JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shashi Kant Gupta, J.—Since all the writ petitions raise almost common questions of facts and law, therefore they are being dealt with together and decided by common order. In all the bunch cases, writ petition No. 35509 of 2008 is taken up as leading case. 2. In writ petition No. 35509 of 2008, the petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs : “(i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the notification dated 20.6.2007 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act published in daily newspaper namely Dainik Jagran in its issue dated 24.6.2007 and the notification dated 18.6.2008 under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act published in daily newspaper namely Dainik Jagran in its issue dated 29.6.2008 in respect of gata No.74 belonging to the petitioners situated at Village Ebadullapur urf Badalpur, Pargana and Tehsil Dadari district Gautambudh Nagar; (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents authority not to dispossess the petitioners from the residential house situated upon the gata No.74 situated at Village Ebadullapur urf Badalpur, Pargana and Tehsil Dadari district Gautambudh Nagar; (iii) issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (iv) Award the cost of the writ petition.” 3. The facts as enumerated in the present writ petition, referred to above, are that the petitioners are the co-tenure holders of the land in question, which is 400 meters away from the National Highway No. 91, Grant Trunk Road and further the village in which the land in question is situated is only 7 kilometers from Ghaziabad. It is further submitted that the entire land of the village is already converted into Abadi, even the circle rate fixed by the officials and further over which the petitioners have constructed their residential houses and remaining portion of the land is used as Agga Sahan. On the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (In short ‘the Act’), the petitioners along with several villagers whose land were proposed to be acquired, filed objection before the respondents authority. On the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (In short ‘the Act’), the petitioners along with several villagers whose land were proposed to be acquired, filed objection before the respondents authority. The respondents authority without making any enquiry, mechanically issued another notification under Section 6 of ‘the Act’ and trying to acquire the land in question in the garb of preparing green belt and green buffer or planned industrial development. It is further submitted that the petitioners are still in physical possession over the land in question. 4. The contention advanced on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of ‘the Act’ are wholly illegal and liable to be quashed in respect of the land in question sought to be acquired on the ground that the land in question is Abadi, hence the same cannot be acquired under the provisions of law as well as the village in which the land in question is situated is beyond the notified area of the Greater Noida. Further contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that notification issued under Section 6 of ‘the Act’ shows that the provisions of Section 17(4) of ‘the Act’ are made applicable, meaning thereby the proceeding under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’ has been dispensed with and in fact there is no reason shown in the said notification for attracting Section 17(4) of ‘the Act’ which clearly shows that there is no urgency. It has been further contended that notification under Section 6 of ‘the Act’ has been issued after expiry of one year from the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of ‘the Act’, which is illegal in the eye of law. 5. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents authority, wherein it has been asserted that notification dated 20th June, 2007 issued under Section 4(1)/17 of ‘the Act’ and declaration notification issued in the official Gazette on 18th June, 2008 under Section 6 of ‘the Act’ by which the plot of the petitioners (Gata No.74, area 0.960 hectares) has been acquired for planned industrial development of Greater Noida, is for public purpose. The land in question i.e. Khasara No. 74, which has been acquired by the State Government was vacant open agriculture land at the time of joint survey and at the time of notification of Section 4(1)/17 of ‘the Act’ and there is no Abadi land, which has been acquired. 6. In the counter affidavit, the respondents authority have clearly mentioned that preliminary notification has been published in official extraordinary Gazette and thereafter the same has been published in two newspapers mentioning the total details of the land (plot numbers) and its area which was proposed to be acquired, namely ‘Rashtriya Sahara’ and ‘Dainik Jagran’ of Noida addition, which is widely circulated in the District, including the village where the land of the petitioners is situated. Apart from this, public notice was affixed in the Panchayat Office and public of the village concerned was also informed by Drum beating. Before sending the proposal for acquiring the aforesaid land, a joint survey team of the Greater Noida officials and revenue department of Collectorate, Gautam Budh Nagar have made the actual spot inspection in the village concerned and they prepared a joint survey detail report. 7. The respondents authority further submitted that plot No. 74 also belongs to the petitioners, over which they have constructed eight rooms and one verandah, including boundary wall. The petitioners and his family members are actually living over part of area of plot No. 165, which is the Abadi land and the same has been excluded from the acquisition. It is further evident that land of the petitioners, which has been acquired by the Greater Noida, is useful in public interest for overall development of ‘Greater Noida’ and that is why the petitioners are to be given two developed plots of 200 sq. meter each apart from 6 per cent land of acquired area as per the rehabilitation scheme of ‘Greater Noida’. It has also been stated on the basis of materials on record that physical possession of the land in question was taken over by the State Government on 18th July, 2008 and the same was handed over to the ‘Greater Noida’ on the same day. It is further contended that 80 per cent of the estimated compensation of the acquired land has already been deposited by the ‘Greater Noida’ with the Additional Collector (Land Acquisition), Gautam Budh Nagar vide letter dated 6th July, 2007. 8. It is further contended that 80 per cent of the estimated compensation of the acquired land has already been deposited by the ‘Greater Noida’ with the Additional Collector (Land Acquisition), Gautam Budh Nagar vide letter dated 6th July, 2007. 8. The facts of all the connected writ petitions are almost similar, therefore the facts of the connected writ petitions are not being repeated again. In all the writ petitions of bunch case, prayers and grounds are almost same, except some changes which ultimately goes to the route of similar controversy, such as in large number of petitions, possession over the land in dispute has been taken over by the State and handed over to the ‘Greater Noida’, whereas only in some petitions, possession has not yet been taken over by the State due to the interim order granted by this Court or the pendency of the petitions before this Court. 9. However, to solve the controversy involved in all the writ petitions of bunch case, it will be necessary to note a few background facts leading to these proceedings. The Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (‘Greater Noida’ in short) is an authority entrusted with the task of development of certain areas in the State into industrial and urban township and for matters connected therewith. The Greater Noida had acquired large tracts of land of village in question for planned industrial development. The State Government at the instance of ‘Greater Noida’ had invoked the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 17 of ‘the Act’, as acquisition for the purposes of ‘Greater Noida’ was considered to be of an urgent nature. Therefore State Government issued notification under Section 4 of ‘the Act’ followed by notification under Section 6 of ‘the Act’, as the said land was essentially urgently required for the planned industrial development in the district through ‘Greater Noida’. In most of the cases, after preparation of all the reports a proposal was sent by Additional Chief Executive Officer, ‘Greater Noida’ to the Additional Collector (Land Acquisition), ‘Greater Noida’ appending therewith a note giving reasons and justification to exempt the provisions of Section 5-A of ‘the Act’. Thereafter the said proposal was sent by the Collector to the Director Land Acquisition Directorate, Board of Revenue, Lucknow along with the certificate recording satisfaction for exempting the provisions of Section 5-A of ‘the Act’. Thereafter the said proposal was sent by the Collector to the Director Land Acquisition Directorate, Board of Revenue, Lucknow along with the certificate recording satisfaction for exempting the provisions of Section 5-A of ‘the Act’. The matter was considered by the competent authority in accordance with law and it was decided to issue the notification under Section 4(1), read with Section 17(4) of ‘the Act’ dated 20th June, 2007 for acquiring the land in question. The authority was satisfied that it is an appropriate case for exempting the provisions of Section 5-A of ‘the Act’. Thus, the aforesaid notification under Section 4 of ‘the Act’ was published in two daily newspapers of the locality on 24th June, 2007. Thereafter the declaration under Section 6 read with Section 17 of ‘the Act’ was issued vide notification dated 18th June, 2008, which was published on 29th June, 2008. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners relying upon the decision in the case of Om Prakash and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1998 SC 2504 , submitted on the ground that there was no relevant material before the State authorities to enable them to invoke Section 17(4) of ‘the Act’; and to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’; and that the grounds sought to be made out by the State authorities in this connection were legally unsustainable and, therefore, the direction contained in the impugned notification under Section 4 invoking Section 17 sub-section (4) of ‘the Act’ and in dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A was liable to be set aside and consequently notification under Section 6 was also required to be quashed and further in any case the land occupied by the petitioners which were sought to be acquired in the present proceedings were having Abadi, constructions occupied for residential and industrial purposes by the petitioners and that a policy decision was taken by the contesting respondents authority not to acquire lands covered by such Abadi. The acquisition proceedings were, therefore, required to be set aside even on that ground. The acquisition proceedings were, therefore, required to be set aside even on that ground. Learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his submission that there was an existing Abadi on the land sought to be acquired contended that in any view of the matter, land in question of the petitioners having Abadi in the light of the policy consistently followed by the contesting respondents authority, could not have been acquired. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relying upon the decision in the case of Union of India and others v. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14 , contended that in fact there is no unforeseen emergency before the authorities to take possession over the land in dispute. The authorities have exercised the power which is unsustainable under law. Particularly paras 30 and 32 of the aforesaid judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners, are quoted below : “30. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 contemplates a different type of urgency inasmuch as it should be an unforeseen emergency. Under this section if the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is such unforeseen emergency the authorities can take possession of the land even without waiting for the fifteen-day period contemplated under Section 9(1). Therefore, in cases, where the Government is satisfied that there is an unforeseen emergency, it will have to in the normal course, issue a Section 4(1) notification, hold Section 5-A inquiry, make Section 6 declaration, and issue Section 9(1) notice and possession can be taken immediately thereafter without waiting for the period of 15 days prescribed under Section 9(1) of the Act.” “32. A careful perusal of this provision which is an exception to the normal mode of acquisition contemplated under the Act shows that mere existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency though is a condition precedent for invoking Section 17(4), that by itself is not sufficient to direct the dispensation of the Section 5-A inquiry. It requires an opinion to be formed by the Government concerned that along with the existence of such urgency or unforeseen emergency there is also a need for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry which indicates that the legislature intended the appropriate Government to apply its mind before dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry. It requires an opinion to be formed by the Government concerned that along with the existence of such urgency or unforeseen emergency there is also a need for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry which indicates that the legislature intended the appropriate Government to apply its mind before dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry. It also indicates that mere existence of an urgency under Section 17(1) or unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) would not itself be sufficient for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry. If that was not the intention of the legislature then the latter part of sub-section (4) of Section 17 would not have been necessary and the legislature in Section 17(1) and (2) itself could have incorporated that in such situation of existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency automatically Section 5-A inquiry will be dispensed with. But then that is not the language of the section which in our opinion requires the appropriate Government to further consider the need for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry in spite of the existence of unforeseen emergency. This understanding of ours as to the requirement of an application of mind by the appropriate Government while dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry does not mean that in each and every case when there is an urgency contemplated under Section 17(1) and unforeseen emergency contemplated under Section 17(2) exists that by itself would not contain the need for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry. It is possible in a given case the urgency noticed by the appropriate Government under Section 17(1) or the unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) itself may be of such degree that it could require the appropriate Government on that very basis to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A but then there is a need for application of mind by the appropriate Government that such an urgency for dispensing of the Section 5-A inquiry is inherent in the two types of urgencies contemplated under Section 17(1) and (2) of the Act.” 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relied paras 35 and 36 of decision in the case of Union of India (supra), which reads thus : “35. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relied paras 35 and 36 of decision in the case of Union of India (supra), which reads thus : “35. At this stage, it is relevant to notice that the limited right given to an owner/person interested under Section 5-A of the Act to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be taken away for good and valid reason and within the limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act. The object and importance of Section 5-A inquiry was noticed by this Court in the case of Munshi Singh v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 337 , wherein this Court held thus : “Section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belong to that person should not be made. .....The legislature has, therefore, made complete provisions for the persons interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special powers have been conferred on the appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions of Section 5-A. 36. It is clear from the above observation of this Court that right of representation and hearing contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act is a very valuable right of a person whose property is sought to be acquired and he should have appropriate and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that the acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. Therefore, in our opinion, if the appropriate Government decides to take away this minimal right then its decision to do so must be based on materials on record to support the same and bearing in mind the object of Section 5-A.” 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the subjective satisfaction for invoking the provisions of Section 17(4) of ‘the Act’ was not independent of satisfaction for invoking Section 17 sub-section (1) and that both these satisfactions were really independent of each other and had to be arrived at as such. Further that State Government was not justified in invoking the provisions of Section 17(4) of ‘the Act’ on the facts and circumstances of the case. Further that State Government was not justified in invoking the provisions of Section 17(4) of ‘the Act’ on the facts and circumstances of the case. He, however, stated that if it is held that the State authorities could not have dispensed with Section 5-A inquiry and if the petitioners are to be given an opportunity to put forward their written objections before the acquiring authority under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’ then the second question regarding Abadi land immunity from being acquired, may not be decided at this stage. 14. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents authority repelling the aforesaid contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners’ counsel contended that there is no error in applicability of Section 17 sub-section (4) of ‘the Act’ to the present proceedings, as there was sufficient material before the State authorities to come to that decision and further for acquisition of the present type wherein large acreage of land had to be acquired for the purpose of planned industrial development of the area undertaken by ‘Greater Noida’, urgency clause could be legitimately invoked. Urgent situation was implicit in such acquisition proceedings and if Section 5-A inquiry was not dispensed with, years would have passed before Section 6 notification could have been issued. It was also submitted by them that the material relied upon by the State authorities for dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’ was quite relevant and this Court would not sit in appeal while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India over the subjective satisfaction of the State authorities in this connection, as it is well settled that if such subjective satisfaction for invoking Section 17(4) of ‘the Act’ is found to be based on relevant material, it cannot be challenged in a Court of law by requesting the Court to reappreciate such evidence specially when there was no challenge to the acquisition proceedings on the ground of mala fides. 