JUDGMENT : Indrajit Mahanty, J. - In this writ application the Petitioner-Ajaya Kumar Dash, a Judicial Officer, has sought to challenge the order of his reversion dated 24.2.2000 passed by this Court purportedly pursuant to the order arising out of Disciplinary Proceeding No. 4 of 1995. 2. From the pleadings it appears that the Petitioner had preferred Writ Petition (Civil) No. 15 of 2002 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and the Hon'ble Supreme Court by its Order Dated 11.2.2002 was pleased to dismiss the said Writ Petition as withdrawn with liberty to the Petitioner to file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and accordingly, the present writ application has been filed. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the Petitioner in brief is that the Petitioner joined in service as a Probationary Munsif in the year 1982 and on completion of his probation, he was promoted to the post of Judicial Magistrate, IInd Class in March, 1984 and in December, 1985, the Petitioner was posted as Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Udaigiri in the district of Phulbani. It is further averred that the Petitioner, thereafter, was promoted to the post of Class-I Officer in the year 1990 and was posted as the S.D.J.M., Hindol and ultimately came to be posted as the S.D.J.M., Kamakshya Nagar with effect from 22.4.1995. While the Petitioner was working as the S.D.J.M., Kamakshya Nagar, he was issued with a Notice dated 7.7.1995 intimating him that the High Court has decided to initiate a Disciplinary Proceeding against him and accordingly, he was put under suspension with immediate effect. A memorandum of charges was served on the Petitioner on 2.1.1996 and the same was related to certain orders passed by the Petitioner in the following cases: G.R. Case No. 355 of 1990 ICC No. 113 of 1994 G.R. Case No. 357 of 1990 ICC No. 114 of 1994 2(C)CC No. 358 of 1994 2(C)CC No. 329 of 1990 4. A memorandum of charges was served on the Petitioner on 2.1.1996 and the same was related to certain orders passed by the Petitioner in the following cases: G.R. Case No. 355 of 1990 ICC No. 113 of 1994 G.R. Case No. 357 of 1990 ICC No. 114 of 1994 2(C)CC No. 358 of 1994 2(C)CC No. 329 of 1990 4. From the aforesaid six cases, total number of fourteen charges were framed and the same are as follows: (i) lnG.R.CaseNo.1671 of 1985 you granted bail to an accused named Raja Pal on 31.3.1993 by recalling the Non-bailable warrant issued against him on the ground of ailment of his mother on the basis of a medical certificate although the concerned medical certificate stated that Sushila Devi, W/o. Raju Pal was suffering from T.B. and was advised rest. The medical certificate in the record did not support the ground for which the bail was granted by you. (ii) In G.R. Case No. 620/94 on 10.5.1994 you rejected the bail petition of the accused Goutam Das on the ground that the offence was heinous, but strangely enough on the very next day i.e. 11.5.1994 on the. self same materials you granted bail to the said Goutam Das on the ground that prima facie the case was u/s 435 I.P.C. and not u/s 436 I.P.C. The records of the case did not indicate any valid reasons for taking such a favourable view in favour of an accused on the very next date. (iii) On the basis of a F.I.R. complaining an offence u/s 307 I.P.C, the GR Case No. 540/94 was initiated against the accused Patric Narayan. The said Case u/s 307 IPC was exclusively triable by the Court of sessions. Although you had no jurisdiction to deal with the said case, you took up the said case and granted bail to the accused Patric Narayan on 11.5.1994 on the ground that accused fired a pistol shot without any intention to kill the person and Section 307 IPC was not attracted. (iv) In the above mentioned GR Case No. 540/94 on 11.5.1994 you granted bail to two accused persons, Shyama and Upendra who were accused of offences u/s 147, 148, 307/149 IPC and Section 25 and 27 of the Arms Act disallowing the prayer of the Investigating officer to take them to police custody for further investigation. (iv) In the above mentioned GR Case No. 540/94 on 11.5.1994 you granted bail to two accused persons, Shyama and Upendra who were accused of offences u/s 147, 148, 307/149 IPC and Section 25 and 27 of the Arms Act disallowing the prayer of the Investigating officer to take them to police custody for further investigation. In the same case on 31.5.1994 you rejected the bail petition of two other accused persons and remanded them to custody on the view that the offence complained of was u/s 307 IPC. (v) In G.R.CaseNo.1952of 1993 on. 18.12.1993 you rejected the prayer for bail of the accused Mahendra Singh on the ground that the accused was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. After rejection of bail by you, the accused moved the Addl. District Judge, Rourkela for bail in Criminal Misc. Case No. 341 of 1993 and the said bail petition was also rejected by the Addl. District Judge. It appears that you received the said order of the Addl. District judge on 22.12.93. Surprisingly on 24.12.93 the accused Mahendra Singh again moved for bail in your Court through another