JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.—Heard Sri S.P. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri S.C. Chaturvedi, Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri Satyendra Nath Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. By this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the Government order dated 30th June, 2009 by which Government order 20% reservation for scheduled caste and 2% reservation for scheduled tribe have been provided in the contract awarded by the Government, Corporation, Development Authority and Local Bodies value of which contract is up to Rs. 5,00,000/-. 3. The petitioner No. 1 is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 constituted to look after the welfare of the contractors of the Public Works Department, who are its members. Petitioner No. 2 is a registered contractor in Public Works Department, Gorakhpur. The petitioners have challenged the above mentioned Government order dated 20th June, 2009 on the ground of violation of rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The petitioners have further stated that representation has also been submitted to the Government for recall of the Government order. 4. Sri S.P. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners, challenging the Government order dated 30th June, 2009 has raised following submissions : (i) The impugned Government order is violative to constitutional guarantee provided under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the impugned Government order imposes restrictions on fundamental rights of the petitioners and other identically situated registered contractors on their carrying on profession to obtain and execute Government contracts. (ii) The restrictions sought to be imposed through the impugned order is beyond the scope and ambit of clause 6 of Article 19 of the Constitution of India, wherein permissible limit to impose restrictions on fundamental rights given in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India has been specified. (iii) The impugned Government order is not a ‘Law’ but an executive order and even if State proceeds to impose restriction on fundamental rights, it can be imposed only by legislation and not by an executive orders. (iv) The impugned Government order creates a monopoly in favour of a category of persons in getting Government contracts without proper competition, which is impermissible. 5. (iv) The impugned Government order creates a monopoly in favour of a category of persons in getting Government contracts without proper competition, which is impermissible. 5. Elaborating his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that while giving various fundamental rights to the citizen, Constitution makers have taken care of the citizens who belong to socially and economical backward category by providing exceptions in different Articles, which provide for fundamental rights. With regard to rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution, exception has been provided in Clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19. Clause (6) of Article 19 empowers the State to impose restrictions on fundamental rights subject to fulfilment of conditions as laid down in sub-clause (6). The restrictions imposed by impugned Government order are beyond the ambit and scope of sub-clause (6) of Article 19. It is contended that under sub-clause (6) of Article 19, the restrictions which can be imposed are permissible only in the interest of general public and in no manner the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe can be termed as general public. It is contended that by the Government order monopoly has been created in favour of particular category of persons, which is impermissible under the Constitution. It is contended that restrictions, if any, on the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) can be imposed only through legislation and not by executive orders. The provisions of Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India cannot be applied to constitutional guarantee given under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the special provisions contemplated under Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India has to confine to admissions in educational institutions it having a specific reference to Clause (2) of Article 29 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his submissions placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the cases of Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1954 SC 728 ; Khyerbari Tea Company Limited v. State of Assam, AIR 1964 SC 925 , Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammed Usmanbhal, AIR 1986 (SC) 1205 ; Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1963 (SC) 1295 and Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty and another, AIR 1962 SC 316 . 6. 6. Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State, contended that the Government order dated 30th June, 2009 has been issued in exercise of power of the State under Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India, which is a special provision for advancement of the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe. It is submitted that the Government is duty bound for social and economic upliftment of different classes of society for providing them reasonable representation in every sphere in the interest of entire society and since in view of the prevailing contract procedure in different Government works the contractors belonging to scheduled caste and scheduled tribes could not get proper representation due to which the entry of the persons of aforesaid category in that field is often lacking and as such the decision has been taken to provide the aforesaid reservation. Instances of special provisions made for advancement of socially and economically backward classes, scheduled caste and scheduled tribe have been referred to including reservation in fair price shops. Reference to the provisions of Section 71(3)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, U.P. Cooperative Societies Rules, 1968 with regard to reservation/nomination of seats for weaker sections has also been made. It is submitted that by the Government order no restrictions in right provided under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution has been made nor the aforesaid Government order can be said to be creating any monopoly in favour of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe. The Government has affirmative duty to provide opportunities to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe, which has been done in exercise of power under Article 15(4) of the Constitution by the State. It is an affirmative action of the State to achieve the goal of giving adequate representation to the scheduled caste and scheduled tribes in order to uplift them so as to enable them to compete with contracts with higher resources. It does not at all affect the right of any person to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance on various judgments of the Apex Court and High Courts including our Court, which shall be referred to hereinafter while considering the submissions in detail. 7. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 8. Learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance on various judgments of the Apex Court and High Courts including our Court, which shall be referred to hereinafter while considering the submissions in detail. 7. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 8. The principal ground, which has been canvassed on behalf of the petitioners is that the Government order violates the rights guaranteed to every citizen under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and further even if it can be treated as restriction to the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g), the same cannot be done by executive instructions and further without conforming to the limitations as provided under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. 9. Before we proceed to examine the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to have a look over the relevant constitutional provisions contained in Articles 15 and 19 of the Constitution of India. 10. Articles 15 to 17 of the Constitution of India deal with right to equality. Article 15(1) of the Constitution provides that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15 of the Constitution as originally enacted contained only three sub-clauses. Sub-clause (4) was added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 as a result of a decision in the case of State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, 1951 SCR 525 . The object of first amendment was to bring Articles 15 and 29 of the Constitution in line with Article 15(4) of the Constitution. Article 15 of the Constitution is quoted below : “15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.—(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to— (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. [(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.] [(5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of Article 30.]” 11. The language of Article 15(4) of the Constitution shows, first, that ‘reservation’ as such, is not expressly mentioned in that Article, but fall within the wide expression ‘special provision for the advancement...”. The special provision includes every kind of assistance which can be given to backward classes, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes to make them stand on their feet to bring them into the mainstream of life. At this stage we propose to consider the submission of the petitioners that Article 15(4) of the Constitution confines only to admission in educational institutions. The said submission has been advanced referring to mention of Clause (2) of Article 29 of the Constitution of India in Article 15(4). Article 29(2) of the Constitution provides that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State fund on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. Sub clause (4) of Article 15 uses two phrases, namely, (i) ‘Nothing in this article’ and (ii) ‘or in Clause (2) of Article 29. Thus Article 15(4) empowers the State to make any special provision notwithstanding the injunction contained in Article 29(2) of the Constitution. Sub clause (4) of Article 15 uses two phrases, namely, (i) ‘Nothing in this article’ and (ii) ‘or in Clause (2) of Article 29. Thus Article 15(4) empowers the State to make any special provision notwithstanding the injunction contained in Article 29(2) of the Constitution. Article 15(4) thus cannot be held to confine to special provision only pertaining to admission in educational institution as provided in Article 29(2), rather Article 15(4) empowers the State to make a provision notwithstanding to Clause (2) of Article 29 but operation of clause (4) of Article 15 cannot be confined only to admission in educational institution. Thus the submission of the petitioners’ counsel that Article 15(4) shall only confine to admission in educational institution cannot be accepted. 12. At this stage, it is relevant to refer certain cases relied by learned counsel for the respondents in which special provision with regard to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes made with regard to subject matter other than admission in educational institutions. In Moosa v. State of Kerala, AIR 1960 Ker 355 an order acquiring land for constructing a colony for Harijans was held valid under Article 15(4) of the Constitution. Similarly the case of Pavadai Gounder and others v. State of Madras and another, AIR 1973 SC 458, was also a case with regard to acquisition of land for construction of colony for Harijans, which was held valid referring to Article 15(4) of the Constitution. In Dr. Ram Krishna Balothia v. Union of India and others, AIR 1994 MP 143 the Madhya Pradesh High Court had occasion to consider the scope and ambit of Article 15(4) of the Constitution in context of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The validity of the 1989 Act was challenged on the ground that it violates Article 15(1) of the Constitution it being based on caste discrimination and is not saved by Article 15(4) of the Constitution. The Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court repelling the submission, laid down following in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment : “8. The language used in Article 15(4) cannot be understood in a narrow sense. Article 15(4) embodies the doctrine of protective discrimination. The Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court repelling the submission, laid down