Judgment K.M. Thaker, J.—In the present petition, the petitioner who is a labour supply contractor and supplies contract labour in various establishment has challenged order dated 26/5/2006 passed by the Provident Fund Commissioner under Section-7A of the Employees Provident Fund and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) whereby the petitioner has been directed to pay Rs. 12,69,289/- towards provident fund’s dues and Rs. 8,50,925/- towards interest. The petitioner has also challenged an order dated 29/5/2007 passed by the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’) whereby the appeal filed by present petitioner against the above referred order, has been rejected solely on the ground that the date on which it was filed, the appeal was time barred. Aggrieved by the said two orders, the petitioner is before this Court. 2. The facts leading to the presentation of this petition are in narrow compass. The petitioner has claimed that it is a proprietary concern which undertakes contracts of suppling contract labour to various establishments. It is further claimed that on an allegation that the petitioner had defaulted in making payment towards PF contribution for the period form March-2000 to June-2002, a notice under the provisions of the Act was issued and it was intimated that the inquiry as contemplated under Section-7A will be initiated in respect of the alleged non-payment. The petitioner has alleged that without affording sufficient opportunity of hearing, particularly with regard to the document on which substantial reliance came to be placed by the adjudicating authority, the impugned order came to be passed. The petitioner claims that after the order dated 26/5/2006 was passed, representation was made by the petitioner on 19/6/2006 but the same remained unattended. Subsequently on or around 17/4/2007, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The period provided for filing an appeal is of 60 days. The Act confers on the Tribunal power to condone delay to the extent of further 60 days. Differently putting the Tribunal’s power to condone delay beyond the period prescribed for filing appeal, is restricted to 60 days. The period provided for filing an appeal is of 60 days. The Act confers on the Tribunal power to condone delay to the extent of further 60 days. Differently putting the Tribunal’s power to condone delay beyond the period prescribed for filing appeal, is restricted to 60 days. Since the appeal preferred by present petitioner was filed not only beyond the prescribed limit but even beyond the time period which could have been condoned by the Tribunal in exercise of its powers, the Tribunal passed the order dated 17/4/2007 rejecting and returning the appeal on the ground of limitation holding that the same was time barred. 3. Aggrieved by the said order and also the order dated 26/5/2006, the petitioner is before this Court. 4. Mr. K. M. Patel, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. J.M. Patel, learned Advocate has appeared for the petitioner and submitted that actually the amount towards contribution has been paid by the petitioner. However, since the petitioner was working, at the relevant time as a Contractor of an undertaking named Dolphin Laboratory, the petitioner was not alloted any separate and independent code number but had to deposit the contribution of its employees under the sub-code of the code number alloted to the Principal Employer i.e. the Dolphin Laboratory. He submitted that due to some inadvertent error either on the part of the principal employer or of the office i.e. the respondent authorities, the amount paid by the petitioner came to be deposited/credited in the account/code number of the principal employer and therefore the accounts of the respondent-authorities reflected non-payment on the part of the petitioner. Consequently the demand notice dated 28/5/2002 came to be issued. Learned Counsel Mr. Patel further submitted that during the proceedings before the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, the petitioner had attended the proceedings through his advocate and the proceedings were adjourned for enabling the petitioner to produce relevant record and before the record could be produced, the impugned order came to be passed. Learned Counsel Mr. Patel submitted that the fact remains that the provident fund contribution in respect of its workers has been deposited with the department but the only difficulty is that the amount was deposited in principal employer’s account and it is this vital and relevant aspect which was required to be considered by the respondent-authorities. Learned Counsel Mr. Patel submitted that the fact remains that the provident fund contribution in respect of its workers has been deposited with the department but the only difficulty is that the amount was deposited in principal employer’s account and it is this vital and relevant aspect which was required to be considered by the respondent-authorities. He submitted that if the aforesaid factual aspect is not considered and if the impugned order is not interfered with then the petitioner would be required to pay the amount once over again and he will be subjected to the hardship of making double payment. Learned Counsel Mr. Patel also submitted that although belatedly, the petitioner did prefer an appeal before the Tribunal, however, the same came to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. 