Judgment :- This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.470/2004 dated 24.11.2005 on the file of the 25th Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore City. The appellant was the defendant in the suit and the respondents were the plaintiffs. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to by their ranking before the trial Court. 2. It is the case of the plaintiffs that they are the owners of the suit schedule premises. The defendant approached the 1st plaintiff for lease of the said premises. It is further contended that the defendant prepared a document styled as a “deed of mortgage” and took signature of the 1st plaintiff on the representation that such a document is necessary to comply with the procedure prescribed under the Rent Control Act during the relevant point of time. The contents of the document were not explained to her. The defendant paid an advance of Rs.30,000/-and agreed to pay a sum of Rs.2,500/-per month towards rent. Since, the plaintiffs wanted the schedule premises for their occupation, they issued a notice dated 1.11.1998 terminating the tenancy of the defendant. In his reply dated 12.1.1999, the defendant admitted his tenancy under the plaintiffs in respect of the schedule premises on a monthly rent of Rs.2,500/-. The plaintiffs filed an eviction petition in HRC No.126/1999 on the file of the Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore. In the said proceedings, the defendant filed an application under Section 43 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (for short ‘the 1999 Act’), which was allowed by the Court on 28.2.2002 and the parties were directed to approach the Civil Court for appropriate reliefs. The revision filed by the plaintiffs challenging the said order in HRRP No.238/2002 was rejected by the High Court by the order dated 7.3.2003. Thereafter, the plaintiffs have filed the suit in question for possession of the suit schedule property and for certain other reliefs. 3. The defendant has filed has written statement, contending that the 1st plaintiff had brought the mortgage deed drafted by her advocate and asked the defendant to sign the same. The 1st plaintiff and the defendant signed the said deed in the presence of two witnesses. The defendant has paid the advance to the 1st plaintiff in accordance with the said agreement. The 1st plaintiff and the defendant signed the said deed in the presence of two witnesses. The defendant has paid the advance to the 1st plaintiff in accordance with the said agreement. The filing of the eviction petition by the plaintiffs in HRC No.126/1999 and its dismissal as also the dismissal HRRP No.238/2002 by the High Court are admitted by the defendant. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the court below has framed the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the defendant is the tenant under them in respect of the suit schedule property? IN THE ALTERNATIVE Whether the defendant is the mortgagee under the plaintiffs in respect of the suit schedule property? 2. Whether the termination of tenancy of the defendant is in accordance with the requirement of law? 3. Whether the defendant is due in a sum of Rs.57,750/-towards the rental arrears at the rate of Rs.2,500/-per month from 01.04.2001 to 01.01.2004 and interest from 15.05.2002 at 12% per annum, as pleaded I paras 13(a) and 13(b) of the plaint? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for ejectment of the defendant from the suit schedule property or redemption of the mortgage? 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for future mesne profits from the date of the suit till they are put in possession of the suit schedule property? 6. Whether the defendant proves that the suit is not maintainable? 7. Whether the defendant proves that the suit is barred by the principles of resjudicata in view of the decisions rendered in HRC No.126/1999 and HRRP No.238/2002, as contended in para-21 of the written statement? 8. What decree or order?” ADDL. ISSUES: 1. Whether the defendant proves that there is no cause of action for the suit as contended in para 17 of the written statement? 2. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of causes of action as contended in para 20 of the written statement?” 5. On behalf of the plaintiffs, the 1st plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and documents Ex.P1 to Ex.P11 have been marked in her evidence. The defendant has not let in any evidence. However, the documents Exs.D.1 to 2 have been marked through P.W1 while she was being cross-examined. The court below on appreciation of the materials on record has decreed the suit. The defendant has not let in any evidence. However, the documents Exs.D.1 to 2 have been marked through P.W1 while she was being cross-examined. The court below on appreciation of the materials on record has decreed the suit. The court below has held that Ex.P1 though styled as a ‘deed of mortgage’, is a lease deed and that the defendant is a tenant under the 1st plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule premises. The court below has further held that the termination of tenancy is valid. The defendant was directed to quit and deliver the vacant possession of the suit schedule premises to the plaintiffs within three months from the date of the decree. 6. Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the plaintiffs are not sure of the nature of relationship between them and the defendant. At one breath, they contend that the defendant is a tenant. Alternatively, they contend that he is a mortgagee. The court below has held that the appellant is a tenant in respect of the suit schedule premises on a monthly rent of Rs.2,500/-. The premises is situated within the limits of the Bangalore City Corporation, and it is covered by part-A of Schedule-1 of the Act. Having regard to Section 27 read with Section 3(c) of the 1999 Act, the Court of Small Causes alone has jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to direct delivery of possession of the suit schedule premises in favour of the plaintiffs. Even otherwise, by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for eviction of a tenant from the premises is governed under the 1999 Act is ousted. Therefore, the court below was not justified in directing delivery of possession of the suit schedule premises to the plaintiffs. 