Advocate on the ground of sickness of the accused in the jail custody. You did not hesitate to go beyond your jurisdiction to entertain the said bail application and to release the accused on Bail on 27.12.1993 after obtaining a report from the Jail doctor. (vi) In G.R. Case No. 355/90 the accused persons namely Erik Alvaris Rajanikanta Mallik, Antaryami Jati and others were absconding from March, 1990. On 3.6.1994 the accused voluntarily surrendered in your Court and moved a bail application. Upon hearing the bail application you adjourned the same to the next date. Strangely on that very date again a fresh application for Bail was filed in your Court and you released the accused on bail on the same date. The order sheet of the said case also contains several suspicious corrections relating to different dates. (vii) In 2(c)CC Case No. 329 of 1990 the accused S.S. Ray appeared in your Court and pleaded guilty. Although a huge quantity of railway properties were involved you imposed a fine of Rs. 3,000 only on the said accused by splitting up the case without any valid or lawful reason. The order sheet of the said case also shows several suspicious corrections relating to dates. Although a huge quantity of railway properties were involved you imposed a fine of Rs. 3,000 only on the said accused by splitting up the case without any valid or lawful reason. The order sheet of the said case also shows several suspicious corrections relating to dates. (viii) In 2(c)CC Case No. 358/94 under the prevention of Food Adulteration Act the Prosecution report was submitted on 22.10.1994 by the concerned Food. Inspector. You showed a particular unusual interest in the said case and took up the hearing of the case givmg preference over a large number of old cases and delivered Judgment on 2.3.95 acquitting the accused. It appears that the acquittal order was passed ignoring a direct decision of the Hon'ble High Court which was cited by the prosecution. The Judgment in the said case prima facie indicates a predetermined motive to acquit the accused. (ix) In GR Case No. 1883/94 you released stolen Iron materials of Rourkela Steel Plant worth of several lakhs of Rupees on 20.4.1995 just two days before you were relieved from the post, under a Jimadar who is a well known notorious member of a Maffia Gang operating for and dealing in stolen iron materials at Rourkela. (x) In ICC Case Nos. 113/94 and 114/94 you first issued bailable warrant against the accused Santanu Hota. Thereafter you suddenly issued non-bailable warrant and instructed the Court Sub-Inspector to arrest the accused who was sitting in the Bar Association Room. The accused was remanded to judicial custody for 3 to 4 days and thereafter he was released on bail by you. (xi) In ICC Case Nos. 13/95 and 20/95 petition to quash cognizance alongwith a petition u/s 205 Cr.P.C. to dispense with personal appearance of the accused persons was filed in your Court. You posted the case to 22.4.95 just two days before you were relieved to join as SDJM, Kamakshyanagar for filing of rejoinder by complainant. Surprisingly on the said date i.e. 22.4.95 you quashed cognizance in both the complaint cases and discharged the accused persons from the charges. (xii) In GR Case No. 75 of 1994 you released the accused on bail on the very date when he surrendered voluntarily in your Court. In a similar case (GR Case No. 1223/93) you remanded a lecturer in Private C.T. College of Rourkela to Jail custody for 3 months. (xii) In GR Case No. 75 of 1994 you released the accused on bail on the very date when he surrendered voluntarily in your Court. In a similar case (GR Case No. 1223/93) you remanded a lecturer in Private C.T. College of Rourkela to Jail custody for 3 months. (xiii) In GR Case No. 566/94 u/s 392 IPC the accused was a relative of yours. The Investigating officer has mentioned in his diary that you directed the I.O. to submit a final report in favour of your said relative. However, when the I.O. went to arrest the accused from the Court area you allowed the accused to remain in your chamber in order to prevent the I.O. from arresting the said accused. (xiv) In GR Case No. 824/94 u/s 498-A and 304-B IPC and Section 3 and 4 D.P. Act, the accused was granted bail on the date he was forwarded to the Court in spite of the fact that an enquiry and a revision was pending before the Addl. District Judge, Rourkela. 5. It further appears from the record that the Petitioner responded to the above charges denying the same and on conclusion of the inquiry, on 10.11.1997, the Enquiring Officer submitted his inquiry report holding the Petitioner guilty of 12 charges. The inquiry report was placed before the Full Court of the High Court which was pleased to direct issue of a second show cause notice to the Petitioner asking him to provide his explanation as to why he should not be dismissed from service. The Petitioner responded to the second show cause notice vide his letter dated 4.5.1998 and on consideration of the inquiry report and the reply of the Petitioner to the second show cause notice, the Full Court found the Petitioner guilty of all the charges except Charge Nos. 1, 2 and 8 and directed