment to the respondent Nos 8 to 11 at a throw-away price of Rs. 23,000/- per katha. After the Managing Committee of the Society earlier headed by Shri P.D. Deorah was reconstituted, the new body made a reference to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Assam for determination of the value of the land. The said reference was under Rule 22 of the Assam Cooperative Societies Rules. Acting on the basis of the reference made, the Registrar passed orders that the valuation of the land allotted should be as may be fixed by the District Revenue Authority and that the sale-deeds would be executed by the Society after the allottees pay the balance amount, as may be determined. Against the aforesaid order of the Registrar, the allottees moved the State Government in appeal in which proceeding, by an order dated 9.4.1992, the order passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies was set aside by the appellate authority. 4. Against the aforesaid order of the Registrar, the allottees moved the State Government in appeal in which proceeding, by an order dated 9.4.1992, the order passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies was set aside by the appellate authority. 4. Thereafter, the four allottees had filed a writ petition before this Court registered and numbered as Civil Rule No. 2197 of 1992. In the said writ petition, the allottees had sought a direction for execution of the sale-deed in their favour by the petitioner Society. The writ petition filed by the allottees was dismissed on 25th August, 1993 primarily on the ground that the same raised certain disputed question of fact, which cannot be effectively adjudicated in a writ petition. Against the aforesaid order dated 25th August, 1993, the allottees had filed a Writ Appeal i.e. W.A. No. 112 of 1993 before this Court. The said writ appeal was disposed of on 22nd August, 1995 once again, by refusing the reliefs sought for by the allottees, however, on the ground that the order of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies in respect of which implementation was prayed for by the allottees should be enforced within the four-corners of the provisions of the Act. 5. It is the further case of the appellant Society that no sale-deed had been executed in favour of the respondent Nos. 8 to 11 in respect of the land in question; neither has any amount been received by the appellant Society as consideration for the alleged sale of the land to the allottees. According to the appellant Society, in the aforesaid circumstances, the ownership of the land continued to remain in the Society which fact was duly reflected in the revenue records. Furthermore, according to the appellant Society, it is the Society that had continued to pay the land revenue in respect of the land. 6. According to the appellant Society, on 7.7.2000, some of its members and office bearers went to the land in question. However, the officers of the respondent No. 7 i.e. Numaligarh Refinery Private Limited prevented the members and office bearers of the Society from entering the land stating that the respondent No. 7 had purchased the land from the respondent No. 5 i.e. Guwahati Metropolitan Development Authority (GMDA). However, the officers of the respondent No. 7 i.e. Numaligarh Refinery Private Limited prevented the members and office bearers of the Society from entering the land stating that the respondent No. 7 had purchased the land from the respondent No. 5 i.e. Guwahati Metropolitan Development Authority (GMDA). The appellant Society was further informed by the respondent No. 7 that the land in question was purchased by the said respondent from the respondent No. 5 by a registered Sale- Deed dated 19.4.1999. In the aforesaid circumstances, enquires were made by the appellant Society which revealed that on 15.5.1996 in connection with L.A. Case No. 10 of 1994, a notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act covering 4 Bighas 11 Lechas of land which according to the notification issued was likely to be needed for the purpose of GMDA. According to the appellant Society, particulars of the land mentioned in the said notification was without reference to specific Dag or Patta numbers and identification was only by indication of the boundaries thereto. Besides, the notification was neither published in the local newspapers nor in the locality concerned. According to the appellant Society, the aforesaid notification under Section 4 was followed by a subsequent declaration dated 5.6.1996 under Section 6 of the Act and further that the said notification under Section 6 was also not published in the local newspapers or notified in the locality, as mandatory required under the Act. Notwithstanding the above, possession of the land was shown to have been taken over from the respondent Nos. 8 and 11 and such possession was handed over to the respondent No. 5 on 7.6.1996 after payment of 80% of the assessed compensation i.e. Rs. 83,05,928/- to the respondent Nos. 8 to 11. The appellant Society had further pleaded that the acquisition proceeding initiated by the purported notification dated 15.5.1996 did not result in any award within the period of two years contemplated under Section 