following in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment : “8. The language used in Article 15(4) cannot be understood in a narrow sense. Article 15(4) embodies the doctrine of protective discrimination. The word ‘advancement’ in clause (4) of Article 15 is not subject to any qualification and by no principle of interpretation it could be said that from the context it should be construed in a restricted sense, as amounting to only social and educational advancement. The expression “special provision for the advancement” is an expression of very wide import and brings within it a sweep each and every kind of advancement. This is so because Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes occupy a special position in our Constitution. They have endured great ill treatment as untouchables for centuries, apart from their backwardness. It must be remembered that thousands of years of discrimination cannot be wiped out in one generation. It is in the fitness of things that every effort is to be made to correct this long standing and historical discrimination. 9. A special provision does not only mean to provide for education, agricultural programmes, schemes for training to purpose trade or business, free education, free hostel facilities, free food or clothes, advancement of loans, special facilities regarding recovery of loans etc. as argued by the counsel for the petitioners. To our mind, it would include all out effort by the State to make them stand on their own feet, to bring them into the mainstream of the National life, to live with dignity, self-esteem and with head held high. This is only possible if they are permitted to live in the society without fear or suppression from upper castes or top echelons of the society belonging to the another caste, creed or religion. The Act contains affirmative measures to weed out the root cause of the same, which has denied them civil rights and subjected them to various kinds of indignities, humiliations and harassment for various historical, social and economic reasons. The Act contains affirmative measures to weed out the root cause of the same, which has denied them civil rights and subjected them to various kinds of indignities, humiliations and harassment for various historical, social and economic reasons. Advancement of the oppressed people requires dealing with upper levels of the society when they try to suppress or deny legitimate aspirations of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, their right to life and dignity, freedom from bonded labour and must protect them from the practice of untouchability, help to protect their self-respect and the honour of their women, and to shield them from oppressive land grabbers of the land allotted to them, protection from all kinds of oppression, social, political, economic and cultural must be provided for to ensure their advancement.” 13. In State of U.P. and another v. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees’ Cooperative Society Ltd. and others, AIR 1997 SC 1413 the provisions of Rules 393-A, 393-B, 440 and 444 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1968, which provided for reservation/nomination of seats for weaker section of the society, were under challenge. The Apex Court upholding the provisions as having been made in exercise of power under Article 15(4) of the Constitution, laid down following in paragraph 16 of the said judgment : “16. Shri Raju Ramachandran, relying upon the judgment of this Court in Damyanti Naranga v. Union of India, 1971 (3) SCR 840 : AIR 1971 SC 966 , has contended that in view of the ratio laid down by this Court, the Government is devoid of power to make law unless any of the restrictions as controlled by clause (4) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India are infringed. The Government has no power to enact a law incorporating the reservation to the members of weaker sections and women thereof. We find no force in the contention. It could be seen that therein, the Government had enacted the Sahitya Sammelan Act exercising the power under Entry 63, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. This Court pointed out that the Act did not envisage that the Samiti is of national importance. Therefore, it was held that the Parliament had lacked power to enact the law incorporating the society and inducting outside members against the wishes of the founder members of the Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. This Court pointed out that the Act did not envisage that the Samiti is of national importance. Therefore, it was held that the Parliament had lacked power to enact the law incorporating the society and inducting outside members against the wishes of the founder members of the Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. This Court also held that the properties belonging to the original Society stood vested in the Society incorporated under Section 4 of the Act without any compensation. Therefore, it was violative of Article 31 of the Constitution of India, as it stood then. The ratio therein has no application to the facts in this case. He then contended that “Other Backward Classes’’ defined under the State Public Services Reservation Act applicable to and covering the public services, they are being inducted as members of the society which are otherwise not eligible and, therefore, the induction of them by amendment of Rules made on 15-7-1994 is unconstitutional. In support thereof, he contends that though Article 15(4) of the Act provides that it is subject to Articles 15(2) and 29(2) of the Constitution, it does not envisage that it is also subject to Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Therefore, the reservation provided to the weaker sections is unconstitutional. We find no force in the contention. The object of Article 15(4) is to lift the prohibition of general equality guaranteed in Articles 15(2) and 29(2) of the Constitution dealing with the right to admission into an educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid from the State. Therefore, their object is distinct and different from Article 19(1)(c), though Article 19(1)(c) gives freedom to form association, it is controlled by the provisions of the Act. As held by this Court, once a society has been registered under the Act, the management of the society through Section 29 and the Rules made thereunder, is regulated by duly elected members. In the democratic set up, all eligible persons are entitled to contest the election, as held, according to the provisions of the Act and Rules. In the absence of elected members belonging to the weaker sections and women elected, nomination of them by the Government is the alternative dispensation envisaged as one of the policies of the Act. Therefore, the Court cannot interfere with the policy and declare it is (as) unconstitutional violating Article 19(1)(C) of the Constitution.” 