15. It is next contended by learned counsel for the respondents authority that possession of the land in question has been taken over by the State authorities and the same was handed over to the ‘Greater Noida’ on 18th July, 2008. Further contention is that petitioners’ land cannot be said to be having Abadi, as mere stray construction on agricultural land cannot be termed Abadi. Further contention is that petitioners’ land cannot be said to be having Abadi, as mere stray construction on agricultural land cannot be termed Abadi. That ‘Abadi’ is a term of art, which connotes constructions for residential purposes on village-site land and it has nothing to do with agricultural land situate beyond village-sites. The documentary material which is furnished in the present proceedings by some of the petitioners to show that their land were having Abadi appears to be interpolated and such forged documents cannot be permitted to be relied upon by the petitioners. 16. It was again contended by respondents’ counsel that acquisition for the planned development of a township on a large scale would entitle the State authorities to invoke urgency provisions of Section 17(4) of ‘the Act’ and the State authorities have not erred in relying upon this legal position, as the planned development of the ‘Greater Noida’ is already underway and other infrastructure facilities are being made available on spot, this Court in exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not interfere in the peculiar facts of the case at such a late stage. 17. In the light of the above rival contentions advanced on behalf of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, the following points/issues arise for determination : “(1) Whether the State authorities were justified in invoking Section 17(4) of ‘the Act’ for dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. (2) Whether the possession of the disputed land of the petitioners have been taken by the respondent authority. (3) In any case, whether the petitioners’ land have to be treated as immune from acquisition proceedings on the ground that they were having Abadi thereon and were, therefore, governed by the policy decision of the State of U.P. not to acquire such lands." 18. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned senior Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 and Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3 and perused the records. Issue No. 1 : Whether the State authorities were justified in invoking Section 17(4) of ‘the Act’ for dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. 19. Issue No. 1 : Whether the State authorities were justified in invoking Section 17(4) of ‘the Act’ for dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. 19. In all these writ petitions, land acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have been challenged on various grounds. The notification under Section 4(1), read with Section 17 of ‘the Act’ was published in the official Gazette on 20th June, 2007 proposing to acquire 230.555 hectares of land of village Ibadullapur (Badalpur) needed for public purpose for planned industrial development in the district Gautam Budh Nagar through ‘Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority’. It was specified in the notification under Section 4 of ‘the Act’ as follows : “Under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No.1) the Governor is pleased to notify for general information that the land mentioned, in the Schedule below is needed for a public purpose namely for the planned Industrial Development in district Gautam Budh Nagar through Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority. The Governor, being of the opinion that the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act are applicable to the said land inasmuch as the said land, is urgently required for the planned Industrial Development in District Gautam Budh Nagar, through the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority and that in view of the pressing urgency it is as well necessary to eliminate the delay likely to be caused by an inquiry under Section 5-A of the said Act, the Governor is further pleased to direct under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the said Act that the provisions of Section 5-A of the said Act shall not apply.” 20. So far as the question of dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A is concerned, the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act has to be kept in view. So far as the question of dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A is concerned, the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act has to be kept in view. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of ‘the Act’ lays down that whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to that effect has to be published in the official Gazette and also to proceed further according to the mode laid down in the said provision then follows Section 5-A. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4, sub-section (1) of ‘the Act’, as being needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose may, within 30 days from the date of publication of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be. Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A of ‘the Act’ lays down the procedure in connection with such an inquiry. The objections under Section 5-A are to be lodged in writing with the Collector and the Collector is required to give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf or by pleader and shall after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under Section 4, sub-section (1) of ‘the Act’, or make different reports to the Government and in the light of the said report, the appropriate Government has to come to its own decision on the objections and such decision is made final under ‘the Act’. Then follows Section 6, sub-section (1), which lays down that subject to the provisions of Part VII of ‘the Act’, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration can be made by the appropriate Government for acquiring such land. It is, therefore, obvious that under the normal scheme of land acquisition proceedings under ‘the Act’ before any land can be acquired, by issuing notification under Section 6, the gamut of hearing of objections to such proposed acquisition as laid down by Section 5-A has to be followed. It is in this light that Section 17 of ‘the Act’, which permits dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A in appropriate case, has to be appreciated. Sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 17 deserve to be noted in extenso. They read as under : “17. Special powers in cases of urgency.—(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (2) to (3-B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1).” 21. In order to examine the applicability of Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act, it will be necessary to find out whether there was any relevant material with the appropriate Government, namely, respondents authority (State of U.P. herein), to enable it to arrive at its subjective satisfaction about dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A in connection with the present acquisition. Before we could arrive at any conclusion, it will be necessary to quickly glance through the factual backdrop leading to the present proceedings. As we have noted earlier, ‘Greater Noida’ was entrusted with the task of developing areas under its jurisdiction and that development could necessarily be a planned development on a large scale. Before we could arrive at any conclusion, it will be necessary to quickly glance through the factual backdrop leading to the present proceedings. As we have noted earlier, ‘Greater Noida’ was entrusted with the task of developing areas under its jurisdiction and that development could necessarily be a planned development on a large scale. Such development could not be confined only to a few pockets of the land but must necessarily encompass in its fold schemes pertaining to large tracts of land which were lying undeveloped and which had to be developed on a systematic basis. It is not in dispute between the parties that initially in 1991 large tracts of land in the districts in the State of Uttar Pradesh were acquired from the villages falling under the district Gautam Budh Nagar. It appears that thereafter necessary development was carried out on the acquired land by ‘Greater Noida’ and as a part and parcel of the comprehensive plan for industrial development, further land were sought to be acquired by it by stages as development of any area or township is a long drawn process spread over years. Thereafter a further notification under Section 4(1) was issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh on 20th June, 2007 acquiring further land for ‘Greater Noida’ from the villages of the district. A number of plots from the village in question were sought to be acquired and they in all amounted to 230.554 hectares of land. 22. A counter affidavit was filed by the State authorities for explaining the reasons why Section 5-A inquiry was dispensed with. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer paras 2e, 2f, 2h, 2i, 2j, 2k, 2l and 2m of the counter affidavit filed by Sri Pradeep Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents authority No. 3, which are quoted below : “2e. That it is submitted that before sending the proposal for acquiring the aforesaid land, the Joint Survey Team of the Greater Noida Officials and Revenue Department of Collectorate, Gautam Budh Nagar have made the actual spot inspection in Village Badalpur and they prepared a joint survey detail report dated 27.5.2007. In the said joint survey report, the details of plots area and details of existing constructions, which were found by the Joint Survey Team has mentioned. 