11A of the Act. Consequently, another notification under Section 4 of the Act proposing to acquire the same land was issued on 19.6.1999 which was followed by the declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 21.8.1999. Pursuant to the aforesaid notification dated 19.6.1999 and declaration dated 21.8.1999, the award was made on 5.9.2001. Consequently, another notification under Section 4 of the Act proposing to acquire the same land was issued on 19.6.1999 which was followed by the declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 21.8.1999. Pursuant to the aforesaid notification dated 19.6.1999 and declaration dated 21.8.1999, the award was made on 5.9.2001. According to the appellant Society, even before the notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on 19.6.1999, the land in question had been transferred by the respondent No. 5 to the respondent No. 7 by the registered Sale-Deed dated 19.4.1999. 7. In the aforesaid facts, on the various grounds and contentions, details of which will be noticed later, the acquisition of the land in question; the transfer thereof to the respondent No. 7 and the payment of compensation to the respondent Nos. 8 and 11 had been challenged by the appellant Society in W.P.(C) No. 114 of 2001, out of which this appeal has arisen. 8. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4; respondent No. 5; respondent Nos. 9, 10 and 11 and respondent No. 12 have filed separate affidavits in the case, details of which may now be briefly noticed. 9. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4, in the affidavit filed, admitted that the notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act dated 15.5.1996 and 5.6.1996 had not been published in the manner required by the provisions of the Act. The said respondents had also admitted that the preceding pursuant to the said notification and declaration had lapsed under Section 11A of the Act. However, what the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 had contended in the affidavit filed is that the acquisition proceeding was revived by a fresh notification and declaration dated 19.6.1999 and 21.8.1999 respectively which were published as required by the provisions of the Act. According to the respondent Nos. 1 to 4, the award was published on 5.9.2001 which is within the period of two years calculated from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, as contemplated by Section 11A of the Act. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 further contended that possession of the land was taken from the respondent Nos. 8 to 11 who were in actual physical possession of the land on the basis of the earlier sale made in their favour by the appellant Society. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 further contended that possession of the land was taken from the respondent Nos. 8 to 11 who were in actual physical possession of the land on the basis of the earlier sale made in their favour by the appellant Society. Thereafter, possession was handed over to the GMDA i.e. the respondent No. 5 on 7.6.1996. As the land was intended by the GMDA for a specific purpose for which a huge loan from HUDCO was obtained and as there were certain difficulties in implementing what was planned, the respondent No. 5 i.e. the GMDA had sold the land to another public body i.e. respondent No. 7 so as to liquidate the loan availed of from HUDCO by the respondent No. 5. 10. The affidavits of the respondent No. 5 as well as the respondent No. 7 are more or less on the same footing. However, what would be required to be specifically noticed is the virtual admission in the affidavit of the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and 7 that it is the appellant Society whose name was reflected in the revenue records as the owner of the land until the same stood transferred in favour of the respondent No. 5 by order dated 8.7.1996 passed by the competent revenue authority, after possession of the land was taken and handed over to the respondent No. 5 in accordance with law. 11. The respondent Nos. 9, 10 and 11 have filed a joint affidavit denying the claim of the appellant Society to the ownership and possession of the land in question. According to the respondent Nos. 9, 10 and 11, it is not correct that the then Chairman of the Society Shri P.D. Deorah had allotted the land to them at a throw-away price and had got the said actions approved by a resolution of the Society. According to the respondents out of the 4 Bighas 11 Lechas of land, 4 Kathas were sold by the appellant Society to one Smt. Kusum Tibrewal i.e. respondent No. 12 by a Registered Sale-Deed dated 16.10.1984. The remaining land i.e. 3 Bighas, 1 Katha and 11 Lechas were sold to the respondent Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 11 at the rate of Rs. 23,000/- per katha which actions were duly approved by the appellant Society in its AGM. According to the respondent Nos. The remaining land i.e. 3 Bighas, 1 Katha and 11 Lechas were sold to the respondent Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 11 at the rate of Rs. 23,000/- per katha which actions were duly approved by the appellant Society in its AGM. According to the