7. On the other hand, Sri G. Vedavyasachar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents would contend that the relationship between the 1st plaintiff and the defendant was that of the landlord and the tenant. The plaintiffs had earlier filed an eviction petition in HRC No.1261/999 and in the said case, the defendant had filed an application under Section 43 of the Act to stop further proceedings since there is a dispute with regard to jural relationship of landlord and tenant. The plaintiffs had earlier filed an eviction petition in HRC No.1261/999 and in the said case, the defendant had filed an application under Section 43 of the Act to stop further proceedings since there is a dispute with regard to jural relationship of landlord and tenant. The court below dismissed the eviction petition with liberty to approach the Civil Court for appropriate reliefs. The said order was unsuccessfully challenged by the plaintiffs before this court in HRRP No.238/2002. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed the suit for possession of the suit schedule premises. The court below has held that the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiffs in respect of the suit schedule premises and it has directed delivery of possession of the said premises. There is no bar for the Civil Court to direct delivery of possession of the suit schedule premises. Alternatively, it is argued that if this Court holds that the suit for possession is not maintainable, the eviction petition filed by the plaintiffs in HRC No.126/1999 may be revived under Section 43 of the 1999 Act. 8. Having regard to the contentions urged, the questions that arise for consideration in this appeal are as under: “i) Whether the court below is justified in holding that the defendant is the tenant under the plaintiffs in respect of the suit schedule premises? ii) Whether the court below has jurisdiction to direct the defendant to deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule premises in favour the plaintiffs? (iii) If the answer to point No.(ii) is in the negative, whether the eviction petition filed by the plaintiffs in HRC No.126/1999 can be revived under Section 43 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999? Re. Point No.(i): 9. Before filing the eviction petition in HRC No.126/1999 against the defendant, the plaintiffs had issued a notice as per Ex.P.2 contending that the defendant is a tenant under them in respect of the suit schedule premises on a monthly rent of Rs.2,500/-. The defendant had sent a reply as per Ex.P.3 dated 02.01.1999 admitting his tenancy under the plaintiffs in respect of the said premises. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an eviction petition in HRC No.126/1999 against the defendant under Section 21(1)(h) of the Rent Control Act, 1961 (for short ‘the 1961 Act’) on the file of the Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore. The defendant had sent a reply as per Ex.P.3 dated 02.01.1999 admitting his tenancy under the plaintiffs in respect of the said premises. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an eviction petition in HRC No.126/1999 against the defendant under Section 21(1)(h) of the Rent Control Act, 1961 (for short ‘the 1961 Act’) on the file of the Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore. In the said proceedings, the defendant filed objections denying the relationship of landlord and tenant. It was further contended that the relationship between them is that of a mortgagor and mortgagee. The Court dismissed the eviction petition on 28.8.2002 holding that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant. The parties were directed to approach the Civil Court for declaration of their rights. A revision filed against the said order by the plaintiffs in HRRP No.238/2002 was also dismissed by this Court on 07.03.2003. 10. Before filing of the aforesaid suit, the plaintiffs issued a notice dated 08.12.2003 as per Ex.P.4 contending that the defendant is the tenant under them in respect of the suit schedule property on a monthly rent of Rs.2,500/-. It was further stated that in order to overcome the prohibition contained in the Rent Control Act, the document Ex.P1 was styled as a ‘mortgage deed’. The respondent has sent a reply as per Ex.P.6 dated 31.12.2003 contending that in the HRC case, the Court has already held that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between them. 11. In the suit, the plaintiffs have contended that the defendant was the tenant. Alternatively, the plaintiffs have sought for redemption of the mortgage, if any. The defendant has filed written statement denying the plaint averments. The court below has framed issue No.1 casting the burden on the plaintiffs to prove that the defendant is a tenant. Both the parties rely on Ex.P.1 dated 1.4.1995 in order to substantiate their contentions. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, the status of the defendant has to be decided first in order to decide the other points arising for consideration because decision on the other points is dependent upon question as to whether the defendant is a ‘tenant’ or a ‘mortgagee’. Ex.P.1 is styled as a ‘deed of mortgage’ and the 1st plaintiff is shown as the ‘mortgagor’ and the defendant as the mortgagee. Ex.P.1 is styled as a ‘deed of mortgage’ and the 1st plaintiff is shown as the ‘mortgagor’ and the defendant as the mortgagee. It further states that the ‘mortgagee’ is interested in advancing a sum of Rs.30,000/-and agrees to pay Rs.60,000/-to the mortgagor from time to time on the date and time mutually agreed by them. The said sum of Rs.30,000/-is refundable to the mortgagee at the time of vacating of the premises. The mortgagee will be put in possession of the premises on the date of payment of Rs.30,000/-. In case the mortgagee agrees to remain in possession of the property beyond the agreed 24 months from the date of Ex.P.1, a separate document has to be executed on mutually agreed terms. It has been further stated that the mortgagor shall return the said sum of Rs.30,000/-on expiration of the period of mortgage. 12. It is settled that the name given by the parties to a document is not conclusive as to its real legal nature and effect. The nomenclature does not determine the character of the document but the substance, which must be looked into to decide its nature. It is also necessary to find out the intention of the party executing it, wile construing a document. The intention has to be gathered from the recitals and the terms in the entire document and from the surrounding circumstances. How the parties have treated the deed is also a relevant factor while determining its character. When the document is of a composite character disclosing features of both mortgage and lease, it need not necessarily be taken as a mortgage. The Court will have to find out predominant intention of the parties executing the document viewed from essential aspect of the reality of the transaction (See Fuzhakkal Kuttappu Vs. C. Bhargavi and Others – AIR 1977 SC 105 ). 