reversion of the Petitioner to the cadre of Orissa Judicial Service, Class-II and the same was duly notified vide Notification No. 1059-A dated 30.11.1998. The Petitioner joined in the reverted post on 14.12.1998 and preferred an appeal in the form of representation before the Disciplinary authority praying for consideration of his explanation submitted to the second show cause notice. The Petitioner joined in the reverted post on 14.12.1998 and preferred an appeal in the form of representation before the Disciplinary authority praying for consideration of his explanation submitted to the second show cause notice. At this stage, the Petitioner claimed to have received a letter dated 1.12.1998 (Annexure-13) issued by the Special Officer (Admn.), Orissa High Court addressed to the District Judge, Dhenkanal stating therein that on consideration of the Petitioner's second show cause reply, the High Court have accepted his explanation and exonerated him of Charge Nos. 1, 2 and 8, but found him guilty of all other charges. It is further submitted by the Petitioner that after the matter stood closed by Annexure-13, the Petitioner's appeal/representation was rejected by the High Court which was communicated to him vide Memo No. 29 dated 19.8.1999 of the office of the District Judge, Bolangir under Annexure-14. 6. In the light of the aforesaid facts, Mr. Ashok Mohanty, Learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner, inter alia, raised the following contentions on behalf of the Petitioner: 1) The High Court having once accepted the explanation and exonerated the Petitioner under Annexure-13, should not have thereafter awarded punishment of reversion since the original order of reversion dated 30.11.1999 under Annexure-11 stood withdrawn on 1.12.1998 under Annexure-13. 2) It is next submitted that all the charges against the Petitioner were in respect of judicial orders passed by him as the S.D.J.M. and in the event any such orders were found improper, illegal or not sustainable in law, such order/orders were open to be challenged and the Petitioner should not have been charged for misconduct even if the Judgment, delivered in those matters were wrong. In this respect reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and Anr. 2007 (2) CLR (SC) 74. 3) The next contention of the Petitioner is that the inquiry report was the result of a complete non-application of mind for which the Full Court of Orissa High Court did not accept the inquiry report in toto and instead accepted the report in so far as the other charges are concerned other than the Charge Nos. 1, 2 and 8. 1, 2 and 8. He submitted that if other charges had been considered against the written response given by the Petitioner, none of the charges should have been found to have proved against the Petitioner. 4) The last contention of the Petitioner is that the Full Court of the Orissa High Court had failed to apply its mind to the inquiry report and had acted in a mechanical manner in directing for issuance of a second show cause notice without noting any reason whatsoever for its satisfaction for issuance of the second show cause notice. 7. In the light of the aforesaid submissions and pursuant to the direction of this Court, Learned Counsel for the High Court produced before us the entire records of Disciplinary Proceeding as well as the personal file of the Petitioner for our perusal. 8. In so far as the first contention of the Petitioner is concerned, we find that the Full Court of the Orissa High Court at its meeting held on 21.2.1998 took the following decisions: Resolved that second show cause notice along with copy of the Inquiry report be issued to Shri A.K. Das, Ex-S.D.J.M., Kamakshyanagar as to why he shall not be dismissed from service. Pursuant to the aforesaid decisions, the Petitioner was called upon to give his response to which he replied and Full Court at its meeting held on 21.11.1998 on perusal of the show cause reply along with the inquiry report and other materials on record in connection with D.P. No. 4 of 1995 resolved as follows: Resolved that the explanation in respect of charges 1, 2 and 8 be accepted and the explanation in respect of other charges be rejected. Resolved further that having found guilty of other charges, the punishment of reduction in rank to the cadre of Orissa Judicial Service, Class-II be imposed. Resolved further that the period of suspension shall be treated as such. Registry shall record the punishment in the C.C.R. of the officer. The officer be reinstated and steps be taken for his posting. This decision of the Full Court dated 21.11.1998 has not been varied at any subsequent point of time. Resolved further that the period of suspension shall be treated as such. Registry shall record the punishment in the C.C.R. of the officer. The officer be reinstated and steps be taken for his posting. This decision of the Full Court dated 21.11.1998 has not been varied at any subsequent point of time. Since the proceeding against the Petitioner was concluded by the Full Court by directing to reinstate the Petitioner against the reverted post, the Standing Committee of the High Court at its meeting held on 25.11.1998 