14. In the absence of elected members belonging to the weaker sections and women elected, nomination of them by the Government is the alternative dispensation envisaged as one of the policies of the Act. Therefore, the Court cannot interfere with the policy and declare it is (as) unconstitutional violating Article 19(1)(C) of the Constitution.” 14. Similarly a Division Bench of our Court in Maiyadeen v. State of U.P. and another, AIR 1997 All 343 while considering the provisions of Rules 9-A and 53-A of U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 held the provisions intra vires after referring to Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India. Following was laid down in paragraph 7 of the said judgment : “7. A perusal of clause (4) of Article 15 as well as Directive Principles of State Policy, contained in Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution will indicate that the State can classify socially and educationally backward classes as different class and can afford to them protection. Any law, Statute, Bye-law, Regulation or Government Order which provide protection or reservation to socially and educationally backward classes cannot be said to be discriminatory, but it in consonance with the principles underlying in clause (4) to Article 15 of the Constitution of India as well as Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution of India. It is a matter of common knowledge that certain classes of citizens known as Mallah, Kewat, Bind, Nishad or Mahgira are generally engaged in carrying on the profession of excavation of sand of morrum on the banks of the rivers.” 15. Now comes the main submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the Government order dated 30th June, 2009 violates the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Article 19(1)(g) confers on a citizen the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business subject to restrictions contained in Article 19(6). Articles 19(1) and 19(6) of the Constitution are quoted below : “19. Article 19(1)(g) confers on a citizen the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business subject to restrictions contained in Article 19(6). Articles 19(1) and 19(6) of the Constitution are quoted below : “19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.—(1) All citizens shall have the right— (a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or unions; (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. (2) ...................................... (3) ...................................... (4) ...................................... (5) ...................................... (6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,— (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.” 16. Article 19 of the Constitution of India declares that all citizen have fundamental right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, which however be subject to any existing law or the law made by the State in the interest of general public containing reasonable restrictions on exercise of right conferred on the said sub-clause. 17. The question to be answered is as to whether the Government order violates the fundamental rights of the petitioners as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution has been subject to consideration by the Apex Court and this Court in large number of cases. 17. The question to be answered is as to whether the Government order violates the fundamental rights of the petitioners as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution has been subject to consideration by the Apex Court and this Court in large number of cases. The judgment relied by learned counsel for the petitioner in Saghir Ahmad’s case (supra) was a case where rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution came for consideration. The appellant before the Apex Court was carrying on the business of plying motor vehicle, which was being regulated according to Motor Vehicle Act, 1939. The U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 was passed by the State of U.P. under which the State Government has exclusive right to operate road transport services and notification was issued providing that route in question was to be exclusively operated by the State Government. The Act was challenged in the High Court and the High Court dismissed the writ petition against which appeal was filed. The contention of the appellant that provisions of the Act violates fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) was upheld. It was held that members of the public are entitled as beneficiaries to use public streets and roads as a matter of right. The State is entitled to impose all such limitations on the character and extent of the user as may be requisite for protecting the rights of the public generally but subject to such limitations the right of a citizen to carry on business in transport vehicles on public pathways cannot be denied. Following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the said judgment : “13. We are in entire agreement with the statement of law made in these passages. Within the limits imposed by State regulations any member of the public can ply motor vehicle on a public road. To the extent he can also carry on the business of transporting passengers with the aid of the vehicles. It is to this carrying on of the trade or business that the guarantee in Article 19(1)(g) is attracted and a citizen can legitimately complain if any legislation takes away or curtails that right any more than is permissible under clause (6) of that article. 14. It is to this carrying on of the trade or business that the guarantee in Article 19(1)(g) is attracted and a citizen can legitimately complain if any legislation takes away or curtails that right any more than is permissible under clause (6) of that article. 