2f. In the said joint survey report, the details of plots area and details of existing constructions, which were found by the Joint Survey Team has mentioned. 2f. That it is submitted that Joint Survey Team has shown the abadi in its report on some Khasara numbers, which were found at the time of inspection. These abadi area although constructed without any permission from the answering respondents authority in other places of the actual abadi area of Village Badalpur. No abadi was found on the land in question i.e. Khasara No. 74. It is also worthwhile to mention here that the petitioner’s abadi, which was found by the Joint Survey Team on the part of Khasara No.165 in lieu of which area 700 sq. meters has been excluded from the acquisition. The rest open land was proposed to be acquired by the Joint Survey Team of petitioner’s plots. 2h. That it is submitted that the Joint Survey Team was constituted to consider the report for acquisition of Plot under the Chairmanship of Additional Chief Executive Officer of Greater Noida. The committee considered the report and decided the matter of exemption of those abadies, which were found to thickly dense abadi area. The Joint Survey Team have shown the abadi clearly which was found at the time of survey in its report. The committee headed under the Chairmanship of Additional Chief Executive Officer has examined the joint survey report and they found that over Plot No. 74, which is away from abadi area, having the new constructions. The said land has come in the planning of Greater Noida and as per the Master Plan of Greater Noida 2021, it is needed for planned industrial development of Greater Noida, therefore, Plot No. 74 was proposed to be acquired by the Acquisition Authority in lieu to the construction over Plot No. 74. The petitioner is to be given two developed plots of 200 sq. meter each apart from 6% land of acquired area (subject to eligibility of 6% as per Policy) as per the rehabilitation scheme of Greater Noida. The Chief Executive Officer of Greater Noida perused the said report, who approved the same by his order. 2i. The petitioner is to be given two developed plots of 200 sq. meter each apart from 6% land of acquired area (subject to eligibility of 6% as per Policy) as per the rehabilitation scheme of Greater Noida. The Chief Executive Officer of Greater Noida perused the said report, who approved the same by his order. 2i. That it is submitted that after preparation of the reports, the proposal was sent to the Additional Collector (Land Acquisition) Greater Noida, who examined the complete reports and put his note, who has given the reasons and justification to exempt the provision of Section 5-A of the Act. The joint survey report and the report prepared by the committee headed by Additional Chief Executive Officer for exempting the certain plots were also appended with the proposal and along with the aforesaid proposal, a Cheque of 10% of the estimated compensation amount for the acquisition of the land was also sent. 2j. That it is submitted that the Collector examined the complete reports and justification note (Auchitya Ki Tippani). The Collector send the papers to the Director (Land Acquisition) Directorate Board of Revenue. Later on vide his letter dated 16.6.2007 along with certificates regarding of his satisfaction for exemption of the provision of Section 5-A of the Act. 2k. That it is submitted that the matter was considered by the competent authority in accordance with law, who sent the same to the State Government. Thereafter, the State Government has issued the preliminary notification under Section 4(1)/17 of the Act on 20.6.2007 for acquiring the area 230.554 hectares land situated in Village Badalpur, Tahsil Dadari, district Gautam Budh Nagar, invoking the Urgency Clause under Section 17(4) of the Act. The competent Government was satisfied after application of its mind that it is appropriate case for exempting the provision of Section 5-A of the Act. The State Government has published the said notification in extraordinary Gazette on 20.6.2007 and thereafter in two daily newspapers of the area on 24.6.2007 respectively and giving public notice in Village on 30.6.2007. 2l. That it is submitted that the declaration notification under Section 6(1)/1(1) of the Act was issued on 18.6.2008 and the same was published in two daily newspapers on 29.6.2008. The entire action for acquiring the land has been made by the competent Government after its subjective satisfaction strictly in accordance with law. 2l. That it is submitted that the declaration notification under Section 6(1)/1(1) of the Act was issued on 18.6.2008 and the same was published in two daily newspapers on 29.6.2008. The entire action for acquiring the land has been made by the competent Government after its subjective satisfaction strictly in accordance with law. All the provisions have been complied with by the State Government and the authorities concerned. The land, which has been notified for acquisition is urgently needed for planned industrial development of Greater Noida, which is public purpose and the State Government is competent to invoke the Urgency Clause after subjective satisfaction. 2m. That it is submitted that prior to taking possession over the acquired land. The notice under Section 9 of the Act was issued to the tenure holders on 1.7.2008 including the petitioner thereafter, the possession of the acquired land has been taken by the State Authorities on 18.7.2008 and the same was handed over to the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority on same day. Now the land has come in possession of Greater Noida, which has been vested in State in accordance with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act free from all encumbrances." 23. Thus, the material which was produced before us was by way of Annexures-CA-2, CA-3, CA-4 and CA-5. When we turn to these annexures, we find that Annexure-CA-4 is a letter dated 16th June, 2007 written by the District Magistrate to the Director, Land Acquisition Directorate, Board of Revenue, Lucknow. It recites that on examination, it was found that the land was immediately required in public interest so that the development work over the said land could be carried out smoothly. When we turn to Annexure-CA-5 which is dated 6th July, 2007, we find that the 80 per cent of the estimated compensation of the acquired land has already been deposited by the Greater Noida with the Additional Collector (Land Acquisition). 24. When we turn to Annexure-CA-5 which is dated 6th July, 2007, we find that the 80 per cent of the estimated compensation of the acquired land has already been deposited by the Greater Noida with the Additional Collector (Land Acquisition). 24. At this stage, it is also relevant to reproduce the extract of the report of the committee dated 8th June, 2007 (Annexure CA-2 filed by respondent No. 3), which reads as follows : ^^xzke cknyiqj] ijxuk o rglhy&nknjh] ftyk xkSrecq)uxj xzsVj uks;Mk izkfèkdj.k ds vf/klwfpr {ks= esa fLFkr gSA lqfu;ksftr vkS|ksfxd fodkl gsrq izLrkfor Hkwfe dh fodkl gsrq rRdky vko’;drk gSA vtZu esa foyEc dh n’kk esa izLrkfor Hkwfe ij vfrdze.k c<+us dh izcy laHkkouk gS ftl dkj.k lqfu;ksftr fodkl dh ladYiuk (Concept) ij izfrdwy izHkko iM+sxkA bl xzke dh vkl&ikl dh Hkwfe iwoZ esa vftZr gks pqdh gS rFkk dqN ij vtZu dh dk;Zokgh py jgh gS ,slh n’kk esa vk/kkjHkwr lsokvksa dh fujUrjrk (Continuity of Infrastructure Services) ds n`f"Vxr iz’uxr Hkwfe ds kh?kz vtZu dh vifjgk;Zrk gSA xzsVj uks;Mk vkS|ksfxd fodkl izkf/kdj.k dks kklu }kjk vuqeksfnr ;kstukuqlkj bl {ks= ds lexz fodkl rFkk lM+dksa] lhojst] fo|qr vkfn miyC/k djkrs gq, fun`"V iz;kstu gsrq fu;kstu fodkl rFkk vkoaVu dk;Z gsrq Hkwfe dh vko’;drk gSA vtZu u gksus ds dkj.k dk;Z :dk gqvk gSA ns’k dh izfrf"Br vkS|ksfxd laLFkk,a tks mRrj izns’k esa Hkkjh fuos’k djuk pkgrh gSaA mudks Hkwfe mudh ;kstukuqlkj vfoyEc miyC/k djk;k tkuk vR;Ur vko’;d gSA vxj bu bdkbZ;ksa dks ;g Hkwfe mudh vko’;drkuqlkj miyC/k ugha djk;h tkrh gS rks ;g bdkbZ;ka vU; jkT;ksa esa viuh vkS|ksfxd bdkbZ;ka LFkkfir dj ysaxha ftlls vfèkdkfèkd iwath fuos’k dh ljdkj dh uhfr rFkk jkstxkj ds voljksa ij foijhr izHkko iM+sxkA vr,ao] ;g iz;kl fd;k tk jgk gS fd Hkwfe dh vuqiyC/krk ds vk/kkj ij dksbZ bdkbZ mRrj izns’k jkT; ds bl {ks= ls nwljs jkT; esa u tkus ik, rHkh bl {ks= dk vkS|ksfxd fodkl leqfpr :i ls lEHko gks ik;sxkA xzke bcknqYykiqj cknyiqj dh 233-845 gs0 Hkwfe dk lqfu;qftr fodkl gsrq vtZu izLrkfor gS ftlesa 515 xkVk la[;k 471 [kkrs rFkk yxHkx 900 d‘“kd fufgr gSaA fyf[kr@ekSf[kd vkifRr lqus tkus rFkk fuLrkj.k esa fuf’pr :i ls o"kksZa yxsaxs rFkk vizR;kf’kr foyEc gksxk ftlls lqfu;ksftr fodkl BIi gks tk;sxk tcfd fof/k }kjk /kkjk&4 ¼1½@17 dh vf/klwpuk rFkk /kkjk&6@17 dh vf/klwpuk ds e/; esa ,d o"kZ dk le; fuèkkZfjr gSA** 25. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid report of the committee, we find that the proposal submitted by the committee was duly countersigned by the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar. The said report clearly recites the urgency for which the land was required, namely to provide land to prospective potential investors including foreign investors to support the planned industrial development in the State of U.P. The proposal, as noted above, also recites that in the event such land is not provided immediately, then the said investors would migrate to other States which would definitely have an adverse impact on the planned industrial development of the State. It is only when that such investors are provided immediate allotments that such planned industrial development would be possible. It is, thus, for the said public purpose coupled with the aforesaid urgency, the proposal was made for invoking the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. The Certificate issued by the Collector after receiving of the said report also re-emphasises the same and clearly spells out the need to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’. It is this material, which was there before the State Government which prompted it to invoke the urgency clause not only under Section 17(1) but also under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of ‘the Act’. Thus, on the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that there was no material before the State Government for invoking the urgency clause. 