13. This Court in K. Amarnath Vs. Smt. Puttamma – ILR 1999 KAR 4634 has considered the difference between the usufructuary mortgage and the lease. It has been held that merely because an amount is advanced and the possession is delivered, a transaction will not become a mortgage. The mortgage contemplates the taking of a loan and delivering possession to secure payment of the loan, the relationship being that of a creditor and debtor. It has been held that merely because an amount is advanced and the possession is delivered, a transaction will not become a mortgage. The mortgage contemplates the taking of a loan and delivering possession to secure payment of the loan, the relationship being that of a creditor and debtor. On the other hand, in a lease for money advanced or deposit made, there is no relationship of debtor and creditor between the landlord and tenant. In such a transaction, the tenant who desires to take the premises on lease, agrees to make a deposit, instead of making a monthly payment as rent with an understanding that the landlord will continue to hold the said advance or deposit so long as the tenant continues in possession and he should refund the same when the tenant vacates the leased premises. In such a transaction, the property is not given as a security for the amount advanced. While the primary transaction in a mortgage is advancing of a loan and securing the advance by an immovable property, in a lease against deposit, the primary intention is to make available the premises to the tenant and receive the consideration therefore by way of interest free advance. 14. A careful perusal of the various clauses in Ex.P.1 makes it clear that the transaction in question is not a loan transaction. The property in question has not been transferred as a security for the debt. Therefore, it does not create the relationship of the mortgagor and mortgagee. The 1st plaintiff has handed over the possession of the suit schedule property to the defendant on payment of Rs.30,000/-towards advance, refundable at the time of vacating of the house. The said advance of Rs.30,000/-does not carry any interest. The remaining sum of Rs.60,000/-is payable from time to time for a period of 24 months. In other words, it amounts to payment of Rs.2,500/-per month to the 1st plaintiff by the defendant. If the defendant remains in possession of the premises beyond the agreed period from the date of Ex.P.1, a separate document has to be executed on mutually agreed terms. A reading of Ex.P.1 as a whole indicates that the 1st plaintiff had let out the premises in question to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs.2,500/-and an advance of Rs.30,000/-which would be refundable at the time of vacating the said premises. A reading of Ex.P.1 as a whole indicates that the 1st plaintiff had let out the premises in question to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs.2,500/-and an advance of Rs.30,000/-which would be refundable at the time of vacating the said premises. The court below, on proper consideration of the materials on record, has rightly concluded that the relationship between the parties is that of the landlord and tenant. Point No.(i) is answered accordingly. Re. Point No.(ii): 15. Learned Counsel for the appellant/defendant submits that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree for possession of the said premises. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs would argue that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to pass a decree for possession when the tenant denies the title of the landlord if the Court finds denial of the relationship is not bonafide. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Qudrat Ullah Vs. Municipal Board, Bareilly – AIR 1974 SC 396 , he submits that the defence or protection granted by the 1961 Act is no longer available to the tenants after enforcement of the 1999 Act. Placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Majati Subbarao Vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by L.Rs – AIR 1989 SC 2187 , learned Counsel argues that a denial of title in the course of eviction petition constitutes a ground for eviction provided the denial is not bona fide. In this case, the denial of relationship is not bona fide. Therefore, the decree for possession has to be sustained. It is further argued that the defendant has not stepped into the witness box. Thus, he has abandoned his case. In support of the case contention, he has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in N. Jayaram Reddy & Another Vs. The Revenue Divisional Officer and Land Acquisition Officer, Kurnool – AIR 1979 SC 1393 . 16. The object of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 is to provide for regulation of rent and eviction of tenants in certain areas of the State of Karnataka and for the matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Revenue Divisional Officer and Land Acquisition Officer, Kurnool – AIR 1979 SC 1393 . 16. The object of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 is to provide for regulation of rent and eviction of tenants in certain areas of the State of Karnataka and for the matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Sub-section (3)(e) of Section 2 of the Act states that the provisions of the Act shall not apply to any premises, deemed rent on the date of the commencement of the Act or the standard rent of which exceeds 3500 rupees per month in any area referred to in Part A of the First Schedule and 2000 rupees per month in any other area. Part-A of the First Schedule consists of the areas within the limits of cities constituted under the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, and within a radius of 3 kms. from the limit of the said cities. The monthly rent of the premises in question is Rs.2,500/-. The premises does not come within the purview of sub-section (3)(a) to (h) of Section 2 of the 1999 Act. Since the said premises is situated at Bangalore, it is covered under Part A of the First Schedule of the Act. There is no dispute on this aspect of the matter. 17. The premises does not come within the purview of sub-section (3)(a) to (h) of Section 2 of the 1999 Act. Since the said premises is situated at Bangalore, it is covered under Part A of the First Schedule of the Act. There is no dispute on this aspect of the matter. 17. The expression “Court” has been defined in sub-section (c) of Section 3 of the Act, which is as under: “(c) “Court” means:- .