14. The legislation in the present case has excluded all private bus owners from the field of transport business. ‘Prima facie’ it is an infraction of the provision of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and the question for our consideration therefore is, whether this invasion by the Legislature of the fundamental right can be justified under the provision of clause (6) of Article 19 on the ground that it imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right in the interests of the general public.” 18. It was further held in the above judgment that when an enactment on the face of it is found to violate the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, it must be held to be invalid unless those who support the legislation can bring it within the purview of the exception laid down in clause (6) of the Article. 19. The question to be answered is as to whether the Government order violates the fundamental rights of the petitioners to carry on trade, business or occupation. The Government order does not in any manner contain any restriction on the rights of the petitioners to take Government contract nor contains any disqualification or prohibition with regard to any person regarding entering into the contract. The Government order only contains certain special provision for advancement of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The said Government order in no manner contains any prohibition or any restriction on the rights of the petitioners. The Apex Court had occasion to consider the rights under Article 19(1)(g) in context of an scheme framed by the Government, which restricted the choice of farmers and agriculturists who opt to receive financial assistance under the Government scheme for purchase of pumping set from approved dealers of the Government in the case of Krishnan Kakkanth v. Government of Kerala and others, 1997(9) SCC 495 . The circular issued by the Government of Kerala dated 19.5.1995 was challenged by the dealers who claimed their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry on business of sale of pump sets and dealership in the pump sets without being subjected to any unreasonable restriction. It was also contended before the Apex Court that the circular cannot be treated to be a restriction within the meaning of Article 19(6) of the Constitution since restriction can be imposed not by circular but only by a ‘law’. The Apex Court negativated the said submission. Following was laid down in paragraph 26 of the said judgment : “After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that the fundamental right for trading activities of the dealers in pumpset, in the State of Kerala as guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution has not been infringed by the impugned circular. Fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution are not absolute but the same are subject to reasonable restrictions to be imposed against enjoyment of such rights. Such reasonable restriction seeks to strike a balance between the freedom guaranteed by any of the clauses under Article 19 (1) and the social control permitted by the Clauses (2) to (6) under Article 19.” 20. It was further held by the Apex Court that although a citizen had a fundamental right to carry on trade or business, but he has no right to insist upon the Government or any other individual for doing business with him. Following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs 32, 33 and 34 of the said judgment : “32. It may be indicated that although a citizen has a fundamental right to carry on a trade or business, he has no fundamental right to insist upon the Government or any other individual for doing business with him. Any Government or an individual has got a right to enter into contract with a particular person or to determine person or persons with whom he or it will deal. 33. In the instant case, the farmer or agriculturist who has chosen to receive subsidies or financial assistance under the schemes of the Government has an obligation to accept the terms and conditions for such assistance. 33. In the instant case, the farmer or agriculturist who has chosen to receive subsidies or financial assistance under the schemes of the Government has an obligation to accept the terms and conditions for such assistance. One of such conditions is that in the northern region of the State, pumpset for which financial assistance has been given is to be purchased from the approved dealers of the Government. The private dealer cannot insist that the Government is also to enter into contract with any such private dealer to make it an approved dealer. Since the Government has every right to select dealers of its choice for delivery of pumpsets at the price agreed upon and to render after sales service to the purchasers of pumpsets covered by its financial assistance scheme. It is not open to challenge such selection of dealers on the score that, such selection amounts to unreasonable restriction imposed on the dealers of the State to carry on trading activities in pumpsets. It is nobody’s case that all the farmers and agriculturists have been compulsorily covered under such schemes. On the contrary, it is open to any farmer or agriculturists not to volunteer for taking such assistance. 34. It has already been indicated that in Vikalad’s case ( AIR 1984 SC 95 ) (supra), it has been held by this Court that infringement of fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) must have a direct impact on the restriction on the freedom to carry on trade and not ancillary or incidental effects on such freedom to trade arising out of any Governmental action. It has also been held in that case that unless the trader or merchant is not wholly denied to carry on his trade, the restriction imposed in denying the allotment of wagon in favour of such trader or merchant to transport coal for carrying out trading activities does not offend Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. No restriction has been imposed on the trading activity of dealers in pumpsets in the State of Kerala including northern region comprising eight districts. Even in such area, a dealer is free to carry on his business. Such dealer, even in the absence of the said circular, cannot claim as a matter