26. We are fortified in our view by the decision of this Court in the case of Jasraj Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (8) ADJ 329 (DB). The relevant para 10 of the said decision of Jasraj Singh (supra) reads as follows : “10. 26. We are fortified in our view by the decision of this Court in the case of Jasraj Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (8) ADJ 329 (DB). The relevant para 10 of the said decision of Jasraj Singh (supra) reads as follows : “10. We have given our anxious consideration to the various submissions advanced and on the basis of the pleadings, the original records and the decisions relied upon by the contending parties, we find that the proposal submitted by the Committee and duly countersigned by the Collector recites the urgency for which the land was required namely to provide land to prospective potential investors including foreign investors to support the planned industrial development in the State of U.P. The proposal, as noted above, also recites that in the event such land is not provided immediately, then the said investors would migrate to other States which would definitely have an adverse impact on the planned industrial development of the State. It is only when that such investors are provided immediate allotments that such planned industrial development would be possible. It is, thus, for the said public purpose coupled with the aforesaid urgency and emergency that the proposal was made for invoking the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. The Certificate issued by the Collector after receiving of the said report also re-emphasises the same and clearly spells out the need to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act it is this material, which was there before the State Government which prompted it to invoke the urgency clause not only under Section 17(1) but also under sub-section (4) of Section 17. Thus, on the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that there was no material before the State Government for invoking the urgency clause.” 27. Learned counsel for the petitioners relying upon the decision in the case of Om Prakash v. State of U.P. (supra) argued that the possibility of encroachment over the area cannot be considered to be a germane ground for invoking urgency powers for dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’. Learned counsel for the petitioners relying upon the decision in the case of Om Prakash v. State of U.P. (supra) argued that the possibility of encroachment over the area cannot be considered to be a germane ground for invoking urgency powers for dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of M/s. Swatantra Bharat Paper Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (9) ADJ 135 (DB), wherein in para 24 of the judgment it has been observed as follows : “24. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash v. State of U.P. (supra) to the effect that possibility of encroachment over the area cannot be considered to be a germane ground for invoking urgency powers for dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. In that case the Supreme Court had, in the facts of the case, permitted the land owners to move the competent authority under the Land Acquisition Act for withdrawal of their plots of land from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act. However, the said observation of Hon’ble S.B. Majumdar, J. in the aforesaid case was later clarified by His Lordship in the case of Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P., (1999) 2 SCC 384 . In paragraph 24 of the said judgment it has been stated that “In our opinion, the procedure adopted in Om Prakash cannot be treated as a precedent in all land acquisition cases where the Section 5-A inquiry is dispensed with. The procedure adopted in that case is based upon the special circumstances obtaining there.” Thus, it is true that possibility of encroachment alone may not be a sufficient clause for invoking such urgency powers but coupled with other facts, as are there in the present case, the urgency clause would certainly be invoked.” (emphasis supplied) 28. Thus, this issue has already been dealt with by this Court in the aforementioned judgment and moreover in the present case it was not the sole ground for invoking the urgency clause but there were other grounds too which were taken into consideration before invoking the urgency clause by the authorities concerned. 29. Thus, this issue has already been dealt with by this Court in the aforementioned judgment and moreover in the present case it was not the sole ground for invoking the urgency clause but there were other grounds too which were taken into consideration before invoking the urgency clause by the authorities concerned. 29. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents authority relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Manju Lala Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others, 2007 (9) ADJ 447 (DB), which has been affirmed by the Apex Court with the rejection of SLP filed against the said decision. For ready reference paras 39 and 43 are reproduced here as follows : “39. It is a settled legal proposition that the scope of judicial review is limited to the decision making procedure and not against the decision of the authority. The Court could review to correct errors of law or fundamental procedural requirements, which may lead to manifest injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in exceptional circumstances. In judicial review, the Court cannot trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and arrive at its own conclusion as it is not an appeal from a decision. Review of the decision is not permissible where the findings are recorded by an authority on the basis of legal evidence and the said findings are not based either on ipse dixit or conjectures or surmises. The Court cannot interfere on the ground that the matter requires appraisal of evidence. “Between appraisal of evidence and total lack of evidence, there is an appreciable difference which could never be lost sight of.” “43. The question whether inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is necessary or not is a question of fact and it requires to be determined by the Government in the facts and circumstances of each case for the reason that no straight jacket formula can be evolved as under what circumstances the urgency clause should be invoked. The role of the Court is very limited and it can only see as to whether there was any material to form an opinion about invoking the urgency clause or whether the Government exercised the power in a malafide manner. The role of the Court is very limited and it can only see as to whether there was any material to form an opinion about invoking the urgency clause or whether the Government exercised the power in a malafide manner. The question as to whether urgency exists or not, is primarily a matter for determination of the Government subject to the scope of judicial review by the Courts of law.” 30. Learned counsel for the petitioners has heavily relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14 . This case has been later on considered by the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Sheikhar Hotels Gulmohar Enclave and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (6) ADJ 307 : 2008 STPL (LE) 40261 (SC) : 2008 (14) SCC 716 : AIR 2008 SC 2284 , wherein the Apex Court while discussing the case of Union of India and others v. Mukesh Hans (supra) held as follows : “In this connection learned senior Counsel for the appellants invited our attention to the decision of this Court in Union of India and others (supra) have held that Section 5-A is not an empty formality but it is a substantive right which can be taken away only for good and valid reason and within the limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act. But in the present case the notification was struck down on the facts that no material was placed on record and secondly, it was also held that discontinuance of festival for want of land and any hindrance in using the land was not there. It was also pointed out that earlier an attempt was made to acquire the land for the very same purpose for holding such festival and it was allowed to lapse by efflux of time and consequently the Court found that there was no reference in the file to the need of invoking Section 17(4) and therefore, in a given situation. Their Lordships held that invocation of Section 17(4) of the Act was vitiated by non-application of mind by the authorities. Therefore, this case was decided on the question of fact.” 31. Thus, the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has held that the case of Mukesh Hans (supra) was confined to its own facts and it is quite distinguishable. Their Lordships held that invocation of Section 17(4) of the Act was vitiated by non-application of mind by the authorities. Therefore, this case was decided on the question of fact.” 31. Thus, the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has held that the case of Mukesh Hans (supra) was confined to its own facts and it is quite distinguishable. 