respondent Nos. 9, 10 and 11, the possession of the aforesaid land was handed over to the respondent Nos. 8 to 11. The sale-deeds though executed, could not be registered on account of a dispute on the question of payment of stamp duty. The respondent Nos. 9, 10 and 11, in their affidavit, had clearly and categorically stated that it is only upon payment of due consideration that the sale-deeds were executed though not registered and possession of the land was handed over to them. The said respondents have further stated that they had voluntarily handed over possession of the acquired land to the Collector and that they are the only persons entitled to receive the acquisition compensation. The aforesaid respondents have clearly and categorically denied any subsisting right of the appellant Society over the land and had further question the locus of the said Society to maintain the writ petition out of which this appeal has arisen. 12. The respondent No. 12, who had impleaded herself in the writ petition, had duly supported the stand taken by the respondent Nos. 9, 10 and 11 in the affidavit filed with further details of the various transactions showing the vesting of title of the land in question in favour of the allottees and the absence of any such title of the appellant Society. Along with the affidavit filed, the respondent No. 12 has also enclosed certain documents, details of which will be noticed later, so as to contend that the appellant Society cannot be understood to have any subsisting right over the land in question and further that the Society has no locus to institute the present proceeding which also suffers from inordinate delay. 13. We have heard Shri D.K. Mishra, learned senior counsel for the appellant/petitioner; Shri P.S. Deka, learned Government Advocate, Assam; Shri N. Deka, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 7 and Shri V. Hansaria, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 9 to 12. 14. 13. We have heard Shri D.K. Mishra, learned senior counsel for the appellant/petitioner; Shri P.S. Deka, learned Government Advocate, Assam; Shri N. Deka, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 7 and Shri V. Hansaria, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 9 to 12. 14. Shri Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant/petitioner has submitted that the materials on record clearly establish that the notification under Section 4 of the Act dated 15.5.1996 and the declaration dated 5.6.1996 under Section 6 of the Act had not been published in the manner as contemplated by the provisions of the Act and further that the acquisition proceeding initiated on the basis of the aforesaid notification/declaration had lapsed under Section 11A of the Act as no award had been passed therein. Shri Mishra has further submitted that a fresh notification under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of the same land and for the same purpose was issued on 19.6.1996 which was followed by the declaration under Section 6 of the Act published on 21.8.1999. In between, on 5.6.1996, the possession of the land was taken over from the respondent Nos. 8 to 11 and respondent No. 12 and handed over to the respondent No. 5. In this regard, Shri Mishra had submitted that the stand taken by the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in the affidavit filed clearly indicate that possession of the land was not taken over under the provisions of Section 16 or 17 of the Act, but such possession of was taken over as, according to the official respondents, the acquisition process was complete within the meaning of Section 12 of the Act once the declaration dated 5.6.1996 was issued under Section 6 of the Act. Shri Mishra has further submitted that unless possession of the land is taken over under Section 16 or 17 of the Act, the land cannot legitimately and legally vest in the respondent state to enable delivery of possession of the same to the respondent No. 5. Shri Mishra has further submitted that on 19.4.1999 i.e. prior to the date of the second notification under Section 4 of the Act (19.6.1999), the respondent No. 5 had sold the land to the respondent No. 7 by the registered sale-deed dated 19.4.1999. Shri Mishra has further submitted that on 19.4.1999 i.e. prior to the date of the second notification under Section 4 of the Act (19.6.1999), the respondent No. 5 had sold the land to the respondent No. 7 by the registered sale-deed dated 19.4.1999. Therefore, according to Shri Mishra, the stated purpose for the acquisition in terms of the second notification dated 19.6.1999 did not exist on the date of the said notification. Shri Mishra has, therefore, submitted that the acquisition sought to be made by the second notification dated 19.6.1999 under Section 4 of the Act and the declaration dated 21.8.1999 under Section 6 of the Act are sham or a mere pretence inasmuch as the object for the acquisition proposed no longer existed, the land having being transferred to the respondent No. 7 prior to the dates of the aforesaid notification and declaration. Shri Mishra, learned Counsel for the appellant/petitioner, has further submitted that in the present case the second declaration under Section 