of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) that a farmer or agriculturist must enter into a business deal with such trader in the matter of purchase of pumpsets. Even in such area, a dealer is free to carry on his business. Such dealer, even in the absence of the said circular, cannot claim as a matter of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) that a farmer or agriculturist must enter into a business deal with such trader in the matter of purchase of pumpsets. Similarly, such trader also cannot claim that the Government should also accept him as an approved dealer of the Government. The trading activity in dealership of pumpsets has not been stopped or even controlled or regulated generally. The dealer can deal with purchasers of pumpsets without any control imposed on it to carry on such business. The obligation to purchase from approved dealer has been fastened only to such farmer or agriculturist who has volunteered to accept financial assistance under the scheme on various terms and conditions.” 21. The Apex Court had again occasion to consider Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India in the case of Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India and others, 2005(1) SCC 679 . A notice was issued inviting tender for supply of high security registration plates for motor vehicles by the State Government for implementing the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It was contended that tender conditions were discriminatory and they were made to create monopoly in favour of few parties violating the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g). The Apex Court repelled the contention that the tender conditions were violative of Article 19(1)(g). 22. In the judgment relied by learned counsel for the respondents in the case of Kannaiyan v. State of Tamilnadu, AIR 2005 NOC 212 (Mad), the Government order providing for grant of contract to Adi-Dravidars or Tribals being in consonance with the Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India has been upheld. Following was laid down in the said judgment : “The scope and object of Article 15(4) to bring Articles 15 and 29 in line with Articles 16(4), 46 and 340 and to make it constitutional for the State to reserve seats for backward classes of citizens, Scheduled Castes and Tribes in the public educational institutions as well as to make other special provisions as may be necessary for their advance. In short, the amendment would validate the reservation and would protect the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In short, the amendment would validate the reservation and would protect the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Article 15(4) is an exception to Article 15(1) in so far as it forbids discrimination on the ground of race or caste. It is also in the nature of an exception to Article 29(2). No doubt that in general statutory provisions of law have the overriding effect on the Government orders passed but since impugned Government Order has been issued in consonance with the enabling provisions of the Constitution particularly under Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India aimed at the advancement of the socially and economically backward sections of the society as a special provision, the Government order has been issued by the first respondent State Govt. and further since the statute cannot override a constitutional right. Though it apparently looks as if the statute has been overridden by the Government order, if it is seen in the light of Article 15(4), the Government order can be given effect to and it cannot be said that the statute is being overridden especially when the fundamental obligation of the State is given effect to for the purpose of giving effect to Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India. The Government order impugned is not class legislation which the constitution forbids but a reasonable classification which the Constitution of India promotes and therefore there is no inconsistency or illegality or even arbitrary exercise of power by the first respondent Government in passing the impugned Government order and since within the parameters of their relevant provisions of the Constitution of India as aforementioned the impugned Government order issued by the first respondent Government has to be held valid and proper.” 23. The petitioners have placed reliance on the judgment in Kharak Singh’s case (supra) in which the Apex Court laid down that restriction contemplated under Article 19 can be imposed only by way of law. The Apex Court held that restriction, which was contained in Police Regulations were not ‘law’, hence cannot be saved under Article 19 clause (2) to (6). It was held : “.... In our view clause (b) of Regulation 236 is plainly violative of Article 21 as there is no “law” on which the same could be justified it must be struck down as unconstitutional”. Following was laid down in paragraph 5 of the said judgment : "5. It was held : “.... In our view clause (b) of Regulation 236 is plainly violative of Article 21 as there is no “law” on which the same could be justified it must be struck down as unconstitutional”. Following was laid down in paragraph 5 of the said judgment : "5. Before entering on the details of these regulations it is necessary to point out that the defence of the state in support of their validity is two-fold : (1) that the impugned regulations do not constitute an infringement of any of the freedoms guaranteed by part III of the Constitution which are invoked by the petitioner, and (2) that even if they were, they have been framed “in the interests of the general public and public order” and to enable the police to discharge its duties in a more efficient manner and were therefore “reasonable restrictions” on that freedom. Pausing here it is necessary to point out that the second point urged is without any legal basis for if the petitioner were able to establish that the impugned regulations constitute an infringement of any of the freedoms guaranteed to him by the Constitution then the only manner in which this violation of the fundamental right could be defended would be by justifying the impugned action by reference to a valid law, i.e., be it a statute, a statutory rule or a statutory regulation. Though learned Counsel for the respondent started by attempting such a justification by invoking Section 12 of the Indian Police Act he gave this up and conceded that the regulations contained in Ch. XX had no such statutory basis but were merely executive or departmental instructions framed for the guidance of the police officers. They would not therefore be “a law” which the State is entitled to make under the relevant clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 in order to regulate or curtail fundamental rights guaranteed by the several sub-clauses of Article 19 (1), nor would the same be “a procedure established by law” within Article 21. The position therefore is that if the action of the police which is the arm of the executive of the State is found to infringe any of the freedoms guaranteed to the petitioner the petitioner would be entitled to the relief of mandamus which he seeks, to restrain the State from taking action under the regulations.” 