(i) in respect of the area comprised within the limits of the City of Bangalore, the Court of Small Causes; .(ii) in such other area as the State Government, may, in consultation with the High Court, by notification specify, the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) having territorial jurisdiction over such area; and (iii) in respect of areas other than those referred to in sub-clauses (i) and (ii), the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) having territorial jurisdiction over such area.” The expression “tenant” has been defined in sub-section (n) of Section 3 of the Act, which is as under: “(n) “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises, is or but for a special contract would be, payable, and includes: .(i) a sub-tenant; .(ii) any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, but does not include any person to whom a licence as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (Central Act 5 of 1882) has been granted.” 18. The other relevant provisions are Sections 27, 46, 50 and 63, which are as under: “27. Protection of tenants against eviction: .(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by the Court, District Judge or High Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant, save as provided in sub-section (2). .(2) The Court may, on an application made to it in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: .(a) to (s) xxx xxxx xxx 46. .(2) The Court may, on an application made to it in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: .(a) to (s) xxx xxxx xxx 46. Revision: (1) The High Court may, at any time call for and examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the Court of Small Causes or the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division referred to in terms (i) and (ii) of clause (c) of Section 3 for the purpose satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. .(2) The District Judge may at any time call for an examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the Court of Civil Judge Junior Division referred to in item (iii) of clause (c) of Section 3 for the purpose of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. .(3) The costs incidental to all proceedings before the High Court or the District Judge shall be in the discretion of the High Court or the District Judge as the case may be. 50. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts barred in respect of certain matters: (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to the fixation of standard rent in relation to any premises to which this Act applies or to any other matter which the Controller is empowered by or under this Act to decide, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Controller under this Act shall be granted by any Civil Court or other authority. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed as preventing a Civil Court from entertaining any suit or proceeding to decide any question of title to any premises to which this Act applies or any question as to the person or persons who are entitled to receive the rent of such premises. 63. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed as preventing a Civil Court from entertaining any suit or proceeding to decide any question of title to any premises to which this Act applies or any question as to the person or persons who are entitled to receive the rent of such premises. 63. Finality of Orders: Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by the Court or controller and every order passed in appeal or revision there against under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any suit, application or execution proceeding.” 19. From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that a ‘tenant’ includes a person who continues to be in occupation of the premises defined under sub-section (i) of Section 3 of the Act even after the termination of his tenancy. Section 27 provides for the protection of tenants against eviction. From the non-obstante clause contained in the opening part of sub-section (1) of Section 27, it is clear that no decree for recovery of any premises shall be made by the Court, District Court or High Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant, except in accordance with the provisions contained in subsection (2) of Section 27 of the Act. Section 46 provides for filing of revision challenging the order passed by the Courts defined in Section 3(c)(i) & (ii) of the Act. The express bar to entertain a suit under Section 50 is limited to matters relating to fixation of fair rent or to any other matter which the Controller is empowered to decide by or under the Act. Section 63 deals with the finality of the orders passed under the Act. 20. In V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammal – AIR 1979 SC 1745 , a larger Bench of the Apex Court consisting of seven Hon’ble Judges has held that the topic of Transfer of Property other than agricultural land is covered by Entry 6 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. 20. In V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammal – AIR 1979 SC 1745 , a larger Bench of the Apex Court consisting of seven Hon’ble Judges has held that the topic of Transfer of Property other than agricultural land is covered by Entry 6 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The subject being in the concurrent list, many State Rent Acts have by necessary implication and many of them by starting certain provisions with a non-obstante clause have done away with the law engrafted in Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act except in regard to any matter which is not provided for in the State Act either expressly or by necessary implication. It has been further held as under: “In order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant under any State Rent Control Act it is not necessary to give notice under Section 106 T.P. Act. Determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with Section 106 of the T.P.Act. On the question of requirement of such a notice under S.106 T.P.Act, the difference in the language of various State Rent Acts does not bring about any distinction. It is not correct to say that S.106 of the T.P.Act merely providing for termination of a lease either by the lessor or the lessee by giving the requisite notice is an extra protection against eviction. The purpose of this provision is merely to terminate the contract which the overriding Rent Acts do not permit to be terminated. Even if the lease is determined by forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act the tenant continues to be a tenant, that is to say, there