6 of the Act is dated 21.8.1999, whereas the award was published on 5.9.2001. As the said award had been made beyond the period of two years from the date of declaration under Section 6of the Act, the proceeding pursuant to the second set of notification and declaration under the Act had lapsed under the provisions of Section 11A of the Act. 15. In reply, Shri Hansaria, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 8 to 12, who had offered the lead argument in the case, has submitted that in the present case the materials on record prove and establish that the appellant Society had sold 4 Kathas of land out of the land in question to the respondent No. 12 in October, 1984 and, thereafter, had sold the remaining area of land to the respondent Nos. 8 to 11. Shri Hansaria has further submitted that consideration for the aforesaid sale was duly received by the appellant Society and sale-deeds were executed which were, however, not registered. Shri Hansaria has submitted that the non-registered sale-deeds can be looked into for collateral purposes i.e. for determination of the possession of the land in which event if becomes crystal clear that the respondent Nos. 8 to 12 were in possession of the land and on receipt of compensation had voluntarily handed over the possession of the land to the Collector. 8 to 12 were in possession of the land and on receipt of compensation had voluntarily handed over the possession of the land to the Collector. Shri Hansaria has further submitted, by referring to the materials available in the affidavits of the respondent Nos. 9 to 12, that after the aforesaid transfer was made, the land in question has not been shown in the Balance Sheet of the Society. Shri Hansaria has also referred to the letter of the President of the appellant Society dated 26.6.1996, relied upon by the learned single Judge, to indicate that the appellant Society was in the full know of the acquisition proceeding initiated in the year 1996. Shri Hansaria has further submitted that the materials on record clearly indicate that the appellant Society had transferred the land way-back in the year 1984-1985 and knew about the acquisition proceeding initiated in respect of the land in the year 1996 itself; yet it had come to the Court in the year 2001 contending that it was not in the know of the acquisition proceeding. In such circumstances, according to Shri Hansaria, it must be understood that the appellant Society did not come to the Writ Court with clean hands and, therefore, is not entitled to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the Court. Shri Hansaria has further pointed out that the sale of the land by the respondent No. 5 to the respondent No. 7 was made at the same amount that was determined on account of compensation for the land covered under the acquisition proceeding and that such transfer to another public sector undertaking would be permissible under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. In this regard, Shri Hansaria, learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Rudradhar R. Trivedi v. State of Maharashtra reported in 1996 (10) SCC 60 ; Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1976) 1 SCC 800 and in Union of India v. Jaswant Rai Kockhar reported in (1996) 3 SCC 491 . Shri Hansaria has further submitted that the appellant Society had not filed any objection under Section5A of the Act. Learned Counsel has also submitted that in any event the question of denial of execution of any sale- deed by the appellant Society in favour of the respondent Nos. Shri Hansaria has further submitted that the appellant Society had not filed any objection under Section5A of the Act. Learned Counsel has also submitted that in any event the question of denial of execution of any sale- deed by the appellant Society in favour of the respondent Nos. 8 to 11; the resolution of the appellant Society approving the transfer of the land to the said respondents and the alleged manipulation of the affairs of the Society by Shri D.P. Deorah are all disputed questions of fact, which cannot be resolved in the present writ petition. 16. The arguments advanced by Shri Hansaria, learned Counsel, as noticed above, have been adopted by Shri P.S. Deka, learned Government Advocate, Assam as well as by Shri N. Deka, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 7. 17. Controverting the submissions advanced by Shri Hansaria, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 9 to 12, Shri D.K. Mishra, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the allegations of suppression of materials facts made against the appellant/petitioner is without any foundation and/or basis. The respondent No. 12 was not impleaded in the writ petition and she had appeared in the case at her own instance. The question of suppression of the sale-deed executed in favour of the said respondent No. 12, therefore, does not arise. In so far as the sale-deeds executed in favour of the respondent Nos. 8 to 11 is concerned, Shri Mishra has submitted that the said sale-deeds have not been brought on record by the respondents. Shri Mishra has further submitted that no such sale-deeds had been executed by the appellant Society; the Society has also not received any consideration for the transfer of the land in favour of the respondent Nos. 8 to 11. Yet, possession of the land had been shown to have been taken from the said respondents who were also paid the compensation amount though it was made very clear to the Collector by the Land Acquisition Officer that the said respondent Nos. 8 to 11 were not the owners of the land. In this regard, Shri Mishra has submitted that it is the appellant Society who continued to be the owner of the land until the revenue records were corrected by the concerned authority on 8.7.1996. 