24. The position therefore is that if the action of the police which is the arm of the executive of the State is found to infringe any of the freedoms guaranteed to the petitioner the petitioner would be entitled to the relief of mandamus which he seeks, to restrain the State from taking action under the regulations.” 24. The next judgment relied by the petitioners’ counsel is Khyerbari Tea Company’s case (supra) where it was held that burden to prove that restrictions are reasonable is on the State when prima facie it is shown that fundamental rights are being violated. Reliance has been placed upon paragraphs 33, 34 and 35 of the said judgment. Paragraphs 33 and 34 are quoted below : “33. On the other hand, Mr. Pathak strenuously argues that the initial presumption would be rebutted as soon as it is shown that the fundamental rights under Article 19 (1)(g) is invaded by a statute, or the freedom of trade guaranteed by Article 301 is assaulted by the impugned statute. Once a citizen shows that the impugned statute invades either his individual fundamental right, or the right of freedom of trade, the presumption has worked itself out and the onus shifts to the State to show that the invasion amounts to a restriction which is reasonable or it is in the interest of the general public. 34. It may be conceded that, prima facie there is some force in the argument raised before us by Mr. Setalvad. If the freedom guaranteed to an individual citizen is not absolute and its content must be determineed by reading Article 19(1)(g) and clause (6) of Article 19 together it can perhaps be said that the initial presumption cannot be rebutted merely by showing that the freedom under Article 19(1)(g) has prima facie been invaded. But we do not think it necessary to pursue this matter any further because we are satisfied that the question raised by Mr. Setalvad is concluded against him by a decision of this Court.” 24. Another judgment relied by petitioners’ counsel is Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad case (supra), which was a case of closure of slaughter house, which was challenged on the ground that rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution has been violated. Following was laid down in paragraph 17 of the said judgment : “7. Another judgment relied by petitioners’ counsel is Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad case (supra), which was a case of closure of slaughter house, which was challenged on the ground that rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution has been violated. Following was laid down in paragraph 17 of the said judgment : “7. The present case is apparently another attempt, though on a slightly different ground, to circumvent the judgment of this Court in Mohd. Hanif Qureshi’s case ( AIR 1958 SC 731 ) (supra). The writ giving rise to the present appeal sought to challenge two Standing Orders made by the Municipal Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad, in exercise of his powers under Section 466(1)(D)(b) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 directing that the Municipal slaughter houses should be kept open for use on all days except on seven days mentioned in the two standing orders.” 25. From the decisions of the Apex Court and the High Courts, as noticed above, it is clear that restrictions on a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution can be saved when it has been imposed by a “Law” and further in accordance with the limits as prescribed under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. 26. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances and the contents of the Government order dated 30th June, 2009, we fail to see any restriction on the petitioners’ fundamental right to carry on trade or business. The mere fact that 21% of the contract is reserved for scheduled castes and 2% is reserved for scheduled tribes up to the value of Rs. 5,00,000/-, cannot be held to mean that fundamental rights of the petitioners to carry on their business or occupation has been violated. The mere fact that 21% of the contract is reserved for scheduled castes and 2% is reserved for scheduled tribes up to the value of Rs. 5,00,000/-, cannot be held to mean that fundamental rights of the petitioners to carry on their business or occupation has been violated. As noticed above, the Government order dated 30th June, 2009 is referable to power of the State under Article 15(4) of the Constitution and by that Government order the State Government has not provided for any restriction on exercise of the rights as contemplated under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India nor the submission of the petitioners that Government order creates any monopoly in favour of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes can be accepted since the Government order dated 30th June, 2009 has been issued by the State Government in exercise of power under Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India providing for a special provision for advancement of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. 27. In view of the foregoing discussions, the Government order dated 30th June, 2009 cannot be held to be violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and it does not deserve to be quashed. No ground is made out to quash the Government order dated 30th June, 2009. 28. The writ petition is dismissed. ————