JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajiv Sharma, J.—The aforesaid writ petition have been filed assailing the orders passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by Param Lal and Mohan Lal. Mr. Alok Kumar states that he has no instructions in Writ Petition No. 21712 of 2004 to conduct the case. Even though the case called out in the revised list, no one appears on behalf of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 21712 of 2004 to press the writ petition. 2. Accordingly, the writ petition No. 21712 of 2004 is dismissed for want of prosecution. Interim order, if any, is called. 3. Mr. Alok Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 47477 of 2004 states that the petitioner was allotted chak on his original holding by the Assistant Consolidation Officer, which was confirmed by the Consolidation Officer vide order dated 21.2.2003. Being aggrieved, the respondent No. 2/Bhujbal filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), which was rejected vide order dated 23.4.2003 and confirmed the chak of the petitioner allotted to him at the stage of Assistant Consolidation Officer and Consolidation Officer. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 as also the aggrieved persons filed a revision before the Revisional Authority, who in turn, vide order dated 7.1.2004 disturbed the chak of the petitioner and chak No. 49 was allotted to the respondent No. 3, whereas chak No. 11 was allotted to the petitioner which is far away from the original holding of the petitioner. 4. He further submits that on initiation of consolidation proceedings, plot No. 49 situated in village and Mauja Khorakha has no concern with the contesting respondent No. 3, but against the demand of respondent No. 2 the original holding of the petitioner was given to him, which will be clear from the memo of revision filed by the contesting respondent No. 2. As mentioned above, Bhujbal/respondent No. 2 never demanded the original holding of the petitioner, but against the demand as well as against the documents on record, the original holding of the petitioner was given to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, thus, the impugned order does not sustainable in the eyes of law. 5. While entertaining the writ petition Nos. 47477 of 2004 and 23179 of 2004, this Court directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect to the nature and possession over the land in dispute. 6.
2 and 3, thus, the impugned order does not sustainable in the eyes of law. 5. While entertaining the writ petition Nos. 47477 of 2004 and 23179 of 2004, this Court directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect to the nature and possession over the land in dispute. 6. Having heard learned Counsel for the petitioners, I am of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is not sustainable. On initiation of consolidation proceedings, plot No. 49 situated in village and Mauja Khorakha has no concern with the contesting respondent No. 3. The opposite party No. 2, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, filed an appeal stating therein that plot No. 49 allotted to the petitioner may be allotted to him. The said plea raised before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was rejected inter alia on the ground that the chaks which have been carved out are near to Udan Chak of the original holdings. Not being successful in getting the plot No. 49 in his favour before the Appellate Authority, he preferred a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, where he gains the plot No. 49 which was allotted to the petitioner. The Revisional Authority without issuing any notice to the petitioner, in whose favour the aforesaid plot was allotted, disturbed the petitioner’s possession. 7. Even otherwise, natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience to be ranked as fundamental. The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the prevention of miscarriage of justice. 8. Besides, natural justice is an inseparable ingredient of fairness and reasonableness. It is even said that the principles of natural justice must be read into unoccupied interstices of the statute, unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in umpteen cases has reiterated that a person who is put to any harm, he shall first be afforded adequate opportunity of showing cause. In D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries, (1993) 3 SCC 259 the Supreme Court while laying emphasis on affording opportunity by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action held that orders affecting the civil rights or resulting civil consequences would have to answer the requirement of Article 14.
In D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries, (1993) 3 SCC 259 the Supreme Court while laying emphasis on affording opportunity by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action held that orders affecting the civil rights or resulting civil consequences would have to answer the requirement of Article 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court concluded as under : “The procedure prescribed for depriving a person of livelihood would be liable to be tested on the anvil of Article 14. The procedure prescribed by a statute or statutory rule or rules or orders affecting the civil rights or result in civil consequences would have to answer the requirement of Article 14. Article 14 has a pervasive procedural potency and versatile quality, equalitarian in its soul and principles of natural justice are part of Article 14 and the procedure prescribed by law must be just, fair and reasonable, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.” 10. In National Building Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66 , it was observed by the Apex Court that a person is entitled to judicial review, if he is able to show that the decision of the public authority affected him of some benefit or advantage which in the past he had been permitted to enjoy and which he legitimately expected to be permitted to continue to enjoy either until he is informed the reasons for withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on such reasons. 11. In view of the above, the writ petition Nos. 47477 of 2004 and 23179 of 2004 are allowed only in respect of plot No. 49 situated in village and Mauja Khorakha. The order dated 7.1.2004 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for deciding the same afresh, in accordance with law, after affording opportunity of hearing to all the parties concerned. Since the matter is lingering since long period, I hope and trust that the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) will make earnest endeavour to decide the case within a maximum period of six months, from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order. ————