8 to 11 were not the owners of the land. In this regard, Shri Mishra has submitted that it is the appellant Society who continued to be the owner of the land until the revenue records were corrected by the concerned authority on 8.7.1996. Shri Mishra has further submitted that all facts in the knowledge of the appellant Society were brought on the record of the writ petition including the resolution passed by the Society allotting the land to the respondent Nos. 8 to 11. In so far as the Balance-Sheets of the appellant Society is concerned, according to Shri Mishra, the land in question was excluded from the assets disclosed in the said Balance-sheets due to the wrongful conduct and action of Shri P.D. Deorah. Referring the facts stated in the writ petition, Shri Mishra has submitted that in the present case there has been no delay on the part of the appellant Society in approaching this Court. Shri Mishra has contended that even if such delay is to be assumed, in view of the apparent illegalities committed in the course of the acquisition proceeding, adjudication of the writ petition on merit should not be refused. In so far as the absence of any objection on the part of the appellant Society under Section 5A of the Act is concerned, Shri Mishra has submitted that in the absence of any knowledge of the acquisition proceeding and the defects in the notification under Section 4 of the Act which had made identification of the land impossible, such objections could not be filed. In the course of his reply, Shri Mishra has again raised the question of the legality of the delivery of possession of the land in favour of the respondent No. 5 and in this regard, has reiterated that the land not having vested in the Collector under the Act, possession thereof could not have been delivered by the Collector to the said respondent No. 5. 18. The necessary discussion that has to follow the arguments raised by the leaned counsels for the contesting parties must be preceded by a consideration of the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents who contend that the writ petition will not be maintainable on the ground that the appellant Society having sold the land to the respondent Nos. 18. The necessary discussion that has to follow the arguments raised by the leaned counsels for the contesting parties must be preceded by a consideration of the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents who contend that the writ petition will not be maintainable on the ground that the appellant Society having sold the land to the respondent Nos. 8 to 12 way back in the year 1984-1985, such sale had divested the title of the Society to the land in question. Therefore the appellant Society would lack the legal competence to question the subsequent acquisition of the land of which the respondent Nos. 8 to 12 are the owners and persons in possession. 19. In this regard, the Court has noticed the averments made in the writ petition alleging that the allotment of the land to the respondent Nos. 8 to 11 and the sale to the respondent No. 12 was made with an ulterior motive by Shri P.D. Deorah, the then Chairperson of the Society. The appellant Society has also denied the sale of the land by the Society to the respondent Nos. 8 to 11 and/or receipt of any consideration for the same. That apart, the Court has also noticed that the materials on record indicate that till the land was mutated in favour of the GMDA by order dated 8.7.1996, it is the name of the appellant Society which was shown as the owner of the land in the revenue records. Whether, the Court would proceed to decide any of the aforesaid issues in the writ petition and if so in what manner is one aspect of the matter. However, on the issues arising on the basis of the questions raised, it cannot be said that the appellant Society does not have the requisite standing to maintain the present challenge so as to be even entitled to the views of the Court on the questions raised by it. 20. The appellant Society has questioned the validity of the acquisition on the ground that both sets of proceedings under the Act i.e. one initiated by the notification issued in the year 1996 and the other in the year 1999 had lapsed under Section 11A of the Act. That the proceeding initiated by the notification dated 15.5.1996 had lapsed is virtually an admitted fact. That the proceeding initiated by the notification dated 15.5.1996 had lapsed is virtually an admitted fact. Insofar as the proceeding initiated by the notification dated 19.6.1999 is concerned, the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant is that the award pursuant to the said proceeding was made on 5.9.2001, whereas the declaration under Section 6 is dated 21st August, 1999. Under Section 11A of the Act, the award has to be made within two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 and not from the date of the said declaration. In the present case, the declaration under Section 6 dated 21.8.1999 was published in the Assam Gazette dated 7th September, 1999 and in the local dailies on 16.9.1999. In such circumstances, it has to be held that the proceeding initiated by the notification dated 19.6.1999 issued under Section 4 of the Act had not lapsed under Section 11A of the Act, as contended by the appellant Society. 