32. In this context, it is also useful to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Manju Lala Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others, 2007 (9) ADJ 447 (DB). The extract of para 71 of the judgment is quoted herein below : “.....There has to be an independent decision by the State Government for such dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’. Section 17(4) itself indicates that the “Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply”. The recital of such an opinion in the order or in notification is not necessary. Nor reasons have to be recorded in this regard in the official records. It is a case of subjective satisfaction of the Government and once the Government forms the opinion and dispenses with the enquiry under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’, the Court, in its limited jurisdiction of judicial review, cannot declare the acquisition proceedings bad. Pre or post-notification delay or lethargy on the part of the officials of the State Government is not fatal to acquisition proceedings. Very often persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired make various representations to the concerned authorities against the proposed acquisition. This is bound to result in a multiplicity of enquiries, communications and discussions leading invariably to delay in the execution of even urgent projects, very often the delay makes the problem more and more acute and increases the urgency of the necessity for acquisition. There is no prohibition in law for acquiring the land for a public purpose, which is not in conformity with the land use shown in the Master Plan, as the Master Plan can be amended/modified by the Government. Acquisition of the land for a use other than the use for which it had been earmarked in the Master Plan can be initiated in anticipation of approval to the proposed amendment/modification of the Master Plan by the State Government. Acquisition of the land for a use other than the use for which it had been earmarked in the Master Plan can be initiated in anticipation of approval to the proposed amendment/modification of the Master Plan by the State Government. Planned development proposed should not be installed at the behest of a few aggrieved persons, whereas huge chunk of land belongs to a very large persons is involved." 33. In the present case, to our mind the facts of the present case as discussed herein earlier, clearly indicate that there was a specific proposal for dispensation of the provisions of Section 5-A of ‘the Act’, which has been separately noticed by the State Government whereafter it was approved. This approval, therefore, amounts to applying mind specifically to the aspect of dispensation under Section 5-A and the submission made on behalf of the petitioners does not appear to be correct. The State Government cannot be said to have ipso facto directed the dispensation of the inquiry inasmuch as the material discussed above, was available to the State Government. 34. The Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan Housing Board v. Sri Kishan, 1993 (2) SCC 84 while dealing with the issue has held as follows : “It must be remembered that the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one and so long as there is material upon which the Government could have formed the said satisfaction fairly, the Court would not interfere nor would it examine the material as an appellate authority. This is the principle affirmed by decisions of this Court not under Section 17(4) but also generally with respect to subjective satisfaction.” 35. In State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and others, AIR 1986 SC 2025 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered its earlier judgment in Narayan Govind Gavate etc. v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1977 SC 183 , wherein it was held that the scheme relating to development of residential area in urban centres was not so urgent that it was necessary for eliminating the inquiry under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’ and came to the conclusion that because of the subsequent fast development of urbanisation, the situation has completely changed and the problem of housing accommodation has become a matter of national urgency. Taking judicial note of this kind of development, the Court held that the acquisition of land for providing housing sites can warrant dispensation of the inquiry under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’. The Court further held that where a large area of land is sought to be acquired, the scheme of planned development should not be frustrated by judicial interference at the behest of few persons. On the issue that there was an omission in the notification issued under Section 17(1-A) of ‘the Act’ regarding the agricultural land the Court held that it was not fatal for the reason that the Government had the power to acquire the land other than waste and arable land also by invoking urgency clause. 36. In Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1999 SC 436 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the issue of urgency and dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’ and also considered the judgment in Om Prakash (supra) but refused to issue similar directions laying down clearly that the case of Om Prakash cannot be treated as precedent in all acquisition cases where Section 5-A inquiry is dispensed with. The Apex Court further observed that those directions had been issued in Om Prakash (supra) considering that the land in dispute was abadi land and the Government had taken a policy decision not to acquire the residential property for industrial use. It may also be necessary to point out that Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Mazmoodar was a Member of the Bench in both the cases. 37. However, subsequent thereto, in First Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli and another, AIR 2002 SC 1314 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the delay between the decision of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’ and the making of the declaration under Section 6 is not fatal. The Court observed as under : “The question of urgency of an acquisition under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and ordinarily it is not open to the Court to make a scrutiny of the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal of facts. The Court observed as under : “The question of urgency of an acquisition under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and ordinarily it is not open to the Court to make a scrutiny of the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal of facts. In this view of the matter when the Government takes a decision, taking all relevant considerations into account and is satisfied that there exists emergency for invoking powers under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act, and issues notification accordingly, the same should not be interfered with by the Court unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that the decision has been taken by the appropriate authority mala fide. Whether in a given situation there existed urgency or not is left to the discretion and decision of the concerned authorities. If an order invoking power under Section 17(4) is assailed, the Court may enquire whether the appropriate authority had all the relevant materials before it or whether the order has been passed by non-application of mind. Any post notification delay subsequent to the decision of the State Government dispensing with an inquiry under Section 5-A by invoking powers under Section 17(1) of the Act would not invalidate the decision itself specially when no mala fides on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. Opinion of the State Government can be challenged in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that action of the State Government is mala fide. Though the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one and is not open to challenge before a Court of law, except for the grounds already indicated, but the said satisfaction must be of the Appropriate Government and that the satisfaction must be, as to the existence of an urgency. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency even though cannot be conclusive but is entitled to great weight, as has been held by this Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1971 SC 1033 . The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency even though cannot be conclusive but is entitled to great weight, as has been held by this Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1971 SC 1033 . Even a mere allegation that power was exercised malafide would not be enough and in support of such allegation specific materials should be placed before the Court. The burden of establishing malafides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. When the Court is called upon to examine the question as to whether the acquisition is malafide or not, what is necessary to be inquired into and found out is, whether the purpose for which the acquisition is going to be made, is a read purpose or a camouflage.” 