resolved to post the Petitioner-Ajay Kumar Das, Ex-S.D.J.M., Kamakshyanagar as J.M.F.C, Bolangir. From the records, it appears that the Petitioner after joining at Bolangir made a further representation to the High Court on 1.2.1999. That representation of the Petitioner came to be rejected by the Full Court of the Orissa High Court by its decision taken on 4.8.1999, wherein, it was noted as follows: Considered the representation of Shri A.K. Dash, J.M.F.C, Bolangir and it is rejected. Registry shall work out the details about fixation of salary of Shri Dash following his reversion from the cadre of O.J.S., Class-I (Junior) to the cadre of O.J.S., Class-II. 9. On perusal of the concerned file and in particular, the note of the Spl. Officer (Admn.) dated 16.12.1999, it appears that even though Sri Dash was punished in D.P. No. 4 of 1995 and was imposed with the punishment of reduction in rank to O.J.S. (Class-II) by treating the period of suspension as such, subsequently, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court that the High Court does not have power to impose the punishment of reduction in the rank, the State Govt. was moved to approve imposition of that punishment by its letter dated 14.10.1999 and 29.10.1999 and, therefore, the Petitioner was posted in the cadre of O.J.S. (Class-I) as he was posted at the time of initiation of the Disciplinary Proceeding. Accordingly, while the decision of the High Court was pending approval with the State Govt. for its implementation, the Standing Committee vide its decision dated 14.10.1999 posted the Petitioner as the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Jharsuguda which has been upgraded to the cadre of O.J.S., Class-I (Junior) by Resolution No. 12024/L dated 5.10.1999 of the Government of Orissa, Law Department, until further orders. for its implementation, the Standing Committee vide its decision dated 14.10.1999 posted the Petitioner as the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Jharsuguda which has been upgraded to the cadre of O.J.S., Class-I (Junior) by Resolution No. 12024/L dated 5.10.1999 of the Government of Orissa, Law Department, until further orders. Obviously, the aforesaid decision became necessary since the decision of the Full Court was pending approval by the State Govt. at that relevant point of time. It further appears from Annexure-17 to the writ application that necessary notification reverting the Petitioner back to O.J.S. (Class-II) was finally issued on 24.2.2000 in which it was noted that pursuant to the decision taken in the Departmental Proceeding No. 4 of 1995 and with the approval of His Excellency Governor of Orissa, Sri Ajay Kumar Dash, an officer of Orissa Judicial Service, Class-I (Junior), at present Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Jharsuguda in the judgeship of Sambalpur-Bargarh-Deogarh-Jharsuguda is reverted to the cadre of Orissa Judicial Service (Class-II) and transferred and posted to be the Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Division) in the cadre of O.J.S. (Class-II) in the same judgeship to be stationed at Sambalpur. Clearly, in terms of what has been noted above. There was never any order of any competent authority recalling the decision of the High Court awarding the penalty of reversion on the Petitioner. Temporary posting of the Petitioner as the Civil Judge (Jr. Division) (Class-I), Jharsuguda was necessitated since by that time the decision" of the Full Court had not been duly approved by the Governor and till such approval was obtained the order of reversion could not have been given effect to. Therefore, we have no hesitation whatsoever to reject the first contention of the Petitioner noted hereinabove. 10. In so far as the second contention of the Petitioner is concerned, the issue as to when a judicial order can be corrected in appeal and/or the disciplinary proceeding can be initiated against a judicial officer for passing a wrong order in a reckless manner or in gross negligence, even if there was no corrupt motive within the ambit of misconduct, is no more res integra. The Supreme Court, in Govinda Menon Vs. The Supreme Court, in Govinda Menon Vs. Union of India (UOI) has held as under: ...It is not necessary that a member of the service should have committed the alleged act or omission in the course of discharge of his duty as a servant of the Government in order that it may form the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings. In other words, if the act or omission is such as to reflect the reputation of the officer for his integrity or good faith or devotion to duty, there is no reason why disciplinary proceedings should not be taken against him for that act or omission.... The test is whether the act or omission has some reasonable occasion with nature and condition of his service or where the act or omission has caused any reflection upon the reputation of the member of the service for integrity or devotion of duty as a public servant.... The proposition put forward was that quasi-judicial orders, unless vacated under the provisions of the Act, are final and binding and cannot be questioned by the executive government