21. The objection raised by the appellant Society with regard to the defects in publication of the notification dated 15.5.1996 under Section 4 and in the declaration dated 5.6.1996 under Section 6of the Act as well as certain alleged defects in identification of the land in the said notification/declaration need not be gone into by the Court as the respondents themselves admit the said facts and further as the proceeding initiated on the basis of the aforesaid notification and declaration had lapsed under Section 11A of the Act. Insofar as the notification dated 19.6.1999 and the declaration dated 21.8.1999 is concerned, the objection of the appellant Society thereto is primarily on the ground that before the notification dated 19.6.1999 under Section 4 was issued, the land had already been sold by the GMDA i.e. respondent No. 5 to the respondent No. 7 by registered sale-deed dated 19.4.1999. Consequently, the public purpose for which the acquisition was sought to be made, as stated in the notification dated 19.6.1999 issued under Section 4, do not exist on the date of the said notification. 22. Precedents, details of which have already been noted, have been placed before the Court to show that a transfer by the PSU for whom acquisition of land was made under the provisions of the Act to another PSU will not affect the public purpose of the initial acquisition. 22. Precedents, details of which have already been noted, have been placed before the Court to show that a transfer by the PSU for whom acquisition of land was made under the provisions of the Act to another PSU will not affect the public purpose of the initial acquisition. If that be so, we do not see any reason as to why the aforesaid principle cannot be extended to a situation where the respondent No. 5, upon receipt of possession, had transferred the land to the respondent No. 7 in anticipation of an award under the Act. However, as the acquisition proceeding had lapsed, a fresh proceeding had been drawn-up, on completion of which the transfer made by the respondent No. 5 to the respondent No. 7 would stand consequently regularized. 23. Sections 16 and 17 of the Act confer power on the Collector to take over possession of the acquired land. While under Section 16 such possession can be taken over only after the award has been made, Section 17 authorizes taking over of possession, in case of emergency, even before an award is made. In the present case, there is no dispute that the land in question was handed over to the respondent No. 5 on 7.6.1996 after payment of 80% of the assessed compensation i.e. Rs. 83,05,928/- to the respondent Nos. 8 to 12 from whom such possession was taken over by the Collector. There is no material on record to hold that the said taking over of the possession from the respondents was in exercise of powers under Section 17 of the Act. It is virtually an admitted position that on the date on which possession was taken over from the respondents, no award has been made. In such circumstances, the question that would call for an answer from the Court is whether under the provisions of the Act the land had vested in the State to enable delivery of possession to the respondent No. 5 on 7.6.1996. The aforesaid question, naturally, is inextricably linked with the subsequent sale made by the respondent No. 5 to the respondent No. 7. 24. The affidavit filed by the respondent No. 12, inter alia, indicates that possession of the land was taken over from the respondent Nos. 8 to 12 on 5.6.1996. Such delivery of possession by the respondent Nos. 8 to 12 to the Collector was voluntarily. 24. The affidavit filed by the respondent No. 12, inter alia, indicates that possession of the land was taken over from the respondent Nos. 8 to 12 on 5.6.1996. Such delivery of possession by the respondent Nos. 8 to 12 to the Collector was voluntarily. There is nothing in the Land Acquisition Act which prohibits voluntary handing over of possession by a land owner or "person interested" to the Collector even before making of the award. What Sections 16 and 17 of the Act provides is the power of the Collector to take over possession. The question of exercise of powers under the aforesaid Sections of the Act at the stage and time contemplated may not arise if the land owner himself wants to voluntarily hand over possession at any earlier point of time. This is precisely what has happened in the present case. Such possession having been voluntarily handed over by the respondent Nos. 8 to 12, who, thereafter, accepted payment of compensation to the extend of 80% of the assessed amount, it cannot be said that the land had not vested in the State Government to enable delivery of possession thereof to the respondent No. 5. Support for the view enunciated above can be drawn from the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Revenue Divisional Officer, Guntur v. Vasireddy Rama Bhanu Bhupal and Ors., AIR 1970 AP 262 . 