JUDGMENT This appeal, preferred under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is directed against the judgment and decree dated 15.05.1991, passed by first appellate court (Civil Judge, Haridwar), in Civil Appeal No. 35 of 1981, whereby said appeal is allowed, and the judgment and decree dated 24.08.1981, whereby said appeal is allowed, and the judgment and decree dated 24.08.1981, passed by the trial court (Munsif, Roorkee), in Suit No. 298 of 1973, dismissing the Suit, is set aside. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the Record. 3. This appeal has arisen out of the suit instituted by the plaintiff/respondents for cancellation of the decree passed by revenue authorities. Also, relief for possession is sought by the plaintiff/respondents. The suit, after recording evidence and hearing the parties, was dismissed by the trial court, but the first appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the trial court. 4. Brief facts giving rise to the entire litigation are that Case No. 124/81/254 and Case no. 125/82/253, were instituted in the year 1968, under Section 229-B of U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short U.P. Act No. 1 of 1950), before Assistant Collector, I Class, Roorkee, by the present defendant/appellants, against plaintiff Laika, for declaration of rights over the agricultural land of Khata No. 88 (measuring area of 6 Bighas, 6 Biswas), Khata No. 208 (measuring area of 15 Biswas), Khata No. 87 (measuring area of 16 Bighas, 13 Biswas) and Khata No. 206 (measuring 21 Bighas, 3 Biswas), situated in Village Raisi, Pargana Jwalapur. In said cases, before revenue authorities, plea of the present defendant/appellants (who were plaintiffs in said cases) was that their mother was Mansha Devi and her first husband was Asa Ram. They were sons of Asa Ram. But, after Asa Ram died, she (Mansha Devi) started living, after ‘KARAO’ (a kind of matrimonial relationship), with Hannu. As such, they became sons of Hannu S/o Jahangira. After death of Hannu, they inherited share in the land in suit. Present plaintiff No. 1 Smt. Brahmi Devi is widow of Laika and plaintiff/respondents Jagpal Singh, Babu Ram, Bhishm Singh, Suresh Chand, Desh Raj and Rajpal are sons of Laika. Laika was defendant No. 1 in the proceedings before revenue authorities. He was son of Shibba, brother of Jahangira. Laika (defendant No. 1, before revenue authorities) contested the suit. Present plaintiff No. 1 Smt. Brahmi Devi is widow of Laika and plaintiff/respondents Jagpal Singh, Babu Ram, Bhishm Singh, Suresh Chand, Desh Raj and Rajpal are sons of Laika. Laika was defendant No. 1 in the proceedings before revenue authorities. He was son of Shibba, brother of Jahangira. Laika (defendant No. 1, before revenue authorities) contested the suit. After hearing the parties, the suit for declaration was decreed by the Assistant Collector, I Class, vide his impugned order dated 19.10.1970. Said order was challenged before Additional Commissioner by filing appeals by Liaka. However, Laika lost the appeals on 17.03.1973. Then Laika filed two second appeals, No. 275 and 276 of 1972-73 before Board of Revenue, U.P. After hearing the parties, said appeals were also dismissed vide impugned order dated 29.06.1973. Challenging said orders, Suit No. 298 of 1973 (from which this appeal has arisen) is instituted by Laika, which was dismissed by the trial court. Present respondents are legal heirs of deceased Laika. After hearing the parties, however, the first appellate court set aside the decree passed by the trial court and decreed the suit. Hence, this second appeal. 5. The orders passed by revenue authorities were challenged in the suit on the ground that the decree passed by said authorities was based on fraud as to the entries in the revenue records in favour of the defendant/appellants, who contested the suit and denied the allegations of fraud. Issues were framed. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, the trial court held that it had jurisdiction to try the suit to declare decree passed by the revenue authorities null and void, if fraud is proved. It further found that suit is not bad for multifariousness. As to impleadment of State, the issue was decided as preliminary one and State was impleaded as a party. The trial court also found that the suit is not barred by principle of res judicata. However, the trial court found that plaintiffs failed to prove that any fraud has been played on the revenue authorities and dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court gave the finding that the decree passed by revenue authorities are based on fraud, and decreed the suit. However, the trial court found that plaintiffs failed to prove that any fraud has been played on the revenue authorities and dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court gave the finding that the decree passed by revenue authorities are based on fraud, and decreed the suit. Aggrieved by said judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court, this second appeal was filed before Allahabad High Court on 09.08.1991, where it was admitted on 13.08.1991, on following substantial questions of law :- (1) Whether the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is vitiated by omission to abate the suit and first appeal under Section 5(2)(a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (in short U.P. Act No. V of 1954), as amended by U.P. Act No. 21 of 1966? (2) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and also in view of amended Section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, the suit was barred by principle of res judicata? (3) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case plaintiff/respondents failed to allege and to establish the type of fraud contemplated under Section 44 of Indian Evidence Act? The appeal is received by this Court under Section 35 of U.P. Reorganization Act, 2000 (Central Act 29 of 2000) for its disposal. 6. (3) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case plaintiff/respondents failed to allege and to establish the type of fraud contemplated under Section 44 of Indian Evidence Act? The appeal is received by this Court under Section 35 of U.P. Reorganization Act, 2000 (Central Act 29 of 2000) for its disposal. 6. Answer to Substantial Questions of Law : Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 5 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, reads as under :- “(2) Upon the said publication of the notification under sub-section (2) of Section 4, the following further consequences shall ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely – (a) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated : Provided that no such order shall be passed without giving to the parties notice by post or in any other manner and after giving them an opportunity of being heard : Provided further that on the issue of a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 6 in respect of the said area or part thereof, every such order in relation to the land lying in such area or part as the case may be, shall stand vacated.” From the record it is clear that when the first appeal was pending before the lower appellate court, the defendant/appellants moved an application 22C, bringing it to the notice of the first appellate court that the land in suit has come under consolidation operations, but the first appellate court vide its order dated 30.07.1990 rejected said application and refused to declare the appeal and suit as abated. 