38. A Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court in Chameli Singh and others v. State of U.P. and another, AIR 1996 SC 1051 , reiterated the similar view observing as under : “It is true that there was pre-notification and post-notification delay on the part of the officers to finalise and publish the notification. But those facts were present before the Government when it invoked urgency clause and dispensed with inquiry under Section 5-A. As held by this Court, the delay by itself accelerates the urgency: Larger the delay, greater be the urgency......When the Government on the basis of the material, constitutional and international obligation, formed its opinion of urgency, the Court, not being an appellate forum, would not disturb the finding unless the Court conclusively finds the exercise of the power mala fide....The lethargy on the part of the officers for pre and post-notification delay would not render the exercise of the power to invoke urgency clause invalid on that account.” (emphasis added) 39. It has come on record that in the present case more than 230 hectares of land has been acquired for further planned development as mentioned in the impugned notification. It has been averred that a total number of 757 tenure holders are affected by the acquisition of the land in question, forming an area of 230.554 hectares. However, out of the said 230.554 hectares of land, included in the notification, actual possession measuring 226.291 hectares has been taken over by the State Government and transferred to the respondents authority. It has been averred that a total number of 757 tenure holders are affected by the acquisition of the land in question, forming an area of 230.554 hectares. However, out of the said 230.554 hectares of land, included in the notification, actual possession measuring 226.291 hectares has been taken over by the State Government and transferred to the respondents authority. The compensation of the acquired land is being settled under the provisions of U.P. Land Acquisition (Determination of Payment of Compensation) Rules, 1997. The authority has already provided compensation amount of Rs. 216.89 crores to the office of the Collector, out of which 144.18 crores have already been disbursed to 720 tenure holders out of total 757 tenure holders. Thus, only 37 tenure holders from 8 Khatas have remained with the total outstanding payable amount standing at 72.71 crores. A statement of the Special Land Acquisition Officer/Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), in this regard, has also been filed by the respondents authority. In view of above, since 95% of the total tenure holders have accepted the payment of compensation, under the agreement, as such at the instance of less than 5% tenure holders, no interference with the acquisition is warranted from this Court. 40. It has been held in the case of A.P. Sareen v. State of U.P., (1997) 9 SCC 359 : 1997 AIR SCW 1341, in which the Apex Court had to consider the question whether the need for urgent possession underlying acquisition proceedings could cease to exist only because of bureaucratic inadvertence. It was held in that case that urgency continued so long as the scheme was not initiated, action taken and process completed. It is, of course, true that while deciding this question, it is observed that it is well settled legal position that urgency can be said to exist when land proposed to be acquired is needed for planned development of the city or town, etc. The said observation clearly shows that in appropriate cases when acquisition is needed for planned development of city or town, urgency provisions can be invoked. 41. The said observation clearly shows that in appropriate cases when acquisition is needed for planned development of city or town, urgency provisions can be invoked. 41. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we arrived at the conclusion that the decision of the State Government dispensing with an inquiry under Section 5-A of ‘the Act’ in the present case was arrived at “real and genuine subjective satisfaction” based upon the relevant materials available with the State authorities at the time when it issued the impugned notification under Section 4(1) of ‘the Act’ and dispensed with Section 5-A inquiry by resorting to Section 17, sub-section (4) as well as Section 17 (1) of ‘the Act’. Issue No. 2 : Whether the possession of the disputed land of the petitioners have been taken by the respondent authority. 42. It has come on the record that consequent upon issuance of notification acquiring the land, notice under Section 9 of ‘the Act’ has been issued on 1st July, 2008 and possession of the land has been taken over from the tenure holders on 18th July, 2008 and transferred to the respondents authority on the same date. The possession memo, in this regard, has also been brought on record. According to the possession memo, which is on the record, possession of more than 226 hectares of land have been taken over by the respondents authority and the same have already vested in the State Government. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that physical possession has not yet been taken over by the respondents authority and the land has yet not been vested with the respondents authority. We are not impressed by the said argument advanced on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioners. The possession memo is on the record, which has not been disputed by the petitioners, which clearly indicates that the possession of the land in dispute has already been taken by the respondents authority. 43. In this regard in State of Tamil Nadu and another v. Mahalakshmi Ammal and others, (1996) 7 SCC 269 , it has been held by the Apex Court in para 9, which reads as under : “..........Possession of the acquired land would be taken only by way of memorandum, Panchnama, which is a legally accepted norm. It would not be possible to take any physical possession. It would not be possible to take any physical possession. Therefore, subsequent continuation, if any, had by the erstwhile owner is only illegal or unlawful possession which does not bind the Government nor vested under Section 16 divested in the illegal occupant. Considered from this perspective, we hold that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the award.” 44. In the counter affidavit, it has been stated that the land of which possession was given to Noida on 18th July, 2008 was an open peace of land and no structure or construction was standing over it and the development activities are to be completed at the earliest. 45. In Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division, U.P. v. Suresh Nand Juyal alias Musa Ram (deceased) by Lrs. and others, (1997) 9 SCC 224 , “it has been observed that the award was made and symbolic possession was taken. Under the circumstances, the land stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances”. 46. In Satendra Prasad Jain and others v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1993 SC 2517 , the Apex Court has held that “the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner”. 47. In view of above, it is held that the possession of most of the land has already been taken over by the respondent authority and it has vested in it. Issue No. 3 : In any case, whether the petitioners’ land have to be treated as immune from acquisition proceedings on the ground that they were having Abadi thereon and were, therefore, governed by the policy decision of the State of U.P. not to acquire such lands. 48. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent-Greater Noida has submitted that there is some misconception about the concept of Abadi. The Abadi is a term which refers to village site land utilised for the residential purposes. He, of course, stated that it is true that there is a policy adopted by the State of Uttar Pradesh not to acquire land on which there is Abadi, namely, village site land having residential construction thereon. The Abadi is a term which refers to village site land utilised for the residential purposes. He, of course, stated that it is true that there is a policy adopted by the State of Uttar Pradesh not to acquire land on which there is Abadi, namely, village site land having residential construction thereon. But in the strict sense of the term it would not be Abadi which would be covered by the State policy of not acquiring land having such Abadi, as any stray construction made on agricultural land outside the village sites, for putting up construction of residential quarters, would not be covered by the State policy of not acquiring such Abadi land. 49. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions, it appears to us that in the present proceedings arising out of petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is not possible to come to a definite conclusion on these highly disputed questions of fact, namely, whether the land in dispute were part of village site land reserved for construction of residential houses and whether they were covered by the term ‘Abadi’ so as to be subjected to any policy decision of the State for excluding such Abadi land from acquisition proceedings. 50. At this juncture, it will now be useful to refer Section 48 of ‘the Act’, which reads as under : “48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed.—(1) Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. (2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any proceedings thereunder, and shall pay such amount to the person interested, together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land. (3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to the determination of the compensation payable under this section.” 51. As laid down by sub-section (1) of Section 48 of ‘the Act’, the Government is at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. (3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to the determination of the compensation payable under this section.” 51. As laid down by sub-section (1) of Section 48 of ‘the Act’, the Government is at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. As we have already held herein earlier that the possession of the most of land has already been taken except few plots. Our attention was also invited to the possession receipts annexed with the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents authority. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that the ‘Greater Noida’ has been given possession on 18th July, 2008. We are, therefore, of the opinion that when the land has already been vested in the State Government, then the provision of Section 48 of ‘the Act’ cannot be invoked and the Government cannot withdraw from any said acquisition. 52. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that it is a policy of the authority not to acquire the Abadi land, as such entire acquisition has been rendered illegal because abadi land of the petitioners have been acquired. 