25. Much debate had been generated over the question of divesting the appellant Society of its ownership rights over the land and acquisition of the same from the respondent Nos. 8 to 12 who were not the owners thereof. In this regard, the issues raised i.e. whether the allotment and sale of land to the respondent Nos. 8 to 12 were fraudulently made by Shri P.D. Deorah, the then Chairperson of the petitioner Society at a artificially low price; whether the approval of the said decision by the Society was engineered by the aforesaid Shri P.D. Deorah who had deliberately omitted the property in question from the assets of the petitioner Society, as shown in the balance sheets; whether sale-deeds were executed by the petitioner Society in favour of respondent Nos. 8 to 11 though not registered; whether the petitioner society continues to remain the owner of the land and such other related questions would not be appropriate to be gone by the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, particularly, in a situation where there are conflicting claims based on disputed facts. Not only that, what would really be required to be determined by the Court in the present case is whether the respondent Nos. 8 to 12 will come within the admit of the expression "interested person" as contained in Section 3(b) of the Act. The Act, nowhere, gives primacy to the owner of the land and consistently refers to the expression "person interested in the land" who is entitled to object to the acquisition, file claims and receive compensation. 26. In the present case, the affidavit of the respondent Nos. 9,10 and 11 as well as the affidavit of the respondent No. 12 and the enclosures thereto make it abundantly clear that the land was initially allotted to the said respondents by the petitioner Society for valuable consideration. Out of the said land, 4 kathas was sold to the respondent No. 12 by a registered sale-deed and the remaining 3 bighas 1 khata and 11 Lechas were covered by separate sale-deeds executed in favour of respondent Nos. 8 to 11 accompanied by delivery of possession. The said later sale-deeds are however not on record. Whether the sale-deeds in favour of respondent Nos. 8 to 11 were executed at all or had been executed but not registered, are admittedly disputed questions. Leaving aside the aforesaid disputed questions what is crystal clear from the materials available before the Court is the possession of the respondent Nos. 8 to 11 over the 3 bighas 1 Katha and 11 Lechas of land and sale of 4 kathas of land to the respondent No. 12. This is evident from the report dated 4.5.1998 of the Commissioner, Lower Assam mentioned in the affidavit of respondent No. 3 as well as the several communications of the petitioner Society issued in this regard which have been annexed to the counter-affidavit of the respondent Nos. 8, 9 and 10 as well as the affidavit of the respondent No. 12. If that be so, the respondent Nos. 8, 9 and 10 as well as the affidavit of the respondent No. 12. If that be so, the respondent Nos. 8 to 12 being persons in possession of the land in the circumstances already noted, would come within the meaning of the expression "person interested", as contained in Section 3(b) of the Act. The petitioner Society on the strength of its claim to be the owner may also come within the said expression. In such event the question that will be required to be determined is one of apportionment of the compensation which has to be settled within the framework provided for by Section 30 of the Act. 27. Much debate has also been generated over the question of delay in instituting the present writ petition out of which this writ appeal has arisen. Admittedly, the writ petition was filed on 4.1.2001 questioning the legality of the acquisition proceeding initiated in the year 1996; the handing over possession of the land to respondent No. 5 on 5.6.1996 by the Collector; the sale thereof to respondent No. 7 on 19.4.1999 and the fresh acquisition proceedings initiated by the notification dated 19.6.1999 under Section 4 of the Act. The expression in this regard, as submitted, by the appellant Society has already been noted. 28. The respondents alleged that the letter dated 26.6.1996 of the appellant Society which was placed before the learned single Judge at the hearing and which letter has been referred to in the impugned judgment makes it clear that the appellant Society was in the known of the acquisition proceeding as far back as in the year 1996. It is, therefore, alleged that not only the writ petition is inordinately delayed, but there is suppression on the part of the petitioner Society with regard to the knowledge of the acquisition proceeding in question. On the said basis it is submitted that necessary and obvious legal consequences with regard to the fate of the present writ petition initiated by the appellant Society should follow. 