7. Learned counsel for the Defendant/appellants argued that in fact the proceedings stood abated in view of the above quoted provisions of law. In reply to this, on behalf of plaintiff/respondents it is argued that the consolidation authorities had no power to declare a decree passed by revenue authority as illegal. 7. Learned counsel for the Defendant/appellants argued that in fact the proceedings stood abated in view of the above quoted provisions of law. In reply to this, on behalf of plaintiff/respondents it is argued that the consolidation authorities had no power to declare a decree passed by revenue authority as illegal. I have examined the provisions of law and the pleadings of the parties. It is settled principle of law that civil court can declare a decree passed by civil court, based on fraud, as nullity, but the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondents is not simplicitor for such declaration, rather there is not only prayer for cancellation of decree passed by revenue authorities, but also for possession of the land in suit, which cannot be granted by civil court in respect of the agricultural land that too under operation of the consolidation. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court where in respect of agricultural land a notification under Section 5 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, has been issued, the suit stands automatically abated as provided in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act, quoted above. 8. As far as the findings of fact recorded by the revenue authorities are concerned, if the decrees are not found based on fraud, said findings are binding on the parties and civil court cannot give a finding inconsistent to the findings recorded by the revenue authorities. But, in the present case, the main issue relates to whether the defendant/appellants obtained the decree from the revenue authorities by playing fraud or not. Said question was not in issue before the revenue authorities. As such, it cannot be said that the present suit is barred by principle of res judicata. On that point, there is no illegality committed either by the trial court or by the first appellate court in holding that the suit is not barred by principle of res judicata. 9. From the perusal of plaint, it is clear that the plaintiff/respondents have not specifically pleaded what fraud was played by the defendant/appellants before the revenue authorities. Only this much has been alleged that the entries made by the revenue authorities were forged. Said plea was also raised by Laika, predecessor in title of the present respondents, before the revenue authorities and not accepted. Only this much has been alleged that the entries made by the revenue authorities were forged. Said plea was also raised by Laika, predecessor in title of the present respondents, before the revenue authorities and not accepted. There is detailed discussion made by the revenue authorities in their orders in support of findings. From the orders, passed by the revenue authorities, it is clear that the entries in favour of the defendants which are being challenged as forged before this Court were already in question before said authorities, as such, it cannot be said that the defendant/appellants had played any fraud in obtaining the decree passed by revenue authorities. A decree passed by a competent court cannot be declared nullity merely on vague allegations that the same were obtained by fraud. For declaring a decree, passed by a competent court, as null and void a party must plead and prove a positive fact relating to fraud with all details of the same. In the opinion of this Court, the first appellate court has erred in law in reversing the decree passed by the trial court merely on the ground that on the complaint of the plaintiff/respondents certain observations were made that there was some overwriting in the entries made in the revenue record in favour of the defendant/appellants. Assuming for a moment, there were some overwriting, the same were not concealed by the defendant/appellants from the revenue authorities. That being so, it cannot be said that defendant/appellants played any fraud in obtaining the decree, passed by the revenue authorities. The first appellate court has erred in law in ignoring the entries in the revenue record, which reflect that even in the lifetime of Jahangira, name of Asa Ram alongwith name of Hannu, both sons of Jahangira, were jointly recorded. It is pertinent to mention here that from the record it appears that Asa Ram died in the year 1936. After death of Asa Ram, names of Rati Ram and Kali Ram (defendant/appellants), were recorded as joint tenure holders with Hannu, and after death of Jahangira in the year 1938, they continued to remain recorded in ‘khewats’ and ‘khataunies’ till 1967, when Hannu died. Such long entries in favour of the defendant/appellants were rightly believed by the revenue authorities. The trial court has rightly held that the defendant/appellants had committed no fraud in obtaining the decree. Such long entries in favour of the defendant/appellants were rightly believed by the revenue authorities. The trial court has rightly held that the defendant/appellants had committed no fraud in obtaining the decree. That being so, the finding recorded by first appellate court that the decree obtained by defendant/appellants was based on fraud, is perverse and against the record. In the opinion of this Court, the plaintiffs have failed to prove their case as required under Section 44 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Substantial questions of law stand answered, accordingly. 10. For the reasons as discussed above, this Court is of the view that the first appellate court has erred in law in reversing the decree passed by the trial court and the findings as to the questioned decree being based on fraud is perverse and against the record. Therefore, the appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and decree dated 15.05.1991, passed by Civil Judge, Haridwar, in Civil Appeal No. 35 of 1981 is set aside. The suit and the appeal stood abated after notification issued under Section 5 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, in respect of agricultural land of Village Raisi (which included land in suit). No order as to costs.