is no forfeiture in the eye of law. The purpose of this provision is merely to terminate the contract which the overriding Rent Acts do not permit to be terminated. Even if the lease is determined by forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act the tenant continues to be a tenant, that is to say, there is no forfeiture in the eye of law. The tenant becomes liable to be evicted and forfeiture comes into play only if he has incurred the liability to be evicted under the State Rent Act, not otherwise.” In H. Shiva Rao and Another Vs. Cecilia Pereira & Others – AIR 1987 SC 248 , the Apex Court was considering the executability of an eviction decree passed by a Civil Court after extension of the 1961 Act. The appellant in the said case was a tenant in the premises where he was residing and was also running a teashop. Subsequent to the decree for possession, the 1961 Act was made applicable to the area in question. The Apex Court held that the Rent Control Legislations are beneficial to the tenant and restrictive of the rights of the landlords. The legislations were passed to meet the problem of shortage of accommodation in the cities and towns. It has been further held that the Court must not make a mockery of legislation and should take a constructive approach to fulfill the purpose and for that purpose, if necessary, iron out the creases. It has been further held as under: “It is well settled legal principle that Rent Control legislations being beneficial to the tenant have to be given a liberal interpretation. While ordinarily substantive rights should not be held to be taken away except by express provision, or clear implication in the case of Rent Control Act, it being a beneficial legislation the provision which confers immunity to the tenant against eviction by the landlord though prospective in form operates to take away the right vested in the landlord by a decree of a Court which has become final, unless there is express provision or clear implication to the contrary.” In Govindamma Vs. Murugesh Mudaliar – ILR 1990 KAR 2639, a Division Bench of this Court has held that by reason of denial of title of the landlord and setting up title in himself by the tenant, there is no automatic forfeiture of the tenancy right and that such conduct on the part of the tenant gives a right to the lessor to elect to determine the lease by issuing a notice in writing as required under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. This proposition is in conformity with the provisions contained in Sec.111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore, it applies to a case where tenancy is purely governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and not by the provisions of the Rent Act. 21. In the present case, the tenancy in question is not governed under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit schedule premises is included in Part-A of the First Schedule of the 1999 Act. Therefore, determination of lease in accordance with the provisions of Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant after such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. 22. It is true that the express bar contained in Section 50 of the Act for entertaining a suit is limited to matters relating to fixation of fair rent or to any other matter which the Controller is empowered to decide by or under the Act. Therefore, it should not be understood that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit for eviction of a tenant from a premises covered under the provisions of the Act. The non-obstante clause contained in the opening part of sub-section (1) of Section 27 makes it clear that the order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises defined in Section 3(i) of the Act shall be made by the Court. District Court or High Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant in accordance with sub-section (2) of Section 27 of the Act. ‘Court’ has been defined in Section 3(c) of the Act, which means the Court of Small Causes in so far as the areas comprised within the limits of the City of Bangalore. District Court or High Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant in accordance with sub-section (2) of Section 27 of the Act. ‘Court’ has been defined in Section 3(c) of the Act, which means the Court of Small Causes in so far as the areas comprised within the limits of the City of Bangalore. Sub-sections (ii) and (iii) of Section 3(c) specifies the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of the other areas in the State of Karnataka. The word ‘Court’ does not include the ordinary Civil Courts because it specifies the Courts which alone can have jurisdiction to pass an order for recovery of possession of the premises on one or more grounds enumerated therein. Therefore, it is not necessary to take the assistance of theory of exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts by necessary implication. Having regard to the embargo contained in sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the 1999 Act, the Civil Court could not have directed delivery of possession of the suit schedule premises. 23. The decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs in Qudrat Ullah’s case (supra), has no application to the facts of this case. In this decision, the Apex Court was considering the effect of repeal of U.P. (Temporary) Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947. The said Act was repealed by a subsequent Act. Therefore, the Apex Court held that protection under the said Act was no longer available to a tenant. That is not the position in the present case. Section 27 of the 1999 Act protects the tenants against eviction. A tenant of a premises governed under the provisions of 1999 Act can be evicted if the landlord makes out a case under sub-clause (2) of Section 27 of the Act. Majati Subbarao’s case (supra) relied on by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs’ does not assist them in any way. In the said decision, the Apex Court was considering the provisions of the A.P.Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. There is a specific provision in the said Act for eviction of a tenant when he denies the title of the landlord or claims a right of permanent tenancy, when the denial and claim was not bona fide. Admittedly, there is no such provision in the 1999 Act. The decision in N. Jayaram Reddi’s case (supra) is also not helpful to the plaintiffs. Admittedly, there is no such provision in the 1999 Act. The decision in N. Jayaram Reddi’s case (supra) is also not helpful to the plaintiffs. In the said decision, the Court has held that a point of defence which has been willfully and deliberately abandoned by a party in a civil case, at a crucial stage when it was most relevant or material, cannot be allowed to be taken up later, at the sweet will of the party. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has relied on the said decision for the proposition that since the defendant has not let in any evidence, it amounts to abandonment of the stand taken by him as a defence. It is to be noticed here that the question for consideration in this case is whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to pass a decree for possession of a premises governed under the 1999 Act? This is a pure question of law. It is well established that the plaintiffs must succeed on the strength of their case and cannot rely on the weakness in the defence. 24. As rightly submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, even otherwise, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to pass an order of eviction of the premises governed under the 1999 Act is ousted by necessary implication. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon the Civil Courts to determine all disputes of a civil nature unless the same is barred by statute either expressly or by necessary implication. The bar of jurisdiction of a Civil Court is not to be readily inferred. The exclusion of jurisdiction would normally be an exception. Courts generally construe the provisions strictly when jurisdiction of a Civil Court is claimed to be excluded. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the enquiry may be decisive. An implied bar may arise when a statute provides a special remedy to an aggrieved party like a right of appeal. Therefore, each case requires examination as to whether the statute provides right and remedies and whether the scheme of the Act is that the procedure provided will be conclusive and thereby excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect thereof. Therefore, each case requires examination as to whether the statute provides right and remedies and whether the scheme of the Act is that the procedure provided will be conclusive and thereby excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect thereof. There is no absolute right in any one to demand that the dispute be adjudicated upon only by a Civil Court. 25. In S. Vanathan Muthuraja Vs. Ramalingam @ Krishnamurthy Gurukkal and Others – (1997) 6 SCC 143 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that where there is an express bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court, an examination of the scheme of the statute to find adequacy or sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary that the statute creates a special right or liability and provides remedy for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right or liability shall be determined by the Tribunal so constituted and the question whether remedies are normally associated with the action in civil Courts or prescribed by the statutes or not require examination. Therefore, each case requires examination as to whether the statute provides right and remedy and whether the scheme of the Act is that the procedure provided will be conclusive and thereby excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect thereof. In Dhruv Green Field Ltd. Vs. Hukam Singh & Others – (2002) 6 SCC 416 , it is held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try all suits of civil nature is very expansive. It is only where cognizance of a specified type of suit is barred by a statute either expressly or impliedly that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be ousted to entertain such a suit. The general principle is that a statute excluding the jurisdiction of Civil Courts should be construed strictly. It is only where cognizance of a specified type of suit is barred by a statute either expressly or impliedly that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be ousted to entertain such a suit. The general principle is that a statute excluding the jurisdiction of Civil Courts should be construed strictly. The proposition of law regarding exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court have been laid down as under: “The question as to whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred must be answered on the basis of the following principles: .(1) If there is express provision in any special Act barring the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to deal with matters specified thereunder, the jurisdiction of an ordinary Civil Court shall stand excluded. .(2) If there is no express provision in the Act but an examination of the provisions contained therein leads to a conclusion in regard to exclusion of jurisdiction of a Civil Court, the Court would then inquire whether any adequate and efficacious alternative remedy is provided under the Act; if the answer is in the affirmative, it can safely be concluded that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. If, however, no such adequate and effective alternative remedy is provided then exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be inferred. .(3) Even in cases where the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is barred expressly or impliedly, the Court would nonetheless retain its jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the suit provided the order complained of is a nullity.” In Union of India and Another vs. Delhi High Court Bar Association and Others – (2002) 4 SCC 275 , it has been held that there is no absolute right in any one to demand that the disputes be adjudicated upon only by a Civil Court. In N.D.M.C. Vs Satish Chand (Deceased) By L.R. Ram Chand – AIR 2003 SC 3187 , it has been held that a bar to file a civil suit may be express or implied. An express bar is where a statute itself contains a provision that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is barred e.g. the bar contained in Section 293 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. An implied bar may arise when a statute provides a special remedy to an aggrieved party like a right of appeal. 26. An express bar is where a statute itself contains a provision that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is barred e.g. the bar contained in Section 293 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. An implied bar may arise when a statute provides a special remedy to an aggrieved party like a right of appeal. 