through disciplinary proceedings.... The charge is, therefore, one of misconduct and recklessness disclosed by the utter disregard of the relevant provisions.... But In the present proceedings what is sought to be challenged is not the correctness or the legality of the decision of the Commissioner but the conduct of the Appellant in the discharge of his duty as Commissioner. The Appellant was proceeded against because in the discharge of his function, he acted in utter disregard of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. It is the manner in which he discharges his function that brought up in these proceedings.... It is manifest, therefore, that though the propriety and legality of the sanction to the leases may be question in appeal or revision under the Act the Government is not precluded from taking disciplinary act if there is proof that he has acted in gross recklessness in the discharge of his duties or that he failed to act honestly or in good faith or that he omitted to observe the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory power. Thus, the aforesaid Judgment is an authority that disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against an employee in respect of the action, even if it pertains to exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers. Thus, the aforesaid Judgment is an authority that disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against an employee in respect of the action, even if it pertains to exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers. In S. Govinda Menon (supra), the Supreme Court had relied upon the Judgment in Pearce v. Foster (1886) 17 QBD 536, wherein it had been held as under: If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. The Supreme Court in Union of India and Others Vs. K.K. Dhawan very heavily relied upon its earlier Judgment in S. Govinda Menon (supra) and observed that the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers, acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person, is not acting as a Judge, and in the disciplinary proceedings, it is the conduct of the officer in discharge of his official duties and not the correctness or legality of his decisions or Judgments which are to be examined, as the legality of the orders can be questioned on Appellate or revisional forum. In such a case the Government cannot be precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. The Court summarized some circumstances in which disciplinary action can be taken, which are as under: (i) Where the Officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion of duty; (ii) if there is, prima facie, material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant; (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; (v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however, small the bribe may be, because Lord Coke said long ago, though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great. The Court further observed that the said instances were not exhaustive. However, it was further observed by the Supreme Court that each case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case, and no absolute Rule can be postulated. Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. The Court further observed that the said instances were not exhaustive. However, it was further observed by the Supreme Court that each case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case, and no absolute Rule can be postulated. Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. K.K. Dhawan (supra). Undoubtedly, abuse of power has always been treated as constituting misconduct, for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings. More so, in Management Utkal Machinery Ltd. Vs. Workmen, Miss Shanti Patnaik the Apex Court held that gross negligence constitutes misconduct. In Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. J. Ahmed the Supreme Court considered whether inefficiency in service amounts to misconduct or not, and the Court answered it in negative, holding that the word "misconduct" itself indicates that, if proved, it may incur the penalty under the Rules. In Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Upendra Singh the Apex Court held that even an officer, while discharging judicial or quashi-judicial duties is amenable to the disciplinary proceedings into his conduct in discharge of the duty. In Union of India and others Vs. A.N. Saxena the Apex Court held that disciplinary action can be taken in regard to the action taken or purported to be taken in course of judicial or quashi-judicial proceedings. However, in such circumstances, the disciplinary proceedings should be initiated with great caution and a close scrutiny of his action, and only if the circumstances so warrant for the reason that non-initiation of disciplinary proceedings against a judicial officer may shake the confidence of the public in the officer concerned, and if lightly taken, it is likely to undermine the independence and in case the action of the judicial officer indicates culpability, there is no reason why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. In State of Punjab and Others Vs. Ram