53. The “land” has been defined under Section 3 sub-section (a) of ‘the Act’, which reads as follows : “3. (a) the expression “land” includes benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth”. 54. The Apex Court in the case of M/s. Anand Buttons Ltd. etc. v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 2005 SC 565 . In paras 11 and 13 of the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court has observed as under : “11. This reasoning of the High Court cannot be faulted for the simple reason that the authority, who has to carry out can be exempted from the acquisition without jeopardizing the development scheme. It is not possible for the Court to sit in appeal over the exercise of such satisfaction by the authority vested with the task of implementing the development plan. “13. It is trite law that not only land but also structure on land can be acquired under the Act. It is not possible for the Court to sit in appeal over the exercise of such satisfaction by the authority vested with the task of implementing the development plan. “13. It is trite law that not only land but also structure on land can be acquired under the Act. As to whether in a given set of circumstances certain land should be exempted from acquisition only for the reason that some construction had been carried out, is a matter of policy, and not of law. If after considering all the circumstances, the State Government has taken the view that exemption of the lands of the appellants would render askew the development scheme of the industrial estate, it is not possible for the High Court or this Court to interfere with the satisfaction of the concerned authorities. We see no ground on which the appellants could have maintained that their lands should be exempted from acquisition. Even if three of the parties had been wrongly exempted from acquisition, that gives no right to the appellants to seek similar relief.” (emphasis supplied) 55. Thus, the Apex Court in the aforementioned case has held that the development authority has to carry out plan development of the industrial estate and has to take decision as to which land can be exempted from the acquisition without jeopardizing the development scheme. 56. In Amar Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2003 (6) AWC 5499, it has been held that “Abadi land can also be acquired. The definition of ‘land’ in Section 3(a) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is a deeming provision. By a legal fiction even buildings and trees standing on the land are deemed to be land. Abadi land is merely land in rural areas set apart from residential and other non-agricultural purpose. There is nothing in the Land Acquisition Act cannot be acquired.” 57. In this regard, the decision of this Court in the case of Radhey Shyam and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2009 (2) ADJ 386 (DB) is also very relevant. Paras 16, 17 and 18 of the aforesaid judgment read as follows : “16. So far as the learned counsel for the petitioner’s contended that there is policy of not acquiring land where abadi exists, we find that he could not place any such Government Order before this Court. Paras 16, 17 and 18 of the aforesaid judgment read as follows : “16. So far as the learned counsel for the petitioner’s contended that there is policy of not acquiring land where abadi exists, we find that he could not place any such Government Order before this Court. He placed, however, reliance on para 27 of the judgment in Om Prakash (supra) and said that there the learned counsel for the NOIDA as well as the State of U.P. admitted that there is a policy adopted by the State of U.P. not to acquire the land on which there is abadi and contended that in view of the said admission of fact as noticed in the aforesaid judgment, this Court must presume that this policy is still continuing and exists. The submission is thoroughly misconceived inasmuch as Om Prakash (supra) the acquisition proceedings were initiated in the year 1991, which were up for challenge before the Apex Court. There also, while referring such policy in the year 1991, the Apex Court has further noticed that the said policy is applicable to genuine abadi land on which abadi situate within the village site but not where there are some stray constructions on agricultural lands beyond the village sites they would not be covered by such State policy. Moreover, the Apex Court has not decided this issue as is evident from para 28 of the judgment observing that it is a disputed question of fact as to whether abadi is such so as to fall within the policy decision of the State Government or not. In para 31 of the judgment, the Court has also observed that it is also not clear as to whether such policy had continued thereafter at the stage of notification under Section 6, as is evident from the following : “and whether such policy had continued thereafter at the stage of Section 6 notification of 7th January, 1992 and whether such policy is still current and operative at the time when the appellants’ representations come up for consideration of appropriate authorities of the State Government.” 17. In the present case, after almost 17 years, i.e. in the year 2008, in the absence of any material on record that any such policy exists, no interference is called for this reason alone. In the present case, after almost 17 years, i.e. in the year 2008, in the absence of any material on record that any such policy exists, no interference is called for this reason alone. Moreover, in the writ petition, the petitioners themselves have admitted that the so called construction in Khasra No. 394 is not a part of the abadi of the village, but it is adjoining the village abadi. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the constructions made on a land, if so exists, cannot be acquired, but the submission is thoroughly misconceived. We find that under the Act any land can be acquired and there is no such restriction that a land over which a construction exists cannot be acquired. In taking this view, we also find support from the Apex Court decision in Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 2005 SC 565 .” 58. Thus, in view of the aforesaid judgment, we are of the view that under the Act there is no such restriction that a land over which a construction exists cannot be acquired. 59. The State Government under Section 48 of ‘the Act’ is empowered to exempt the land, but the said provision cannot be invoked where the possession has been taken over by the Collector. There is no provision under the Act to revert the land which has vested in the State. 60. In the case of State of Haryana and another v. Jaipal Singh and others, J.T. 1996 (7) SC 574, the Apex Court has observed that “there is no general policy as such that all the lands on which construction has come to be made are required to be deleted from the acquisition.” 61. It is also relevant to note that in the case of Om Prakash (supra), a finding was recorded by the Apex Court that the possession of the disputed land was not taken over by the State Government, but in the present case as we have already held herein earlier that the possession over the land in dispute has already been taken over by the respondents authority, therefore there is no question of relegating the matter back to the State Government for deciding the same whether the land in dispute can be released or not on the ground that it is claimed by the petitioners that it is Abadi land. 62. 62. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that land of the petitioners cannot be treated as immune from the acquisition proceedings allegedly on the ground that they were having Abadi thereon and governed by the policy decision of the State of U.P. not to acquire such land and it is further held that the land of the petitioners cannot be released under Section 48 of ‘the Act’. 63. Before parting with the judgment, it is relevant to quote the observation made by the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Swatantra Bharat Paper Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (9) ADJ 135 (DB). In Para 23 of the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court has held as under : “The Apex Court in the case of Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 134 has, more than a decade back, observed that “our country is now launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic advancement to make out economy competitive in the world market.........It is, however, recognized on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country.” While keeping the above in mind, it was observed by the Apex Court that affected persons challenge the acquisition proceedings in Courts by filing writ petitions but has observed that “a time has come where the Courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction and that such power should be exercised only in furtherance of interest of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. While interfering in such matters the Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226". (Emphasis supplied) In the present case the Textile Centre Scheme at Pilakhuwa is in the larger public interest, and even though certain persons affected may face inconvenience, but the process of acquisition should not be stalled merely because of that, as the public purpose for which it is being acquired has to be considered, which undoubtedly is laudable, as it is a programme for all-round economic advancement of the textile industry of the area, as well as of the nation.” 64. In view of the discussions made herein above, we do not find any merit in these writ petitions. In view of the discussions made herein above, we do not find any merit in these writ petitions. These writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. The interim order/orders, if any, stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs. ———