26. At this stage, learned Counsel for the respondents contends that there is a difference between the language contained in Section 21 of the 1961 Act and Section 27 of the 1999 Act. The word ‘any Court’ included in Section 21(1) of the 1961 Act, is not found in Section 27(1) of the 1999 Act. In the 1961 Act, there is a total prohibition for any Court to pass a decree for recovery of possession of the premises except the Courts designated for the said purpose in the said Act, whereas in the 1999 Act, there is no such bar. He has further argued that the 1961 Act does not contain a provision similar to Section 43 of the 1999 Act. Section 43 of the 1999 Act provides for stopping of all further proceedings in an eviction petition and direct the parties to approach the competent Court of civil jurisdiction for declaration of their rights, if in the opinion of the Court there is a reason to suspect the genuine existence of the document of lease or the receipt or acknowledgment of payment of rent. It is further argued that in Govindamma’s case (supra), this Court had suggested to the State Government to add one more ground to Section 21 of the 1961 Act enabling the landlord to secure possession of the premises similar to Section 13(1)(f) of Rajasthan Rent Act. That is why the word ‘any Court’ has not been included in Section 27(1) of the 1999 Act. Therefore, it should be presumed that Civil Court has jurisdiction to direct delivery of possession of the premises covered under the 1999 Act. 27. The expression ‘any Court’ contained in Section 21(1) of the 1961 Act has not been included in Section 27(1) of the 1999 Act. Section 27 of the Act starts with a non-obstante clause. Therefore, it should be presumed that Civil Court has jurisdiction to direct delivery of possession of the premises covered under the 1999 Act. 27. The expression ‘any Court’ contained in Section 21(1) of the 1961 Act has not been included in Section 27(1) of the 1999 Act. Section 27 of the Act starts with a non-obstante clause. It states that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by the Court, District Court or High Court in favour of the landlord against the tenant except in accordance with sub-section (2) of the said provision. The expression ‘the Court’ has been defined in sub-section (c) of Section 3 of the Act. A combined reading of these provisions make it clear that the Courts included in Section 3 (c) alone have jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction from the premises defined under Section 3(i) of the Act. It is obvious that ordinary Civil Courts are not empowered to pass similar orders. Therefore, even if the word ‘any Court’ has not been used in Section 27(1) of the 1999 Act, it does not make any difference. 28. Learned Counsel for the respondents further submits that the 1999 Act has liberalized the law relating to eviction of tenants. Therefore, the decree passed by the Civil Court has to be sustained. It is true that the 1999 Act has liberalized the law in favour of the landlords. The non-residential tenancies are kept out of the premises of the Act except small commercial premises of the plinth area not excluding fourteen square metres. The leases of high rent are also kept out by pegging the same to Rs.3,500/-per month in City Corporation areas and to Rs.2,000/-per month in City Municipality areas of the State. The grounds of eviction and procedure of eviction are also rationalized. Under the 1999 Act, the protection of tenants against eviction is made available only to those premises, which are included in the Act. Since the premises in question comes within the purview of the Act, the appellant-tenant can be evicted only in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein. It is settled that if the law states that a particular thing must be done in a particular manner, the thing must be done in that manner alone. 29. Since the premises in question comes within the purview of the Act, the appellant-tenant can be evicted only in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein. It is settled that if the law states that a particular thing must be done in a particular manner, the thing must be done in that manner alone. 29. From the discussion made above, it is clear that the defendant is the tenant of the suit schedule premises governed under the provisions of 1999 Act. The tenant in occupation of the premises after the termination of tenancy would continue to be a tenant. In the matter of determination of tenancy, the 1999 Act does not permit the landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by serving notice to quit as provided in Transfer of Property Act. Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable because the tenancy is governed under the 1999 Act. Section 27(1) read with Section 3(c) of the 1999 Act excludes the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts to pass an order of eviction of a tenant from the premises governed under the said Act. Even otherwise, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for the said purpose is ousted by necessary implication. The 1999 Act contains/creates a special right and provides for the determination of the right and further lays down all questions about the said right to be determined by the Court constituted thereunder. It also provides for a forum for challenging the order passed by the designated Court. Thus, the said Act is a complete Code in itself. The Civil Court having held that the respondent is a tenant under the plaintiffs in respect of the suit schedule premises, could not have directed delivery of possession of the said property. When the tenancy is governed under the provisions of 1999 Act, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree for possession of the suit schedule property. Point No.(ii) is answered accordingly. Re. Point No.(iii): 30. As has been stated earlier, before filing of the suit, the plaintiffs had filed an eviction petition in HRC No.126/1999 against the defendant under Section 21(1)(h) of the 1961 Act. The Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 came into force with effect from 22.11.2001. The 1961 Act was repealed by Section 70 of the 1999 Act. Re. Point No.(iii): 30. As has been stated earlier, before filing of the suit, the plaintiffs had filed an eviction petition in HRC No.126/1999 against the defendant under Section 21(1)(h) of the 1961 Act. The Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 came into force with effect from 22.11.2001. The 1961 Act was repealed by Section 70 of the 1999 Act. The effect of coming into force of the 1999 Act and the effect of repeal of 1961 Act have been dealt with by Sections 69 and 70 of the 1999 Act. After considering the said provisions, the Apex Court in Mahendra Saree Emporium (II) Vs. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy – (2005) 1 SCC 481 , has held that the cases and proceedings initiated under the 1961 Act in respect of which the 1999 Act is also applicable, shall continue to be heard and disposed of whether at the stage of trial (subject to the provisions contained in Section 69 of the 1999 Act) or in appeal or revision but the substantive law which would govern the decision in such cases and proceedings shall be the one contained in the 1999 Act. 31. Therefore, the eviction petition filed by the plaintiffs under the provisions of the 1961 Act was continued under the 1999 Act. In the eviction petition, the defendant filed an application under Section 43(2) of the 1999 Act to stop all further proceedings in the suit and to direct the parties to approach the competent Civil Court for appropriate reliefs since there is a serious dispute with regard to the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between parties in respect of the premises in question. On consideration of the said application, the court below dismissed the eviction petition on 28.2.2002 and directed the parties to approach the Civil Court for declaration of their rights. The said order has been confirmed by this Court in HRRP No.238/2002 disposed of on 7.3.2003. That is why the plaintiffs have filed the aforesaid suit for recovery of possession of the suit schedule premises or in the alternative for redemption of the mortgage. I have held that the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiffs in respect of the suit schedule premises and that the decree passed by the Civil Court is without jurisdiction. Therefore, it is necessary to find out the option available to the plaintiffs in law to recover possession of the suit schedule premises. I have held that the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiffs in respect of the suit schedule premises and that the decree passed by the Civil Court is without jurisdiction. Therefore, it is necessary to find out the option available to the plaintiffs in law to recover possession of the suit schedule premises. 32. In Smt. Rukminibai Kom Laxman Murkote & Others Vs. Goususab Moulasab Matigar & Others – 1988 (1) KLJ 200, this Court was considering a similar case under 1961 Act. In the said case, the plaintiff had filed a petition for eviction of the defendant under the provisions of 1961 Act. The defendant denied the tenancy and set up title in himself. Therefore, the Court directed the parties to settle their rights in a properly constituted suit in a Civil Court. The Civil Court held that the defendant is a tenant and ordered his eviction. This Court held that once the defendant is declared as the tenant, he is entitled for protection under Section 21 of the 1961 Act. Therefore, the Civil Court cannot pass a decree for possession of the suit schedule property and that plaintiff has to file a fresh application for eviction of the tenant before the competent Court under the 1961 Act. 33. However, the legal position has changed after coming into force of the 1999 Act. Now, the plaintiffs need not file a fresh case for eviction of the defendant. Section 43 of the 1999 Act comes to their aid, which is as under: “43. Dispute of relationship of landlord and tenant: (1) Where in any proceeding before the Court, a contention is raised denying the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant as between the parties it shall be lawful for the Court to accept the document of lease or where there is no document of lease, a receipt of acknowledgment of payment of rent purported to be signed by the landlord a prima facie evidence of relationship and proceed to hear the case. .(2) Where: .(a) the lease pleaded is oral and either party denies relationship, and no receipt or acknowledgment of payment of rent as referred to in sub-section (1) above is produced, or .(b) in the opinion of the Court there is reason to suspect the genuine existence of the document of lease or the receipt of acknowledgment of payment of rent the Court shall at once stop all further proceeding before it and direct the parties to approach a competent Court of civil jurisdiction for declaration of their rights.” 34. The above provision lays down that if in the opinion of the Court there is a reason to suspect the genuine existence of the document of lease or receipt of acknowledgment of payment of rent, the Court shall at once stop all further proceedings before it and direct the parties to approach a competent court of civil jurisdiction for appropriate reliefs. The said provision does not empower the Civil Court to pass an order of eviction. It provides for declaration of their rights in respect of the property in question. The order in HRC No.126/1999 dated 28.2.2002 is referable to sub-section (2)(b) of Section 43 of the 1999 Act. Though the Small Causes Court has used the expression ‘dismissed’ in its order, it has permitted the parties to approach the Civil Court for declaration of their rights. The Civil Court has declared that the relationship between the parties is that of landlord and tenant. The said finding has been confirmed by me. Therefore, the order dated 28.2.2002 should be understood as stoppage of further proceedings and not a dismissal of the case. In the circumstances, it is just and reasonable to revive the eviction petition in HRC No.126/1999. Point No.(iii) is answered accordingly. 35. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, I pass the following: ORDER .(i) The appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree in O.S.No.470/2004 dated 24.11.2005 on the file of the 25th Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore City, in so far as directing delivery of possession of suit schedule premises is concerned, is hereby set aside. The finding of the court below that the defendant is a tenant of the said premises under the plaintiffs is sustained. .(ii) HRC No.126/1999 disposed of on 28.2.2002 on the file of the Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore, stands restored. The finding of the court below that the defendant is a tenant of the said premises under the plaintiffs is sustained. .(ii) HRC No.126/1999 disposed of on 28.2.2002 on the file of the Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore, stands restored. The said Court is directed to proceed further with the matter and pass appropriate order thereon in accordance with the provisions of Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, from the stage at which further proceedings was stopped, which has been referred to in paragraph 33 of this judgment. (iii) Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. Draw the decree accordingly.