Singh Ex. Constable the Supreme Court considered various dictionaries to find out the meaning of "misconduct" and the same is worth quoting, which is as under: Misconduct has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 999 thus: 'A transgression of some established and definite Rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, willful in character, improper or wrong behaviour, its, synonyms are misdemeanour, misdeed, misbehaviour, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offence, but not negligence or carelessness. Misconduct in office has been defined: 'Any unlawful behaviour by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in character. The embraces acts which the offence holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act.' P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 at page 821, defines 'misconduct' thus: The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of Judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct in usual parlance, misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite Rule of action, where no discretion is left, except what necessity may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskilfulness are transgressions of some established, but indefinite, Rule of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law, carelessness or abuse o. discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been affected. The Supreme Court further held that the word "misconduct" though not capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, willful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite Rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of Judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complied of bears forbidden quality or character. In Government of Tamil Nadu Vs. K.N. Ramamurthy the Supreme Court held that exercise of judicial or quasi judicial power negligently having adverse affect on the party or the State certainly amounts to misconduct. In M.H. Devendrappa Vs. In Government of Tamil Nadu Vs. K.N. Ramamurthy the Supreme Court held that exercise of judicial or quasi judicial power negligently having adverse affect on the party or the State certainly amounts to misconduct. In M.H. Devendrappa Vs. The Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corporation the Supreme Court has ruled that any action of an employee which is detrimental to the prestige of the institution or employment, would amount to misconduct. In Union Bank of India Vs. Vishwa Mohan the Supreme Court held that misconduct includes not working with diligence by an employee. In State Bank of India and others Vs. T.J. Paul the Supreme Court held that even in a case where the allegations of malafide and corrupt practice have neither been alleged nor revealed while issuing the charge-sheet, the delinquent employee may be held guilty of misconduct, in case the officer acts without restraints jeopardizing the interest and rights of other party. The said case was for granting the bank loan negligently and the bank suffered serious loss. The Apex Court held that it may not be a case of insubordination or disobedience of specific order of any superior officer, if the act is prejudicial to the interest of the bank or gross negligence or negligence involved or likely to involve the bank in serious loss, would amount to misconduct. In other words, if negligence of an officer seriously affects and prejudices the rights of the party, it definitely amounts to misconduct. In Government of A.P. Vs. P. Posetty the Supreme Court held that sense of propriety and acting in derogation to the prestige of the institution and placing his official position under any kind of embarrassment may amount to misconduct as the same may ultimately lead that the delinquent had behaved in a manner which is unbecoming of an employee/Government servant. Officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function acting negligently or recklessly risk themselves to disciplinary action (Vide Union of India and Ors. v. Duli Chand 2006) 5 SCC 680. If the judicial order can be corrected in an appeal or revision, initiation of disciplinary proceeding is not warranted, is not correct. As the Apex Court has consistently held that in exceptional circumstances even if such an order can be corrected by an Appellate or Revisional Court, disciplinary proceeding can certainly be held against the judicial officer. If the judicial order can be corrected in an appeal or revision, initiation of disciplinary proceeding is not warranted, is not correct. As the Apex Court has consistently held that in exceptional circumstances even if such an order can be corrected by an Appellate or Revisional Court, disciplinary proceeding can certainly be held against the judicial officer. The Court can review only the "decision making procedure" and not the "decision" of the authority. The Court not being a Court of Appeal, is not competent to substitute its own view on factual aspects of the case. 11. Reliance was placed by the Petitioner on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Singh (supra) in support of his contention that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had