5. Learned Advocate Mr. Niral Mehta has appeared for the respondent and opposed the petitioner. He submitted that dispite ample opportunities, no record or documents were produced nor any other details were submitted and that therefore, no fault can be found with the adjudicating authority in passing the order when dispite opportunities, the petitioner neglected the proceedings. Learned Advocate Mr. Niral Mehta further submitted that the appeal was filed after almost 11 months and the power of the Appellate Tribunal are circumscribed and the Tribunal cannot travel beyond the powers conferred on it. The Tribunal is not competent to condone the delay for more than 60 days beyond prescribed period of limitation and that therefore there is no error in the order of Appellate Tribunal. Learned Advocate Mr. Niral Mehta on premises of such contentions, urged that the petition may be dismissed. 6. In light of such submissions, the request of the petitioner has to be considered. It deserves to be mentioned that learned Counsel Mr. Patel has submitted that after the order was passed, the respondent-authorities asked the petitioner’s bankers, in exercise of powers under Section-8(F), to remit the amounts from petitioner’s account to the department towards payment of the quantified amount and consequently the bankers have remitted about Rs. 3.40 lakhs to the department. 7. The main plank of petitioner’s submissions is that the petitioner has made the payment of contribution which was payable by it on the basis of number of employees and the wages paid to them during the period in question and according to its calculation and records no amounts are due and payable. 3.40 lakhs to the department. 7. The main plank of petitioner’s submissions is that the petitioner has made the payment of contribution which was payable by it on the basis of number of employees and the wages paid to them during the period in question and according to its calculation and records no amounts are due and payable. However, its account shows debit entry only for the reason that the amounts which were deposited have been inadvertently deposited or credited in the account or the code number of the principal employer. Though the petitioner requested the principal employer and authorities to rectify the entries, necessary actions have not been taken and consequently though the petitioner has made the payment, it is being compelled to make the payment once-over again because of the impugned orders. 8. The submissions raised by the petitioner involve various disputed questions of fact which can be established and/or examined only after examination of documentary as well as oral evidence and probably cross examination of petitioner’s witnesses by the respondent-authorities. Further, the submission of the petitioner’s Counsel is to the effect that adjudicating authority has mechanically relied upon the report of the inspector without cross checking the details and/or without identifying the employees. Further grievance has been made on behalf of the petitioner is that the said report of the inspector was also not supplied to the petitioner before the impugned order came to be passed. On the aforesaid such and other grounds the order of the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner has been assailed. 9. Whether the petitioner has already deposited the amount (which could be payable by it in accordance with law) or not is the issue which falls for consideration. Needless to state that it would not be practicable or permissible to embark upon such inquiry in this proceedings. Even otherwise such inquiry would warrant specialization and expertise to cross check the Chalans. Had there not been delay in filing appeal by the petitioner, all these aspects would have been gone into and examined by the Appellate Tribunal while deciding the appeal on merits. However, the petitioner delayed the filing of the appeal. 10. So far as the order of the Tribunal is concerned, the order cannot be said to be erroneous or arbitrary. However, the petitioner delayed the filing of the appeal. 10. So far as the order of the Tribunal is concerned, the order cannot be said to be erroneous or arbitrary. The Tribunal is creature of statute and it does not have any inherent power to condone delay and it cannot travel beyond the powers conferred on it. As mentioned herein above earlier, the authority of the Tribunal to condone the delay for circumscribed and it cannot condone the delay for more than 60 days beyond period prescribed for filing appeal. Hence, the order of the Tribunal cannot be treated as arbitrary or unjustified. 11. From the submissions of both sides and particularly by Mr. Mehta, it appears that the copies of the Chalans which have been produced by the petitioner along with the petition, call for detailed and closer scrutiny to ascertain as to whether they represent the amounts towards contribution for the period in question as claimed by the petitioner, or not? This Court is not in a position to examine either the veracity of the said Chalans and/or the details about the period for which the said Chalans are filled up and/or the issues as to whether the payments were actually made under the said Chalans or not etc. The aforesaid and such other issues are supposed to be examined by the adjudicating authority or by the Appellate Tribunal. It appears that if the amounts have been, as claimed by the petitioner, are really paid then it would cause injustice and hardship to the petitioner if the petitioner is required to again make the payment of the amount in question. Under the circumstances it appears that in the interest of justice, it would be just and reasonable if the statutory authority under the Act examines aforesaid factual aspects and comes to conclusion as to whether the amounts as claimed by the petitioner have been really paid or not and whether there is any outstanding demand legally tenable against the petitioner or not. 12. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Patel for the petitioner submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be just and reasonable to grant the petitioner an opportunity before the original adjudicating authority to demonstrate by all the relevant records that the amount have been adjudicated. Learned Advocate Mr. Mehta has strongly opposed the said submission. 12. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Patel for the petitioner submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be just and reasonable to grant the petitioner an opportunity before the original adjudicating authority to demonstrate by all the relevant records that the amount have been adjudicated. Learned Advocate Mr. Mehta has strongly opposed the said submission. In view of the fact that the petitioner has already approached the Appellate Tribunal, this Court also is not inclined to accept the petitioner’s submission that this Court should afford an opportunity to the petitioner to demonstrate the facts before the original adjudicating authority. At the most, the petitioner can be relegated to the Appellate Authority before whom the petitioner had already filed an appeal. 13. Learned Advocate Mr. Mehta has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case between Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. vs. Custodian, reported in (2004) 11 SCC 472 wherein the Hon’ble Court, while considering the issue about the limitation prescribed under special statute, held as follows: “The provision prescribing a time-limit for filing a petition for objection under Section 4(2) of the Act is mandatory in the sense that the period prescribed cannot be extended by the court under any inherent jurisdiction of the Special Court. Prescribed periods for initiating or taking steps in legal proceedings are intended to be abided by, subject to any power expressly conferred on the court to condone any delay. If the periods prescribed were not mandatory, it would not have been necessary in the Limitation Act to provide exclusion of extension of time in certain circumstances nor would the method of computation of time have any meaning. Section 4(2) of the Act plainly read simply requires a person objecting to a notification issued under Section 3(2) to file a petition raising such objections within 30 days of the issuance of such notification. The words are unequivocal and unqualified and there is no scope for reading in a power of court to dispense with the time-limit on the basis of any principle of interpretation of statutory provisions.” 14. Learned Counsel Mr. The words are unequivocal and unqualified and there is no scope for reading in a power of court to dispense with the time-limit on the basis of any principle of interpretation of statutory provisions.” 14. Learned Counsel Mr. Patel also submitted that if at all the original order under Section 7-A is not interfered with, then also in the event the petitioner fails to pay the amount in question it would be principal employer’s obligation to make the payment and the respondent should endavour to recover the amounts from the principal employer, more particularly, in light of the fact that the amounts paid by the petitioner have been inadvertently credited in the petitioner’s principal employers’ account. 15. At this stage it is relevant to note that the petitioner claims that even the principal employer M/s. Dolphin Laboratories Ltd. does not dispute that a part of the amount under dispute i.e. from March-2000 to June-2002 which came to be deposited by three Chalans pertains to the petitioner-M/s. Om Enterprises and that the said amount came to be deposited/credited in code No.GJ/AHD/25394, however, the said amount belongs to the employees of Om Enterprises i.e. the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner asserts that the amount in question has been deposited and if the grievances of the petitioner are not heard on merits and/or if the impugned order is not set aside then the petitioner would be required to make the entire payment once over again and the petitioner being a small establishment engaged in the activity of supplying the contract labour cannot afford such double payments. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Patel on behalf of the petitioner submitted that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it would be just and reasonable that the petitioner gets an opportunity to demonstrate before the original adjudicating authority or at least before the appeal tribunal to demonstrate that the demand is unjustified and the petitioner is not liable to make any payment, as demanded by the impugned notice and the impugned order. So far as the reliance place on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. (Supra) is concerned, it can be seen that question before the Hon’ble Apex Court was with regard to the Special Court constituted for trial of offence in connection with the transactions in security 1992 and in light of the provisions of the said act, the question which was raised was as to whether the Special Court has power to condone delay in filing petition under Section 4(2) of the Act. With reference to the said issue the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: “We are of the view that the provisions prescribing time-limit for filing the petition for objection under Section 4(2) of the Act is mandatory in the sense that the period prescribed cannot be extended by the court under any inherent jurisdiction of the Special Court.” Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the powers of the Special Court to condone the delay and held that the Special Court does not have power to condone delay. 16. In this regard, it is appropriate to mention that while considering powers of the Appeal Tribunal under the Act, this Court has held that the Appeal Tribunal does not have jurisdiction or authority to condone delay for more than 60 days beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the Act for filing appeal. Thus in light of the view taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. (Supra) so far as the impugned order of the Tribunal is concerned, the same cannot be faulted and it cannot be said that the said order suffers from any illegality or error or that the impugned order suffers from any error of jurisdiction. 17. However, when this Court, upon prima facie examination of facts find that if the petitioners grievance is not entertained on the ground that petitioner caused delay in approaching the Appeal Tribunal, then there is likelihood of injustice being caused to the petitioner, then this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, may require the Tribunal to examine the case on merits. The Hon’ble Devision Bench of this Court has, in the case between DR Industries Limited and Another vs. Union of India and Others reported in 2008 (3) GLH 662 , while considering the provisions regarding limitation under Central Excise Act, 1944 in para-19 of the decision, inter alia, held, as under: “19. As regards the contention that there may be extra-ordinary cases where assessees may not be in a position to challenge the order of the adjudicating authority before the Commissioner (Appeals) within a period of 90 days from the date of communication of the order, we are of the view that in such extra-ordinary cases where in assessee can show extra ordinary circumstances explaining the delay and also gross injustice done by the adjudicating authority, the assessee may invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, in cases where the assessees have suffered gross injustice and they could not file appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) within a period of 90 days from the date of communication of the order-in-original on account of circumstances beyond their control, such assessees can invoke the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but, of course, not as a matter of right.” 18. In the present case there is an additional fact also which is relevant. The petitioner claims that the amount claimed by the department, or at least substantial part of the claim, has already been deposited, however due to inadvertence the same is credited in the principals account and therefore any further payment is not required to be made and thereafter the petitioner’s bankers have, by now, remitted in all total amount of about Rs. 3.40 lakhs (as claimed by the petitioner) to the department. 19. On overall consideration of the facts and circumstances it would be in fitness of things that the petitioner may be granted opportunity of hearing and defense on merits so that the petitioner can demonstrate the factual aspects and the said factual assertions can be verified and decided by the Appellate Tribunal. Such opportunity, however, should not go to the petitioner without payment of any cost. 20. Such opportunity, however, should not go to the petitioner without payment of any cost. 20. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above, the impugned order dated 29/5/2007 passed by the Appellate Tribunal rejecting the appeal as time-barred is set aside and the learned Tribunal is directed to hear and decide the appeal on merits, subject to other conditions, including the requirement of precondition of deposit etc. as may be applicable, after affording opportunity of hearing and defense to the petitioner. The petitioner shall co-operate with the hearing and shall not seek adjournments and would also not fail to attend the proceedings. It would be open to the petitioner to make request to the Tribunal for stay of the operation of the order passed by the adjudicating authority and the Tribunal will decide said request/application strictly in accordance with law and without being influenced by the present order. The appeal by the petitioner will also be decided strictly in accordance with law and also subject to compliance with other pre conditions regarding maintainability of appeal and on such compliance of other pre conditions, the appeal to be decided without being influenced by this order. 21. With the aforesaid clarifications and directions, the petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent and on the aforesaid conditions, no order as to costs.