29. The decision of the Apex Court in Vice Chancellor and Anr. v. Dr. Bijayananda Kar and Ors. reported in (1994) 1 SCC 169 , relied upon by Shri D.K. Mishra, learned Counsel for the appellant Society to counter the arguments advanced has received the due consideration of the Court. 29. The decision of the Apex Court in Vice Chancellor and Anr. v. Dr. Bijayananda Kar and Ors. reported in (1994) 1 SCC 169 , relied upon by Shri D.K. Mishra, learned Counsel for the appellant Society to counter the arguments advanced has received the due consideration of the Court. In the aforesaid decision, the Apex Court disapproved the course of action adopted by the High Court in relying upon the two letters written to the Vice Chancellor by two expert members of the Selection Committee with regard to the suitability of the selected candidate. The contents of the aforesaid two letters were not specifically pleaded though the same were mentioned in an application filed before the High Court for summoning the records. The two letters were, thereafter, placed before the Bench hearing the case and were subsequently relied upon. What, however, would be significant to note in this regard is that the disapproval of the Apex Court with regard to the reliance placed on the two letters is primarily on the ground that the Vice Chancellor of the University, not being a party to the proceeding, was deprived of an opportunity to offer an explanation in respect of the letters in question. The letters, as already noticed, were addressed to the Vice Chancellor. In the present case, the letter dated 26.6.1996 addressed to the Deputy Commissioner by the Chairman and Secretary of the appellant Society did not contain an opinion as in the case of the letters before the Apex Court in Bijayananda Kar and Ors. (supra). On the contrary, the said letter dated 26.6.1996 contains a narration of certain facts relevant to the case i.e. allotment of the land to the respondent Nos. 8 to 11 for valuable consideration; the sale of 4 kathas of land to the respondent No. 12 and the initiation of a land acquisition proceeding in respect of the said land wherein, according to the appellant Society, 80% of the compensation assessed was wrongly paid to one Assam Vegetable and Oil Products. The aforesaid letter dated 26.6.1996, therefore, clearly show knowledge of the appellant Society with regard to acquisition of the land in the year 1996 itself. The aforesaid letter dated 26.6.1996, therefore, clearly show knowledge of the appellant Society with regard to acquisition of the land in the year 1996 itself. The contention made on behalf of the appellant that all such relevant facts had been intentionally suppressed by the then Chairman Shri P.D. Deorah also cannot assist the appellant Society as the appellant itself had admitted that the Society was reconstituted by replacing Shri Deorah in the year 1989. That apart, if the Society had continued to remain the owner of the land to the exclusion of the respondent Nos. 8 to 12, as claimed, it is inconceivable, by application of the rule of normal prudence, that from the year 1989 when the composition of the Society was changed and Shri Deorah was replaced till 7.7.2000, as claimed by the appellant Society, it was not aware of the fact that the land had been acquired and subsequently sold to the respondent No. 7. The lack of knowledge of ownership of a valuable piece of property as claimed by the appellant cannot, in our considered view, be reasonably explained in the manner that has been advanced in the present case. 30. Delay in approaching the Writ Court by itself may not be always be fatal. Such delay, however, has to be taken into consideration at the time of grant of relief. In the event additional rights have been crated and/or the situation has been altered, the litigant who is responsible for the delay in approaching the Court must suffer the consequences of refusal of the grant of relief. In the present case, though the appellant had moved this Court on 4.1.2001 i.e before the award dated 5.9.2001 was made, it is during the period for which the appellant Society had remained silent, inspite of knowledge of the earlier acquisition proceeding initiated in the year 1996, that possession of the land was handed over to the GMDA and subsequently the land was transferred to the respondent No. 7. The respondent No. 7 in the meantime must have utilized the land to construct its permanent office building. All the aforesaid facts would have disinclined the Court to grant any relief to the appellant Society even if the grievances raised were to be found to be tenable on merit. The respondent No. 7 in the meantime must have utilized the land to construct its permanent office building. All the aforesaid facts would have disinclined the Court to grant any relief to the appellant Society even if the grievances raised were to be found to be tenable on merit. The said grievances having been found to be wholly untenable, we do not find the present to be a fit case for interference. Consequently, we dismiss the appeal, however, leaving the parties to bear this own costs. Appeal dismissed