disapproved the practice of initiation of disciplinary proceeding against the Officers of subordinate judiciary for the Judgment/ orders passed by them which are wrong. It is submitted that the Appellate/Revisional Courts have been established and given powers to set aside such orders. No doubt this observation of the Apex Court finds mention in paragraph-12 of the aforesaid Judgment, but and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the same paragraph has observed that while taking disciplinary action based on judicial orders, the High Courts must take "extra care and caution". From the aforesaid observations, it would be clear that there is no absolute proposition that disciplinary inquiry cannot be initiated against judicial officers arising out of Judgments/orders rendered by them. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has directed initiation of such action with "extra care and caution" and it remains accepted proposition of law that a judicial officer while exercising judicial power cannot act in a reckless manner and such recklessness on his part can be proceeded against through a disciplinary proceeding, if such recklessness misconduct has been committed in a manner which is unbecoming of a judicial officer. In paragraph-18 of the aforesaid Judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken note of Confidential Reports of the Officer and found that the said Officer's integrity and honesty had never been doubted at any point of time. Obviously, the conduct of the Officer, weighed with the Hon'ble Supreme Court, to come to the conclusion that the punishment of reversion in the said case was disproportionate to the alleged lapse in the case. Obviously, the conduct of the Officer, weighed with the Hon'ble Supreme Court, to come to the conclusion that the punishment of reversion in the said case was disproportionate to the alleged lapse in the case. But, in the present case, the conduct of the Petitioner while exercising judicial power has been clearly found to have been exercised in a most reckless manner amounting to misconduct and therefore, unbecoming for a Judicial officer for which the penalty of reversion was imposed. Apart from this, in the present case, the Petitioner's Confidential Reports indicate that the Petitioner was found to be 'doubtful' in integrity and impartiality during the period from 1991 to 1999. Therefore, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the case of Ramesh Chandra Singh.(supra) and, therefore, the same is of no assistance to the Petitioner. 12. In the light of the discussion of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as noted herein above, we are of the considered view that the charges established against the Petitioner clearly are of such an act or omission clearly reflective on the reputation of such an officer so far as his integrity is concerned. The findings of the Enquiring Officer clearly indicate that the Judicial Officer had acted in utmost disregard to the direction and order of the superior authorities. The findings against Charge No. 5 are that the Petitioner had originally refused bail to one accused Mahendra Singh against which the accused had moved the Addl. Sessions Judge, Rourkela and the Addl. Sessions Judge had rejected the bail on 22.12.1993. The said Mahendra Singh again filed a fresh bail application before the Petitioner on 24.12.1993 (two days after rejection of his bail application by the Learned' Addl. Sessions Judge) and the Petitioner allowed the bail application of the said accused by his Order Dated 27.12.1993. The Petitioner in his reply to the charges has indicated that since the accused was suffering from grave ailment and required treatment outside, hence the bail was granted to him. In respect of Charge No. 5, the Enquiring Officer has given the following findings: After receiving this report, the delinquent should have directed the Supdt. Of Jail to provide better treatment for him in other better hospital. Available at Rourkela. In respect of Charge No. 5, the Enquiring Officer has given the following findings: After receiving this report, the delinquent should have directed the Supdt. Of Jail to provide better treatment for him in other better hospital. Available at Rourkela. In the worst, steps should have been taken to refer the accused-patient to a Medical College Hospital for further treatment. Instead of doing that although bail was rejected by the leaned Addl. Sessions Judge, the delinquent has granted it on the aforesaid ground even though the ailment is not said to be serious. By doing so, he has not acted properly. 13. We are of the considered view that this case clearly illustrates the reckless manner in which the jurisdiction was sought to be exercised by the Petitioner in utter disregard to the rejection of the bail application by the. Addl. Sessions Judge, Rourkela. It was incumbent in the circumstances for the Petitioner to reject the bail application in view of the rejection order passed by his superior authority only on few days ago and to direct the accused to move the Learned Addl. Sessions Judge for appropriate direction in the matter. Apart from the above, in the finding in respect of Charge Nos. 3 and 4, the Enquiring Officer has noted that the order (Ext-B) had been interpolated by different ink after the bail order was passed. 14. In so far as Charge No. 6 is concerned, the Petitioner has stated that since the marriage of the sister of one of the accused was scheduled, bail was granted to one Rajanikanta Mallik and others, the bail application being filed by the self-same advocate. Apparently, in the first bail application, there was no mention of any schedule of marriage and in the second bail application the word "Marriage" of the sister of accused Rajanikanta has been omitted. The Enquiring Officer had noted that in the second bail application filed by the same Advocate, not a single word was whispered about the marriage of the sister of accused Rajanikanta and the other bail petition was not signed by the Bench Clerk nor born any mark of Court Seal. In the said petition two dates i.e. 3.6.1994 and 4.6.1994 had been put. From all these, the Enquiring Officer concluded that Ext-D has been subsequently tagged with the bail application in order to justify the bail application. 15. Charge Nos. In the said petition two dates i.e. 3.6.1994 and 4.6.1994 had been put. From all these, the Enquiring Officer concluded that Ext-D has been subsequently tagged with the bail application in order to justify the bail application. 15. Charge Nos. 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 clearly indicate gross misconduct on the part of the Petitioner and therefore, we are of the considered view that the next contentions of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner merits no consideration and hence rejected. 16. The next contention is that the inquiry report was the result of a complete non-application of mind. After going through the inquiry report, we are of the view that the report was extremely detail noting the evidence both documentary and oral. The procedure adopted by the Enquiring Officer is in no manner prejudicial to the delinquent and the principles of natural justice has not been violated. We find that in the present case, the Petitioner had inspected and had been given further opportunity to defend himself in the Disciplinary Proceeding. Therefore, no objection in this score can be entertained by us. 17. The next contention that the order of the Full Court does not indicate application of mind is to be rejected out right in view of the facts narrated hereinabove. The Full Court when took a decision to put the Petitioner under suspension also directed for framing of charges and conducting disciplinary proceeding. On receipt of the inquiry report the Full Court applied its mind to it and on being satisfied with the report of inquiry, called upon the Petitioner to submit his second show cause. The act of calling upon the Petitioner to submit his second show cause is adequate to indicate application of mind by the Full Court. Had the Full Court at their stage not dealt with the inquiry report, consideration of the Petitioner's reply to the second show cause notice would have grossly rendered nonest or would have in contrary prejudice the Petitioner. Further, the fact that the Full Court accepted the Petitioner's reply so far as charge Nos. 1, 2 and 8 and the other charges to be proved, also further exemplary of application of mind and therefore, no objection in this regard is entertainable. 18. Further, the fact that the Full Court accepted the Petitioner's reply so far as charge Nos. 1, 2 and 8 and the other charges to be proved, also further exemplary of application of mind and therefore, no objection in this regard is entertainable. 18. In the light of the findings as arrived at by us as has been noted hereinabove while concluding that the writ application merits no further consideration, it becomes impracticable. Prior to disposal of the writ application to take note of personal records of the Petitioner. On perusal of the Confidential Character Roll noted against the Petitioner, we find the following remarks regarding Petitioner's reputation of integrity and impartiality: Year Subject Remarks 1991 General Reputation Not well spoken of 1993 Integrity Doubtful 1994 General Reputation Bad 1999 Integrity/General Reputation Bad From perusal of the C.C.R., we find that the C.C.R. of the Petitioner has been consistently poor so far as law is concerned. In so far as integrity is concerned, the remark "Doubt" has been expressed regarding impropriety and integrity of the Petitioner. 19. We take note of the aforesaid facts to consider the Petitioner's entire carrier although challenge in the present writ application remains to the order of reversion. We are of the view that the present writ application is a case where the Full Court seems to have taken a liberal view of the charges leveled against the Petitioner and instead of dismissing the Petitioner from service directed his reversion from O.J.S. (Class-I) to O.J.S. (Class-II). It is well settled in law and in administration of justice that no compromise can ever be made with a person who lacks integrity and of doubtful character. 20. The writ application is dismissed without cost. Final Result : Dismissed